Claire Nicola Bell v. Timothy John Bell - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s determination that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s judgment (1) finding a material change in circumstances; (2) holding that “the best interest of the children [is] that [Mr. Bell] be the Primary Residential Parent;” and (3) awarding father 215 days of residential parenting time with the balance of days awarded to mother. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie Kay Cardle v. Daniel Marcum Cardle
Wife filed a complaint for divorce following a fifteen-year marriage. The trial court granted Wife a divorce, distributed the marital estate, and awarded Wife alimony. The trial court granted Husband’s request to pay the alimony in solido award over a period of six years, with post-judgment interest payable at 10% interest per annum. Husband appeals the division of some of the marital assets and debts, the award of alimony in solido, and the post-judgment interest award. We affirm the trial court’s division of the marital estate and the award of alimony in solido, but we modify the post-judgment interest rate from 10% to 5.50% to conform with the interest on judgments statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Winston Keith Kyle v. Janice Gomer Kyle
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court's final decree of divorce included a division of marital property but failed to adjudicate the issue of alimony. A subsequent order states that the parties “agreed that [Wife’s] claim for alimony in futuro and rehabilitative alimony . . . are dismissed.” The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellant Procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding. Affirmed and remanded. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Wayne A. Howes, et al. v. Mark Swanner, et al.
Homeowners filed suit for breach of contract and fraud and/or negligent representation against the owners of a restoration business who performed repairs on their house after a fire. When the defendants failed to respond to or appear at the hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The defendants then filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion and affidavits stating that they did not receive notice of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The trial court held a hearing on the Rule 60 motion and denied the motion. Because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence regarding the hearing on the summary judgment motion or on the Rule 60 motion, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ Rule 60 motion. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip Jay Seifert v. Maria Coveny Seifert
The principal issues in this divorce action arise from the parties’ antenuptial agreement. The trial court declared the parties divorced, classified the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property, divided the modest amount of assets that were classified as marital property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro of $8,000 per month and alimony in solido of $500,000. Both parties appeal. Wife contends the court erred in classifying the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property and that the alimony awarded to her is insufficient. She also requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. Husband contends that all of the income he earned during the marriage is his separate property, that all assets he acquired with that income is his separate property, and that the antenuptial agreement prohibited the trial court from considering the value of his separate property in awarding alimony to Wife. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Wife is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Debeora D. Whitfield v. Holly Thrasher Schroeder
This appeal involves an option to purchase real estate. After a bench trial, the circuit court awarded the tenant a judgment for $12,000. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable meaningful appellate review, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hailey K., Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The Trial Court Judge announced a ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the final hearing below and then subsequently entered a written order vacating the oral ruling. The order vacating the oral ruling contemplates further proceedings in the Trial Court. Because there is no final written order terminating the parental rights of the appellant, Shanna K., to her children, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Wesley Finch v. O.B. Hofstetter/Anderson Trust, et al.
This appeal stems from a dispute over a tract of real property in Nashville. The plaintiff, who claims to have entered into an enforceable contract for sale of the disputed tract, brought multiple claims against multiple defendants after the land was not transferred to him. After competing cross-motions for summary judgment were filed, the trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims, finding, inter alia, that the plaintiff never entered into a valid, enforceable contract regarding the subject property. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Ryan Skelton v. Jenna Marie Skelton
A father and mother moved to modify a permanent parenting plan in which they were each named primary residential parent. Both parents alleged, for different reasons, that a material change in circumstance had occurred sufficient to modify custody. After a hearing, the court determined a material change in circumstance had occurred and that modification of the current joint custody arrangement was in the child’s best interest. The court named the father the primary residential parent and granted the mother liberal visitation. The mother appeals, arguing that the court erred in finding that her move was a material change and in dismissing her modification petition. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the chancery court’s findings, and the court did not err in dismissing Mother’s petition. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Gallatin Housing Authority v. Mahoganee Pelt
This appeal arises from an indigent tenant’s petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for a de novo review of an unlawful detainer action originally filed in general sessions court. The tenant sought to remain in possession of the leased premises during the review without posting a possessory bond. The circuit court initially issued the writs and, in lieu of a bond, ordered the tenant to pay rent as it became due. The landlord objected, arguing that a possessory bond was mandatory under the applicable statute. The circuit court then ordered the tenant to post a bond and, after the tenant failed to comply, dismissed the previously issued writs. On appeal, the tenant argues that the circuit court erred in calculating the amount of the bond and in dismissing the writ of certiorari with the writ of supersedeas. She also contends that the landlord executed the writ of possession in violation of the initial stay of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 62.01. We conclude that, although it erred in including court costs as part of the possessory bond in light of the tenant’s indigence, the trial court properly dismissed the writs of certiorari and supersedeas after the tenant failed to file a possessory bond. We also conclude that Rule 62.01 did not stay the dismissal of the writ of supersedeas. Consequently, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Mindy Leigh Veard v. Edward Eugene Veard, Jr.
This accelerated interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. After carefully reviewing the trial court’s ruling pursuant to the de novo standard of review required under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion for recusal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Kocher, et al. v. Laua Bearden, et al.
This appeal involves a third-party’s attempt to intervene in this case in order to gain access to documents in the record, as the entire record was previously sealed by the trial court pursuant to an agreed order between the original parties. The trial court denied the third-party’s motion to intervene and also denied its motion to modify the order sealing the record. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion to intervene, vacate its denial of the motion to modify the protective order sealing the record, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Individual Healthcare Specialists, Inc. v. BlueCross BlueShield Of Tennessee, Inc.
This is a breach of contract action in which the issues hinge on the meaning of several provisions in the agreement. In 1999 and again in 2009, BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. (“BlueCross”) and Individual Healthcare Specialists, Inc. (“IHS”) entered into a general agency agreement that authorized IHS to solicit applications for individual insurance policies through IHS’s in-house agents and outside “subagents.” The commission rates to be paid were stated in a schedule, which was subject to modification by BlueCross. During the first eleven years, BlueCross modified the commission schedule several times and each modification was prospective only. In 2011, BlueCross modified the commission schedule and, for the first time, applied the commission schedule retrospectively. At the same time, IHS determined that BlueCross had been underpaying commissions since 1999. As a consequence, it commenced this action asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and damages, while also claiming it was entitled to recover its attorney’s fees based on the contract’s indemnification provision. BlueCross denied any breach of contract. It also asserted the statute of limitations defense as a bar to recovering any commissions that accrued more than six years earlier, and asserted that IHS was not entitled to recover its attorney’s fees because the indemnification provision did not apply to disputes between the contracting parties. Shortly thereafter, BlueCross terminated the general agency agreement and began paying renewal commissions directly to IHS’s subagents instead of paying them to IHS as it had done since 1999. IHS then amended its complaint to assert a claim that BlueCross also breached the agreement by failing to pay commissions directly to IHS. Following a bench trial, the court denied BlueCross’s statute of limitations defense on the ground that IHS’s claims were “inherently undiscoverable.” The court also determined that BlueCross breached the contract by underpaying commissions, by applying the 2011 commission rates for renewals to existing policies, and by failing to pay all renewal commissions to IHS after termination of the general agency agreement. As for damages, the court awarded IHS some of the damages it claimed but denied others on the ground the evidence was speculative. As for IHS’s attorney’s fees, the trial court considered parol evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties and held that the indemnification provision authorized the recovery of attorney’s fees in a dispute between the contracting parties. Accordingly, it held that IHS, as the prevailing party, was entitled to recover its attorney’s fees. Both parties appeal. We affirm the trial court in all respects but one, that being the award of attorney’s fees. We have determined the trial court erred by considering parol evidence to determine the meaning of the indemnification provision. We also find that the indemnification provision does not apply to contractual disputes between the parties. Accordingly, IHS is not entitled to recover its attorney’s fees in this action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Wesley P.
This is the second appeal regarding the termination of Father’s parental rights with respect to this child. On October 22, 2014, the trial court entered an order terminating both Mother’s and Father’s rights to their son based on a finding of severe abuse and a determination that it was in the child’s best interest that both parents’ rights be terminated. Mother and Father appealed that determination to this Court. On May 29, 2015, this Court issued an opinion, In re Wesley P., No. W2014-02246-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 3430090 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015), affirming the trial court’s finding of severe abuse but reversing the termination of parental rights on the basis that it was not in the best interest of the child to do so at that time. On January 12, 2016, DCS filed another petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, alleging several grounds for termination. Mother subsequently surrendered her parental rights to the child voluntarily, and her rights are not subject to this appeal. After a full hearing, the chancery court found by clear and convincing evidence that all grounds for termination alleged against Father existed and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Sydney B.
In this termination of parental rights case, prospective adoptive parents appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their petition after finding that father did not willfully fail to pay support for the child. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
J. Alexander's Holdings, LLC v. Republic Services, Inc.
A Tennessee company brought an action in the Davidson County General Sessions Court against an Arizona company for breach of contract and negligence, seeking recovery for damage to plaintiff’s restaurant, which was located in Michigan. The case was dismissed on the ground of improper venue. Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court, which granted summary judgment to defendants on the basis of improper venue, lack of personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse the holdings that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant and that venue was improper; we affirm the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens and vacate the denial of the motion to amend the complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Wondimu Borena v. Jason Jacocks, et al.
This is a mechanic’s lien case. Appellee/auto repair shop agreed to repair Appellant’s vehicle for $5,267.30. Appellant paid this amount, but Appellee raised the estimate to $9,489.30. Appellant did not pay the additional costs. Under a purported mechanic’s lien, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 66-19-103, Appellee sold Appellant’s vehicle for $4,500.00. Appellant filed a complaint, seeking damages for conversion and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim. Concerning the conversion claim, the trial court held that Appellee did not have a valid mechanic’s lien and had converted the property. The trial court awarded $10,000.00 in damages to Appellant. Appellant appeals, arguing that the damage award is insufficient. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Stockton, et al. v. Ford Motor Company
This is a jury case. Automobile mechanic and his wife, Appellees, filed suit against Appellant Ford Motor Company for negligence in relation to wife’s diagnosis of mesothelioma. Appellees allege that Ford’s brake products, which contained asbestos, were unreasonably dangerous or defective such that Ford owed a duty to warn Mr. Stockton so that he, in turn, could protect his wife from exposure to air-borne asbestos fibers. The jury returned a verdict against Ford for $3.4 million. Ford appeals. Because the jury verdict form is defective, in that it omits two necessary questions in products liability cases, i.e., that the product at issue was unreasonably dangerous or defective and that the plaintiff’s injuries were reasonably foreseeable, we vacate the judgment and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Stockton, et al. v. Ford Motor Company-Concur
I concur fully in the majority Opinion. I also agree with the dissent that this Court “has no authority to overrule or modify Supreme Court’s opinions.” Bloodworth v. Stuart, 428 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tenn. 1968). I, however, disagree with the dissent regarding duty of care as the Trial Court was in fact cognizant of and adhered to our Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008). |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Stockton, et al. v. Ford Motor Company-Partial Dissent
Although I agree with the majority Opinion’s discussion of the improper jury instructions given by the trial court in this case, I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis with regard to the duty owed by Ford. Because Ford’s duty is a threshold issue that must be determined prior to any consideration of the jury instructions given by the trial court, I therefore file this partial dissent. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Jo Ann Street
Appellant appeals from the trial court’s decision granting a judgment of possession to the Appellee bank. Because of profound deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we hold that her arguments are waived. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kim L. Higgs v. John C. Green
This appeal arises from a two-car accident. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the collision occurred because Defendant violated several statutory rules of the road by failing to yield the right of way and making a turn across traffic without confirming it was safe to do so. Defendant denied any negligence and claimed that Plaintiff was more than 50% at fault. Following a trial, the jury found that Plaintiff was 75% at fault; as a result, judgment was entered for Defendant. On appeal Plaintiff contends she is entitled to a new trial for two reasons. She contends the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the testimony of the investigating police officer to what the parties told him at the scene and to matters that are reflected in his accident report. She also contends she is entitled to a new trial due to jury misconduct. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Darrell Adkins v. Rhonda Forlaw Adkins
After the trial court denied Wife’s motion to set aside the mediated Marital Dissolution Agreement and Permanent Parenting Plan and entered its order declaring the parties divorced, Wife filed a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge. The judge denied the motion, and Wife timely filed her petition for recusal appeal seeking an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of her motion. We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Franklin Square Towne Homeowners Association Inc., et al. v. Joseph B. Kyles, et al.
This case involves a dispute over property. The trial court ruled that the defendants’ driveway and air conditioner pads encroached onto the plaintiffs’ property but declined to order their removal. Rather, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs damages and ruled that the encroachments could remain in place. Both parties appealed. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ action with regard to the driveway is not barred by the Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-103 statute of limitations. We reverse the trial court’s ruling, however, to note that any action regarding the air conditioners and their placement is barred by the section 28-2-103 statute of limitations. We also reverse the trial court’s ruling allowing the driveway to remain in place. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sherra Robinson Wright v. The Estate of Lorenzen Vern-Gagne Wright, et al.
This case involves a divorced party’s request to recover unpaid child support and alimony. The petitioner filed her lawsuit in the Shelby County Circuit Court, which denied her request for relief. Although the petitioner appeals, we conclude that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims. Because the petitioner’s ex-husband is deceased and the claims at issue are against the ex-husband’s estate, the petitioner was required to file her claims against the estate in the Shelby County Probate Court. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
