Carrie Coggins et al. v. Holston Valley Medical Center
On August 6, 2011, Carrie Coggins and her husband Joel R. Coggins (Plaintiffs) visited a patient at Wellmont Holston Valley Medical Center (Hospital). While there, Mrs. Coggins tripped and fell, sustaining serious injuries. Plaintiffs filed suit and alleged that Mrs. Coggins tripped over a feeding tube that, according to Plaintiffs, had been negligently left near her friend’s bed in such a way as to create a dangerous condition. Before they filed suit, Plaintiffs served Hospital with pre-suit notice of their intent to file. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (2012). Hospital filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The trial court granted Hospital summary judgment. The court held that (1) Plaintiffs’ action was an ordinary negligence action based on premises liability, not a health care liability action; and (2) Plaintiffs could not rely upon (a) Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c), which extends the applicable statutes of limitations and repose for 120 days when pre-suit notice is properly given, or (b) Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(e), which provides that “[i]n the event that a complaint is filed in good faith reliance on the extension of the statute of limitations or repose granted by this section and it is later determined that the claim is not a health care liability claim, the extension of the statute of limitations and repose granted by this section is still available to the plaintiff.” We agree with the trial court’s holding that Plaintiffs’ claim sounds in ordinary negligence under a premises liability theory. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company a/s/o Kenneth L. Couch v. Jackson Madison School System Board of Education
This case arises from a non-contact accident between a John Deere crop sprayer and a school bus. The sprayer, which is insured by Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company as subrogee of the owner, Appellee Kenneth L. Couch, was driven by Mr. Couch‘s employee, Cameron Martin. The school bus, which is owned by Appellant Jackson Madison School System Board of Education, was driven by its employee, Lawrence Davis. The trial court held that Mr. Davis was negligent in failing to appreciate the situation so as to ―take reasonable action to avoid an accident.‖ We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court‘s finding of negligence on the part of Mr. Davis. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Appellant. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In re M.P.H.
J.L.W. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter, M.P.H. (the Child). Based on evidence of Mother’s drug abuse, the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) removed the Child from Mother’s custody and placed her in foster care. The Child was later adjudicated dependent and neglected. Eighteen months after the Child’s removal, DCS filed a petition to terminate each of her parents’ rights. After a trial, the court granted the petition. As to Mother, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) multiple grounds for termination exist, and (2) termination is in the Child’s best interest. Mother challenges each of these determinations. We affirm. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
In re Aisha R., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Christee R. and Matthew R. to two of their minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of each parent's parental rights on the statutory grounds of persistence of conditions and mental incompetence and that termination of their rights was in the best interest of the children. The parents appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re Steven C.
A father’s parental rights to his child were terminated on the grounds that the father failed to comply with the requirements of the permanency plans developed when the child went into the custody of the Department of Children’s Services and that the conditions which led to the child’s removal persisted. Father appeals, contending that the Department did not use reasonable efforts to reunite him with his child and that the court erred in finding that the child had been removed from Father’s home. Finding that clear and convincing evidence exists to support the grounds for termination of Father’s rights, and that termination of those rights is in the best interest of the child, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Bonnie L., et al
This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The children were removed from their parents’ home because of drug exposure and domestic violence. A court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected about six months after their removal. Nearly two years later, the Department of Children’s Services petitioned to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Following a trial, the juvenile court found that two statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s rights— substantial noncompliance and persistent conditions. The court found that three grounds existed to terminate Father’s rights—abandonment for failure to visit, substantial noncompliance, and persistent conditions. The court also concluded that the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Mother appeals the court’s determination that there were statutory grounds to terminate her rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. Father also appeals the court’s best interest determination, but he appeals the court’s decision on only two of the three statutory grounds to terminate his rights. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Fredrico A. Dixon, III v. Patricia Grissom
The dispute central to this interlocutory appeal involves a failed real estate transaction and alleged breach of a real estate agent‘s fiduciary duty to her client. The plaintiff buyer entered into an agreement to purchase improved real property from the seller but failed to obtain financing to complete the purchase. In a previous action brought by the seller against the buyer, the trial court found that the buyer‘s attempted termination of the contract was ineffective and that he therefore breached the contract. On appeal, this Court affirmed that judgment in favor of the seller. The buyer subsequently brought the instant action against the defendant real estate agent, alleging breach of fiduciary duty based on the agent‘s failure to confirm delivery of the buyer‘s credit declination letter to the seller. The agent filed a motion for summary judgment, averring that the buyer had filed this action outside the time parameters of the applicable statute of limitations. Following a hearing, the trial court applied the discovery rule to find that knowledge of the agent‘s alleged failure to terminate the contract could not be imputed to the buyer before April 22, 2010, when the seller‘s counsel had raised the issue during trial in the original action. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Lee Hibbens v. Ashley Elizabeth Rue
This appeal involves an award of retroactive child support. The child‘s father is in the military and was deployed overseas during part of the relevant time period. The trial court initially set the child support obligation based on the number of days the father would have had with the child pursuant to the parties‘ mediated agreement, regardless of the fact that he did not exercise all of that time due to his deployment. After considering a post-trial motion filed by the mother, the trial court altered the award to set the child support obligation based on the number of days the father actually spent with the child, not the number of days he was provided under the mediated agreement. The father appeals, challenging substantive and procedural aspects of the court‘s decision. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In re Kalob S., et al.
This case involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological father to his seven children. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights. Because the grounds for termination are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the minor children at issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Bundren v. Thelma Bundren, et al.
Thelma Bundren and George David Bundren (“Defendants”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that the survey prepared by Comparoni & Associates establishes the boundary lines between real properties owned by Defendants and real property owned by Jerry Bundren (“Plaintiff”). We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Bundren v. Thelma Bundren et al.
Thelma Bundren and George David Bundren (“Defendants”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that the survey prepared by Comparoni & Associates establishes the boundary lines between real properties owned by Defendants and real property owned by Jerry Bundren (“Plaintiff”). We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Bundren v. Thelma Bundren, et al.
Thelma Bundren and George David Bundren (“Defendants”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that the survey prepared by Comparoni & Associates establishes the boundary lines between real properties owned by Defendants and real property owned by Jerry Bundren (“Plaintiff”). We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
In re: William B.
In this termination of parental rights case, the father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to his son on the grounds of wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to father’s incarceration. The father also asserts the court erred in finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the decision of the trial court and affirm the judgment in all respects. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Southern Trust Insurance Company v. Matthew Phillips
This appeal involves the interpretation of an insurance policy in order to determine whether the policy provided coverage for damage caused by arson. The insurer and the insured filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on this issue. The trial court found the policy ambiguous and construed it in favor of coverage, holding that arson was covered under the policy. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the insured and denied the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the insurer. The insurer appeals. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, et al
Appellants appeal the dismissal of their products liability cases. The trial court concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to a prior forum non conveniens dismissal. The trial court reasoned that, at the time of the prior forum non conveniens dismissal, Appellant should have foreseen that the foreign forum would be unavailable to them and that issue should have been raised in previous proceedings. Because we conclude that an alternative exception to the application of collateral estoppel may apply, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Jean Kerr, individually, and on behalf of Willie M. Kerr v. Tommy C. Thompson, M.D.
The trial court denied the defendant doctor’s motion to dismiss this medical malpractice action on the ground that the plaintiff had substantially complied with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122, despite the fact that her certificate of good faith did not contain a statement that the executing party had no prior violations of the good faith certificate requirement. This Court granted an interlocutory appeal. While this appeal was pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its Opinion in Davis v. Ibach, No. W2013-02514-SC-R11-CV, --- S.W.3d ---, 2015 WL 3451613 (Tenn. May 29, 2015), ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122 does not require a party executing a certificate of good faith to note the absence of any prior violations of the good faith certificate requirement. Based on Davis, we conclude that plaintiff’s certificate of good faith was fully compliant with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122. Accordingly, although we rely on different grounds, we affirm the trial court’s ruling denying the defendant doctor’s motion to dismiss. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert T. Hughes, et al. v. Henry County Medical Center d/b/a Lake Haven Behavioral Center
This is a healthcare liability action, arising from alleged injuries to Appellant, Melba Hughes. Mrs. Hughes' husband, Robert Hughes, filed this action against Appellee, Henry County Medical Center (“HCMC”), and Dr. Donald Gold, who is not a party to this appeal. Appellees moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121. Specifically, Appellee challenged whether the medical authorization provided with the pre-suit notice letter was compliant with Tennessee Code Annotated 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). An error in the medical authorization form provided to HCMC did not permit HCMC to obtain medical records from Dr. Gold. However, Dr. Gold saw the patient only at HCMC, and he had no records independent of the hospital's records. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed the action without prejudice. Mr. and Mrs. Hughes timely filed their appeal. We reverse and remand the matter to the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Ridenour, et al v. Covenant Health, et al.
This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Mary Ridenour, individually, and, Jacob Ross Ridenour, a minor by Mary Ridenour (“Plaintiffs”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiffs to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiffs' claims. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Phillips v. Covenant Health, et al.
This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Michael Phillips (“Plaintiff”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiff to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiff's claims. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Keith Gillis v. Covenant Health, et al.
This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Keith Gillis (“Plaintiff”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiff to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiff's claims. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Connie Raby v. Covenant Health, et al.
This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Connie Raby (“Plaintiff”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiff to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiff's claims. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Micah Noelle Lewellen, et al v. Covenant Health, et al.
This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Micah Noelle Lewellen, individually, and, Cale Ryan Lewellen, a minor by Micah Noelle Lewellen (“Plaintiffs”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiffs to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiffs' claims. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Anthony R.
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the statutory ground of wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. Father appealed. We reverse because when Father engaged in the conduct at issue, in fact, Father did not know of his parentage. A father cannot exercise wanton disregard for the welfare of a child if he does not know the child exists. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tamar v. William B. Batte, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief. Although Appellant was represented by counsel at oral argument, she filed her initial appellate brief and reply brief to this Court pro se. Significant procedural shortcomings in Appellant’s brief prevent this Court from reaching the merits of the appeal. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nan E. Scott, et al v. The City of Knoxville, et al.
This is an appeal from a judgment in a certiorari review action where the trial court upheld the Knoxville City Council's ruling in favor of the respondents. The Knoxville City Council found that a proposed expansion project involving the construction of a crematory for incinerating human bodies was permitted as an accessory use for the existing funeral home. The trial court found that the Knoxville City Council had not exceeded its jurisdiction, followed an unlawful procedure, acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or acted without material evidence to support its decision. The petitioners appeal. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
