APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State of Tennessee has filed a petition to rehear asking this Court to reconsider certain
portions of the opinion. Contrary to the assertions of the petition the opinion does not require the giving of a special “proximate cause” instruction in every homicide case. The opinion requires the giving of a general causation instruction whenever the homicide offense does not itself explicitly or implicitly include a causation instruction. As the State recognizes, some of the homicide offenses include elements that implicitly instruct the jury that a causation finding is necessary. Also without merit is the State’s assertion that the suggested pattern jury instruction set out in footnote 16 conflicts with existing law and relieves the State of its burden of proof. The State’s petition confuses criminal negligence and causation. Both elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to establish criminally negligent homicide. Moreover, we emphasize that the language in footnote 16 is merely a suggestion which may be accepted, revised, or rejected by the Pattern Jury Instruction Committee. Accordingly, the State’s petition to rehear is DENIED. Costs of this petition are taxed to the State of Tennessee, for which execution may issue if necessary.
 

Defendant, Ricky Anderson, appeals his Shelby County convictions for two counts of first
degree premeditated murder, for which he received concurrent life sentences. Defendant
contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographs of one of the deceased
victims. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's award of summary judgment for the defendants. The trial court found that the
record shows, as a matter of law, that the defendant banks did not breach the duty of good faith in imposing fees for returned checks drawn on accounts with insufficient funds.
This Court concurs in the decision made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

This appeal involves a personal injury action that was dismissed because the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Davidson County refused to accept and file a summons that had not been prepared on an original form provided by the clerk. By the time the plaintiff provided another summons acceptable to the clerk, the time for filing the complaint and the summons had elapsed. Accordingly, on motion of one of the defendants, the Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed the personal injury claim because it was time-barred. We have determined that the clerk’s office exceeded its authority when it declined to accept and file the summons and, therefore, that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, we vacate the order dismissing the personal injury claims and remand the case for further proceedings.

The petitioner, who is serving a sentence for a federal court conviction, has filed two petitions attacking prior state convictions which were used to enhance the sentence for the federal conviction. These two petitions, called petitions for the writ of coram nobis or for habeas corpus, were dismissed by the trial court without a hearing on the basis that they were actually petitions for post-conviction relief and barred by the statute of limitations. We agree with the trial court.

This is an action pursued by the appellant, Lesa Johnson (Johnson), for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment with South Central Human Resource Agency (SCHRA). The Chancery Court for Bedford County dismissed the complaint upon motion of the appellees, SCHRA, and its executive and deputy directors, Roy Tipps and John Ed Underwood, Jr., respectively.

This Court has been appointed by the Governor to decide the case of Delaney v. Thompson, et al., in which the plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the uniquely statutory merit selection system for appellate judges called the Tennessee Plan. Rather than contend with the constitutional issues, the majority, deciding this case by statutory construction, utilizes a construction which reflects neither the meaning of the statute nor the positions of the parties. In doing so, the majority opinion neither clarifies issues of importance to the electorate and judiciary, nor discourages future litigation on the same issues.

Plaintiff, Alton F. Dixon, appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendant, Nike, Inc. Nike is a manufacturer of sporting goods, footwear, and apparel, and Dixon was an at-will employee of Nike. Nike encourages its employees to actively participate in improving their work environment and in implementing ideas for new products on the market 2 through a program called “I Got It.” The program invites Nike’s employees to submit ideas that “eliminate waste, improve the way we work, increase productivity, prevent accidents, save time, money, or energy.” Employees can also submit ideas for new products or inventions. In a weekly bulletin for employees, Nike stated, “If what you are suggesting is an idea for a new product or invention, to protect you and NIKE, a letter of understanding will be sent for your signature stating, in essence, that NIKE will not use your product idea until a written contract is negotiated and signed.”

This is a wrongful death action. On April 28, 1998, Cynthia Low Armes ("Sister"), the sister of the late Terry Allen Lowe ("decedent"), instituted this action against Granville Simpson ("Granville") and his wife, Judy Simpson ("Judy"), (collectively, "the Simpsons"), alleging that the Simpsons were negligent in allowing three men, including Granville, to go armed on the Simpson's premises on December 10, 1995, and that their negligence directly contributed to the shooting death of the decedent. The trial court granted the Simpsons summary judgment on the ground that the complain was not filed within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Sister appeals, raising the following issue for our consideration: Did the trial court err in holding that Sister was aware of the injury and the cause of action on December 10, 1995, and therefore her action was barred by the statute of limitations?