Jennifer Lynn Morgan Esposito v. Joseph Diego Esposito
In this divorce action, the trial court entered an order in December 2021, according to the parties’ announced agreement, granting the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds and directing, inter alia, that the marital residence would be sold at auction and that any “marital personal property” upon which the parties could not reach an agreement prior to the auction would be “sold by the court when the [marital residence was] auctioned.” The court also memorialized the parties’ agreement that each would keep the vehicles in his or her possession and be responsible for debts incurred in each of their respective names. In an order entered in April 2022, the court confirmed that the marital residence had been sold at auction to the husband. Following a bench trial, the court found that, with the exception of two personal items belonging to the wife, the marital residence and “the contents located at the property” were all marital property; that the proceeds from “marital property located at the home” were included in the auction sale proceeds; and that the proceeds from the auction should be divided equally between the parties. The wife has appealed. Upon careful consideration, we affirm the trial court’s findings that the marital personal property located at the marital residence had been sold with the marital residence and that the auction sale price reflected the total valuation of both the residence and personal property sold. We also affirm the trial court’s adoption of the parties’ agreement regarding vehicles and debts. However, we vacate the trial court’s classification of the marital residence as marital property and the court’s overall distribution of marital property. We remand for (1) further findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding classification of the marital residence and, if necessary, identification of any increase in value of the marital residence that resulted from the husband’s significant contributions during the marriage; (2) a limited evidentiary hearing to identify, classify, and value the parties’ bank accounts; and (3) reconsideration of the marital property distribution inclusive of the findings on remand and pursuant to the statutory factors provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) (2021). Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part; Case Remanded. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Arthur A. Allen v. Heather S. Allen
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed by |
Court of Appeals | ||
Marquica L. Beasley Et Al. v. Jae Nails Bar, LLC
This is a premises liability action in which the plaintiff slipped and fell while she was walking to a pedicure station in a nail salon. Two principal issues are presented. First, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by denying her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 34A.02 motion for spoliation of evidence by finding that the defendant was not put on notice that a video recording from a surveillance camera in the nail salon was relevant to pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. Second, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing her complaint on the basis that there was no proof that the defendant had created the allegedly hazardous condition in the nail salon or that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Aurora Loan Services, LLC, et al. v. Frederick J. Elam, et al.
The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Darrell Tipton, Et Al. v. William J. Wolfenbarger, Et Al.
This case stems from a dispute over a parcel of real property located in Monroe County, |
Court of Appeals | ||
Lee Ann Polster v. Russell Joseph Polster
In the prior appeal of this case, a husband’s argument regarding the division of assets/unconscionability of the marital dissolution agreement was deemed waived because it was not raised in the trial court. The case was remanded for a determination of attorney’s fees. The husband attempted to bring the issue up again on remand, and the trial court refused to consider them. We affirm based on waiver and the narrow scope of the remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
The State Of Tennessee on behalf of Bledsoe County, Tennessee Et Al v. Whoriskey, Inc.
This appeal arises from an action to recover delinquent ad valorem real property taxes. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Aubria H. et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two minor children. The trial court concluded that several grounds for termination existed and that the termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Although we vacate two grounds for termination, we affirm the trial court’s reliance on the remaining grounds for termination and its best interests determination. The trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights is accordingly affirmed. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Corey Andrew Tate v. Andrea Nicole Jones
This is an appeal by Father of a judgment rendered against him for child support. Because |
Court of Appeals | ||
Susan Davis Malone v. Thomas Franklin Malone
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Davis Malone v. Thomas Franklin Malone - DISSENT
I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that recusal of the trial judge is |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Courtney Logan v. Lisa Helton, et al.
Appellant, Courtney Logan, appealed a December 7, 2022 order of the Hardeman County |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone - DISSENT
I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that recusal of the trial judge is |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Erick Gordon v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security
The petitioner’s employment as a Tennessee highway patrolman was terminated for cause |
Court of Appeals | ||
Janice Deloach v. Sahara Daycare Center, Inc., ET AL
This is a breach of contract case involving a business partnership. Due to deficiencies in |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jonah B.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, who was nearly three years old at the time of trial. On appeal, Father disputes that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s determinations as to both the ground for termination and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Penny Lawson, et al. v. Hawkins County, TN et al.
This appeal concerns governmental immunity. Steven W. Lawson (“Decedent”), by and through his widow, Penny Lawson, and on behalf of Corey Lawson, Decedent’s child (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), sued the Hawkins County Emergency Communications District Board (“ECD-911”), Hawkins County, Tennessee, and Hawkins County Emergency Management Agency (“the EMA”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Gerrish & McCreary, PC v. Carri Chandler Lane
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Glenn B. et al
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three of her children. The trial court found six grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found termination of Mother’s parental rights to be in the best interests of the children. Mother raises procedural and substantive challenges to the trial court’s decision. We affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s parental rights. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Raylon S. et al
A mother and stepfather sued to terminate a father’s parental rights based on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support as well as the best interest of the children. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that both grounds for termination existed and that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the father’s parental rights. The father appealed. We affirm. |
Van Buren | Court of Appeals | |
Greg Gonzales v. Orion Federal Credit Union et al.
A federally chartered credit union agreed to purchase substantially all assets of a Tennessee-chartered bank. The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions objected. He contended that the transaction was prohibited by the Tennessee Banking Act because the credit union was not a bank holding company. So he sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the transaction. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded the sale of substantially all of the assets of a bank was not prohibited by the Act. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lewana Castillo Webb v. Gregory Ryan Webb
This case involves the respondent’s pro se appeal from an order of protection granted by |
Court of Appeals | ||
Sara Beth Schwab v. Alfred C. Schwab, III
This is a post-divorce dispute in which the former husband seeks to terminate alimony in futuro based on the fact that a third party, not related by blood, resided with the former wife for several months. It is undisputed that the girlfriend of the parties’ son had previously resided in the former wife’s home, but that the girlfriend had moved out before the husband filed his petition to terminate alimony. The parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) provides that “alimony shall terminate upon the death of Husband or Wife, the remarriage of Wife, o[r] Wife’s cohabitation with someone to whom she is not related by blood pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. [§] 36-5-121(f).” The trial court held that the reference to § 36-5-121(f) evinced an intent to rely on the so-called “cohabitation statute” in subsection (f)(2)(B), which creates a rebuttable presumption that an alimony recipient does not need the same level of support when they are living with a third person. However, because the son’s girlfriend was no longer residing in the wife’s home, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition. The trial court relied on a line of cases, including Woodall v. Woodall, No. M2003-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2345814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) and Wiser v. Wiser, No. M2013-02510-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1955367 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015), which stand for the proposition that “[a]n obligor spouse cannot rely on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(f)(2)(B) to terminate or suspend alimony payments if the alleged cohabitation ceased before the modification petition was tried.” We affirm the trial court in all respects. The MDA also contains a mandatory attorney fee provision entitling the wife, as the prevailing party, to recover her reasonable expenses incurred in defending this appeal, including attorney’s fees and court costs. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court shall make the appropriate award. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Clata Renee Brewer et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County et al.
This action involves various requests directed to the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) for the release of records, pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”), related to a school shooting that occurred at a private school in Nashville. Before making a determination concerning release of the records, the trial court allowed certain interested parties to intervene in the action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.02. The parties requesting the records have appealed that ruling pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.05.1 Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |