

Supreme Court Appeals
Pending Cases
6-27-25

1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Antonio Demetrius Adkisson a/d/a Antonio Demetrius Turner, Jr.
2.	Docket Number	W2022-01009- SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/AdkissonAntonioOPN.pdf https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/AdkissonAntonioDIS.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	A Gibson County jury convicted the defendant, Antonio Demetrius Adkisson a/k/a Antonio Demetrius Turner, Jr., of two counts of second-degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the juvenile court erred in transferring the defendant to circuit court and (2) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the defendant's statement. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
5.	Status	Heard 5/28/25 at Cookeville SCALES.
6.	Issue(s)	<p>As stated in the Appellant's Rule 11 Application:</p> <p>1. Whether the Juvenile Court lacked probable cause to bind the case over to the Circuit Court[.] Close question.</p> <p>2. Whether the Circuit Court erred in not suppressing Defendant's statement based on violations of Miranda and voluntariness of confession.</p> <p>3. Is the standard of review of a juvenile court bindover order, as it relates to the probable cause clause in T.C.A. § 37-1-134(a)(4)(A) (probable cause to believe the child committed the delinquent act), de novo as suggested by the dissent or abuse of discretion as used by the majority[?]</p>

1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Anthony Cornelius Baylis
2.	Docket Number	E2023-00886-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/State%20vs.%20Anthony%20Cornelius%20Baylis%20Opinion.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	Defendant, Anthony Cornelius Baylis, appeals his Monroe County Circuit Court jury conviction of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; that the trial court erred in affirming his conviction as the thirteenth juror; that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of the grand jury foreperson's signature attesting that witnesses were sworn; that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony; that the State wrongfully commented on Defendant's election to not testify; and that the trial

court erred by imposing a fully-incarcerative sentence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

5. Status Application granted 5/23/25.

6. Issue(s) As stated in the application:

1. Whether there was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Baylis of trafficking for a commercial sex act where testimony elicited at trial showed Mr. Baylis used neither coercion or deception, nor could a rational trier of fact find that Mr. Baylis believed the adult undercover officer was actually a minor or that Mr. Baylis intended or attempted to force her into sexual slavery?

2. Whether the actus rei for trafficking for a commercial sex act and promoting prostitution are too similar and cause a lack of uniformity of decision among lower courts in the application of these statutes, which ultimately resulted in an erroneous conviction in the trial court and affirmation of that conviction by the appellate court, and whether this confusion causes a lack of notice to defendants accused of these crimes?

3. Whether the trial court erred in permitting TBI Agent Jamesena Walker to give improper opinion testimony as a lay witness to the meaning of everyday language in a manner that did not aid the jury in determining ultimate issues of fact?

4. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to comment in closing argument, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, on Mr. Baylis's decision not to testify by implying that he should have explained why he had knowledge of the "hourly rate" for prostitution?

5. Whether the trial court erred in ordering an eight-year sentence of confinement rather than split confinement under the facts alleged, where a mandatory prison sentence was not required?

1. Style State of Tennessee v. Hayden Jennings Berkebile

2. Docket Number E2022-01700-SC-R11-CD

3. Lower Court Decision Links <https://tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%202024-06-07%20-%20State%20of%20Tennessee%20v.%20Hayden%20Jennings%20Berkebile%20-%20E2022-01700-CCA-R3-CD.pdf>

<https://tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Separate%20Opinion%20-%20State%20of%20Tennessee%20v.%20Hayden%20Jennings%20Berkebile%20-%20E2022-01700-CCA-R3-CD.pdf>

4. Lower Court Summary In this case of first impression, we consider whether a defendant can be convicted of criminally negligent homicide when he incites, encourages or coerces another person to commit suicide and whether the State of Tennessee has territorial jurisdiction over a defendant when he affirmatively reaches out to Tennessee via electronic means. A Knox County jury convicted Defendant, Hayden Jennings Berkebile, of criminally negligent homicide after the victim, Grace Anne Sparks, shot and killed herself for Defendant's sexual pleasure while on a video call with Defendant. Defendant argues on appeal that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because (a) the State did not prove that Defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the victim's death, and (b) the negligent homicide statute as construed here violates the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) the State did not establish territorial jurisdiction over Defendant because he was in Indiana at the time of the victim's death and only communicated with her electronically; (3) the trial court erred in admitting an alleged hearsay statement by the investigator; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to utilize a transcript of Defendant's interrogation that contained inaccurate transcriptions; (5) cumulative error requires a new trial; and (6) the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion because it relied on evidence not in the record. After reviewing the parties' briefs and oral arguments, the record, and the relevant law, we affirm in all respects.

5. Status Application granted 2/21/25. Appellant's brief filed 4/25/25. Motion for extension to file appellee's brief granted and due July 11, 2025.
6. Issue(s)
 1. Did the State's proof fail to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Defendant's] words constituted an act that was the proximate cause of her death?
 2. Did the State establish territorial jurisdiction for the charged crime based on nothing more than [Defendant's] out-of-state words and electronic messages?

1. Style	Berkeley Research Group, LLC v. Southern Advanced Materials, LLC
2. Docket Number	W2023-00720- SC-R11-CV
3. Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/BerkleyResearchGroupLLCOPN.pdf
4. Lower Court Summary	Defendant appeals the trial court's decision to deny its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and grant the plaintiff's motion to confirm an arbitration award. Because we conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish that the trial court had either specific or general jurisdiction over this matter, we reverse.
5. Status	Heard 5/29/25 at Nashville.
6. Issue(s)	<p>As stated in the Appellant's Rule 11 Application:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Whether a trial court must make an independent determination of personal jurisdiction under the TUAA rather than looking through to the jurisdictional contacts in the underlying proceeding—before confirming arbitration awards when the party opposing confirmation of the award does business and has assets in this state? 2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by determining that BRG, a company registered to do business in Tennessee with an office in Tennessee failed to meet its burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award when BRG alleged and presented evidence that Southern: (i) was organized under the laws of Tennessee; (ii) has and continues to maintain a principal office and registered agent in Tennessee; (iii) has and continues to maintain money in a bank account in Tennessee; (iv) made payment for the services rendered by BRG (which were the subject of the arbitration) with checks drawn from a bank account in Tennessee; (v) mailed checks for payment for three invoices arising from work performed under contract that was subject of the underlying arbitration with funds from the Tennessee bank account; and (vi) was served with process of the Petition to Confirm the arbitration award at its principal office in Tennessee? 3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing and remanding this case to the Trial

Court for dismissal?

In addition to the issues raised in Berkeley Research Group’s application, the Court directed the parties to address the following:

1. Whether Tennessee courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over this action even though it arises from an arbitration that, by agreement, was to occur in another state. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-327(b).

2. Assuming subject-matter jurisdiction exists, did Southern Advanced Materials, LLC consent to personal jurisdiction in Tennessee by contractually agreeing that “judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered by any State or Federal Court having jurisdiction thereof.”

1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Torrian Seantel Bishop
2.	Docket Number	W2023-00713-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	BishopTorrianSeantelOPN.pdf BishopTorrianSeantel2OPN.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this case for reconsideration in light of <i>State v. Andre JuJuan Lee Green</i> , --- S.W.3d ---, No. M2022-00899-SC-R11-CD, 2024 WL 3942511 (Tenn. 2024). See <i>State v. Torrian Seantel Bishop</i> , No. W2023-00713-CCA-R3- CD, 2024 WL 1564346, (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2024) (Bishop I), case remanded (Tenn. Aug. 27, 2024). This court concluded in the previous appeal that the certified question was dispositive of the case and that the officers had probable cause to search the Defendant’s car because an officer smelled the odor of marijuana. Upon further review, we conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case because our supreme court in <i>Andre JuJuan Lee Green</i> made clear that a trial court must apply a totality of the circumstances analysis when determining whether an officer has probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a car. --- S.W.3d ---, 2024 WL 3942511, at *6. Upon consideration of the certified question and our supreme court’s holding in <i>Andre JuJuan Lee Green</i> , we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the certified question presented. The appeal is dismissed.
5.	Status	Application granted 3/14/25. Appellant’s brief filed 5/14/25. Motion for extension to file appellee’s brief granted and due 7/14/25.
6.	Issue(s)	Whether the certified question before the Court remains dispositive after the case was remanded for reconsideration in light of <i>State v. Green</i> , 697 S.W.3d 634 (Tenn. 2024). If so, whether the defendant is entitled to relief because the trial court erroneously determined that the smell alone of marijuana established probable cause for the search of the defendant’s vehicle.

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| 1. | Style | Shirley Buckley et al. v. Jackson Radiology Associates, P.A., et al. |
| 2. | Docket Number | W2023-01777-SC-R11-CV |

3. Lower Court Decision Links <https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Buckley-ShirleyOPN.pdf>
4. Lower Court Summary

This is a healthcare liability/wrongful death case. Appellees, healthcare providers, alleged that appellant abused the discovery process in failing to make her expert available for deposition within the time set by the trial court's scheduling order. Appellant moved for amendment of the scheduling order and for continuance of the trial date. The trial court denied appellant's motions and granted appellees' motion to exclude appellant's expert. The exclusion of appellant's expert resulted in the trial court granting appellees' motion for summary judgment, thus dismissing appellant's lawsuit. Under the circumstances, the trial court's exclusion of appellant's expert (and the resulting dismissal of her lawsuit) was too harsh a punishment. Vacated and remanded.
5. Status

Application granted 6/20/25.
6. Issue(s)

Did the Court of Appeals erroneously reverse the Circuit Court's disqualification of the plaintiff's lone expert witness for discovery violations?

1. Style

State of Tennessee v. William Tony Burrell
2. Docket Number

E2023-01404-SC-R11-CD
3. Lower Court Decision Links <https://tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%202024-10-17%20-%20State%20of%20Tennessee%20v.%20William%20Tony%20Burrell%20-%20E2023-01404-CCA-R3-CD.pdf>
4. Lower Court Summary

Defendant, William Tony Burrell, was indicted for driving under the influence (DUI), possession of a handgun while under the influence, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and violation of the implied consent law. After Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained against him during a traffic stop that led to his arrest was denied by the trial court, Defendant entered into negotiated guilty pleas to one count of DUI and one count of possession of a handgun while under the influence. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the parties reserved a certified question of law for appeal under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). After review, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because the certification did not meet the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2) and *State v. Preston*, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and we dismiss the appeal.
5. Status

Application granted 4/23/25. Appellant's brief filed 6/22/25.
6. Issue(s)

As set forth in the application:

Whether the Defendant's certified question of law met the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b) as set out by the Tennessee Supreme Court in *State v. Preston*, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The Defendant's certified question of law is:

Whether or not an unreasonable seizure occurred when the arresting officer blocked the Defendant's vehicle into a parking spot based solely on an uncorroborated, anonymous caller, who allegedly reported reckless driving regarding an unknown vehicle and driver.

1.	Style	Alan C. Cartwright v. Thomason Hendrix, P.C., et al.
2.	Docket Number	W2022-01627- SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/CartwrightAlanC5OPN.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	Appellants, lawyers and their law firms, appeal the trial court’s denial of their petition to dismiss this lawsuit under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that Appellants failed to establish that this claim relates to the protected right to petition. As such, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
5.	Status	Heard 4/9/25 at Jackson
6.	Issue(s)	As stated in the Appellant’s Rule 11 Application: Whether the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA) applies to this legal malpractice action.

1.	Style	Brian Coblenz, et al. v. Tractor Supply Company
2.	Docket Number	M2023-00249-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%20M2023-00249-COA-R3-CV.pdf https://tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Separate%20Opinion%20-%20M2023-00249-COA-R3-CV.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	A sales representative for a product vendor was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The sales representative received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, a hardware product company, and then proceeded with a tort case against Tractor Supply. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Tractor Supply was the sales representative’s statutory employer within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113(a) and, therefore, his recovery from his employer was his exclusive remedy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply.
5.	Status	Heard 2/12/25 at Nashville.
6.	Issues(s)	(1) Under what circumstances, if any, does a retailer assume workers’ compensation liability (and, in turn, quid pro quo tort immunity) for a vendor employee’s injuries occurring at the retailer’s store? (2) Do the actions of the vendor’s employee in this case—inventorying and ordering merchandise and straightening the vendor’s merchandise display—make the retailer a “principal contractor,” thereby immunizing it from tort claims brought by the vendor’s

employee?

1.	Style	Vanessa Colley v. John S. Colley
2.	Docket Number	M2021-00731- SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/m2021-731 - opinion - colley.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	Appellant/Husband voluntarily nonsuited his post-divorce lawsuit involving issues of alimony and the parties' alleged settlement of an IRS debt. Appellee/Wife moved for an award of her attorney's fees on alternative grounds, i.e., the abusive lawsuit statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-106; the parties' MDA; and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5- 103(c). The trial court granted Wife's motion and entered judgment for her attorney's fees and costs. The trial court specifically held that Husband's lawsuit was not abusive, and Wife does not raise this as an issue on appeal. As such, we conclude that she is not entitled to her attorney's fees under the abusive lawsuit statute. As to her claim for attorney's fees and costs under the MDA and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c), both grounds require that Wife be a "prevailing party" in the underlying lawsuit. Because Husband took a voluntary nonsuit, neither party prevailed in the action, and Wife is not entitled to her attorney's fees and costs. Reversed and remanded.
5.	Status	Heard 10/4/23 at Nashville. Opinion filed 4/29/25; petition to rehear denied 6/24/25.
6.	Issue(s)	As stated in the Appellant's Rule 11 Application: <p>1. Is a defendant who defends against a lawsuit that seeks to modify a court-ordered Marital Dissolution Agreement and secures a judgment of dismissal, without prejudice, following the plaintiff's voluntary nonsuit a "prevailing party" within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c)?</p> <p>2. When "contract language is interpreted according to its plain terms and ordinary meaning," <i>see BSG, LLC v. Check Velocity, Inc.</i>, 395 S.W.3d 90, 93 (Tenn. 2012), is a defendant who secures a judgment of dismissal, without prejudice, following a plaintiff's voluntary nonsuit a "prevailing party" within the meaning of a contractual fee-shifting provision when the term "prevailing party" is not otherwise defined?</p>

1.	Style	Kendall Collier ex rel Chayce C. v. Periculis Roussis, M.D. et al.
2.	Docket Number	E2022-00636-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Kendall%20Collier%20vs.%20Periculis%20Roussis%20M.D.%20et%20al.%20%28unsigned%29.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	This appeal concerns juror misconduct. Chayce Collier ("Chayce"), a minor, by and through his parent and next friend, Kendall Collier ("Plaintiff"), sued Periculis Roussis, M.D. ("Dr. Roussis"), Fort Sanders Perinatal Center, and Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center ("the Hospital") ("Defendants," collectively) in the Circuit Court for Knox County ("the Trial Court") alleging health care liability in Chayce's delivery. A major issue at trial was whether Dr. Roussis fell below the standard of care by failing to

administer epinephrine to Plaintiff when she had an anaphylactic reaction during labor. The jury found for Defendants. However, it emerged that a juror had gone home and looked at the warning on an epipen which said that epinephrine should only be used when the potential benefit justifies the potential risk to the fetus. The juror shared this information with the rest of the jury. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which the Trial Court first granted and then denied. Plaintiff appeals. Under Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b), jurors may not be asked what effect, if any, that extraneous information had on them. Instead, courts look to the extraneous information itself to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that it altered the verdict. We hold that there is a reasonable possibility that the extraneous information shared with the jury in this case altered the verdict, and Defendants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice. The Trial Court applied an incorrect legal standard and thereby abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion for a new trial. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

5. Status Application granted 6/21/24. Fully briefed.
6. Issue(s)
 - (1) What is the proper analytical framework and standard of proof for determining whether a new trial is warranted in a civil case based on a juror's consideration of extraneous prejudicial evidence?
 - (2) Applying the correct analytical framework and burden of proof, is Plaintiff entitled to a new trial based on the jury's consideration of information on an Epi-Pen label (as relayed by a juror) that was not introduced at trial?

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1. Style Virginia Curtis ex rel Bruce Allen Curtis v. Tiffany L. Sharp et al.
 2. Docket Number E2023-01583-SC-R11-CV
 3. Lower Court Decision Links <https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Buckley-ShirleyOPN.pdf>
 4. Lower Court Summary This is a healthcare liability/wrongful death case. Appellees, healthcare providers, alleged that appellant abused the discovery process in failing to make her expert available for deposition within the time set by the trial court's scheduling order. Appellant moved for amendment of the scheduling order and for continuance of the trial date. The trial court denied appellant's motions and granted appellees' motion to exclude appellant's expert. The exclusion of appellant's expert resulted in the trial court granting appellees' motion for summary judgment, thus dismissing appellant's lawsuit. Under the circumstances, the trial court's exclusion of appellant's expert (and the resulting dismissal of her lawsuit) was too harsh a punishment. Vacated and remanded.
 5. Status Application granted 6/20/25.
 6. Issue(s) Did the Court of Appeals erroneously reverse the Circuit Court's disqualification of the plaintiff's lone expert witness for discovery violations?
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1. Style Fred C. Dance v. BPR
2. Docket Number M2024-01757-SC-R3-BP

3.	Lower Court Decision Links	N/A
4.	Lower Court Summary	N/A
5.	Status	Notice of appeal filed 11/22/24. Record filed 4/15/25. Appellant's brief filed 6/16/25.
6.	Issue(s)	N/A

1.	Style	Ashley Denson ex rel. Bobbie J. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge et al.
2.	Docket Number	E2023-00027-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/E2023-27%20Maj..pdf https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/E2023-27%20Dis..pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>This appeal arises from a health care liability action following the death of Ashley Denson from a cardiac event she suffered after being treated and released from Methodist Medical Center. Ms. Denson was unmarried and had two minor children at the time of her death. The statutorily-required pre-suit notice listed Ms. Denson's mother, Bobbie J. Denson, as the claimant authorizing notice. The minor children were not identified anywhere in the notice. The subsequent complaint was filed by "ASHLEY DENSON, Deceased, by and through her Next Friend and Mother BOBBIE JO DENSON, and BOBBIE JO DENSON, Individually." The body of the complaint lists, for the first time, Ashley Denson's children, and states that Bobbie Denson "brings this action individually, and on behalf of Plaintiff, decedent's surviving minor children ... as Grandmother and Legal Guardian." The defendants filed motions to dismiss, challenging Bobbie Denson's standing to bring the action and contending that the pre-suit notice failed to comply with the requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act.¹ The trial court initially granted the motions to dismiss but reversed course after the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider. We hold that, although Grandmother has standing, the pre-suit notice does not comply with the requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. The judgment of the trial court is ultimately affirmed in part and reversed in part.</p>
5.	Status	Heard 2/12/25 at Nashville.
6.	Issue(s)	<p>As certified by the trial court and accepted by the Court of Appeals:</p> <p>Did Plaintiff Bobbie Joe Denson substantially comply with the presuit notice requirement regarding identification of the "claimant" pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-26- 21(a)(2)(B) when she did not indicate in the presuit notice that she was acting on behalf of the decedent's surviving minor children?</p>

1.	Style	Jo Carol Edwards v. Peoplelease, LLC et al.
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2. Docket Number ~~W2024-00034-SC-R11-CV~~
3. Lower Court Decision Links ~~N/A~~
4. Lower Court Summary ~~N/A~~
5. Status ~~Filed 5/29/25 at Nashville~~ Heard 5/29/25 at Nashville.
6. Issue(s) ~~N/A~~

1. Style Alice Cartwright Garner, et al. v. Thomason, Hendrix, Harvey, Johnson & Mitchell, PLLC, et al.
2. Docket Number W2022-01636- SC-R11-CV
3. Lower Court Decision Links <https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/GarnerAlice-CartwrightOPN.pdf>
4. Lower Court Summary In this case, the plaintiffs sued the former attorneys of her opponent in a multitude of unsuccessful actions involving family trusts. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued that they were damaged by the tortious conduct of the attorneys under the tort of another doctrine. The defendant-attorneys filed a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the basis that the act was inapplicable. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
5. Status Heard 4/9/25 at Jackson.
6. Issue(s) Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court and holding that Defendants had made a prima facie showing that this action is related to Defendants' exercise of the right to petition?

1. Style Preston Garner et al. v. Southern Baptist Convention et al.
2. Docket Number E2024-00100-SC-R11-CV
3. Lower Court Decision Links <https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Preston%20Garner%20Et%20Al.%20v.%20Southern%20Baptist%20Convention%20Et%20Al.%20Opinion.pdf>
4. Lower Court Summary The appellees filed suit against the appellants for defamation, defamation by implication, false light invasion of privacy, and loss of consortium. The appellants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the trial court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. They also filed petitions seeking to have the case dismissed pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act ("TPPA"). The trial court denied in part the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to this case. It also denied the TPPA petitions, finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case. Alternatively, it found that the appellees satisfied their prima facie burden under the TPPA burden-shifting framework. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case and reverse that portion of the judgment. Finding no other error, we

otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

5. Status Application granted 6/20/25.
6. Issue(s) As stated by the Applicants:
 1. Whether the First Amendment bars civil courts from exercising jurisdiction to adjudicate tort claims over a religious association's internal communications about a sensitive matter of church governance regarding ecclesiastical affiliation and church leadership.
 2. Whether the Tennessee Public Participation Act sets an enhanced evidentiary standard at the prima facie stage.
 3. Whether truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim.
 4. Whether Tennessee courts should, for the first time, import the "special relationship" exception to the publicity requirement of false light invasion of privacy.

1. Style Cinda Haddon v. Ladarius Vanlier, et al.
2. Docket Number M2023-01151-SC-R11-CV
3. Lower Court Decision Links <https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%20M2023-01151-COA-R3-CV.pdf>
4. Lower Court Summary A driver was injured in a car accident with an uninsured motorist and filed a negligence suit against the uninsured motorist. The driver served her uninsured motorist insurance carrier with notice of the lawsuit. After the driver could not obtain service of process on the uninsured motorist, the case proceeded against the insurance carrier. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found in favor of the driver. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, awarding damages to the driver. The trial court denied the driver's post-trial motion for prejudgment interest based upon its determination that the suit was a personal injury action and that, therefore, the court could not award prejudgment interest. We have concluded that the trial court erred in classifying the claim against the insurance carrier as a personal injury action. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order denying prejudgment interest and remand for a determination of the proper amount of prejudgment interest.
5. Status Application granted 3/17/25. Fully briefed.
6. Issue(s) As stated by Applicant:

Whether the rule established over 130 years ago by this Court in *Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Wallace*, 17 S.W. 882 (Tenn. 1891), that prejudgment interest is categorically barred in personal injury actions, remains the law of this State.

1. Style April Hawthorne v. Morgan & Morgan Nashville, PLLC, et al.
2. Docket Number W2023-01186-SC-R11-CV
3. Lower Court Decision Links <https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/HawthorneApril2OPN.pdf>

4.	Lower Court Summary	This is an appeal from a trial court's decision to grant class action certification. Discerning no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to certify the class at issue, we affirm.
5.	Status	Application granted 5/22/25. Motion for extension to file appellant's brief granted and due 8/22/25.
6.	Issue(s)	<p>1. Did the Chancery Court and Court of Appeals utilize incorrect legal standards in evaluating whether certification of a class action is appropriate and, applying the correct standards, is certification of the proposed class warranted in this case?</p> <p>2. Does Hawthorne have standing to bring a class action against Barnett and her colleagues at Morgan & Morgan for malpractice damages allegedly resulting from their negotiations with funeral homes that Hawthorne did not utilize?</p> <p>3. Is Hawthorne's attorney adequate and appropriate class counsel in this action despite having also served as counsel for the plaintiffs in the Galilee action?</p>

1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. James R. Holley
2.	Docket Number	W2024-00748-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	HolleyJamesROPN.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Defendant, James R. Holley, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court's denial of his request for alternative sentencing after his guilty pleas to eight counts involving drugs, weapons, and traffic offenses. Based on our review, we conclude that the Defendant failed to provide this court with an adequate appellate record. Accordingly, his appeal is dismissed.
5.	Status	Application granted 6/20/25.
6.	Issue(s)	<p>Whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by dismissing the appeal due to the inadequacy of the appellate record.</p> <p>In addition to the issue raised in the application, the Court requests that the parties also address the following issues in their briefs and at oral argument:</p> <p>(1) whether, as argued by the parties, the application of the statutory enhancement factors found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 is appropriate in determining manner of service of a sentence, and</p> <p>(2) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' sua sponte dismissal of the appeal is contrary to this Court's decision in State v. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d 917 (Tenn. 2022).</p>

1.	Style	Brett W. Houghton, et al. v. Malibu Boats, LLC
2.	Docket Number	E2023-00324-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Houghton%20vs.%20Malibu%20Boats%20%28unsigned%20opinion%29.pdf

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| 4. | Lower Court Summary | This appeal concerns standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Brett and Ceree Houghton (“Plaintiffs”) were the sole shareholders of Great Wakes Boating, Inc. (“GWB”), a Malibu Boats, LLC (“Defendant”) dealership. Defendant ended its dealership agreement with Plaintiffs, and GWB failed. Plaintiffs sued Defendant in the Circuit Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and promissory fraud. The jury awarded Plaintiffs \$900,000 in damages for loss of equity in certain real property owned by GWB. Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or for a new trial. At a hearing on the motion, Defendant argued for the first time that Plaintiffs lacked standing. The Trial Court agreed and entered an order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, deeming the other issues in Defendant’s motion moot. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Defendant’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing went to the merits and did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing is waived as untimely raised. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
| 5. | Status | Heard 1/8/25 at Knoxville. Supplemental authorities filed 2/10/25 and 2/13/25. |
| 6. | Issue(s) | In <i>Keller v. Estate of McRedmond</i> , 495 S.W.3d 852 (Tenn. 2016), this Court held that a shareholder does not have “standing” to sue in an individual capacity for injury to the shareholder’s corporation. The principal question presented in this appeal is whether Keller’s shareholder-standing rule is jurisdictional or whether it is subject to a defendant’s waiver and/or forfeiture? |

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| 1. | Style | <i>Jamesway Construction, Inc. v. David W. Salyers, P.E.</i> |
| 2. | Docket Number | M2023-01704-SC-R11-CV |
| 3. | Lower Court Decision Links | https://tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%20M2023-01704-COA-R3-CV.pdf

https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Separate%20Opinion%20-%20M2023-01704-COA-R3-CV.pdf |
| 4. | Lower Court Summary | The plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of its claim concerning the Water Quality Control Act (“WQCA”), codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 69-3-101, et seq. We now affirm the dismissal due to the applicable statute of limitations. |
| 5. | Status | Application granted 2/21/25. Appellant’s brief filed 4/22/25. Motion for extension to file appellee’s brief granted and due 6/30/25. |
| 6. | Issue(s) | The Water Act provides that an administrative appeal must be filed within 30 days of an initial order. The UAPA provides that an administrative appeal must be filed within 15 days of an initial order. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the UAPA provision prevails over the Water Act provision by discounting duly enacted but uncoded legislation expressly providing that the Water Act provision shall govern in the event of such a conflict? |

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| 1. | Style | <i>James B. Johnson v. BPR</i> |
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2.	Docket Number	M2024-00452-SC-R3-BP
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	N/A
4.	Lower Court Summary	N/A
5.	Status	Notice of appeal filed 3/26/24. Heard 2/12/25 at Nashville on-briefs.
6.	Issue(s)	N/A

1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Randall Corey Johnson (In re: Nashville Banner)
2.	Docket Number	M2024-00959-SC-R10-CO
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://ctrack.tncourts.gov/ctrack/document/documentUpload.do?doView&tableListID=169&itemID=1381486
4.	Lower Court Summary	N/A
5.	Status	Application granted 11/21/24. Fully briefed. Heard 6/25/25 on-briefs.
6.	Issue(s)	What is the proper procedural vehicle to appeal denial of an intervenor's motion to unseal a judicial disqualification motion? Did the trial court apply the correct legal standards in its (1) order to seal records and (2) order denying the motion to unseal?

1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Ronald Matthew Lacy
2.	Docket Number	E2022-01442-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%202024-09-27%20-%20State%20of%20Tennessee%20v.%20Ronald%20Matthew%20Lacy%20-%20E2022-01442-CCA-R3-CD.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	A Loudon County jury convicted the Defendant, Ronald Matthew Lacy, of theft of property over \$60,000. The Defendant, a Kentucky resident, entered into a transaction for the sale of a car with a Tennessee resident, but with the intent not to perform as promised and to misappropriate the money instead. The trial court sentenced him to ten years, which was suspended after service of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction. He also asserts that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction and that the case should be addressed as a civil matter. Alternatively, the Defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because his trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

5.	Status	Application granted 2/21/25. Fully briefed.
6.	Issue(s)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Whether the State of Tennessee had territorial jurisdiction in Loudon County Criminal Court to prosecute a Kentucky defendant for a theft offense that was purportedly commenced or consummated via emails and text messages sent by the Kentucky defendant to the Tennessee victim. Whether the evidence supported the conviction for theft of property over \$60,000.
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1.	Style	Matthew Long v. Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund
2.	Docket Number	E2022-01151-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Long%20vs.%20Chattanooga%20Fire%20and%20Police%20Pension%20Fund%20COA%20%28unsigned%29.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	<p>Petitioner/Appellee Matthew Long (“Long”) applied for disability pension benefits due to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) caused by various traumatic events he experienced during his time as a firefighter with the Chattanooga Fire Department (“CFD”). The Board of Trustees (the “Board”) for Respondent/Appellant Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund (the “Fund”) denied Long’s application. Long filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”) seeking a reversal of the Board’s decision. Finding that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, the trial court reversed the denial of Long’s application. The trial court also denied a motion to alter or amend filed by the Fund. Following thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.</p>
5.	Status	Heard 1/8/25 in Knoxville.
6.	Issue(s)	<p>As stated in the Appellant’s Rule 11 Application:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Has Tennessee’s Uniform Administrative Procedures Act abrogated or limited the traditional common-law doctrine that pension statutes and plans must be construed liberally for applicants for benefits? When does Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-9-114(a) require municipal civil service boards to follow the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act’s contested-case procedures in their own administrative proceedings? <p>In addition to other issues properly raised, the Court would like the parties to address the following issues:</p> <p>Does the Pension Fund’s Disability Policy and/or the City Charter and Code of Ordinances require a court to review the Board’s interpretation of the Policy under a deferential standard of review?</p> <p>Does the Board’s interpretation of the Policy survive judicial review under the correct standard of review?</p>

1.	Style	Danielle Lowe, ex rel. Beau Christopher Lowe et al. v. Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC
2.	Docket Number	M2023-01774-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%20M2023-01774-COA-R3-CV.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	This is a premises liability/wrongful death case. Decedent, an employee of appellee's independent contractor, died when the suspension system that was used to lift and turn tire molds failed, and the mold fell onto decedent. The trial court denied appellee's motion for summary judgment on the question of workers' compensation exclusivity, but it granted appellee's motion for summary judgment on the question of duty. Because disputed material facts concerning appellee's duty to decedent preclude summary judgment, we reverse the trial court's grant of the motion on that question. We affirm the trial court's denial of summary judgment on the workers' compensation exclusivity question.
5.	Status	Application granted 5/29/25. Motion for extension to file appellant's brief granted and due 7/30/25.
6.	Issue(s)	(1) Is Bridgestone properly considered Lowe's statutory employer under the Workers' Compensation Act and therefore shielded from tort liability under the Act's exclusive-remedy rule? (2) Did Bridgestone have a duty of care toward Lowe?

1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Tate and Steven J. Ogle
2.	Docket Number	E2023-01737-SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%202024-11-05%20-%20State%20of%20Tennessee%20v.%20Jeffrey%20August%20Tate%20and%20Steven%20Ogle%20-%20E2023-01737%20-CCA-R3-CD.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	Defendants, Jeffrey August Tate and Steven Ogle, were indicted in separate cases for multiple counts of theft of property and home construction fraud involving separate victims. Before trial, both Defendants filed motions to dismiss the home construction fraud counts in their respective indictments, alleging that a portion of the home construction fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154(b)(1), was unconstitutionally vague on its face, and Defendant Tate also argued that the statute was vague as applied to him. Following a joint hearing on both Defendants' motions, the trial court concluded that the home construction fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face. The State appealed both Defendants' cases pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), and this court consolidated the appeals. We conclude that the State does not have an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 3(c) because the record does not reflect that the substantive effect of the trial court's order resulted in the dismissal of the indictments. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals
5.	Status	Application granted 4/24/25. Appellant's brief filed 6/26/25.

6. Issue(s) As stated in the Appellant's Rule 11 Application:
1. Whether the State has a right of appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c) when the trial court dismisses some, but not all, counts of an indictment.
 2. Whether the State has a right of appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c) when the trial court enters an order declaring a criminal statute facially unconstitutional, effectively dismissing counts of an indictment brought under that statute, even if the court does not enter a separate dismissal order or judgment.

1. Style State of Tennessee v. Ginny Elizabeth Parker
2. Docket Number M2022-00955-SC-R11-CD
3. Lower Court Decision Links <https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20%2818%29.pdf>
4. Lower Court Summary The Defendant, Ginny Elizabeth Parker, was convicted following a bench trial of five counts of forgery, for which she received an effective six-year sentence to serve. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her forgery convictions, specifically regarding whether she acted without authorization; (2) the trial court shifted the burden of service of medical records pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-122(c) from the State to the Defendant; (3) the trial court erroneously admitted proof of a PayPal account that was linked to the victims' bank account; (4) she is entitled to relief based on cumulative error; and (5) her sentence is grossly disproportionate to her offenses, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
5. Status Heard 5/28/25 at Cookeville SCALES.
6. Issue(s) Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for forgery.

1. Style Connie Reguli v. BPR
2. Docket Number M2024-00153-SC-R3-BP
3. Lower Court Decision Links N/A
4. Lower Court Summary N/A
5. Status Heard 5/29/25 on-briefs.
6. Issue(s) N/A

1. Style Connie Reguli v. BPR

2.	Docket Number	M2025-00454-SC-R3-BP
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	N/A
4.	Lower Court Summary	N/A
5.	Status	Notice of appeal filed 4/1/25. Show cause order for failure to file transcript with the trial court filed 6/11/25.
6.	Issue(s)	N/A

1.	Style	Brenda Sands v. Robert Williard et al.
2.	Docket Number	W2024-00772-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/SandsBrendaOPN.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Plaintiff, who was injured by tripping on a sidewalk, filed suit against the private property owners and city but failed to properly serve the city. In their original answer, the private property owners asserted the city's comparative fault but not in express terms. The Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the city as a defendant. In an amended answer, the private property owners expressly asserted comparative fault against the city. The Plaintiff promptly amended her complaint to add the city as a defendant under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119, which provides a plaintiff 90 days after the filing of an answer asserting comparative fault against a non-party to add that non-party as a defendant, even if doing so would otherwise be barred by a statute of limitations. The city asserted this was not in accordance with the statute because the private property owners asserted comparative fault against the city in the original answer. The trial court determined that, although the original answer did raise comparative fault of the city, this did not trigger the 90-day window under the statute because the city was a party at the time. The trial court concluded that the amended answer was timely filed within 90 days of the filing of the first answer alleging comparative fault against a non-party, which was the amended answer. The city appeals. We affirm.
5.	Status	Application granted 6/20/25.
6.	Issue(s)	As stated by Applicant: Whether, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, an added defendant's status as a party is determined when the plaintiff amends her complaint, as the court of appeals held in Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co. and Queen's Tree Surgery, Inc. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, or when the answer raising the added defendant's comparative fault is filed, as the court of appeals held in Scales v. H.G. Hill Realty Co., LLC and this case.

1.	Style	Elliott James Schuchardt v. BPR
2.	Docket Number	E2024-00812-SC-R3-BP

3.	Lower Court Decision Links	N/A
4.	Lower Court Summary	N/A
5.	Status	Notice of Appeal filed 6/3/24. Fully briefed.
6.	Issue(s)	N/A

1.	Style	SH Nashville, LLC et al. v. FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC
2.	Docket Number	M2023-01147-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/E-SIGNED-M2023-1147-COA-SH%20NASHVILLE.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	This appeal arises out of a contract for the sale of a hotel property near the Nashville airport. After numerous amendments to the purchase and sale agreement, the seller declared the prospective buyer to be in default, sold the property to a different buyer, and retained over 18 million dollars in earnest money. The prospective buyer filed suit against the seller for a declaratory judgment that the liquidated damages provision in the contract was unenforceable and for conversion. The trial court dismissed the conversion claim and ruled in favor of the seller on summary judgment. We have concluded that the trial court erred in its disposition of both causes of action.
5.	Status	Application granted 2/26/25. Appellant's brief filed 5/22/25. Motion for extension to file appellee's brief granted and due 7/21/25.
6.	Issue(s)	As stated in the Appellant's Rule 11 Application: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Under the prospective approach adopted by this Court to review liquidated damages provisions, does the defaulting party have the burden to show that a liquidated damages provision is unenforceable if the party seeking to enforce the provision has presented an agreement with clear and unambiguous terms on the reasonableness of damages and that damages would be difficult if not impossible to ascertain? In a real estate contract where the liquidated damages are a percentage of the purchase price, must the parties' agreement contain a "metric for calculating the amount of liquidated damages or an explanation of the basis for the amounts provided" at the time of entering into the contract? Under Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, is presentation of the parties' express agreement as to liquidated damages by the non-defaulting party sufficient to show it is entitled to summary judgment on a declaratory judgment claim such that the burden shifts to the defaulting party to present evidence of why the liquidated damages are not reasonable or must the non-breaching party present evidence extrinsic to the agreement regarding the reasonableness of the estimated damages?

1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Shenessa Sokolosky
2.	Docket Number	M2022-00873-SC-R11-CD

3.	Lower Court Decision Links	Majority Opinion - M2022-00873-CCA-R3-CD.pdf (tncourts.gov)
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Defendant, Shenessa L. Sokolosky, appeals from the Smith County Criminal Court's probation revocation of her two consecutive eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentences for her guilty-pleaded misdemeanor convictions for drug possession and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation. We dismiss the Defendant's appeal pursuant to the mootness doctrine.
5.	Status	Heard 2/12/25 at Nashville.
6.	Issue(s)	A. Whether the trial court's orders should be reversed and vacated because the original probation violation warrant against Ms. Sokolosky should have been dismissed and because the State failed to prove that Ms. Sokolosky violated the conditions of her probation. B. Whether the issue is moot because Ms. Sokolosky has completed her sentence.

1.	Style	Tinsley Properties, LLC et al. v. Grundy County, Tennessee
2.	Docket Number	M2022-01562-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%20M2022-01562-COA-R3-CV.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	This case concerns the validity of a county resolution prohibiting quarries and rock crushers "within five thousand (5,000) feet of a residence, school, licensed daycare facility, park, recreation center, church, retail, commercial, professional or industrial establishment." The plaintiff landowners argued that the county failed to comply with the requirements in Tennessee's county zoning statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 to -115. In the alternative, they argued that state law expressly preempted local regulation of quarries. However, the county argued that it was exercising its authority to protect its citizens' health, safety, and welfare under the county powers statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-1-118. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county on the ground that it had no comprehensive zoning plan. This appeal followed. We affirm.
5.	Status	Heard 5/29/25 at Nashville.
6.	Issue(s)	(1) Do a county's "police powers" set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-118 authorize Grundy County to adopt a resolution prohibiting quarries within 5,000 feet of certain sensitive locations? (2) Is the County's quarry resolution tantamount to a zoning regulation that must be adopted in compliance with state statutory procedures for zoning regulations?

1.	Style	Tri-State Insurance Company of Minnesota a/s/o Campus Chalet, Inc. v. East Tennessee Sprinkler Company, Inc.
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2.	Docket Number	E2024-00599-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/E2024-00599.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	This appeal stems from a dispute over a purportedly defective sprinkler system which malfunctioned, causing significant damage to Campus Chalet, Inc. (“Campus Chalet”). East Tennessee Sprinkler Company, Inc. (“ETS”) installed the system in 1992 and remained contractually responsible for subsequent inspections, testing, and maintenance of the system. On October 5, 2023, Campus Chalet’s insurance carrier filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Washington County (the “trial court”), against ETS, alleging that the sprinkler system malfunctioned and caused significant damage to Campus Chalet. ETS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint was time-barred by a statute of repose. The trial court granted ETS’s motion, and this appeal followed. Because we agree with the appellant that the negligence and breach of contract claims are based on ongoing failures to inspect, test, and maintain the system, we reverse.
5.	Status	Application granted 6/2/25.
6.	Issue(s)	<p>1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action for negligence and breach of contract under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 where the cause of Plaintiff’s claim for damages—as pleaded in the Complaint—arose from the allegedly improper design and construction of an improvement to real property in 1992.</p> <p>2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action for negligence and breach of contract where no duty was adequately pleaded.</p> <p>3. Whether the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s fees to Defendant under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119 should be affirmed.</p>

1.	Style	State of Tennessee v. Ambreia Washington
2.	Docket Number	W2022-01201- SC-R11-CD
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/WashingtonAmbreiaOPN.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	The Defendant, Ambreia Washington, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and driving with a canceled, suspended or revoked license (second offense), a Class A misdemeanor, for which he received an effective fifteen-year sentence. <i>See</i> T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307 (2018) (subsequently amended) (unlawful possession of weapon), 39-16-602 (2018) (resisting arrest), 55-50-504 (2020) (canceled, suspended or revoked license). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, failing to dismiss the indictment due to missing evidence, admitting certain photographs into evidence at trial, and denying a motion for a mistrial as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. The Defendant also contends that the cumulative nature of the errors warrant relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
5.	Status	Heard 12/4/24 SCALES at Austin Peay
6.	Issue(s)	Whether the trial court erred by declining to suppress a handgun seized from a car driven

by the defendant, when the illegal nature of the firearm was not immediately apparent to the officer under the plain view doctrine, the investigation into the defendant's criminal history went beyond the scope of the officer's community caretaking function, and the officer failed to give Miranda warnings before inquiring into the defendant's status as a convicted felon.

1.	Style	Sarah Elizabeth Woodruff v. Ford Motor Company
2.	Docket Number	E2023-00889-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Wood%20ruff%20vs.%20Ford%20Motor%20Co.%20COA%20Opinion.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	After a tragic motor vehicle accident caused her husband's death and her minor child's serious injuries, the plaintiff filed this products liability action against several manufacturers and sellers. We granted the instant interlocutory appeal in which the defendant requests review — based on the Tennessee Supreme Court's majority opinion in Carolyn Coffman, et al. v. Armstrong International, Inc., et al., 615 S.W.3d 888 (Tenn. 2021) — of the trial court's denial of its motion for relief from unfavorable summary judgment orders. We reverse the trial court.
5.	Status	Application granted 10/24/24. Fully briefed.
6.	Issue(s)	As stated in the Appellant's Rule 11 Application: 1. Whether this Court's holding in Coffman v. Armstrong International, Inc., 615 S.W.3d 888 (Tenn. 2021), means that manufacturers in Tennessee have no legal duty to adequately warn about the uses and misuses of their own products if the harm to be warned against happens to involve interplay with another manufacturer's product. 2. Whether the subject seat belt extender was defective or unreasonably when it left Ford's control within the meaning of section 29-28-105(a), when Ford failed to reasonably communicate the danger of misusing the subject extender to restrain children, and when Ford had pre-sale notice and knowledge that consumers were misusing the product to restrain children riding in booster seats.

1.	Style	Sarah Elizabeth Woodruff ex rel Ethan Woodruff et al. v. Ford Motor Company et al.
2.	Docket Number	E2023-00488-SC-R11-CV
3.	Lower Court Decision Links	https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Sarah%20Elizabeth%20Woodruff%20vs.%20Ethan%20Woodruff%20et%20al.%20COA%20Opinion.pdf
4.	Lower Court Summary	After a tragic motor vehicle accident caused her husband's death and her minor child's serious injuries, the plaintiff filed this products liability action against several manufacturers and sellers. The plaintiff appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., a booster seat manufacturer. Based on the Tennessee Supreme Court's majority opinion in Carolyn Coffman, et al. v. Armstrong International, Inc., et al., 615 S.W.3d 888 (Tenn. 2021), and the relevant provisions of the Tennessee Products Liability Act, we affirm the trial court.
5.	Status	Application granted 10/24/24. Fully briefed.
6.	Issue(s)	As stated in the Appellant's Rule 11 Application:

Whether *Coffman v. Armstrong International, Inc.*, 615 S.W.3d 888, 897 (Tenn. 2021), defeats Plaintiff's claim against Dorel for failing to warn of the dangers associated with using a seat belt extender to install the subject booster seat, when Dorel negligently and recklessly instructed consumers to "contact your dealer for a seat belt extender" if "your vehicle belt is too short."