IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

2010 MOY 23 PM 3: 59

STATE OF TENNESSEE V. STEPHEN MICHAEL WEST AN LLASE COUNT OLDER MANNAULE STATE OF TENNESSEE V. BILLY RAY IRICK

No. M1987-000130-SC-DPE-DD No. M2010-02275-SC-R11-CV

NOTICE OF FILING

Pursuant to the Court's November 23, 2010 Order, Stephen Michael West and Billy Ray

Irick hereby file copies of the transcript of the trial court's November 19, 2010 ruling.

Respectfully submitted,

Stephen M. Kissinger Dana Hansen Chavis Stephen A. Ferrell FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC. 800 S. Gay Street, Suite 2400 Knoxville, TN 37929 Telephone: 865-637-7979 Facsimile: 865-637-7999

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been sent via email and facsimile to:

Mark A. Hudson, Senior Counsel, Office of the Attorney General, 425 Fifth Avenue North, P.O. Box 20208, Nashville, Tennessee 37243, Fax No. 615-532-2541,



Gayle Ray	November 19, 2010		
Page 0			
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY,	1 APPEARANCES		
TENNESSEE	2		
	FOR PLAINTIFF:		
STEPHEN MICHAEL WEST,)	4		
Plaintiff,	5 STEPHEN M. KISSINGER		
vs.)No. 10-1675-I	DANA HANSEN CHAVIS 6 FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN		
	TENNESSEE, INC.		
) GAYLE RAY, In her official)	Suite 2400		
capacity as Tennessee) Commissioner of Corrections,)	Telephone: (865) 637-7979		
et al.,	9 Email:		
	10 FOR PLAINTIFF:		
Defendants.)	11 ROGER W. DICKSON		
	12 MILLER & MARTIN, LLP 832 Georgia Avenue		
	13 100 Volunteer Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402		
COURT'S RULING	Email: Rdickson@millermartin.com		
BE IT REMEMBERED that the	15		
above-captioned cause came on for hearing this, the 19th day of November, 2010, in the above Court, before the Honorable Claudia C. Bonnyman,	16 FOR INTERVEINING THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF; BILLY		
Court, before the Honorable Claudia C. Bonnyman, Judge presiding, when and where the following	17 IRICK:		
proceedings were had, to wit:	18		
	19 HOWELL CLEMENTS CLEMENTS & CROSS		
	20 Monteagle Office 1020 West Main Street		
	21 P.O. Box 99		
VOWELL & JENNINGS, INC.	Monteagle, Tennessee 37356 22 Telephone: (931) 924-2060		
Court Reporting Services 207 Washington Square Building	23		
214 Second Avenue North Nashville, Tennessee 37201 (615) 256-1935	24 (Appearances Continued Page 2)		
(615) 256-1555	25		
Page 3	Page 4		
1 APPEARANCES CONTINUED	1		
2 FOR STATE OF TENNESSEE:	2		
3 MARTHA A. CAMPBELL	3 ****		
4 MARK HUDSON STATE OF TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL	THE COURT: Please be seated.		
5 2nd Floor, CHB 425 5th Avenue, North	5 Lawyers and citizens and court reporter, I		
6 Nashville, Tennessee 37219 Telephone: (615) 532-2558	6 appreciate your patience. I know this is not		
7 Email: Martha.campbell@ag.tn.gov, Mark.Hudson@ag.tn.gov	7 easy on people to stay this late.		
8	8 As I stated before this is the		
9 COURT REPORTING FIRM:	 Court's bench ruling, and a bench ruling is 		
	10 sometimes pretty rough and this one will be		
LEILA ZUPKUS NOLAN 11 Vowell & Jennings, Inc. 214 274 August North	11 somewhat rough, but I'm hoping and trusting that		
214 2nd Avenue North 12 Suite 207	12 this will be an opinion that will be		
12 Suite 207 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 13 Office: (615) 256-1935	13 understandable and will be useful.		
14	The statement of the case: The		
15	¹⁵ plaintiff is an inmate condemned to be executed		
16	16 by order of Tennessee's Supreme Court on		
17	17 November 30, 2010 because he murdered		
18	18 15-year-old Sheila Romines and her mother Wanda		
19	19 Romines. He will be executed by the default		
20	²⁰ method of legal injection lethal injection.		
21	The petitioner filed suit in the		
22	22 Davidson County Chancery Court seeking		
23	23 declaratory judgment that the method of his		
24	24 execution is wrongful under the federal and		
	25 state constitutions. An additional plaintiff		
25	A A A		

Gayle Ray	November 19, 2010
Page 5	Page 6
1 Mr. Irick was allowed to intervene in the case	1 for execution under the 2007 protocol is cruel
² because he faces execution on December 7, 2010	2 and unusual punishment.
3 and he seeks the same relief against the same	3 The plaintiff argues that all three
4 defendants.	4 drugs are separately intended to kill the
s As in all situations involving	5 condemned man. The plaintiff asserts that the
6 capital punishment the condemned plaintiff, or	6 first drug is to render the person unconscious.
7 inmate, has committed a heinous crime. The	7 The second drug is to paralyze the lungs,
8 Tennessee legislature and many other state	⁸ diaphragm, and the entire body, and the third
 legislatures have passed laws requiring that 	⁹ drug is to stop the heart. According to the
10 when crimes are determined to be sufficiently	10 plaintiff, the first drug, sodium thiopental,
11 horrific, the ultimately penalty, death, will be	11 does not function as represented by the State.
12 the punishment. The Court may interfere only	12 Instead, says the plaintiff, sodium thiopental
13 may only interfere with that process that	13 is an ultra fast acting drug, which cannot be
14 judgment and that penalty when that process runs	14 relied upon to keep the condemned man fully
15 afoul of the Federal and State Constitutions.	15 unconscious or to render him dead before the
16 The narrow focus of this Court is	16 second drug, a paralyzing drug, begins its
17 upon Tennessee's 2007 lethal drug execution	17 effect of suffocation.
18 method under its protocol and whether the	18The plaintiff asserts that although
19 protocol violates the constitutional prohibition	19 the second drug, pancuronium bromide, is
20 against cruel and unusual punishments. And as	20 administered the prevent the condemned man from
²¹ for the issues in this case, the plaintiff	21 moving or breathing or calling out, it is
22 contends that the State's current protocol for	22 actually the fatal element under the Tennessee
23 execution does not render the inmate unconscious	²³ protocol and death is therefore by suffocation.
²⁴ before the second and third lethal drugs are	24 The plaintiff argues that the autopsy reports
²⁵ administered, and for that reason the punishment	²⁵ and toxicology reports show postmortem serum
Page 7	Page 8
1 levels of sodium thiopental from three	1 second drug is injected.
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Gayle Ray	November 19, 2010
Page 9	Page 10
 mandated in the protocol, which is 5 grams creates an objectively intolerable risk of harm or suffering, and this the plaintiff cannot show. The State reasons that the expert medical examiner, Dr. Li, is an autopsy expert and knows better than the plaintiff's expert what occurs in the blood after death. The issues for the Court to decide are: One, whether the current amount and concentration of sodium thiopental mandated by Tennessee's 2007 lethal injection protocol are insufficient to insure unconsciousness so as to create an objectively intolerable risk of severe suffering or pain during the execution. Two, as a factual matter, the Court is to decide at what level what level of sodium thiopental is sufficient to insure unconsciousness so as to negate any objectively intolerable risk of severe suffering or pain during the execution. Number three, is there a feasible and readily available alternative procedure which could be supplied at execution to insure unconsciousness 	 alternative, and without justification adhere to its current method. And as for the summary a very brief summary of the decision, the Court find the current protocol for execution by lethal injection execution is cruel and usual because the plaintiff has carried its burden to show that the protocol allows suffocation death by suffocation while the prisoner is conscious. And as for the facts that the Court is finding as a result of the evidentiary hearing, Number 1, Tennessee's 2007 lethal injection protocol. Tennessee's 2007 protocol requires the administration of three drugs; sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride through an intravenous catheter in a rapid by use of 11 large and rapid bolus injections. Before the injection process begins, according to the protocol, catheters are inserted in both of the inmate's arms by two technicians. Once the lines have been established, the technicians leave the execution chamber and remain in an area where
24 severe suffering or pain. And, Four, did the	24 they cannot see the inmate.
25 State refuse to adopt or adapt to this	The only person with the inmate in
Page 11	Page 12
 the execution chamber at the time the drugs are administered is the warden of River Bend Maximum Security Institution, the site of the execution apparatus. The the need for two catheters is that the first catheter is used for the injection, and the second catheter is a backup in case the first one fails. The executioner first injects 5 grams of sodium thiopental, which the protocol states is disbursed into four syringes at a concentration of 2.5 percent with 1.25 grams of the drug in each syringe. Sodium thiopental is a rapid acting barbiturate commonly used in anesthesia. In the past, sodium thiopental was administered in small amounts during surgery, before surgery to induce unconsciousness rapidly while other measures were then used to deepen the level of unconsciousness. Sodium thiopental is now used is not common used in surgery at this time. Continuing on with the protocol, following a saline flush, the executioner injects 100 milligrams of pancuronium bromide into the IV lines. Pancuronium bromide is a 	 the diaphragm, such that the prisoner cannot breathe. By itself, 100 milligrams of pancuronium bromide would be sufficient to kill a person by suffocation. Pancuronium bromide eliminates the involuntary muscle movements that could be caused by the operation of the third drug, potassium chloride, in the prisoner's body. If pancuronium bromide were injected solely on its own, the prisoner would experience and be aware of his death by suffocation. Following a second saline flush, the executioner injects a third and final drug, potassium chloride in the amount of 200 milligrams 200 MEQ. The purpose of this drug is to cause cardiac arrest. If conscious, the inmate would suffer a burning pain throughout his body when the potassium chloride is injected. And I believe the parties agree about this and I think they also agree that if pancuronium bromide were given by itself the death would be by conscious suffocation. I don't think there is a dispute about that. Now, the plaintiff does not focus on the third drug in this lawsuit because the plaintiff

Gayle Ray	November 19, 2010
Page 13	Page 14
1 understands that the third drug is redundant and	1 Court than an expert anesthesiologist who is
2 the prisoner has already died by suffocation.	 2 also teacher is an ideal expert for the
3 In this case, the plaintiff has	³ evaluation of consciousness and unconsciousness.
4 carried his burden to show that the first	4 Dr. Li, a senior assistant medical
 injection of 5 grams of sodium thiopental 	5 examiner contracted in Metro Government has also
 followed by rapid injection of the second drug 	 ⁶ been a teacher in the past. He began his
7 will result in the inmate's consciousness during	7 medical education in his native China and then
⁸ suffocation. And as for further facts in the	 continued with his residency in this country.
case and the medical proof, both parties called	 There is no reason to doubt his expertise based
¹⁰ medical experts. The Court found that both	¹⁰ upon his education and background. It appears
11 experts could assist the finder of fact because	11 to the Court that a medical examiner has
12 the issues in the case focus upon chemical	12 experience and knowledge about toxicality,
¹³ reaction to drugs in the body before and after	13 toxicology, pathology, pharmacology and other
14 death.	14 matters in order to opine about the cause of
15 In compliance with Rule 702 of the	15 death and the manner of death.
16 rules of evidence both experts are medical	16 And as for the medical proof, the
17 doctors. Dr. Lubarsky called by the plaintiff	17 plaintiff carried his burden to show that the
18 is a board-certified anesthesiologist, who is	¹⁸ Tennessee protocol does not insure that the
19 both a clinician and a prolific academic	19 prisoner is unconscious before the paralyzing
20 researcher and published writer. Dr. Lubarsky	20 drug; that is, the second becomes active is
21 has been a tenured professor on medical	21 injected and becomes active in the body. The
22 factories at excellent medical schools. He is a	22 petitioner, or plaintiff, has never conceded
²³ teacher accustomed to providing explanations in	23 that 5 grams of sodium thiopental insures
24 the language of beginning and in the language of	24 unconsciousness or insures unconsciousness by
25 experienced medical students. It appears to the	²⁵ death for any particular person because there
25 experienced medical stadents. It appears to and	
Page 15	Page 16
Page 15	Page 16
Page 15 1 are many variables which prevent such a safe	Page 16 1 sodium thiopental in the blood serum through
Page 15 are many variables which prevent such a safe prediction which would prevent conscious death 	Page 16 1 sodium thiopental in the blood serum through 2 autopsy, which of course, is after the prisoner
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Gayle Ray	November 19, 2010		
Page 17	Page 18		
1 testimony is convincing, and his study is	1 be conscious at that time and half would not be		
² convincing that the level of sodium thiopental	2 conscious.		
³ is used by different people in different ways,	³ As for medical proof, continued,		
4 and the reactions are variable are very	4 Dr. Li opined that he believed that Mr. Coe,		
⁵ variable. The study shows the amount of sodium	⁵ Mr. Workman, Mr. Henley were unconscious at the		
6 thiopental in the blood serum of prisoners	6 time of their deaths. He based his opinion in		
 across the country were lower than one would 	 7 part on Winek's drug and chemical blood level 		
 ⁸ hope would be the case because the level was not 	 a data. This is Trial Exhibit 27. This chart 		
high enough to insure that the prisoners were	 shows levels for therapeutic or normal and then 		
10 unconscious.	10 for toxic and lethal. The postmortem levels of		
Dr. Lubarsky studied and reported	11 sodium thiopental in previous Tennessee executed		
12 upon the autopsies of three Tennessee prisoners	12 inmates sometimes fell within the range for		
13 who were executed using the protocol in	13 therapeutic or normal, as well as falling within		
14 Tennessee that is the issue in this case. They	14 the range for toxic or lethal. When asked to		
15 were injected with 5 grams of sodium thiopental	15 explain why Mr. Workman's postmortem sodium		
16 as far as anyone is aware. The level of this	16 thiopental level was sufficiently higher		
17 drug in the blood measured through the	17 significantly higher than Mr. Coe's and		
18 autopsies, however, shows the three men did not	18 Mr. Henley's even though his autopsy had not		
19 have sufficient amounts of this drug to insure	 been performed until ten days after his 		
20 unconsciousness. Instead their levels were	²⁰ execution and the other inmate's autopsies had		
21 10.2 milligrams per liter for Mr. Coe, 18.9	21 been performed seven hours after their		
²² milligrams per liter in the Workman's case, and	22 executions approximately, Dr. Li stated that		
23 8.31 milligrams per liter from the Henley	²³ every human body is different and that these		
24 autopsy. His research shows that with 50	24 differences have an effect on the drug level.		
²⁵ milligrams per liter, half of the persons would	²⁵ He also states that no single		
Page 19	Page 20		
1 member such as the one no single number such	1 three-drug protocol issue which is presented		
2 as the one used in Winek's can be used to	2 here.		
 as the one used in Whick's can be used to explain or calculate what the drug level would 	3 And as for facts regarding the		
4 have been at the time of the inmate's death.	4 failure to check for consciousness, the Florida		
5 Dr. Li stated that according to general theory,	5 Department of Corrections which adopted new		
 b) D) b) b)	6 lethal injection procedure effective for		
 reversion incureation round in the block decreased postmortem but that this would depend 	 retual injection procedure circenve for executions after May 9, 2007 included the 		
⁸ upon the medication. The two experts agree	 a following procedure to immediately follow the 		
 appear to agree that the levels of sodium 	and the second at the second sec		
¹⁰ thiopental will be used in the body depending			
11 upon many variables. This is a complex study,	10 point, At this point a member of the execution 11 team will assess whether the inmate is		
¹¹ and Dr. Li conceded or stated that he would need			
12 and D1. El conceded of stated that he would need	and the disc sheet the increase is in the d		
Grate and the second have a second have been a	13 consultation that the inmate is indeed 14 unconscious. Until the inmate is unconscious		
14 factors to analyze before concluding now a 15 particular medication would act in the body	1 (1) - manufactor have and any 1 (have any south any any tag		
	senting the mean time and the line terms and the		
16 predeath and postdeath.			
17 Now, the State called Mr. Voorhies	17 Step 5, close quote. And this is from Florida		
18 as a witness. He is a department of corrections	18 protocol hearing exhibit hearing and this is		

- 19 exhibit -- Trial Exhibit 24 Page 8.
 - 20 Proceeding on with the facts --
 - 21 findings of fact under the subject, Failure to
 - 22 check for consciousness, the Court finds that in
 - 23 California's lethal injection protocol and
 - 24 review, which was issued on May 15, 2007, the
 - 25 California Department of Corrections review team

19 experienced administrator from the State of

20 Ohio. He testified about nine executions at

to be fatal when allowed to work over 11

²⁵ minutes, however, is not depositive of the

²¹ which he had been present where 5 grams of

sodium thiopental were injected. The fact that5 grams of sodium thiopental is fatal or appear

Gayle Ray	November 19, 2010
Page 21	Page 22
1 pointed out that earlier versions of this	1 for checking consciousness under the three-drug
² protocol made no provisions of any objective	² protocol option. In a document prepared by the
3 assessment of consciousness of the condemned	³ chair of the committee, Julian Davis, that
 inmate following administration of the sodium 	4 listed the pros and cons of the various options
 thiopental, and before the administration of the 	 considered by the committee, the following
6 other chemicals.	 phrase appears as "con" under the three-drug
7 The State of California lethal	 protocol: Would likely need to add a method of
⁸ injection protocol review. The California	 ascertaining consciousness after sodium
 committee noted that there are reliable but 	 thiopental. Hearing collective Exhibit Number 3
¹⁰ relatively uncomplicated methods for effectively	¹⁰ former trial Exhibit Number 7. The April 19,
11 assessing consciousness that have been	11 2007, minutes of the Tennessee Protocol
¹¹ assessing consciousness that have been ¹² incorporated into California lethal injection	¹¹ 2007, finitutes of the Temiessee Trotecol ¹² Committee state that Deputy Commissioner Ray
¹² protocol. Among them are talking to and gently	13 also mentioned having something that would
14 shaking the inmate as well as lightly brushing	14 assure the unconsciousness of the inmate during
¹⁴ shaking the innate as wen as rightly brushing ¹⁵ eyelash. For that reason, changes were made to	15 the execution procedure. In addition, those
16 the California protocol to place staff in close	¹⁶ minutes reflect a conversation between Warden
¹⁷ proximity to the condemned inmate throughout the	¹⁷ Bell and Physician A in which Warden Bell
17 provinity to the condemned minate throughout the 18 execution to assess and confirm the condemned	¹⁷ Ben and Thysician A in which watten ben ¹⁸ inquired about what would indicate the inmate is
¹⁹ inmate is unconscious prior to and during the	¹⁹ unconscious after the first drug and a saline
²⁰ administration of the pancuronium bromide and	²⁰ flush are given, in paren, three drug protocol,
²¹ the potassium chloride. This is from Trial	²¹ close paren, so we can give the signal to go
22 Exhibit Number 25, Page I'm sorry Hearing	²² ahead with the other drugs. The physician
23 Exhibit 25 Page 20. Number 25, Page 20.	²³ suggested looking at the inmate's eyes but also
²⁴ The Tennessee protocol committee	24 stated that constricted pupils are not a
²⁵ appears to have been well aware of the necessity	²⁵ definitive sign of unconsciousness. Therefore,
Page 23	Page 24
1 he also advised checking for an eyelash response	1 during the course of the committee's work
2 by brushing a finger across them, lifting up the	2 advised the committee about a number of
³ person's arm and a pin prick or pinching the	³ different ways to assess an inmate's anesthetic
 inples. This Hearing Exhibit Collective 3, 	4 depth which wouldn't require the use of any
5 former Trial Exhibit 29.	s machine; is that correct?
6 Ms. Gail Ray's notes from that same	6 And her answer was: A physician
7 meeting include the sentence: What if any	7 did recommend in response to our question to
⁸ safeguards to insure a person is appropriately	⁸ give us ways that we could actually sort of
• anesthetized, with an arrow pointing toward any	⁹ determine at a particular point whether there
¹⁰ monitoring by medicine, medical personnel,	10 was consciousness or not, but those weren't ways
11 question. Hearing Exhibit Collective 3, former	11 of actively monitoring the anesthetic depth over
12 trial Exhibit 31 at Page 30. Mr. Elkins,	12 the process.
13 counselor to the Governor, verified that he had	13 Question: Okay. Did the physician
14 taken notes concerning a telephone conversation	14 that told you that those were ways to assess
15 with Commissioner Little on April 20, 2007, in	15 anesthetic depth, was he the one that told you
¹⁶ which he had written ask them to introduce a	16 that wasn't that that wasn't adequate?
17 step to explicitly go over and check level of	Answer: No. What I'm saying is
18 sedation. Hearing Exhibit Collective Number 3;	
18 Solution. Meaning Exhibit Concentre Rumber 5,	18 the physician was telling us that at a
19 former Trial Exhibit 5 at Page 7.	19 particular point you could maybe look at do a
-	 particular point you could maybe look at do a pinprick or move something on the inmate's foot,
19 former Trial Exhibit 5 at Page 7.	 particular point you could maybe look at do a pinprick or move something on the inmate's foot, pinch them, and that right tell you at the time
 former Trial Exhibit 5 at Page 7. And also from Harbison versus Little and Others, Exhibit Number 1, I'm going to read into the record a brief testimony from 	 particular point you could maybe look at do a pinprick or move something on the inmate's foot, pinch them, and that right tell you at the time that that inmate was unconscious at this point,
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Gayle Ray	November 19, 2010
Page 25	Page 26
1 execution.	1 consciousness.
2 Question: Did the physician tell	2 Question: You said before that
3 you you couldn't make a second check or third	 experts that you had experts who told you
4 check or a fourth check?	4 that assessing anesthetic depth wasn't
5 Answer: No.	 necessary, but those same experts did advise you
6 Question: If it was needed?	 of the critical importance of the inmate being
7 Answer: No.	 of the official importance of the infinite being unconscious before the administration of the
8 Question: Did the physician tell	 B second two drugs, did they?
• the committee that there was some limitations on	 Answer: They certainly, yes,
10 how often these checks could be provided or	¹⁰ indicated that that was the purpose of the first
11 could be conducted?	11 drug and that that was important.
12 Answer: No.	12 And that completes at this time the
13 Question: So what is the basis of	13 findings of fact. I'm going to move to the
14 your statement that these checks could not be	14 principals law. And first the Court is looking
15 continued throughout the lethal injection	15 at Rule 702, testimony about experts. If
16 process?	16 scientific, technical, or other specialized
Answer: Well just that it wouldn't	
18 be practical as you are carrying out the19 execution to have someone standing there	
²⁰ pinching the inmate. I mean, we didn't think	· · ·
	 expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify in the form of an
21 that would be appropriate, and our experts	²¹ of education, may testify in the form of an ²² opinion or otherwise.
22 didn't indicate that you know, that this was	
23 a necessary step. In any event, these	23 Rule 703, basis of opinion
24 suggestions were simply in response to our	24 testimony by experts. The facts or data in the
²⁵ question of what could be done to check	²⁵ particular case upon which an expert basis an
Page 27	Page 28
1 opinion or inference may be those perceived by	1 indicate a lack of trustworthiness. The rules
² or made known to the expert at or before the	 2 together necessarily require determination as to
³ hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by	 the scientific validity or reliability of the
4 experts in a particular field in forming	 evidence. Simply put, unless the scientific
 opinions or inferences upon the subject, the 	 s evidence is valid, it will not substantially
⁶ facts or data need not be admissible in	6 assist the trier of fact unless underlying facts
⁷ evidence. The Court shall disallow testimony in	 assist the trief of fact timess underlying facts and data appear to be trustworthy, but there is
 a the form or opinion or inference if the 	 no requirement any rule be generally accepted.
 underlying facts or data indicates lack of 	 Although we do not expressly adopt here the
	¹⁰ Court is referring to the federal standard in
	¹⁰ Court is referring to the rederal standard in ¹¹ Daubert, The non-exclusive list of factors to
As for principles of the law from	¹¹ Daubert, The holl-exclusive list of factors to ¹² determine reliability are useful in applying our
12 McDaniel versus CSX Transportation, which is 955	12 Rule 702 and 703. The Tennessee Trial Court may
13 S.W. 2d 257, a 1977 opinion Supreme Court	13 Rule 702 and 703. The remessee That Court may 14 consider in determining liability: One, whether
14 opinion, in general, questions regarding the	14 consider in determining hability: One, whether 15 scientific evidence has been testified and the
15 admissibility, qualifications, relevancy and	
16 competency of expert testimony are left to the	¹⁶ methodology with which it has been tested. Two,
17 discretion of the trial court. The specific	17 whether the evidence has been subjected to peer
18 rules of evidence that govern the admissibility	18 review or publication. Three, whether a
19 of scientific proof in Tennessee are Tennessee	19 potential rate of error is known. Four, whether
20 Rules of Evidence 702 and 703.	20 as formerly required by Frye the evidence is
In Tennessee under the recent	21 general accepted in the scientific community.
²² rules, a Trial Court must determine whether the	22 And Five, whether the expert's research in the

- 22 rules, a Trial Court must determine whether the
- 23 evidence will substantially assist the trier of
- fact to determine a fact in issue and whether
- ²⁵ the facts and data underlying the evidence
- 24 litigation. Although the Trial Court must

23 field has been conducted independent of

25

Gujie May	107cmber 19, 2010
Page 29	Page 30
1 analyze the signs and not merely the	1 demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in
2 qualifications, demeanor, or conclusions of	² carrying out executions. Our cases; that is,
³ witnesses, the Court may not weigh or choose	3 those of the U.S. Supreme Court, recognize that
4 between two legitimate but conflicting	4 subjecting individuals to a risk of future harm,
5 scientific views. The Court instead must assure	5 not simply actually inflicting pain can qualify
6 itself that the opinions are based on relevant	6 as cruel and unusual punishment.
7 scientific methods, processes, and data and not	7 To establish that exposure violates
⁸ upon an expert's mere speculation.	⁸ the 8th Amendment, however, the conditions
And now the Court will continue with	9 presenting the risk must be sure or very likely
10 principals of law from Baze versus Rees, which	10 to cause serious illness and needless suffering
11 is U.S. Supreme Court Case at 553 US35 rendered	11 and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers.
12 in 2008. The 8th Amendment to the Constitution	12 We have explained that to prevail on such a
13 applicable to the states through the due process	13 claim, there must be a substantial risk of
14 clause of the 14th Amendment provides that	14 serious harm, an objectively intolerable risk of
15 excessive bail shall not be required nor	15 harm that prevents prison officials from
16 excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual	16 pleading that they were subjectively blameless
17 punishments inflicted.	17 for purposes of the 8th Amendment. Simply
18 We begin with a principle settled by	18 because an execution method may result in pain
19 Gregg versus Georgia that capital punishment is	19 either by accident or is an inescapable
20 constitutional. It necessarily follows that	20 consequence of the death does not establish the
21 there must be a means of carrying it out. Some	21 sort of objectively tolerable risk of harm that
²² risk of pain is inherent in method of execution	22 qualifies as cruel and unusual.
23 no matter how humane. If only from the prospect	Given what our; that is, the U.S.
 of error in following the required procedure, it's clear then that the constitution does not 	 Supreme Court cases, have said about the nature of the risk of harm that is actionable under the
25 It's creat then that the constitution does not	
 	Page 32
Page 31	Page 32
1 8th Amendment, a condemned prisoner cannot	1 it is a principle of law from the Harbison case.
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November 19, 2010
Page 34
 for further principles of law and further analysis of this particular case. And this is from the plurality decision in U.S. Supreme Court case in Baze. The decent believes that rough and ready tests for checking consciousness; calling the inmate's name, brushing his eyelashes or presenting him with strong noxious odors could materially decrease the risk of administering the second and third drugs before the sodium thiopental has taken effect. Again and this is from Baze, the risk at issue is already attenuated, given the steps Kentucky has taken to insure the proper And here this Court notes in Baze and in Harbison, the parties had agreed that if properly administered, the level of sodium thiopental was constitutionally acceptable. This case, this West and Irick case, differs because there is no such agreement here and the Court must therefore continue on and continue on as I have done earlier in this decision to analyze other factors and not stop at the Baze and Harbison analysis. I am going back now to the issues
Page 36
 inadequate and inefficient drug has been injected; that is, to do so so quickly and to do at all. As a factual matter going on now to issue Number 2, at what level is this particular drug; that is, Number 1 sufficient to insure unconsciousness. And although Dr. Li testified that 5 grams of sodium thiopental is fatal or should be fatal, Dr. Li also agreed with Dr. Lubarsky that the amount of sodium thiopental which will can be can provide an assurance that a particular level of this drug will be effective in the body depends on many, many variables. And so although this Court listened very closely to the experts' opinions about this particular issue, this Court is unable to find what level of sodium thiopental is sufficient to insure unconsciousness because I don't think there is

- unconsciousness because I don't think there is
 - 20 one, given the medical proof that the Court is
 - 21 relying on; given the medical proof in the case.
 - Number 3, is there a feasible and 22
 - 23 readily available alternative procedure which
 - ²⁴ could be supplied at execution to insure
 - 25 unconsciousness and negate any objectively

20 of severe suffering or pain during the

21 execution. And I should go back to issue 22 Number 1, and say the objectively intolerable

23 risk of severe pain -- suffering or pain during

the execution is the injection of the second

²⁵ drug, the paralyzing drug after the first

Gayle Ray	November 19, 201
Page 37	Page 38
 intolerable risk of severe suffering or pain? It appears to this Court that there are feasible and readily available alternative procedures which could be supplied at execution to insure unconsciousness and negate any objectively intolerable risk of severe suffering or pain. This Court should not say or find which of those it would recommend, but I think the Court's finding of fact regarding the ways the various ways that unconsciousness can be checked should be left to the State. But the proof in the Harbison case that was filed in this case, the the facts that were gleaned from Mr. Voorhies' testimony in which and from other state protocols in which checks for consciousness were overt and explicit and intentional indicate that there are various ways to go to do that and it should be done. Number 4, did the State refuse to adopt this alternative and without justification adhere to its current method? Well, the State 	 checking for consciousness or unconsciousness, and given the other protocols that have been filed in with Court, given the approach taken by taken in Ohio as testified to by Mr. Voorhies, it does seem that the State should have figured out some way some simple way, should have adopted one of the simple ways which appears to be used in other states to check on, to make sure that the prisoner was unconscious, and this Court cannot find a justification for not checking on consciousness on unconsciousness. I just don't think there is a justification that this Court can understand. And back just for a moment to Issue Number 2. I think the Court should say that it cannot state there is no level of sodium thiopental sufficient to insure unconsciousness. This Court does not find there is no level whatsoever, but this Court does not know what it would be. And Lawyers is there anything else I ought to do? Is there anything any housekeeping issue that should be addressed that
Page 39 1 plaintiffs are aware of, Your Honor. 2 MR. HUDSON: Nothing from the 3 defendants, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Okay. Lawyers, I will 5 be here on Monday and Tuesday to sign anything 6 that I need to sign. Too late for me to sign 7 anything today, but like I said I will be here 8 Monday and Tuesday, and appreciate our patience. 9 We are now adjourned. 10 11 12 13 14 15	1 COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 STATE OF TENNESSEE: 3 COUNTY OF DAVIDSON: 4 I, LEILA ZUPKUS, Court Reporter and Notary 5 Public, Davidson County, Tennessee, CERTIFY: 6 1. The foregoing proceeding was taken before me 7 at the time and place stated in the foregoing 8 styled cause with the appearances as noted; 9 2. Being a Court Reporter, I then reported the 10 proceeding in Stenotype to the best of my skill 11 and ability, and the foregoing pages contain a 12 full, true and correct transcript of my said 13 Stenotype notes then and there taken; 14 3. I am not in the employ of and am not related 15 to any of the parties or their counsel, and I 16 have no interest in the matter involved. 17 WITNESS MY SIGNATURE, this, the
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	<pre>17 WITNESS MY SIGNATURE, this, the 18 22nd day of November, 2010. 19 20 21 22 23 24 LEILA ZUPKUS NOLAN, TLCR 25 My commission expires: June 30, 2012</pre>

Stephen Michael West v. Gayle Ray

Gayle Ray		1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		November 19, 2010
	1 17 02 10	15.00		
	4:17;23:12	15:20	advise (1)	19:9,23;28:7
1	31 (1)	accustomed (1)	26:5	appears (6)
	- 23:12	13:23	advised (2)	13:25;14:10;21:25;
	23.12			
1 (4)		across (2)	23:1;24:2	22:6;37:2;38:8
10:12;23:21;35:22;	4	17:7;23:2	afoul (1)	applicable (1)
36:6		act (1)	5:15	29:13
	4 (1)	19:15	Again (1)	
1.25 (1)		1		applying (1)
11:11	37:20	acting (2)	34:11	28:12
10.2 (1)		6:13;11:12	against (2)	appreciate (2)
17:21	5	actionable (1)	5:3,20	4:6;39:8
		30:25		
100 (2)			agree (5)	approach (1)
11:23;12:2	5 (11)	active (2)	12:19,20;19:8,9;35:13	38:3
11 (2)	9:1;11:8;13:5;14:23;	14:20,21	agreed (2)	appropriate (1)
10:17;19:24	17:15;19:21,23;20:17;	actively (1)	34:16;36:9	25:21
		24:11		1
14th (1)	23:19;36:8;37:25		agreement (3)	appropriately (1)
29:14	50 (1)	actual (1)	31:22;33:21;34:20	23:8
15 (1)	17:24	35:11	ahead (1)	approximately (1)
20:24	553 (1)	actually (3)	22:22	18:22
	29:11	6:22;24:8;30:5		
15-year-old (1)	29:11		air (4)	April (2)
4:18		adapt (1)	15:7,9,10,12	22:10;23:15
18.9 (1)	7	9:25	allowed (3)	area (1)
		add (1)	5:1;8:15;19:24	10:23
17:21	7 (2)	22:7		
19 (1)	7 (3)		allows (1)	argues (4)
22:10	5:2;22:10;23:19	addition (1)	10:8	6:3,24;8:24;32:5
1977 (1)	702 (4)	22:15	alterative (1)	arm (2)
	13:15;26:15;27:20;	additional (1)	31:7	23:3;33:3
27:13		4:25	alternative (7)	
	28:13			arms (1)
2	703 (3)	address (1)	8:3;9:21;10:1;31:10;	10:21
	26:23;27:20;28:13	31:5	36:23;37:3,21	arrest (1)
2 (2)		addressed (2)	alternatives (1)	12:16
2 (2)	8	38:23,24	31:5	
36:5;38:15	0			arrow (1)
2.5 (1)		adequate (1)	although (6)	23:9
11:10	8 (1)	24:16	6:18;7:20;28:9,25;	article (1)
	20:19	adequately (1)	36:7,14	16:19
20 (3)		7:12		
21:23,23;23:15	8.31 (1)		amended (2)	ascertaining (1)
200 (2)	17:23	adhere (2)	32:14;33:5	22:8
12:14,15	8th (5)	10:1;37:22	Amendment (6)	asserts (4)
	29:12;30:8,17;31:1,16	adhering (1)	29:12,14;30:8,17;	6:5,18;8:12,16
2007 (12)	29.12,50.0,17,51.1,10	31:13	31:1,16	assess (4)
5:17;6:1;7:2,14;9:11;	0	1		
10:12,13;20:7,24;22:11;	9	adjourned (1)	Among (1)	20:11;21:18;24:3,14
23:15;35:3		39:9	21:13	assessing (2)
	9 (1)	administered (7)	amount (7)	21:11;26:4
2008 (1)		5:25;6:20;7:10;11:2,	8:25;9:9;12:14;17:5;	assessment (1)
29:12	20:7			
2010 (2)	955 (1)	14;33:23;34:17	35:2,8;36:10	21:3
4:17;5:2	27:12	administering (2)	amounts (2)	assist (4)
24 (1)		32:17;34:9	11:15:17:19	13:11;26:17;27:23;
	Α	administration (6)	analysis (2)	28:6
20:19	A			
25 (3)		10:14;21:4,5,20;26:7;	34:2,24	assistant (1)
21:22,23,23	ability (1)	34:14	analyze (3)	14:4
257 (1)	35:11	administrator (1)	19:14;29:1;34:23	assurance (1)
	able (2)	19:19	anesthesia (1)	36:12
27:13			11:13	
27 (1)	15:13;33:8	admissibility (2)		assure (2)
18:8	academic (1)	27:15,18	anesthesiologist (2)	22:14;29:5
29 (1)	13:19	admissible (1)	13:18;14:1	attenuated (1)
	acceptable (3)	27:6	anesthetic (5)	34:12
23:5		admits (1)	24:3,11,15,25;26:4	authored (1)
2d (1)	31:24;33:24;34:18			
27:13	accepted (2)	16:15	anesthetized (1)	15:24
	28:8,21	adopt (4)	23:9	author's (1)
3	accident (1)	9:25;28:9;31:10;37:20	anticipated (1)	16:21
5		adopted (3)	15:22	autopsies (3)
	30:19			
3 (5)	According (4)	20:5;33:5;38:7	apparatus (1)	17:12,18;18:20
22:9;23:4,11,18;36:22	6:9;7:13;10:19;19:5	advantages (1)	11:4	autopsy (5)
30 (2)	accurate (1)	31:11	appear (3)	6:24;9:5;16:2;17:24;
30(7)			1 • • • · ·	

<u> </u>		1	r	1000ember 19, 2010
18:18	14:21;15:9;18:23;19:10,	10:17;11:5,6	13:19	conducted (2)
available (4)	15;36:13	catheters (2)	close (3)	25:11;28:23
7:21;9:21;36:23;37:3	body's (2)	10:20;11:4	20:17;21:16;22:21	confirm (1)
avoidance (1)	35:11,11	cause (3)	closely (1)	21:18
30:1	bolus (1)	12:16;14:14;30:10	36:15	conflicting (1)
aware (5)	10:18	caused (1)	co-authors (1)	29:4
7:7;12:11;17:16;	both (7)	12:6	16:4	cons (1)
21:25;39:1	10:20;13:9,10,16,19;	certainly (1)	Coe (3)	22:4
	32:11:35:13	26:9	7:7;17:21;18:4	conscious (9)
В	breath (1)	chair (1)	Coe's (1)	7:7;10:9;12:16,22;
	15:9	22:3	18:17	
back (4)	breathe (1)	challenge (1)	collected (1)	15:2,16;18:1,2;32:20
33:25;34:25;35:21;	12:2	31:2	7:20	consciousness (20)
38:14	breathing (2)	challenged (1)	collective (4)	7:23,24;8:19;13:7;
backed (1)	6:21;15:5	16:20	22:9;23:4,11,18	14:3;20:4,22;21:3,11;
16:22	brief (2)	challenges (1)	Commissioner (2)	22:1,8;24:10;26:1;33:2,
background (1)	10:4;23:22	16:22	22:12;23:15	14,20;34:6;37:16;38:1,
14:10	British (1)	chamber (2)	committed (1)	
backup (1)	15:24	10:23;11:1	5:7	consequence (1) 30:20
11:6	bromide (11)	Chancery (1)	committee (8)	
bail (1)	6:19;7:17;10:15;	4:22		consider (1) 28:14
29:15	11:23,24;12:3,4,9,21;	change (1)	21:9,24;22:3,5,12;	
	21:20;32:18	31:14	24:2;25:9;32:23	considered (1) 22:5
barbiturate (1)			committee's (1)	1
11:12	brushing (4)	changes (1)	24:1	consistent (1)
based (3)	21:14;23:2;33:2;34:7	21:15	common (1)	8:11
14:9;18:6;29:6	burden (4) 8:24;10:7;13:4;14:17	character (1)	11:19	Constitution (2)
basis (3)		32:11	commonly (1) 11:13	29:12,25
25:13;26:23,25	burning (1)	chart (1) 18:8		constitutional (2)
Baze (12)	12:17		community (1) 28:21	5:19;29:20
29:10;31:20,21;32:2,	С	check (10)		constitutionally (3)
12;33:15,22,25;34:4,11,	C	20:4,22;23:17;25:3,4,	competency (1) 27:16	31:24;33:24;34:18
15,23	coloulate (1)	4,25;33:13,19;38:8		constitutions (2) 4:25;5:15
becomes (2)	calculate (1) 19:3	checked (1) 37:10	completely (1) 11:25	
14:20,21	California (5)	checking (5)	completes (1)	constricted (1) 22:24
began (1) 14:6	20:25;21:7,8,12,16	22:1;23:1;34:5;38:1,	26:12	consultation (1)
begin (1)	California's (1)	11	complex (1)	20:13
29:18	20:23	checks (3)	19:11	consulted (1)
beginning (1)	called (3)	25:10,14;37:16	compliance (1)	23:25
13:24	13:9,17;19:17	chemical (3)	13:15	contends (2)
		13:12;16:13;18:7	comprehension (1)	5:22;8:9
begins (2) 6:16;10:19	calling (2) 6:21;34:6	chemicals (1)	15:21	contentions (1)
		21:6	con (1)	8:6
believes (1) 34:4	can (9)	China (1)	22:6	continue (4)
	15:15;19:2;22:21;	14:7	conceded (2)	20:16;29:9;34:21,21
Bell (2) 22:17,17	30:5;31:15;36:11,11; 37:10;38:13	chloride (6)	14:22;19:12	continued (3)
,	capital (3)	7:17;10:16;12:7,14,	concedes (2)	14:8;18:3;25:15
bench (2) 4:9,9	5:6;8:14;29:19	18;21:21	16:16;32:2	Continuing (1)
,		· ·	concentration (4)	11:21
Bend (1)	cardiac (1)	choose (1) 29:3	9:10;11:10;35:2,9	contracted (1)
11:2 h act (1)	12:16	Circuit (1)		14:5
best (1)	carried (3) 10:7;13:4;14:17	31:18	concerning (1) 23:14	conversation (2)
7:22			concluded (1)	22:16;23:14
better (1)	carrying (3)	citation (1)	32:14	convincing (2)
9:6	25:18;29:21;30:2	31:25		17:1,2
blameless (1)	case (26) 4:14;5:1,21;11:7;13:3,	citizens (1) 4:5	concluding (1) 19:14	corrections (4)
30:16		1	conclusions (1)	19:18;20:5,25;23:24
blood (8)	9,12;17:8,14,22;26:25;	claim (1) 30:13	29:2	counsel (1)
9:7;16:1,8,13;17:6,17;	29:11;31:19,22,25;32:1; 33:21;34:2,4,19,19;35:1,	clause (1)	condemned (10)	23:24
18:7;19:6 board-certified (1)	14;36:21;37:12,13	29:14	4:15;5:6;6:5,14,20;	counselor (1)
13:18	cases (2)	clear (1)	7:5;21:3,17,18;31:1	23:13
body (10)	30:2,24	29:25	conditions (1)	countered (1)
6:8;12:8,18;13:13;	catheter (3)	clinician (1)	30:8	16:23
0.0,12.0,10,13.13,	catheter (5)		50.0	

Gayle Ray			1	November 19, 2010
country (2)	death (14)	5:10	5:24;6:4;7:25;10:14;	9:5;14:5,11
14:8;17:7	5:11;6:23;9:7;10:8;	determining (2)	11:1;13:13;22:22;26:8;	
County (1)	12:11,22;13:14;14:15,	28:14;33:1	32:7;34:10	exams (1) 15:25
4:22	15,25;15:2;16:12;19:4;	diaphragm (2)		
course (3)	30:20	6:8;12:1	due (1) 29:13	excellent (1)
16:2;24:1,25	deaths (2)	1 .		13:22
COURT (57)		died (1)	during (12)	excessive (2)
	7:8;18:6	13:2	7:16;9:14,19;11:15;	29:15,16
4:4,5,16,22;5:12,16;	Debbie (1)	differences (1)	13:7;21:19;22:14;24:1;	executed (7)
8:7,9,23;9:8,15;10:4,10;	23:23	18:24	33:10;35:7,20,23	4:15,19;7:6;16:3,5;
13:10;14:1,11;15:21;	December (1)	different (4)		17:13;18:11
16:25;20:22;26:14;27:7,	5:2	17:3,3;18:23;24:3	E	execution (35)
13,17,22;28:10,13,25;	decency (1)	differs (1)		4:24;5:2,17,23;6:1;
29:3,5,9,11;30:3,24;	8:12	34:19	earlier (2)	8:3,5,20;9:14,19,22;
31:17,18;32:13,18;	decent (1)	difficult (1)	21:1;34:22	10:5,6,23;11:1,3;15:17;
33:12,17;34:4,15,21;	34:4	16:4	easy (1)	16:12;18:20;20:10;
35:1,8,16;36:15,16,20;	decide (4)	disagreed (1)	4:7	21:18;22:15;25:1,19;
37:2,7;38:3,10,13,15,18,	9:8,15;35:1,16	33:13	education (3)	29:22;30:18;31:3,14;
19;39:4	decided (2)	disallow (1)	14:7,10;26:21	32:19;33:10;35:7,21,24;
courts (1)	8:10;37:23	27:7	effect (3)	36:24;37:4
8:10	decision (3)	disbursed (1)	6:17;18:24;34:11	executioner (4)
Court's (3)	10:4;34:3,22	11:9	effective (2)	11:7,22;12:13;20:16
4:9;15:21;37:8	declaratory (1)	disciplines (1)	20:6;36:13	executioners (3)
create (2)	4:23	19:13	effectively (2)	7:11;20:15;33:7
9:13;35:5	decrease (2)	discretion (1)	21:10;31:5	executions (5)
creates (1)	16:14;34:8	27:17	efforts (1)	7:2;18:22;19:20;20:7;
9:2	decreased (1)	dispute (1)	8:5	30:2
crime (1)	19:7	12:23	either (1)	Exhibit (15)
5:7	deepen (1)	distinguish (1)	30:19	18:8;20:18,19,19;
crimes (1)	11:17	32:9	element (1)	21:22,23;22:9,10;23:4,5,
5:10	default (1)	distinguishing (2)	6:22	11,12,18,19,21
critical (1)	4:19	31:19;32:11	eliminates (1)	expected (1)
26:6	defendants (2)		12:5	16:10
		District (3)		
criticism (1)	5:4;39:3	32:13;33:12,17	Elkins (1)	experience (3)
16:23	deficient (1)	disturbing (1)	23:12	12:11;14:12;26:20
critics (1)	32:15	15:6	else (1)	experienced (3)
16:22	definitive (1)	doctors (1)	38:21	7:8;13:25;19:19
cruel (8)	22:25	13:17	enhanced (1)	expert (10)
5:20;6:1;8:3;10:6;	demand (1)	document (1)	33:14	7:19;9:4,5,6;14:1,2;
29:16;30:6,22;31:15	30:1	22:2	enough (1)	26:20,25;27:2,16
CSX (1)	demeanor (1)	documented (1)	17:9	expertise (1)
27:12	29:2	31:11	entire (1)	14:9
current (9)	department (4)	done (3)	6:8	experts (12)
5:22;9:9;10:2,5;31:13,	19:18;20:5,25;23:23	25:25;34:22;37:19	equivalent (1)	13:10,11,16;19:8;
19;35:2,8;37:22	depend (1)	dose (1)	16:11	25:21;26:3,3,5,15,24;
	19:7	33:19	error (2)	27:4;35:13
D	depending (1)	doubt (1)	28:19:29:24	expert's (2)
	19:10	14:9	establish (4)	28:22;29:8
dangers (1)	depends (2)	Dr (21)	8:18;30:7,20;32:12	experts' (1)
30:11	35:12;36:13	7:19;8:17;9:5;13:17,	established (1)	36:15
data (14)	depositive (1)	20;14:4;15:4,13,20,23;	10:22	explain (4)
7:19,24;16:5,6,7,17,	19:25	16:3,18,25;17:11;18:4,	evaluation (1)	16:6,7;18:15;19:3
18;18:8;26:24;27:6,9,	depth (5)	22;19:5,12;36:7,9,10	14:3	explained (4)
25;28:7;29:7	24:4,11,15,25;26:4	draw (1)	even (1)	15:4,23;16:3;30:12
Daubert (1)		19:13	18:18	explanations (1)
28:11	Deputy (1) 22:12	drug (36)	event (1)	13:23
			25:23	
Davidson (1)	Despite (1)	5:17;6:6,7,9,10,13,16,		explicit (1) 37:17
4:22	33:4	16,19;7:18;8:1;11:11,	evidence (13)	1
Davis (1)		25;12:7,13,15,24;13:1,6;	7:22;13:16;26:18;	explicitly (1)
	determination (1)		07.7 10 00 00 05 00 4 5	12.17
22:3	28:2	14:20;15:14;17:17,19;	27:7,18,20,23,25;28:4,5,	23:17
22:3 days (1)	28:2 determine (7)	14:20;15:14;17:17,19; 18:7,24;19:3;22:19,20;	15,17,20	exposure (1)
22:3 days (1) 18:19	28:2 determine (7) 20:12;24:9;26:18;	14:20;15:14;17:17,19; 18:7,24;19:3;22:19,20; 26:11;34:14;35:12,25,	15,17,20 evidentiary (1)	exposure (1) 30:7
22:3 days (1)	28:2 determine (7)	14:20;15:14;17:17,19; 18:7,24;19:3;22:19,20;	15,17,20	exposure (1)

Gayle Ray				November 19, 2010
extremely (1)	10:11;37:9	23:6	high (1)	increased (1)
15:6	findings (2)	general (4)	17:9	15:21
eyelash (2)	20:21;26:13	19:5;23:24;27:14;	higher (3)	indeed (1)
21:15;23:1	finds (3)	28:21	16:9;18:16,17	
eyelashes (2)	16:25;20:22;35:8	generally (1)		20:13
33:3;34:7	fines (1)	28:8	holding (1)	independent (1)
eyes (1)			33:13	28:23
	29:16	gently (1)	Honor (2)	indicate (4)
22:23	finger (1)	21:13	39:1,3	22:18;25:22;28:1;
T.	23:2	Georgia (1)	hope (1)	37:17
F	first (13)	29:19	17:8	indicated (1)
	6:6,10;11:5,7,8;13:4;	given (10)	hoping (1)	26:10
face (1)	15:4;22:19;26:10,14;	8:23;12:21;15:17;	4:11	indicates (1)
31:11	32:13;34:14;35:25	22:20;30:23;34:12;	horrific (1)	27:9
faces (1)	Five (1)	36:20,21;38:2,3	5:11	individuals (1)
5:2	28:22	glass (1)	hours (1)	30:4
fact (13)	Florida (2)	33:9	18:21	induce (1)
7:5;8:22;13:11;19:22;	20:4,17	gleaned (1)	housekeeping (1)	11:15
20:21;26:13,18,19;	flush (3)	37:14	38:23	inefficient (1)
27:24,24;28:6;31:8;37:9	11:22;12:12;22:20	goes (1)	HUDSON (1)	36:1
factories (1)	focus (3)	24:23	39:2	inescapable (1)
13:22	5:16;12:24;13:12	1		30:19
		good (1) 16:19	human (1)	
factors (3) 19:14;28:11;34:23	focuses (1) 8:17		18:23	inference (2)
		govern (1)	humane (2)	27:1,8
facts (10)	follow (1)	27:18	8:5;29:23	inferences (1)
10:10;13:8;20:3,20;	20:8	Government (1)	humans (1)	27:5
26:24;27:6,9,25;28:6;	followed (2)	14:5	15:6	inflicted (1)
37:13	13:6;32:3	Governor (1)	-	29:17
factual (4)	following (7)	23:13	I	inflicting (1)
9:15;15:19;35:15;36:4	11:22;12:12;16:21;	grams (10)		30:5
fails (1)	20:8;21:4;22:5;29:24	9:1;11:8,11;13:5;	ideal (1)	Inglis (1)
11:7	follows (1)	14:23;17:15;19:21,23;	14:2	23:23
failure (3)	29:20	36:8;37:25	identified (1)	inherent (1)
20:4,21;33:13	foot (1)	great (1)	8:7	29:22
fairly (1)	24:20	15:11	illness (1)	injected (9)
16:10	form (2)	greatly (1)	30:10	7:25;8:1;12:10,19;
falling (1)	26:21;27:8	33:14	illuminate (1)	14:21;15:15;17:15;
18:13	former (4)	Gregg (1)	32:11	19:22;36:2
far (2)	22:10;23:5,11,19	29:19	immediately (1)	injecting (1)
7:20;17:16	formerly (1)	guards (1)	20:8	37:23
fast (1)	28:20	7:15	imminent (1)	injection (21)
6:13	forming (1)		30:11	4:20,20;7:4,16;8:11,
fatal (5)	27:4	Н	imperfect (1)	13;9:11;10:6,13,18;
6:22;19:23,24;36:8,9	found (3)		7:21	11:6;13:5,6;15:18;20:6,
feasible (4)	13:10;15:20;19:6	half (2)	impetus (1)	23;21:8,12;25:15;35:4,
9:20;31:7;36:22;37:2	Four (3)	17:25;18:1	15:5	24
	9:24;11:9;28:19	Harbison (14)	implemented (1)	injections (2)
federal (4)	, ,			10:18;20:9
4:24;5:15;8:10;28:10	fourth (1)	23:20;31:18,21,22,25;	31:8	
fell (1)	25:4	32:1,2,9,12;33:12,22;	importance (1)	injects (3)
18:12	Frye (1)	34:16,24;37:12	26:6	11:8,23;12:13
field (2)	28:20	harm (7)	important (1)	inmate (25)
27:4;28:23	fully (1)	9:2;30:4,14,15,21,25;	26:11	4:15;5:7,23;10:24,25;
figured (1)	6:14	31:6	imposed (1)	12:17;20:11,13,14;21:4,
38:6	function (1)	hearing (9)	29:16	14,17,19;22:14,18;
filed (3)	6:11	10:12;20:18,18;21:22;	inadequate (1)	24:22;25:20;26:6;32:2,
4:21;37:13;38:3		00 0 00 4 11 10 07 0	36:1	16,20,24;33:7,8,15
	Further (6)	22:9;23:4,11,18;27:3		
final (1)		heart (1)	include (1)	inmates (1)
	Further (6)			
final (1)	Further (6) 7:9;13:8;16:23;32:8;	heart (1)	include (1)	inmates (1)
final (1) 12:13	Further (6) 7:9;13:8;16:23;32:8; 34:1,1	heart (1) 6:9	include (1) 23:7	inmates (1) 18:12
final (1) 12:13 find (5) 10:4;36:17;37:7;	Further (6) 7:9;13:8;16:23;32:8; 34:1,1 future (1)	heart (1) 6:9 heinous (1) 5:7	include (1) 23:7 included (2) 20:7;33:2	inmates (1) 18:12 inmate's (9)
final (1) 12:13 find (5) 10:4;36:17;37:7; 38:10,18	Further (6) 7:9;13:8;16:23;32:8; 34:1,1 future (1) 30:4	heart (1) 6:9 heinous (1) 5:7 Henley (3)	include (1) 23:7 included (2) 20:7;33:2 incorporated (1)	inmates (1) 18:12 inmate's (9) 7:23;10:20;13:7;
final (1) 12:13 find (5) 10:4;36:17;37:7; 38:10,18 finder (1)	Further (6) 7:9;13:8;16:23;32:8; 34:1,1 future (1)	heart (1) 6:9 heinous (1) 5:7 Henley (3) 7:6;17:23;18:5	include (1) 23:7 included (2) 20:7;33:2 incorporated (1) 21:12	inmates (1) 18:12 inmate's (9) 7:23;10:20;13:7; 18:20;19:4;22:23;24:3, 20;34:6
final (1) 12:13 find (5) 10:4;36:17;37:7; 38:10,18	Further (6) 7:9;13:8;16:23;32:8; 34:1,1 future (1) 30:4	heart (1) 6:9 heinous (1) 5:7 Henley (3)	include (1) 23:7 included (2) 20:7;33:2 incorporated (1)	inmates (1) 18:12 inmate's (9) 7:23;10:20;13:7; 18:20;19:4;22:23;24:3,

Gayle Ray				140vember 19, 2010
inserted (1)	10:1;31:12,13;37:21;	9:16,16;11:17;15:25;	16:18	4:20,23;5:18;8:13;
10:20	38:10,13	16:8,11;17:2,8,16;18:7,	maladministration (1)	10:2;22:7;29:22;30:18;
Instead (7)	20110,12	16,24;19:3;23:17;31:23;		31:2,13,15;37:22
6:12;8:4;17:20;29:5;	K	34:17;35:16,17;36:5,12,	man (4)	methodology (1)
31:4;32:5;33:6		17;38:16,18	6:5,14,20;7:5	28:16
Institution (1)	keep (2)	levels (8)	mandated (3)	methods (3)
		7:1,22;8:18;17:20;		
11:3	6:14;7:4		9:1,10;35:3	21:10;29:7;32:25
insufficient (3)	Kentucky (1)	18:9,10;19:6,9	manner (1)	Metro (1)
9:12;35:4,10	34:13	Li (8)	14:15	14:5
insure (18)	kill (2)	9:5;14:4;18:4,22;19:5,	many (8)	milligrams (7)
7:13;9:12,17,22;	6:4;12:3	12;36:7,9	5:8;15:1;19:11,13,13;	11:23;12:2,15;17:21,
14:18;17:9,19;23:8;	kind (1)	liability (1)	35:12;36:14,14	22,23,25
32:24;34:13;35:4,10,18;	16:12	28:14	marginally (1)	minutes (3)
36:6,18,24;37:4;38:17	KISSINGER (1)	life (1)	31:4	19:25;22:11,16
insures (2)	38:25	15:8	materially (1)	moment (1)
14:23,24	knowledge (3)	lifting (2)	34:8	38:14
insuring (1)	14:12;26:17,20	23:2;33:3	matter (4)	Monday (2)
32:16	known (2)	lightly (2)	9:15;29:23;35:15;36:4	39:5,8
intended (1)	27:2;28:19	21:14;33:2	matters (1)	monitor (1)
6:4	knows (1)	likely (2)	14:14	24:24
intentional (1)	9:5	22:7;30:9	Maximum (1)	monitored (1)
37:17		limitations (1)	11:2	33:9
interfere (2)	L	25:9	may (9)	monitoring (2)
5:12,13		limited (2)	5:12,13;20:7,24;	23:10;24:11
intervene (1)	lack (3)	7:20;8:6	26:21;27:1;28:13;29:3;	more (1)
5:1	15:12;27:9;28:1	lines (2)	30:18	16:17
into (4)	Lancet (2)	10:21;11:24	maybe (1)	mother (1)
11:9,24;21:12;23:22	15:25;16:16	list (1)	24:19	4:18
intolerable (10)	language (2)	28:11	McDaniel (1)	move (2)
9:2,13,18,23;30:14;	13:24,24	listed (1)	27:12	24:20;26:13
35:6,19,22;37:1,6	large (1)	22:4	mean (2)	movements (1)
intravenous (1)	10:17	listened (1)	24:23;25:20	12:5
10:16	late (2)	36:15	means (1)	moving (1)
introduce (1)	4:7;39:6	liter (4)	29:21	6:21
23:16	law (7)	17:21,22,23,25	measure (1)	much (1)
involuntary (1)	26:14;27:11;29:10;	litigation (1)	37:24	16:14
12:5	32:1,10,13;34:1	28:24	measured (1)	murdered (1)
involving (1)	laws (1)	Little (2)	17:17	4:17
5:5	5:9	23:15,21	measures (2)	muscle (2)
Irick (2)	lawsuit (1)	look (1)	11:16;16:9	11:25;12:5
5:1:34:19	12:25	24:19	medical (16)	must (11)
issue (11)	Lawyers (3)	looking (2)	9:4;13:9,10,16,21,22,	20:12;27:22;28:25;
15:10;17:14;20:1;	4:5;38:21;39:4	22:23;26:14	25;14:4,7,11,16;18:3;	29:5,21;30:9,13;31:5,7;
		looks (1)	23:10;35:13;36:20,21	34:21:35:1
26:19;27:24;34:12;	leave (1)	8:4	medication (3)	54.21,55.1
35:21;36:5,16;38:14,23	10:22		19:6,8,15	N
issued (1)	left (2)	lower (2) 16:10;17:7	medicine (1)	
20:24	27:16;37:11		23:10	name (1)
issues (4)	legal (1)	Lubarsky (11)	1	34:6
5:21;9:8;13:12;34:25	4:20	7:19;13:17,20;15:4,	meeting (1) 23:7	
IV (1)	legislature (1)	13,20,23;16:3,18;17:11;	1	narrow (1)
11:24	5:8	36:10	member (2)	5:16
IVs (1)	legislatures (1)	Lubarsky's (2)	19:1;20:10	native (1)
7:10	5:9	8:17;16:25	men (2)	14:7
	legitimacy (1)	lungs (1)	7:6;17:18	naturally (1)
J	8:22	6:7	mentioned (1)	16:14
	legitimate (2)	ъл	22:13	nature (1)
journal (1)	29:4;31:12	M	MEQ (1)	30:24
15:25	lethal (16)		12:15	necessarily (2)
judgment (2)	4:20;5:17,24;8:10,13;	machine (1)	mere (1)	28:2;29:20
4:23;5:14	9:11;10:5,12;18:10,14;	24:5	29:8	necessary (2) 25:23;26:5
			monolar (7)	121111111
Julian (1)	20:6,23;21:7,12;25:15;	majority (1)	merely (2)	
	20:6,23;21:7,12;25:15; 35:3 level (23)	majority (1) 8:14 makes (1)	29:1;31:3 method (12)	necessity (2) 21:25;33:16

		T		
need (6)	one-way (1)	35:25	pinch (1)	30:12
11:4;15:9;19:12;22:7;	33:9	paren (2)	24:21	prevent (3)
27:6;39:6	only (4)	22:20,21	pinching (3)	6:20;15:1,2
needed (1)	5:12,13;10:25;29:23	part (1)	23:3;25:20;33:3	prevents (1)
25:6	operation (1)	18:7	pinprick (1)	30:15
needless (1)	12:6	particular (10)	24:20	previous (1)
30:10	opine (1)	14:25;19:15;24:9,19;	place (2)	18:11
negate (5)	14:14	26:25;27:4;34:2;36:5,	21:16;32:24	prick (1)
9:18,23;35:19;36:25;	opined (1)	12,16	plaintiff (24)	23:3
37:5	18:4	parties (3)	4:15,25;5:6,21;6:3,5,	primary (2)
new (1)	opinion (8)	12:19;13:9;34:16	10,12,18,24;7:6,9,14,18;	15:5,10
20:5	4:12;18:6;26:22,23;	passed (1)	8:2;9:3;10:7;12:24,25;	principals (3)
nine (1)	27:1,8,13,14	5:9	13:3,17;14:17,22;15:13	26:14;29:10;32:10
19:20	opinions (3)	past (2)	plaintiffs (1)	principle (2)
nipple (1)	27:5;29:6;36:16	11:13;14:6	39:1	29:18;32:1
33:4	option (1)	pathology (1)	plaintiff's (2)	principles (3)
nipples (1)	22:2	14:13	8:24;9:6	27:11;32:13;34:1
23:4	options (1)	patience (2)	pleading (1)	prior (1)
non-exclusive (1)	22:4	4:6;39:8	30:16	21:19
28:11	order (2)	patient (3)	Please (1)	prison (2)
nor (4)	4:16;14:14	15:6,7,11	4:4	30:15;33:6
7:12;16:23;29:15,16	ordered (1)	peer (2)	plurality (1)	prisoner (12)
normał (2)	20:15	16:19;28:17	34:3	7:13,16;10:9;12:1,10;
18:9,13	Others (1)	· ·		
	23:21	penalogical (1)	point (6)	13:2;14:19;15:16;16:2;
noted (3)		31:12	16:19;20:10,10;24:9,	31:1;33:9;38:9
21:9;32:18;33:18	otherwise (1)	penalty (2)	19,22	prisoners (4)
notes (3)	26:22	5:11,14	pointed (1)	16:5;17:6,9,12
23:6,14;34:15	ought (1)	people (2)	21:1	prisoner's (1)
November (1)	38:22	4:7;17:3	pointing (1)	12:7
4:17	out (7)	per (4)	23:9	procedure (9)
noxious (1)	6:21;21:1;24:23;	17:21,22,23,25	pose (1)	9:21;20:6,8;22:15;
34:8	25:18;29:21;30:2;38:6	perceived (1)	32:4	29:24;31:4,7;32:16;
Number (17)	outset (1)	27:1	posed (1)	36:23
9:20;10:12;19:1;	33:18	percent (1)	23:24	procedures (4)
21:22,23;22:9,10;23:18,	over (4)	11:10	Possible (1)	7:15;32:23;33:17;37:3
21;24:2;35:15,22;36:5,6,	19:24;23:17;24:11,25	perfect (1)	32:25	proceed (1)
22;37:20;38:15	overt (1)	16:16	postdeath (1)	20:16
0	37:16	perfectly (1)	19:16	Proceeding (2)
0	own (1)	32:3	postmortem (8)	20:20;32:20
	12:10	performed (2)	6:25;7:21,23;8:17;	process (7)
objective (1)		18:19,21	16:9;18:10,15;19:7	5:13,14;10:19;24:12;
21:2	Р	person (5)	potassium (6)	25:16;29:13;33:10
objectively (11)		6:6;10:25;12:4;14:25;	7:17;10:16;12:7,14,	processes (1)
9:2,13,18,23;30:14,21;				
	Page (6)	23:8	18;21:21	29:7
35:5,19,22;36:25;37:5	20:19;21:22,23,23;	personnel (3)	potential (1)	professor (1)
			1 1	professor (1) 13:21
	20:19;21:22,23,23;	personnel (3)	potential (1)	professor (1)
occurs (1) 9:6	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10	potential (1) 28:19	professor (1) 13:21
occurs (1) 9:6	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19)	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1)	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1)	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1)
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17;	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6,	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1)	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1)	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1)
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8 off (1) 16:22	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6, 20,23,23;37:1,6	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1) 23:3	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1) 19:16	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1) 31:5
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8 off (1) 16:22 officials (1)	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6, 20,23,23;37:1,6 pancuronium (11)	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1) 23:3 petitioner (2) 4:21;14:22	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1) 19:16 prediction (1) 15:2	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1) 31:5 prohibition (1)
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8 off (1) 16:22 officials (1) 30:15	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6, 20,23,23;37:1,6 pancuronium (11) 6:19;7:17;10:15;	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1) 23:3 petitioner (2)	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1) 19:16 prediction (1)	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1) 31:5 prohibition (1) 5:19
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8 off (1) 16:22 officials (1) 30:15	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6, 20,23,23;37:1,6 pancuronium (11) 6:19;7:17;10:15; 11:23,24;12:3,4,9,21;	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1) 23:3 petitioner (2) 4:21;14:22 pharmacology (1)	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1) 19:16 prediction (1) 15:2 prepared (1)	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1) 31:5 prohibition (1) 5:19 prolific (1)
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8 off (1) 16:22 officials (1) 30:15 often (1) 25:10	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6, 20,23,23;37:1,6 pancuronium (11) 6:19;7:17;10:15; 11:23,24;12:3,4,9,21; 21:20;32:17	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1) 23:3 petitioner (2) 4:21;14:22 pharmacology (1) 14:13	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1) 19:16 prediction (1) 15:2 prepared (1) 22:2	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1) 31:5 prohibition (1) 5:19 prolific (1) 13:19
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8 off (1) 16:22 officials (1) 30:15 often (1) 25:10 Ohio (2)	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6, 20,23,23;37:1,6 pancuronium (11) 6:19;7:17;10:15; 11:23,24;12:3,4,9,21; 21:20;32:17 paralytic (1)	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1) 23:3 petitioner (2) 4:21;14:22 pharmacology (1) 14:13 phrase (1) 22:6	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1) 19:16 prediction (1) 15:2 prepared (1) 22:2 present (1) 19:21	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1) 31:5 prohibition (1) 5:19 prolific (1) 13:19 proof (8) 7:3;13:9;14:16;18:3;
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8 off (1) 16:22 officials (1) 30:15 often (1) 25:10 Ohio (2) 19:20;38:4	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6, 20,23,23;37:1,6 pancuronium (11) 6:19;7:17;10:15; 11:23,24;12:3,4,9,21; 21:20;32:17 paralytic (1) 11:25	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1) 23:3 petitioner (2) 4:21;14:22 pharmacology (1) 14:13 phrase (1) 22:6 Physician (7)	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1) 19:16 prediction (1) 15:2 prepared (1) 22:2 present (1) 19:21 presented (1)	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1) 31:5 prohibition (1) 5:19 prolific (1) 13:19 proof (8)
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8 off (1) 16:22 officials (1) 30:15 often (1) 25:10 Ohio (2) 19:20;38:4 Once (1)	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6, 20,23,23;37:1,6 pancuronium (11) 6:19;7:17;10:15; 11:23,24;12:3,4,9,21; 21:20;32:17 paralytic (1)	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1) 23:3 petitioner (2) 4:21;14:22 pharmacology (1) 14:13 phrase (1) 22:6 Physician (7) 22:17,22;24:6,13,18;	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1) 19:16 prediction (1) 15:2 prepared (1) 22:2 present (1) 19:21 presented (1) 20:1	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1) 31:5 prohibition (1) 5:19 prolific (1) 13:19 proof (8) 7:3;13:9;14:16;18:3; 27:19;36:20,21;37:12 proper (3)
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8 off (1) 16:22 officials (1) 30:15 often (1) 25:10 Ohio (2) 19:20;38:4 Once (1) 10:21	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6, 20,23,23;37:1,6 pancuronium (11) 6:19;7:17;10:15; 11:23,24;12:3,4,9,21; 21:20;32:17 paralytic (1) 11:25 paralyze (1) 6:7	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1) 23:3 petitioner (2) 4:21;14:22 pharmacology (1) 14:13 phrase (1) 22:6 Physician (7) 22:17,22;24:6,13,18; 25:2,8	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1) 19:16 prediction (1) 15:2 prepared (1) 22:2 present (1) 19:21 presented (1) 20:1 presenting (2)	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1) 31:5 prohibition (1) 5:19 prolific (1) 13:19 proof (8) 7:3;13:9;14:16;18:3; 27:19;36:20,21;37:12 proper (3) 32:15;33:18;34:13
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8 off (1) 16:22 officials (1) 30:15 often (1) 25:10 Ohio (2) 19:20;38:4 Once (1) 10:21 one (12)	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6, 20,23,23;37:1,6 pancuronium (11) 6:19;7:17;10:15; 11:23,24;12:3,4,9,21; 21:20;32:17 paralytic (1) 11:25 paralyze (1) 6:7 paralyzes (1)	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1) 23:3 petitioner (2) 4:21;14:22 pharmacology (1) 14:13 phrase (1) 22:6 Physician (7) 22:17,22;24:6,13,18; 25:2,8 physicians (1)	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1) 19:16 prediction (1) 15:2 prepared (1) 22:2 present (1) 19:21 presented (1) 20:1 presenting (2) 30:9;34:7	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1) 31:5 prohibition (1) 5:19 prolific (1) 13:19 proof (8) 7:3;13:9;14:16;18:3; 27:19;36:20,21;37:12 proper (3)
occurs (1) 9:6 odors (1) 34:8 off (1) 16:22 officials (1) 30:15 often (1) 25:10 Ohio (2) 19:20;38:4 Once (1)	20:19;21:22,23,23; 23:12,19 pain (19) 9:14,19,24;12:17; 15:11;29:22;30:1,5,18; 31:9;32:4,7;33:15;35:6, 20,23,23;37:1,6 pancuronium (11) 6:19;7:17;10:15; 11:23,24;12:3,4,9,21; 21:20;32:17 paralytic (1) 11:25 paralyze (1) 6:7	personnel (3) 7:10,11;23:10 persons (1) 17:25 person's (1) 23:3 petitioner (2) 4:21;14:22 pharmacology (1) 14:13 phrase (1) 22:6 Physician (7) 22:17,22;24:6,13,18; 25:2,8	potential (1) 28:19 practical (1) 25:18 predeath (1) 19:16 prediction (1) 15:2 prepared (1) 22:2 present (1) 19:21 presented (1) 20:1 presenting (2)	professor (1) 13:21 proffer (1) 8:2 proffered (1) 31:5 prohibition (1) 5:19 prolific (1) 13:19 proof (8) 7:3;13:9;14:16;18:3; 27:19;36:20,21;37:12 proper (3) 32:15;33:18;34:13 properly (2)

Gayle Kay	1		7	November 19, 2010
prospect (1)	rapid (4)	20:3;27:14;37:9	30:11	38:5
29:23	10:17,18;11:12;13:6	rejected (1)	risk (24)	senior (1)
protocol (40)	rapidly (1)	33:16	9:2,13,18,23;29:22;	14:4
5:18,19,22;6:1,23;7:2,	11:16	relatively (1)	30:1,4,9,13,14,21,25;	sentence (1)
14;8:11;9:1,11;10:5,8,	rate (1)	21:10	31:6,9;32:4,6;33:14;	23:7
13,13,19;11:9,21;14:18;	28:19	relevancy (1)		1
17:13;20:1,18,23;21:2,8,		27:15	34:9,12;35:6,19,23;37:1,	separately (1)
13,16,24;22:2,7,11,20;	22:12		6	6:4
		relevant (1)	River (1)	serious (3)
31:24;32:3,14,22;33:6,	Ray's (1)	29:6	11:2	30:10,14;31:6
22;35:4;37:23,24	23:6	reliability (2)	Romines (2)	serum (6)
protocols (3)	reach (1)	28:3,12	4:18,19	6:25;7:21;8:18;16:1,9;
8:4;37:15;38:2	8:5	reliable (1)	room (1)	17:6
provide (2)	reaction (1)	21:9	33:7	settled (1)
32:15;36:11	13:13	relied (3)	rough (3)	29:18
provided (1)	reactions (1)	6:14;27:3;33:17	4:10,11;34:5	seven (1)
25:10	17:4	relief (1)	Rule (5)	18:21
provides (1)	read (1)	5:3	13:15;26:15,23;28:8,	severe (10)
29:14	23:22	relying (1)	13	9:13,19,24;31:9;32:6;
providing (1)	readily (4)	36:21	rules (5)	35:6,20,23;37:1,6
13:23	9:20;31:8;36:23;37:3	remain (1)	13:16;27:18,20,22;	severity (1)
provisions (1)	reading (1)	10:23	28:1	15:22
21:2	31:17	render (4)	ruling (5)	shaking (1)
proximity (1)	ready (1)	5:23;6:6,15;33:19	4:9,9;31:18,20,21	21:14
21:17	34:5	rendered (1)	runs (1)	shall (3)
publication (1)	reason (3)	29:11	5:14	20:16;27:7;29:15
28:18	5:25;14:9;21:15	reported (1)		shares (1)
published (4)	reasonably (1)	17:11	S	8:13
13:20;15:24;16:15,20	27:3	reporter (1)	~	Sheila (1)
punishment (7)	reasoning (2)	4:5	safe (2)	4:18
5:6,12,25;6:2;8:15;	31:20,21	reports (2)	7:15;15:1	show (9)
29:19;30:6	reasons (2)	6:24,25	safeguard (1)	6:25;7:22,24;8:25;9:4;
punishments (2)	7:18;9:4	represented (1)	33:11	10:7;13:4;14:17;15:13
5:20;29:17	rebutted (1)	6:11	safeguards (2)	showing (1)
pupils (1)	8:20	require (3)	23:8;33:5	31:3
22:24	recent (1)	24:4;28:2;37:25	safer (1)	shows (4)
purpose (2)	27:21		31:4	17:5,18,24;18:9
12:15;26:10	1	required (4) 28:20;29:15,24;32:19	1	sign (4)
	recognize (1) 30:3		saline (3)	22:25;39:5,6,6
purposes (1)		requirement (1)	11:22;12:12;22:19	
30:17	recommend (2)	28:8	same (4)	signal (1)
put (2)	24:7;37:8	requires (2)	5:3,3;23:6;26:5	22:21
28:4;32:24	recommendation (1)	10:14:37:25	saying (2)	significantly (2)
0	33:4	requiring (1)	24:17,23	18:17;31:8
Q	recommended (1)	5:9	schools (1)	signs (1)
	32:23	research (2)	13:22	29:1
qualifications (2)	record (1)	17:24;28:22	scientific (8)	simple (2)
27:15;29:2	23:22	researcher (1)	26:16;27:19;28:3,4,	38:6,7
qualified (1)	reduce (1)	13:20	15,21;29:5,7	simplistic (1)
26:19	31:9	residency (1)	seated (1)	15:8
qualifies (1)	redundant (1)	14:8	4:4	simply (4)
30:22	13:1	response (4)	second (14)	25:24;28:4;30:5,17
qualify (2)	Rees (1)	16:21;23:1;24:7;25:24	5:24;6:7,16,19;7:25;	single (2)
30:5;31:6	29:10	result (4)	8:1;11:6;12:12;13:6;	18:25;19:1
quickly (1)	referring (1)	10:11;13:7;30:18;32:6	14:20;25:3;26:8;34:9;	site (1)
36:2	28:10	returning (1)	35:24	11:3
quote (1)	reflect (1)	33:1	Security (1)	situations (1)
20:17	22:16	review (5)	11:3	5:5
	refusal (1)	20:24,25;21:8;28:18;	sedation (1)	Sixth (1)
quotes (1)	31:14	32:22	23:18	31:18
20:9				skill (1)
D	refuse (2)	reviewed (1)	seeking (1)	26:20
R	9:25;37:20	16:20	4:22	
(2)	refuses (1)	right (1)	seeks (1)	slightly (1)
range (2)	31:10	24:21	5:3	31:3 small (1)
18:12,14	regarding (3)	rise (1)	seem (1)	small (1)
the state of the second second second				1

somewhat (2)study (1)talking (1)(hreughout (3) $25;33:1;38:9$ soon (1) $25;16:7,15;17:1,5;19:11$ teacher (3) $12:17;21:17;25:15$ unconclosumess (2) $15:14$ subject (2) $13:23;14:2,6$ $39:7$ $14:3;24;24;17:20;2$ $20:21;27:5$ team (3)together (1) $25;35:5,10;18;36;12$ $21:22$ subjected (1) $20:1;27:5$ team (3)together (1) $25;35:5,10;18;36;12$ $21:22$ subjectivel (1) $20:1;27:5$ team (3)together (1) $25;35:5,10;18;36;12$ $24:43;30:21$ subjectivel (1) $20:1;22:3;21:9$ $28:2$ $25;37:5,10;8;36;12$ $26:16$ subjectivel (1) $10:21,22$ $30:21$ $42:45;18;6:1;22;$ $26:16$ subjectivel (1) $10:21,22$ $30:21$ $42:45;18;6:1;22;$ $27:17$ subsequent (1) $23:14$ $23:9$ $30:22;33:1:6$ $27:12:31:19$ substantial (3) $24:18$ $18:10,14$ $27:9;25;28:6$ $29:eulation (1)$ $30:13;31:6,9$ ten (1)toxic (2)underying (3) $29:8$ substantially (3) $18:19$ $14:12$ $4:13$ $28:10$ $30:13;15:6,9$ ten (1)toxicology (2)understands (1) $29:8$ substantially (3) $18:19$ $14:12$ $4:13$ $31:1$ $31:2,11,12:1,12:13;35:32$ trained (1) $13:21$ $28:10$ suffering (1) $21:7;33:15$ $27:19;8:12;12:12:22;23:15:20$ $7:19;8:12;12:12:22;23:15:20$ $31:10,33:11;35:13;6:6,18;$ $21:9;17;12:3;17:19$ $13:21$ <	Gayle Kay				November 19, 2010
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			4:16;8:7,9;27:13;	12,14,18;13:5;14:23;	8:3;27:3
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $			29:11;30:3,24;34:3	15:15;16:1,8,11;17:2,6,	
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	6:10,12;7:1,3;8:18,25;	32:21,25	sure (2)	15;18:11,16;19:10,22,	U
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	9:10,16;10:15;11:8,11,	steps (1)			
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					ultimately (1)
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$					
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$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
			11:10		
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $			т		
somewhat (2)study (1)talking (1)throughout (3) $25;33:1;38:9$ som (1) $25;16:7,15;17:1,5;19:1$ $12:17;21:17;25:15$ unconsciousness (2)15:14subject (2) $13:23;14:2,6$ $39:7$ $14:3,24;24;17:20;2$ sorry (1) $20:21;27:5$ team (3)together (1) $25;35:10,18;36:1$ 21:12subjected (1) $20:1;27:5$ team (3)together (1) $25;35:10,18;36:1$ $24:43;0:21$ subjecting (1) $20:1;25:16;61:1,22;$ $30:4$ under (10) $26:16$ subjecting (1) $26:16$ $24:14,15:26:3$ $32:4$ $26:16$ subjecting (1) $20:1;22:1,62:12;$ $30:21$ $42:45:18,61:1,22;$ specific (1) $30:4$ technicians (2)tolerable (1)under (10) $26:16$ substantial (3) $24:18$ $18:10,14$ $27:9,25:28:6$ specific (1) $30:16$ telling (1)toxic (2)underlying (3) $27:17$ substantial (3) $24:18$ $18:10,14$ $27:9,25:28:6$ speculation (1) $30:13:16,9$ ten (1)toxic (2)understandable (1) $29:8$ substantial (3) $24:18$ $18:10,14$ $27:9,25:28:6$ staff (1) $31:2$ $11:4:18;17:11:21:14:18:11;$ $14:12:14:18:11;$ $21:16$ suffering (12) $14:12:14:18:11;$ $13:14$ $28:10$ $38:17:33:15:26:22;7:28:8,12;$ $15:17$ $32:8$ $31:10:33:1:15;36:6:18;$ $26:29:12:12:12:22;$ $15:17$ $32:12:14:11$ $28:19:17;12:31:15:1226:17;7:14:9:11;$			1		
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$					22:19;24:22;26:7;32:17,
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$		25;16:7,15;17:1,5;19:11			9:12,17,22;11:16,18;
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	15:14		13:23;14:2,6		14:3,24,24;17:20;22:14,
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	sorry (1)	20:21;27:5	team (3)	together (1)	25;35:5,10,18;36:7,19,
sort (2)28:17technical (1)told (3)unconstitutional (1) $24:3,30:21$ subjecting (1) $26:16$ $24:14,15;26:3$ $32:4$ $26:16$ subjectively (1) $10:21,22$ $30:21$ $4:24,51:8,61,22;$ $26:16$ subjectively (1) $10:21,22$ $30:21$ $4:24,51:8,61,22;$ $27:17$ subsequent (1) $23:14$ $23:9$ $30:25;31:16$ $27:12,31:19$ substantial (3) $24:18$ $18:10,14$ $27:9,25;28:6$ $39eculation (1)$ $30:13,31:6,9$ ten (1)toxic (2)under (10) $29:8$ substantial (3) $24:18$ $18:10,14$ $27:9,25;28:6$ 312 substantial (3) $26:17:27:23;28:5$ Tennesse (17)toxicology (2)understandable (1) 312 $312:17:17;23;28:5$ Tennesse (17)toxicology (2)understands (1) $31:1$ $31:12$ $14:18;17:12,14;18:11;$ tragedy (1)understands (1) $28:10$ suffer (2) $27:19,19,21;28:13;22:21$ $7:11$ $8:8$ $31:1,33:18;36:60,23;37:1.6$ sufficient (9) $33:17:23:28;13:23:22:27:19,19,21:21;$ $26:20$ $24:24;28:4.6$ $31:1,03:31:1,37:11,15,$ sufficient (9) $38:17$ $28:16$ $18:8;20:19;21:21;$ $31:16,20:11,21;$ $31:1,03:31:1,37:11,15,$ suffocter (1) $19:20;28:15;36:7;38:4$ $22:23:1:15$ $22:23:1:15$ $31:1,03:31:1,37:11,15,$ suffocter (1) $19:20;28:15;36:7;38:4$ $22:23:1:15$ $22:23:1:15$ $31:1,03:31:1,37:11,15,$ suffocter (1) $19:20;28:15;36:7;38:4$	21:22	subjected (1)	20:11,25;32:19	28:2	25;37:5,10;38:1,12,17
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	sort (2)	28:17	technical (1)	told (3)	
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$		subjecting (1)			
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	specialized (1)		technicians (2)	tolerable (1)	
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$		subjectively (1)			
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
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$\begin{array}{l lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$					
29:8 substantially (3) 18:19 14:12 4:13 stable (1) 26:17;27:23;28:5 Tennessee (17) toxicology (2) understands (1) 16:13 successfully (1) 31:2 5:8;6:22;7:2;8:8,12; toxicology (2) 13:1 staff (1) 31:2 14:18;17;12,14;18:11; tragedy (1) understands (1) 28:10 suffering (12) Tennessee's (7) 7:11 8:8 standards (1) 9:3,14,19,24;15:11,22; 4:16;5:17;7:14;9:11; training (1) undest (3) standards (1) 9:3,14,19,24;15:11,22; 4:16;5:17;7:14;9:11; training (1) unless (3) standards (1) 9:3,14,19,24;15:11,22; 4:16;5:17;7:14;9:11; training (1) unless (3) standards (1) 9:3,14,19,24;15:11,22; 4:16;5:17;7:14;9:11; trainsportation (1) unless (3) standing (1) sufficient (9) 8:21;9:17;12:3;17:19; 33:11;35:18;36:6;18; testef (1) Trial (11) unnecessary (2) state (25) sufficiently (3) testified (4) 22:10;23:5;12,19:27:17; unuecessary (2) stated (5) sufficiently (3) testified (4) 22:10;23:5;12,19:27:17;					
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$					
16:13successfully (1)5:8;6:22;7:2;8:8,12;6:25;14:1313:1staff (1)31:214:18;17:12,14;8:11;tragedy (1)undetected (1)21:16suffer (2)21:24;22:11;23:23;15:1732:8standard (1)12:17;33:1527:19,12,128:13;32:22;trained (1)United (1)28:10suffering (12)7:118:8standards (1)9:3,14,19,24;15:11,22;4:16;5:17;7:14;9:11;trained (1)United (1)8:1130:10;35:6,20,23;37:1,610:2,13;35:326:2024:24;28:4,6standing (1)sufficient (9)8:21;9:17;12:3;17:19;13:2127:1231:21state (25)33:11;35:18;36:6,18;testified (4)22:10;23:5,12,19;27:17,31:21state (25)33:11;35:18;36:6,18;28:1618:8;20:19;21:21;33:15,20state (25)33:11;35:18;36:6,18;28:1618:8;20:19;21:21;33:15,20state (25)33:11;35:18;36:6,18;28:1618:8;20:19;21:21;33:15,20state (25)sufficiently (3)testified (4)22:28:13,255:20;6:2:29:16;3031:10;33:11;37:11,15,suffocate (1)testify (1)22:23:23:22:20:16;3022:31:1520:22;38:5,1615:1226:2126:17;27:23;28:6up (2)state (5)suggestion (1)test (1)27:10;28:114:10;17:12;19:8,14:14;25:14suggestion (1)27:10;28:114:10;17:12;19:8,14:14;25:14suggestion (1)28:728:7US35 (1)5:19Sust (1)therapeut					
staff (1) 31:2 14:18;17:12,14;18:11; tragedy (1) undetected (1) 21:16 suffer (2) 12:17;33:15 12:17;33:15 32:8 standard (1) 12:17;33:15 27:19,19,21:23:23; trained (1) United (1) 28:10 suffering (12) 9:3,14,19,24;15:11,22; 4:16;5:17;7:14;9:11; trained (1) United (1) standards (1) 9:3,14,19,24;15:11,22; 30:10;35:6,20,23;37:1,6 training (1) unless (3) standing (1) sufficient (9) 8:21;91:7;12:3;17:19; 10:12,13;35:3 26:20 24:24;28:4,6 state (25) 33:11;35:18;36:6,18; tested (1) Transportation (1) Unike (1) 25:19 3:1:1,35:18;36:6,18; tested (1) 27:12 31:21 31:2,32:24 sufficiently (3) testified (4) 22:10;23:5;12,19;21:71, 33:15,20 20,22;38:5,16 suffocate (1) 19:20;28:15;36:7;38:4 22:10;23:5;12,19;27:17, 5:20;6:2;29:16;30 21:4;4;25:14 22:23 suffocation (11) testified (1) 27:10;28:1 4:11 upon (14) 22:24 12:4;12;21;32:2;6:15,37:14 27:7;16;37:14 trustworthiness (2)					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$					
28:10 suffering (12) Tennessee's (7) 7:11 8:8 standards (1) 9:3,14,19,24,15:11,22; 4:16;5:17;7:14;9:11; training (1) 24:24;28:4,6 standing (1) sufficient (9) tenured (1) 26:20 24:24;28:4,6 25:19 8:21;9:17;12:3;17:19; 13:21 27:12 31:21 state (25) 33:11;35:18;36:6,18; 28:16 18:8;20:19;21:21; 33:15,20 winecessary (2) 38:17 28:16 18:8;20:19;21:21; 33:15,20 state (25) sufficiently (3) testified (4) 22:10;23:5;12,19;27:17, unusual (6) 20;22;38:5,16 15:12 26:21 26:17;27:23;28:6 up (2) stated (5) suffocate (1) testify (1) 23:2;33:3 23:2;33:3 4:8;18:2;19:5,12; 5:17;23;7:8;10:8,9; 17:1;23:22;26:15,24; 4:11 upon (14) 2:2:24 suggested (1) tests (1) 27:10;28:1 14:10;17:12;19:8,1 4:14;25:14 22:23 34:5 trustworthiness (2) 5:17;6:14;8:17;13 statement (2) suggestio					
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$					
8:11 30:10;35:6,20,23;37:1,6 10:12,13;35:3 26:20 24:24;28:4,6 standing (1) 25:19 8:21;9:17;12:3;17:19; 13:21 27:12 31:21 state (25) 33:11;35:18;36:6,18; tested (1) Trial (11) unnecessary (2) 4:25;5:8,15;6:11;7:10; 38:17 28:16 18:8;20:19;21:21; 33:15,20 25;19:17,19;21:7;22:12; 5:10;18:16;30:11 19:20;28:15;36:7;38:4 22;28:13,25 5:20;6:2;29:16;30 31:10;33:11;37:11,15, suffocation (1) testified (4) 22:28:13,25 5:20;6:2;29:16;30 31:10;33:11;37:11,15, suffocation (11) testify (1) trier (3) 22:31:15 0:22;31:15 20,22;38:5,16 15:12 26:21 26:17;27:23;28:6 up (2) 23:2;33:3 stated (5) suffocation (11) testinon (7) trusting (1) 23:2;33:3 4:8;18:22;19:5,12; 6:17,23;7:8;10:8,9; 17:1;23:22;26:15,24; 4:11 upon (14) 4:14;25:14 22:23 34:5 trustworthiness (2) 5:17;6:14;8:17;13 5:19 suggestions (1) theory (1) 28:7 26:25;27:3;5:29:8; 15:19 <					
standing (1) sufficient (9) tenured (1) Transportation (1) Unlike (1) 25:19 3:21;9:17;12:3;17:19; 3:21 31:21 31:21 state (25) 3:11;35:18;36:6,18; 13:21 27:12 31:21 4:25;5:8,15;6:11;7:10; 38:17 28:16 18:8;20:19;21:21; 33:15,20 wnnecessary (2) 33:16;30:11 19:20;28:15;36:7;38:4 22:20;23:5,12,19;27:17, 5:20;62:29:16;30 31:10;33:11;37:11,15, suffocate (1) 15:12 26:21 26:17;27:23;28:6 up (2) stated (5) suffocation (11) testimony (7) trusting (1) 23:2;33:3 23:2;33:3 stated (5) suffocation (11) tests (1) 27:10;28:1 14:10;17:12;19:8,1 4:8;18:22;19:5,12; 2:2:23 27:7,16;37:14 trustworthiness (2) 5:17;6:14;8:17;13 22:24 suggestions (1) 25:24 34:5 28:7 US35 (1) 5:19 suggestions (1) 25:24 19:5 28:7 US35 (1) 15:19 suit (1) therefore (3) 15:9 29:11 39:5,8 use (3) states (7) 8:8,14;11:9;1					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		30:10;35:6,20,23;37:1,6		26:20	
state (25) 33:11;35:18;36:6,18; tested (1) Trial (11) unnecessary (2) 4:25;5:8,15;6:11;7:10; 38:17 28:16 18:8;20:19;21:21; 33:15,20 8:6,9,12,16,23,24;9:4, sufficiently (3) testified (4) 22:10;23:5,12,19;27:17, 33:15,20 31:10;33:11;37:11,15, suffocate (1) 19:20;28:15;36:7;38:4 22;28:13,25 5:20;62:29:16;30 20,22;38:5,16 15:12 26:21 26:17;27:23;28:6 up (2) stated (5) suffocation (11) testimony (7) trusting (1) 23:2;33:3 4:8;18:22;19:5,12; 6:17,23;7:8;10:8,9; 17:1;23:22;26:15,24; 4:11 upon (14) 22:24 12:4,12,22;13:2,8;15:3 27:7,16;37:14 trustworthiness (2) 5:17;6:14;8:17;13 statement (2) suggestions (1) tests (1) 28:7 US35 (1) 4:14;25:14 22:23 34:5 trustworthy (1) 26:25;27:3,5;29:8; statements (1) suggestions (1) theory (1) 28:7 US35 (1) 15:19 25:24 19:5 Tuesday (2) 29:11 8:8,14;11:9;18:25; 4:21 18:9,13 tuned (1) 10:17;					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$					1
8:6,9,12,16,23,24;9:4, 25;19:17,19;21:7,22:12; 31:10;33:11;37:11,15, 20,22;38:5,16 sufficiently (3) 5:10;18:16;30:11 testified (4) 19:20;28:15;36:7;38:4 22:10;23:5,12,19;27:17, 22;28:13,25 unusual (6) 5:20;6:2;29:16;30 stated (5) suffocation (11) testify (1) 22:10;23:5,12,19;27:17, 20;22;38:5,16 unusual (6) stated (5) suffocation (11) testimony (7) true (3) 22:31:15 4:8;18:22;19:5,12; 6:17,23;7:8;10:8,9; 17:1;23:22;26:15,24; 4:11 upon (14) 22:24 12:4,12,22;13:2,8;15:3 27:7,16;37:14 trustworthiness (2) 5:17;6:14;8:17;13 statement (2) suggestions (1) tests (1) 27:10;28:1 14:10;17:12;19:8,1 4:14;25:14 22:23 34:5 trustworthiness (2) 5:17;6:14;8:17;13 statements (1) suggestions (1) theory (1) 28:7 US35 (1) 15:19 25:24 19:5 Tuesday (2) 29:11 states (7) suit (1) therapeutic (2) 39:5,8 use (3) 8:8,14;11:9;18:25; 4:21 18:9,13 tuned (1) 10:17;24:4;35:11 29:13;32:18;38:8 summary (2) 6:23;22:25;34:21 Two (8) 11:5,13,17,		33:11;35:18;36:6,18;			
25;19:17,19;21:7;22:12; 31:10;33:11;37:11,15; 20;22;38:5,165:10;18:16;30:11 suffocate (1)19:20;28:15;36:7;38:4 testify (1)22;28:13,25 trier (3)5:20;6:2;29:16;30 22;31:15stated (5) 4:8;18:22;19:5,12; 22:2415:12 suffocation (11)26:21 testimony (7)trier (3) 26:17;27:23;28:622;33:3 up (2)statement (2) 22:24suggested (1) 22:23tests (1) 22:2327:7,16;37:14 trustworthiness (2)5:17;6:14;8:17;13 27:10;28:1statement (2) 4:14;25:14suggestions (1) 25:24tests (1) 15:1927:10;28:1 25:2414:10;17:12;19:8,1 25:24states (7) 8:8,14;11:9;18:25; 29:13;32:18;38:8summary (2) 	4:25;5:8,15;6:11;7:10;				33:15,20
31:10;33:11;37:11,15, 20;22;38:5,16suffocate (1) 15:12testify (1) 26:21trier (3) 26:17;27:23;28:622;31:15stated (5) 4:8;18:22;19:5,12; 22:24suffocation (11) 6:17,23;7:8;10:8,9; 12:4,12,22;13:2,8;15:3testimony (7) 17:1;23:22;26:15,24; 27:7,16;37:14trier (3) 26:17;27:23;28:622;31:15statement (2) 4:14;25:14suggested (1) 22:2327:7,16;37:14trustworthiness (2) 27:7,16;37:145:17;6:14;8:17;13statements (1) 15:19suggestions (1) 25:2419:528:7 19:5US35 (1) 29:13;32:18;38:8state's (5)10:3,4therefore (3) 6:23;22:25;34:2139:5,8 10:3,4use (3) 15:19	8:6,9,12,16,23,24;9:4,	sufficiently (3)	testified (4)		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	25;19:17,19;21:7;22:12;	5:10;18:16;30:11	19:20;28:15;36:7;38:4	22;28:13,25	5:20;6:2;29:16;30:6,
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		suffocate (1)	testify (1)	trier (3)	22;31:15
stated (5)suffocation (11)testimony (7)trusting (1) $23:2;33:3$ $4:8;18:22;19:5,12;$ $6:17,23;7:8;10:8,9;$ $17:1;23:22;26:15,24;$ $4:11$ upon (14) $22:24$ $12:4,12,22;13:2,8;15:3$ $27:7,16;37:14$ trustworthiness (2) $5:17;6:14;8:17;13$ $4:14;25:14$ $22:23$ $34:5$ trustworthy (1) $26:25;27:3,5;29:8;3$ statements (1) $25:24$ $19:5$ Tuesday (2) $29:11$ $5:17;6:14;8:17;13$ $19:5$ tuned (1) $10:17;24:4;35:11$ $8:8,14;11:9;18:25;$ $4:21$ $18:9,13$ tuned (1) $10:17;24:4;35:11$ $29:13;32:18;38:8$ summary (2)therefore (3) $15:9$ Two (8) $11:5,13,17,19,19;$					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		1	testimony (7)	trusting (1)	
22:2412:4,12,22;13:2,8;15:327:7,16;37:14trustworthiness (2)5:17;6:14;8:17;13statement (2)suggested (1)tests (1)27:10;28:114:10;17:12;19:8,14:14;25:1422:2334:5trustworthy (1)26:25;27:3,5;29:8;statements (1)suggestions (1)theory (1)28:7US35 (1)15:1925:2419:5Tuesday (2)29:11states (7)suit (1)therapeutic (2)39:5,8use (3)8:8,14;11:9;18:25;4:2118:9,13tuned (1)10:17;24:4;35:1129:13;32:18;38:8summary (2)therefore (3)15:9used (12)State's (5)10:3,46:23;22:25;34:21Two (8)11:5,13,17,19,19;					
statement (2) suggested (1) tests (1) 27:10;28:1 14:10;17:12;19:8,1 4:14;25:14 22:23 34:5 trustworthy (1) 26:25;27:3,5;29:8; statements (1) suggestions (1) theory (1) 28:7 US35 (1) 15:19 25:24 19:5 Tuesday (2) 29:11 states (7) suit (1) therapeutic (2) 39:5,8 use (3) 8:8,14;11:9;18:25; 4:21 18:9,13 tuned (1) 10:17;24:4;35:11 29:13;32:18;38:8 summary (2) therefore (3) 15:9 used (12) State's (5) 10:3,4 6:23;22:25;34:21 Two (8) 11:5,13,17,19,19;					5:17;6:14;8:17;13:12;
4:14;25:1422:2334:5trustworthy (1)26:25;27:3,5;29:8;3statements (1)suggestions (1)theory (1)28:7US35 (1)15:1925:2419:5Tuesday (2)29:11States (7)suit (1)therapeutic (2)39:5,8use (3)8:8,14;11:9;18:25;4:2118:9,13tuned (1)10:17;24:4;35:1129:13;32:18;38:8summary (2)therefore (3)15:9used (12)State's (5)10:3,46:23;22:25;34:21Two (8)11:5,13,17,19,19;			1		
statements (1) suggestions (1) theory (1) 28:7 US35 (1) 15:19 25:24 19:5 Tuesday (2) 29:11 States (7) suit (1) therapeutic (2) 39:5,8 use (3) 8:8,14;11:9;18:25; 4:21 18:9,13 tuned (1) 10:17;24:4;35:11 29:13;32:18;38:8 summary (2) therefore (3) 15:9 used (12) State's (5) 10:3,4 6:23;22:25;34:21 Two (8) 11:5,13,17,19,19;					
15:1925:2419:5Tuesday (2)29:11States (7)suit (1)therapeutic (2)39:5,8use (3)8:8,14;11:9;18:25;4:2118:9,13tuned (1)10:17;24:4;35:1129:13;32:18;38:8summary (2)therefore (3)15:9used (12)State's (5)10:3,46:23;22:25;34:21Two (8)11:5,13,17,19,19;					
States (7) 8:8,14;11:9;18:25; 29:13;32:18;38:8suit (1) 4:21therapeutic (2) 18:9,1339:5,8 tuned (1)use (3) 10:17;24:4;35:11 used (12)State's (5)10:3,46:23;22:25;34:21Two (8)11:5,13,17,19,19;				-	
8:8,14;11:9;18:25; 29:13;32:18;38:84:2118:9,13tuned (1)10:17;24:4;35:1129:13;32:18;38:8summary (2)therefore (3)15:9used (12)State's (5)10:3,46:23;22:25;34:21Two (8)11:5,13,17,19,19;		1			
29:13;32:18;38:8summary (2)therefore (3)15:9used (12)State's (5)10:3,46:23;22:25;34:21Two (8)11:5,13,17,19,19;				,	
State's (5) 10:3,4 6:23;22:25;34:21 Two (8) 11:5,13,17,19,19;					
5/27/9/4/5/21/2 ournhied (3) thiopental (45) 9/14/10/21/11/4/19/8/ 15/14/16/17/17/15					
	5:22;8:4,5;31:2,14	supplied (3)	thiopental (45)	9:14;10:21;11:4;19:8;	15:14;16:17;17:3;19:2,
stay (1) 9:22;36:24;37:4 6:10,12;7:1,3,22;8:18, 26:8;28:16;29:4;35:15 2,10;38:8					
4:7 Supreme (8) 25;9:10,16;10:15;11:8, type (2) useful (2)	4:7	Supreme (8)	25;9:10,16;10:15;11:8,	туре (2)	userul (2)

Т

using (2) 7:2;17:13 usual (1) 10:6 V valid (1) 28:5 validity (1) 28:3 variable (2) 17:4,5 variables (4) 15:1;19:11;35:12; 36:14 various (3) 22:4;37:10,18 verified (1) 23:13 verify (1) 7:15 versions (1) 21:1 versus (4) 23:20;27:12;29:10,19 viewed (1) 31:15 views (1) 29:5 violates (2) 5:19;30:7 visually (1) 33:10 Voorhies (2) 19:17;38:5 Voorhies' (1) 37:14	Winek's (2) 18:7;19:2 within (2) 18:12,13 without (3) 10:1;31:12;37:21 witness (2) 19:18;26:19 witnesses (1) 29:3 work (2) 19:24;24:1 Workman (2) 7:7;18:5 Workman's (2) 17:22;18:15 writer (1) 13:20 written (2) 23:16;33:23 wrongful (1) 4:24
W	
Wanda (1) 4:18 warden (6) 11:2;20:12,15;22:16, 17;33:6 way (2) 38:6,6 ways (9) 17:3;24:3,8,10,14; 37:9,10,18;38:7 weigh (1) 29:3 weight (2) 8:22,23 weren't (1) 24:10 West (1) 34:19 whatsoever (1) 38:19 window (1)	