IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

STEPHEN MICHAEL WEST,	
Petitioner,	
v.	
RICKY BELL, Warden,	
Respondent.	

No. 3:01-cv-91 Judge Varlan

RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, Stephen West, has filed a motion seeking issuance of a certificate of appealability from this Court's order of October 27, 2010, transferring his successive habeas petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. (D.E. 217). However, a certificate of appealability is neither warranted nor permissible in this matter, and the motion should be denied.

On October 15, 2010, the petitioner, Stephen West, filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and 60(d) for relief from this Court's September 2004 judgment denying habeas corpus relief.¹ (D.E. 189). In an order entered October 27, 2010, the Court transferred petitioner's filing to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 as a successive habeas application. (D.E. 217). As the Court made clear in its accompanying

¹ The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed this Court's judgment denying habeas relief in 2008. *West v. Bell*, 550 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2008) (reh. denied May 20, 2009), *cert. denied*, 130 S.Ct. 1687 (2010).

Memorandum, "After reviewing the pleading and briefs filed by both parties . . . , the Court finds Petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion, in substance, is a second or successive habeas petition and therefore will **IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER** this action to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit." (D.E. 216) (emphasis in original). Petitioner now moves for a certificate of appealability as to this Court's determination that his motion constitutes a successive habeas application. The motion should be denied.

Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 2253(a) provides that "the *final order* [in a habeas corpus proceeding] shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held." (emphasis added). However, "[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the *final* order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issues by a State court" 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This court's order transferring petitioner's motion to the Sixth Circuit for review under § 2244(b)'s gatekeeping provisions is not a "final order" in a habeas proceeding. Specifically, the order did not end the litigation on the merits; rather, it recognized that, under AEDPA, a petitioner is entitled to only one petition for habeas corpus relief and that further attempts to challenge the underlying conviction must initially be reviewed by the Sixth Circuit to determine if the statutory requirements to proceed on a successive application are satisfied. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit promptly docketed the matter for that purpose. See In re: Stephen Michael West, No. 10-6333 (6th Cir.) (docketed Oct. 27, 2010). Moreover, by transferring this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, the Court recognized that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's motion for relief from judgment.² Because, by

 $^{^2}$ 28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides: "Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title . . . and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if

statute, the action now proceeds in the Sixth Circuit "as if it had been filed" there originally, the proper mechanism to grieve the transfer decision is not a notice of appeal of this Court's decision to the Sixth Circuit, but a motion in the Sixth Circuit requesting a retransfer of the matter to this Court. *See Howard v. United States*, 533 F.3d 472, 474 (6th Cir. 2008) ("Our court's practice in the case of second-or-successive transfer orders to this court is to treat the transfer order as non-appealable, and to consider in the transferred case whether such a transfer was necessary or appropriate.").

WHEREFORE, respondent requests that the Court deny petitioner's motion.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR. Attorney General & Reporter

/s/ Jennifer L. Smith

JENNIFER L. SMITH Associate Deputy Attorney General Criminal Justice Division P.O. Box 20207 Nashville, Tennessee 37202-0207 (615) 741-3487 B.P.R. No. 16514

it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action . . . shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred."

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that the foregoing response was filed electronically on October 28, 2010. A copy of the document will be served via the Court's electronic filing process on: Roger W. Dickson, Miller & Martin LLP, 832 Georgia Ave., Suite 1000, Chattanooga, TN 37402; and Stephen Ferrell, Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee, Inc., 800 S. Gay St., Suite 2400, Knoxville, TN 37929.

<u>/s/ Jennifer L. Smith</u> JENNIFER L. SMITH Associate Deputy Attorney General