Alfred Bowling vs. Dobbs Bros. W2000-01476-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
This appeal arises from the trial court's denial of a motion in limine. Employee was fired from his position at Company. At a pre-trial deposition, Manager testified on behalf of Company that Employee was terminated due to Manager's observation of Employee's lack of sales skills. Employee filed a motion seeking to bar testimony of other Company employees during the trial. These employees were to testify on Employee's lack of sales skills. Employee argued that this testimony would be inconsistent with Company's pre-trial deposition that Employee was terminated due to Manager's observation of his lack of sales skills. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Jacqueline Patterson vs. Richard French W2000-02668-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This is an attempt to collect child support arrearages. In a 1993 order, the father was ordered to pay current support as well as a lesser amount for an existing arrearage. The father failed to comply with this order. In 1999, the child reached majority. The State filed an action on the mother's behalf to set arrearage payments and hold the father in contempt. The trial court set the arrearage payments at an amount less than the total support the father had previously been ordered to pay. In addition, the trial court refused to consider the contempt petition because the child had reached majority. Finally, the court ordered the father to make payments through the clerk of the court rather than through the State disbursement unit. The State appeals all three decisions. We reverse, finding that the trial court was required to set the arrearage payments at the total amount of support previously ordered, that the child reaching majority is not a basis for refusing to consider the contempt petition, and that the father is required to make the payments through the State disbursement unit.
Gibson
Court of Appeals
Barbara White vs. Dr. John Albritton W2000-03068-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: James F. Russell
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim filed in the Circuit Court of Shelby County by the Appellant against the Appellees. On the first day of trial, the Appellant announced her intention to voluntarily nonsuit the case. The trial court entered an order of voluntary nonsuit. The Appellees filed a motion for discretionary costs. The trial court held that the motion was premature but would revisit the motion if the lawsuit was refiled. The Appellant refiled the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The Appellees refiled the motion for discretionary costs in the Circuit Court of Shelby County. The circuit court granted the Appellees' motion for discretionary costs. The Appellant appeals from the grant of the Appellees' motion for discretionary costs by the Circuit Court of Shelby County. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's decision.
The grand jury for Monroe County charged the defendant with one count of possession of cocaine with intent to resell and one count of felony evading arrest. The defendant went to trial, and the jury acquitted him of the narcotics offense but found him guilty of Class D evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to five years incarceration in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the state's misuse of his post-arrest silence, the flight instruction given to the jury, and his classification as a Range II offender. Unpersuaded by the defendant's contentions, we affirm the trial court's judgment and sentence.
Gary L. Holt, Sr. v. Ozburn-Hessey Moving Company and American Alternative Insurance Corporation M1999-02563-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Lee Russell, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Appellant appeals from the amount of the award of permanent partial disability benefits. After a complete review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the award made by the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. ' 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed LEE RUSSELL, SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, J. and JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR.J., joined Jeffrey P. Boyd, Jackson Tennessee, for the appellant, Ozburn-Hessey Moving Company James R. Tomkins, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Gary L. Holt, Sr. MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal by Defendant Ozburn-Hessey Moving Company (hereinafter referred to as "Ozburn-Hessey" or "the company") from an award of benefits made in favor of Gary L. Holt 1 ("Claimant") on a claim filed pursuant to the Tennessee Workers Compensation Act. The trial court held that the Claimant was an employee of Ozburn-Hessey and awarded the Claimant a forty percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of an injury to the back which allegedly occurred on July 23, 1998. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial judge erred in her holding that the Claimant was an employee of Ozburn-Hessey and not a mere independent contractor. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial judge's finding that the Claimant was an employee.
Davidson
Workers Compensation Panel
State vs. Miles Mateyko M1998-00275-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee
The defendant was charged and convicted of child abuse through neglect in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-401(a). The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, finding that the State did not establish that the defendant's children suffered any actual, deleterious effect or harm from the neglect. However, the intermediate court found that the defendant was guilty of attempted child abuse through neglect, and it remanded the case for resentencing. The State requested permission to appeal to this Court, and we hold that section 39-15-401(a) does require proof of an actual, deleterious effect or harm to the child's health and welfare and that the mere risk of harm is insufficient to support a conviction. We also hold that in those cases in which no such actual, deleterious effect or harm is shown, a defendant may be convicted of attempted child abuse through neglect under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-12-101, provided that the State is successful in making the required showing. Because the record in this case contains conflicting evidence as to the required intent necessary for the attempted crime, we remand this case to the Lincoln County Circuit Court for a new trial on the lesser-included offense of attempted child abuse through neglect. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
In matter of Hannah Parlow W2000-01462-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George E. Blancett
After paternity was established and Mother was granted custody of minor daughter, Father filed petition to change custody on the ground of material change of circumstances consisting of Mother's remarriage to an allegedly violent man, and Mother's intention to move with the child out of the state. The juvenile referee denied the petition and, upon a de novo trial before a special juvenile judge of the juvenile court, Father's petition was denied. Father has appealed. We affirm.
Cora Cantrell, et al vs. Knox County Bd of Ed. et al E1999-01557-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Harold Wimberly
The issue in this appeal is whether non-certified, non-tenured teacher aides have under state law a reasonable expectation of continued employment beyond the term of their written contracts such that they are entitled to back pay and benefits beyond the expiration of their contract period. We conclude that teacher aides do not have a reasonable expectation of continued employment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
Knox
Supreme Court
Charmaine West, et al vs. Media General Convergence, Inc., et al M2001-00141-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this Court accepted certification of the following question from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee:
Supreme Court
Nancy Byrd v. Freshi Air Systems, Inc. (Formerly E2000-00481-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: O. Duane Sloan, Circuit Judge
The trial court found the plaintiff sustained a permanent psychological or mental impairment as a result of a confrontation between her and a supervisor of the defendant. The trial judge found the plaintiff sustained a fifty percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of the confrontation. The defendant says the evidence preponderates against the finding. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Annette L. Hanna, et al. v. Federated Insurance Company M2000-01967-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff's husband was killed in the course and scope of his employment and ordered the amount to which his dependants were entitled should be paid in a lump sum. The court further ordered the money to be paid into the court and that the Clerk and Master invest the funds and pay the interest earned thereon to the widow for the benefit fo the deceased's minor children. The defendant says the death benefits cannot be paid in a lump sum and further says, even if lump sum payments is permissible, the plaintiff has failed to show she can manage the money. Further, the defendant says the trial court erroneously failed to commute the award to its present value. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, J. and JOSEPH C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., joined. D. Brett Burrow and Delicia R. Bryant, Nashville, Tennessee, attorneys for the appellant, Federated Insurance Company. Mark A. Rassas and Julia P. North, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Annette L. Hanna, widow of the decedent, Darren D. Hanna, and as Guardian for the minor children, Brett Hanna and Marian Hanna, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Darren D. Hanna. OPINION On September 2, 1999, Darren H. Hanna died as a result of a vehicle accident. There was no dispute that the accident occurred within the scope and course of the decedent's occupation with the defendant. Mr. Hanna was survived by his widow, Annette L. Hanna, who was born November 25, 1972, and two minor children, Marian Ruth Hanna, born September 17, 1994, and Brett Darren Hanna, born March 3, 1997. On November 5, 1999, the widow filed this case against the defendant. On June 15, 2, the widow was appointed guardian of the estate of the two minor children to receive any workers' compensation benefits, and also in that order the Clerk of the Chancery Court was authorized to receive the proceeds of any compensation benefits, invest them and pay the interest to Annette K, Hanna for the care and maintenance of the two minor children. On June 27, 2, the widow filed a sworn statement renouncing any benefits from the proceeds of any workers' compensation award conditional on the money being paid into the court and invested and distributed as subsequently ordered by the trial court. On June 3, 2, the trial judge ordered the defendant to pay a lump sum of $174,416. into the court less any credits for sums previously paid, and that the Clerk and Master have control of the funds for the purpose of investment and for payments of the interest earned thereon to the widow for the benefit of the minor children. Discussion Did the trial court have authority to order a lump sum payment_yes. In Jones v. General Accident Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. 1993), the court held "(i)n any event, we hold today that death benefits awarded under Tennessee Code Annotated. _ 5-6-21 can be commuted to a lump sum." In Clayton v. Cookeville Energy Inc., 824 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1992), the court approved a lump sum settlement to the widow, and in Ponder v. Manchester Housing Authority, 87 S.W.2d 282 (Tenn. 1994) the court approved a lump sum payment to the widow and an arrangement for the minor children's share to be paid to the clerk, invested and the interest therefrom paid to the children. The arrangement in this case is similar to the arrangement in Ponder except in this case the widow will not receive a share of the proceeds.1 Perhaps a more substantial argument is made by the defendant on the premise that the evidence does not support a lump sum award because the widow has demonstrated an inability to wisely manage a lump sum award. 1 The defendant's argument that the widow might remarry is not important because the defendant would still be liable for two-thirds of the benefit because of the two remaining children. -2-
Robertson
Workers Compensation Panel
Did Not Meet The Criteria For Acceptance of Scientific Testimony In Mcdaniel v. Csx Transportation M2000-00185-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Weatherford, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Don Ash, Chancellor
The plaintiff, Mary E. Miller, appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court of Tennessee for the 16th Judicial District at Murfreesboro, where the trial court found: (1) that Ms. Miller sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of her employment and awarded twenty percent (2%) permanent vocational or industrial disability to the right lower extremity; (2) that the testimony of Ms. Miller's expert witness on reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) and fibromyalgia did not meet the criteria for acceptance of scientific testimony in McDaniel v. CSX Transportation Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn.1997), and therefore excluded his testimony; (3) that her condition of fibromyalgia and resulting psychiatric condition were not work-related and as such were not compensable; (4) that Ms. Miller was entitled to permanent medical care and treatment only for the injury to her right leg arising out of this work-related accident but not for fibromyalgia or any other conditions. Ms. Miller also raises some other procedural and evidentiary issues that will be addressed herein. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Rutherford
Workers Compensation Panel
Arthur Ray White v. Maytag Cleveland Cooking E2000-01451-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor
The Second Injury Fund has appealed an award of total disability where the employer was ordered to pay 2 percent of the award and the Second Injury Fund was to pay the remaining 8 percent. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
White
Workers Compensation Panel
State vs. Michael D. Simmons M1999-00099-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
Appellant, Michael Dewayne Simmons, pled guilty to felony theft of property and aggravated robbery but reserved for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i) the following certified question of law: whether the defendant was denied his federal and state constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Simmons had not been deprived of his speedy trial right. We granted Simmons' application for permission to appeal to determine whether a speedy trial violation occurred in this case where the only prejudice allegedly resulting from the delay is the defendant's lost possibility of concurrent sentencing with a sentence imposed for a prior unrelated offense. Because the delay of twenty-three months was not egregious, the reason for the delay was negligence or administrative oversight, and the only prejudice alleged is the lost possibility of serving a concurrent sentence, we conclude that the defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Estate of Julie Amos, et al. v. Vanderbilt University, et al. M1999-00998-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
We granted appeal in this case to determine whether the special proof requirements of Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996), extend to all negligence claims in which damages for emotional distress are sought as an item of compensatory damages. We hold that the special proof requirements of Camper apply only to "stand-alone" claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress. We further hold that Vanderbilt University Medical Center owed a duty to warn Julie Amos of her potential exposure to HIV so that she might take appropriate measures to protect third parties. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment in this case.
