William E. Jarvis v. State of Tennessee, ex rel, Janice L. Bane
Father previously convicted of contempt for failure to pay child support appeals the dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. Finding that the petition does not allege facts sufficient to support the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the judgment is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rickey Clyde Taylor v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rickey Clyde Taylor, appeals as of right from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and received an effective 28-year sentence for the convictions. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner alleges that as a result of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, his guilty pleas were involuntarily entered. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clifton Douglas v. Joe Easterling, Warden
The Petitioner, Clifton Douglas, appeals as of right from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that the State failed to provide proper notice of its intention to seek enhanced punishment as required by statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-202(a). Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Matter of Kaitlyn M.W., Nathan A.W. v. Crystal D.S.P.
This is a child custody case. The mother and father were never married to each other; the child was born when both were teenagers. Under the parenting plan, the mother was designated as the primary residential parent and the father had parenting time every weekend. After the father married, disputes ensued; many were disputes between the father’s wife and the child’s mother. The father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan to designate him as the child’s primary residential parent. He alleged, among other things, that the child was often tardy or absent from school, that the mother lacked stability, and that mother prevented him from exercising his parenting time. The trial court found no material change in circumstances and declined to change custody. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Darren Perry and Mechelle Perry v. All Unknown Parties Having Any Interest in the Property Known as the Mathis Cemetery et al.
This appeal arises from a petition to terminate the use of property as a burial ground. The plaintiffs purchased property in which an abandoned cemetery was situated. They filed this complaint for court approval to terminate the use of the property as a burial ground and remove and reinter the remains to another cemetery, pursuant to Tennessee statutes. An attorney ad litem was appointed to represent unknown parties with an interest in the abandoned cemetery. The attorney ad litem investigated and did not oppose the relief sought. The plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court denied the motion for default judgment and dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis R. Shaw
Following a jury trial in Putnam County, Defendant, Dennis Russell Shaw, was convicted of driving on a revoked license, second offense or subsequent offense, violation of the registration law, and violation of the financial responsibility law. He has appealed only the driving on revoked license conviction, arguing that his conviction was improperly enhanced beyond a first offense. After reviewing the briefs of the parties and the record, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David A. Ferrell v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, David A. Ferrell, was convicted of failure to display a license, violation of the seatbelt law, and two violations of the vehicle registration law. He was ordered to serve thirty days in jail and pay a fifty-dollar fine. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied his application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his case. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition citing the petition’s untimeliness. The Petitioner appeals, contending the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mitchell Dwayne Gentry v. Jerica Renae Gentry
In this divorce case after lengthy trial, the Trial Court designated the mother as the primary residential parent, awarded the mother alimony, child support, and attorney's fees. The father appealed, asking the Trial Court be reversed on the award of primary care, and the alimony award to the mother. The mother appeals the issue of whether the father was entitled to appeal, since he had been held in contempt of court. Upon consideration of the issues, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Saundra Kay (Pace) Mason v. James E. Mason
This is a divorce case. The parties had a long-term marriage, with one minor child born of the marriage. The wife was designated as the primary residential parent, and the husband was required to pay alimony and child support. The wife appeals the amount of child support, the alimony award, and the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney fees. The husband argues that he was entitled to relief from his pendente lite child support payments while he was out of work recovering from several surgeries. We reverse the trial court’s holding on the husband’s pendente lite child support, affirm the remainder of the trial court’s holding, and remand. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Mills, et al. v. John H. Booth, II, et al.
On November 8, 2008, James Turlington and his wife, Altha Turlington, were killed in an automobile accident after their car tuned left in front of a vehicle being driven by John H. Booth, II (“Booth”). Initially, it was believed that the Turlington vehicle was being driven by Altha Turlington. It was determined two days later that the Turlington vehicle was being driven by James Turlington. An accident reconstructionist later concluded that while the Turlington vehicle did turn in front of the Booth vehicle, the Turlington vehicle would have had sufficient time to complete its turn without any collision taking place if Booth had not been speeding. A complaint was filed on November 10, 2009, by Altha Turlington’s daughter, Patricia Mills. The Trial Court determined that the statute of limitations began to run on the day of the accident, that the discovery rule could not be used to extend when the statute of limitations began to run, and the complaint had not been filed within the applicable one year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Joe Lee v. Charles E. Ridenour, Trustee, et al.
In December of 2008, Robert Joe Lee (“Plaintiff”) sued Charles E. Ridenour, Trustee, and FSG Bank National Association (“FSG Bank”) seeking, in part, a declaratory judgment with regard to two trust deeds, and an injunction preventing FSG Bank from foreclosing on the real property named in the trust deeds. After a trial, the Trial Court entered a Final Judgment on February 25, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that the trust deeds created a valid enforceable lien on the named real property, and dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Marcus Welcome v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Marcus Welcome, was convicted by a Knox County jury of criminal responsibility for aggravated robbery. As a result, Petitioner was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years in confinement. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Welcome, 280 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court determined that Petitioner had failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dawn Ann Davis (Goodwin) v. Daniel Pace Goodwin
In this divorce case, Wife appeals the trial court’s division of marital property. She asserts that the parties’ marital residence is her separate property and that the trial court erred in awarding Husband a share of the net proceeds following its court-ordered sale. Wife contends that she purchased the property during the marriage with her separate, premarital funds, that it was titled and financed in her name only, and that she paid the mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the property. We agree that the trial court erred and conclude that the marital residence is Wife’s separate property. However, because the property increased in value during the marriage, we remand to the trial court to determine whether Husband substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation. Reversed and Remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Estate of Curtis Rinda, Terry Abernathy, Administrator
Appellant, the Estate of the Decedent herein, appeals the Chancery Court of McNairy County’s denial of the Estate’s exception to a claim for Decedent’s funeral expenses. Decedent’s brother, the Appellee herein, held a power of attorney for his father (who is also Decedent’s father). Appellee exercised the power of attorney to arrange Decedent’s funeral and to pay for that funeral with the father’s funds. The claim, which was filed in Appellee’s name only, was excepted by the Estate, on grounds that Appellee had no standing to file the claim because he did not, in fact, pay the funeral expenses. The trial court allowed the claim, but held that it was payable to the father. The Estate appeals. We find that the existence and amount of the claim are supported by the record, and that Appellee’s power of attorney authorized him : (1) to bind the father to the funeral contract, (2) to pay the funeral expenses from the father’s funds, and (3) to file a claim against the Estate, on behalf of the father, to recoup those expenses from the Estate. The decision reached by the trial court is affirmed. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Chandler Daniels
Appellant William Chandler Daniels pled guilty to a charge of theft of property valued at more than $10,000. The plea agreement stipulated that Appellant’s sentence was to be three years, with the manner of service and restitution to be determined by the court. The completed judgment form indicates that Appellant was sentenced to serve his three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. It also provides that “[r]estitution is reserved pending a hearing.” At a subsequent hearing, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay $2,000 in restitution. In this appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s authority to order restitution in combination with a custodial sentence as well as the court’s evaluation of the appropriate amount of restitution. We conclude that the trial court was permitted to order restitution; however it did not consider Appellant’s ability to pay or specify the time or amount of payment. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clarence D. Hayes
A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of first degree felony murder, and he received a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he arguesthat (1) the trial court denied his right to counsel at his motion for new trial hearing; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing a lay witness to provide expert testimony. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Wayne Robinson
Appellant, Terry Wayne Robinson, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and DUI seventh offense. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of DUI. Appellant pled guilty to DUI, seventh offense. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced Appellant to four years as a Range II, multiple offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant has appealed. Appellant argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for DUI. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aaron T. James v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Aaron T. James, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping and resulting sixty-year sentence. He contends that the trial court committed plain error by (1) failing to instruct the jury on the need for unanimity as to the theory of guilt, (2) failing to require the State to elect a theory of guilt, and (3) failing to correct the prosecutor’s misstatement of law during closing argument. He also contends that (4) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to or request corrections for the first three issues and (5) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise these issues on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony C. Brown v. Tennessee Department of Safety
Petitioner filed an appeal to the Commissioner of the Department of Safety to challenge the seizure of his Chevrolet Suburban incident to his arrest for drug related charges and the subsequent forfeiture of his vehicle. An Administrative Judge issued an initial order, finding the Department had carried its burden of proof and established that Petitioner’s vehicle was being used to facilitate the sale of illicit drugs and ordering that Petitioner’s vehicle be forfeited. The Commissioner’s designee affirmed the forfeiture. Petitioner then filed a petition for judicial review with the Davidson County Chancery Court which affirmed the forfeiture by the Department. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Gray Mills, Jr., and wife, Linda Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc.
Plaintiffs initially filed suit against Royal Group, among others. In its answer, Royal Group alleged the comparative fault of Aaron Rents, Inc. Because the one-year statute of limitations had run, Plaintiffs utilized Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119’s ninetyday window to amend their complaint to add Aaron Rents as a defendant. However, in its answer, Aaron Rents then identified Fulmarque, Inc. as a comparative tortfeasor. Plaintiffs again amended their complaint to add Fulmarque as a defendant, but summary judgment was granted to Fulmarque based upon the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the parties disagree as to whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 authorizes successive ninety-day windows in which additional defendants may be named. We are asked to interpret whether the term “applicable statute of limitations” as used in the statute, and appearing in the phrase “or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations,” refers only to the one-year limitation period for personal injury or to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. We find that the term does not simply refer to the one year limitation period for personal injury, but also to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. Therefore, because Aaron Rents was “named in an a amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations[,]” and because Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name Fulmarque within ninety days from Aaron Rents’ identification of Fulmarque in its answer, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Fulmarque. Bearing these principles in mind, we find that the term “applicable statute of limitations” as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119, and appearing in the phrase “or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitation,” does not refer simply to the one-year limitation period for personal injury, but also to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. As such, because Aaron Rents was “named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations[,]” and because Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name Fulmarque within ninety days from Aaron Rents’ identification of Fulmarque in its answer, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Fulmarque based upon a running of the statute of limitations. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed, and this cause remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Cooper, Individually and of Behalf of the Heirs at Law of Leslie Phillipsen v. Thomas N. Tabb, M.D., Individually, Thomas N. Tabb, P.C., and Perinatal Associates, P.C.
This medical malpractice case involves the reconsideration of an order granting a new trial. The patient, in her second trimester of pregnancy, presented at the hospital with abdominal pain and bleeding. Her treating physician consulted with a maternal-fetal specialist physician. The patient suffered a placental abruption, and the fetus died in utero. Later that day, the patient developed a blood-clotting disorder. She died that evening. The patient’s husband filed this lawsuit against the treating physician, the hospital and its employees, and the maternal-fetal specialist physician. A settlement was reached with all of the defendants except for the maternal-fetal specialist, and a jury trial was held as to only the specialist. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant specialist. The trial court granted the plaintiff husband’s motion for a new trial. Three years later, the defendant specialist filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider its order granting a new trial. Upon reconsideration, the trial court granted the motion and reinstated the jury verdict. The plaintiff husband now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider its initial order, and that the trial judge’s remarks, taken as a whole, indicate he was not satisfied with the jury verdict. Accordingly, we remand for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John F. Johnson v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks reversal of trial court’s affirmance of disciplinary board proceeding finding inmate guilty of solicitation of staff in violation of Tennessee Department of Correction policy and grant of judgment on the record to the Tennessee Department of Corrections. Petitioner asserts that the decision of the disciplinary board was unsupported by material evidence and was procedurally defective. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin E. Shepard
The defendant, Kevin E. Shepard, was convicted after a bench trial of reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, and was sentenced to two years, suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Lee Williams
Appellant, Kevin Lee Williams, pleaded guilty in the Montgomery County General Sessions Court to two counts of domestic assault. The general sessions court sentenced Appellant to two concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days. Appellant subsequently appealed his plea to the Montgomery County Circuit Court arguing that his plea was entered involuntarily. The circuit court held a hearing, but the hearing was limited to the issue of sentencing. Appellant appeals from the circuit court’s refusal to consider whether his plea was entered voluntarily based upon provisions set out in Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because we have determined that Rule 37 does not apply to proceedings in general sessions courts, we affirm the circuit court’s determination with regard to limiting the hearing to an appeal of the imposed sentence. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Don Siddall
The Defendant, Don Siddall, was found guilty in a bench trial by the Hamilton County Criminal Court of two counts of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-13-302 (2010). He was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement, suspended after time served. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficientto support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by allowing the victims to be exempt from the rule of sequestration. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals |