APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Robert Christopher Maclin, was convicted of driving on a revoked license and possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his cocaine conviction because he was not in possession of cocaine when he was arrested. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal of this breach of contract case. In Gary Weaver, et al v. Thomas R. McCarter, et al, No. W2004-02803-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1529506 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2006), this Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and remanded the case “for further clarification concerning the amount of damages awarded with respect to plaintiff’s claims of negligence per se, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract.” Upon remand, the trial court entered judgment against the defendants jointly and severally and in favor of plaintiffs for compensatory damages and pre-judgment interest. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding pre-judgment interest, we reverse that portion of the Judgment. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Gordon Meyer appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate the judgment entered against him pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Meyer and his former wife, Leslie Meyer, were sued by Stephen and Michael Meisenheimer after Michael Meisenheimer, a minor, was injured during a birthday party at the defendants’ residence. Mr. Meyer and Mrs. Meyer failed to appear for trial, and the trial court, after hearing the plaintiffs’ proof, entered a judgment against the defendants in the amount of $12,683.25. Mrs. Meyer’s debt was discharged in bankruptcy, and the plaintiffs sought to collect from Mr. Meyer. The judgment was revived in 2003, and after the assignee of the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel Mr. Meyer to answer postjudgment interrogatories, Mr. Meyer filed a Rule 60.02 motion to vacate the judgment.  Although two attorneys entered pre-trial appearances on behalf of Mr. Meyer and Mrs. Meyer, one of whom filed an answer for the couple in circuit court, Mr. Meyer denied knowledge of the lawsuit and claimed that he did not receive notice of the trial date. Mr. Meyer submitted an affidavit from one of the attorneys who appeared on his behalf, claiming that he did not remember ever talking to Mr. Meyer about the lawsuit. An affidavit from a third attorney, Stephen Bowling, who represented Mr. Meyer in his divorce suit and to whom a copy of the judgment in this case was mailed,  confirmed that he would not have accepted service or forwarded any legal documents for Mr. Meyer if the documents did not pertain to the divorce action. Following a hearing, the trial court overruled Mr. Meyer’s Rule 60.02 motion, and he appeals. After careful review, we affirm, finding that Mr. Meyer failed to meet his burden of proof to justify Rule 60.02 relief.

The Appellant, Tony Alan Winsett, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his “Motion for Delayed Appeal” following the Circuit Court’s March 28, 2006 dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged only that his sentence was illegal. On January 9, 2007, Winsett, proceeding pro se, filed a “Motion for Delayed Appeal” seeking to appeal the March 2006 dismissal of the petition. In his motion, Winsett also asserted new grounds for relief, including ineffective assistance of counsel and a motion to suppress issue. After review, we conclude that this court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Antonio Currie, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years in the county workhouse. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying probation. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher Brown, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

A Weakley County Circuit Court jury convicted the petitioner, Allen Jean Stephens, of possession of more than one-half gram of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of drug paraphernalia, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to an effective sentence of twenty three years in confinement. This court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions. See State v. Allen Jean Stephens, No. M2004-00531-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 668 (Jackson, June 23, 2005), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2005). Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to argue at his pretrial suppression hearing that no probable cause existed for a search warrant to be issued for his home and failed to argue on direct appeal that the trial court did not make a necessary finding of fact regarding the motion to suppress. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a petition for past due child support. When the parties divorced in 1993, the mother was designated as the primary residential parent of the child, and the father was ordered to pay child support “directly to” the mother. In 1998, the mother remarried. From that point forward, the father made his child support checks payable to the child, not to the mother. Nevertheless, the mother endorsed the checks, deposited them into the same bank account as she had before, and maintained control over the use of the funds. Years later, in 2005, the father filed a petition to modify custody, seeking to be designated as primary residential parent. The mother filed a counterclaim for child support arrearages, claiming that the father had not made proper payments as required under the divorce decree since 1998, and that he should not receive credit for the child support checks that were made payable to the child. After a hearing, the trial court gave the father credit for the child support checks. The trial court reasoned that, although the checks were made payable to the child, the money remained in the mother’s control and she treated it as her own.  The mother now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the father should receive credit for the disputed payments under the circumstances presented.

The defendant, Robin M. Chambers, pled guilty to twenty-two counts of forgery, Class E felonies, twenty-three counts of identity theft, Class D felonies, three counts of theft of property under $500, Class A misdemeanors, and one count of criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. The defendant was sentenced to fourteen years and six months in confinement as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant was denied alternative sentencing by the trial court. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her alternative sentencing instead of the imposed term of confinement. Following our review of the full record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Curtis Buford, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of aggravated robbery, and he received a sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Calvin Renard Steel, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of possession with the intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of twelve years as a Range II, multiple offender. In this appeal, he contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We conclude that no error exists, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Dontae Lamont Brown, of attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to thirty-two years and eight years, respectively, and merged the convictions. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erred by giving the jury a flight instruction, and (3) the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the jury’s guilty verdicts and the appellant’s thirty-two-year sentence for attempted murder. However, given that the trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted murder conviction, the court should have entered only one judgment of conviction. Therefore, we remand the case for the trial court to enter a single judgment reflecting the merger of the convictions.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee died as a result of a compensable occupational disease, silicosis, which was caused by exposure to silica dust in the course of his employment. The court awarded death benefits and specified medical and funeral expenses to employee’s widow. The employer has appealed that ruling, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding on causation. In the alternative, the employer requests that the case be remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of a set-off, if any, for Social Security old-age insurance benefits in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i)(2005). We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

The Petitioner, Leroine Martin, pled guilty to two counts of second degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel prior to and during the guilty plea proceedings. The post-conviction court denied his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Hardeman County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Aaron Leon Burnette, Jr., of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, vandalism of property valued one thousand dollars or more but less than ten thousand dollars, and evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to ten, eight, and four years, respectively, and ordered that he serve the ten- and four-year sentences consecutively for an effective sentence of fourteen years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress because the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence and ordered consecutive sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion because I, too, conclude that the certified question does not clearly identify the scope and limits of the reserved issue. However, I disagree with the majority opinion’s view of the other reasons it uses to forbid the appeal.

The issue on appeal is whether the general sessions court may back date the dismissal of a civil warrant, the result of which deprives the plaintiff of the benefit of the Savings Statute to commence a new civil action. When it was discovered that the plaintiffs had requested a voluntary dismissal a year and a half earlier but the case had not been dismissed, the general sessions court entered a dismissal and backdated the effective date of the dismissal to the date the voluntary dismissal had been requested. When the plaintiffs perfected an appeal of the dismissal to the circuit court within ten days of the entry of the order of dismissal, the defendants moved to dismiss the case as being barred by the statute of limitations, relying on the nunc pro tunc application of the dismissal. The circuit court dismissed the case as time barred and this appeal followed. We have determined a dismissal of a civil warrant is not effective until an order of dismissal, signed by the judge, is entered by the clerk of the court. The plaintiffs timely appealed the dismissal of their general sessions warrant within ten days of the date of entry of the order by the clerk. Therefore, this action is not time barred.

The defendant, Michael R. King, was indicted by the Dickson County Circuit Court Grand Jury on two counts of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), second offense. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401, -403(a)(1) (2004). He moved to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test. Following the circuit court’s denial of the motion, a plea agreement resulted in a nolle presequi of count one (DUI), a guilty plea to count two (DUI per se, see id. § 55-10-401(a)(2)), and the reservation of a certified question of law: “Whether the trial court erred following a suppression hearing held on July 10, 2006, that the results of the Defendant’s blood alcohol test may be admitted into evidence?” Because the certified question was not properly reserved for review, we  dismiss the appeal.

The Appellant, Matthew Jordan Buentiempo, appeals the order of the Blount County Circuit Court revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentences of confinement. On appeal, Buentiempo alleges that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. After a review of the record, we affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute between the City of Millersville and a homeowner regarding the enforcement of an ordinance regulating the location of dumpsters on residential property. After the Millersville City Court fined the homeowner fifty dollars for violating the ordinance, the homeowner appealed to the Circuit Court for Sumner County. Following a bench trial, the court found that the homeowner had violated the ordinance and, in addition to fining him fifty dollars, ordered the homeowner to remove the dumpster from his property. The homeowner has appealed. We have determined that the trial court erred by ordering the homeowner to remove the dumpster from his property.

The petitioner, Bobby Marable, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily. After review, we conclude that no error exists, and we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Christopher Perry, was convicted of the first degree murder of Stanley Johnson, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. In the instant appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the court should have found that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Upon reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jermaine Hunter, appeals from the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Appellant, Elmer Harris, appeals his convictions in the Shelby County Criminal Court for aggravated robbery, criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The charges stemmed from incidents occurring at two different Memphis convenience stores on July 4 and July 10, 2004. Prior to trial, the State moved that the two separate indictments be consolidated for trial, and the trial court granted the motion for consolidation. On appeal, Harris presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments for trial; and (2) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his convictions. We affirm Harris’ convictions; however, we conclude that double jeopardy protections require that the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated assault be merged. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for purposes of merger and for entry of corrected judgments of conviction.

The pro se Petitioner, Thomas Earl Williams, appeals the habeas corpus court’s order summarily dismissing his petition, arguing that the dismissal was erroneous for several reasons. Principally, he contends that he is entitled to relief because the sentencing statutes under which he was sentenced in 1974 were later found to be unconstitutional. Following our review, we conclude that his sentences are lawful and have not expired, and that his judgments are not void. Consequently, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s order of summary dismissal.