APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner appeals the Roane County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney (1) failed to file a motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) failed to schedule a hearing to set bond; (3) failed to obtain a second psychological evaluation for him; and (4) failed to file a motion for change of venue. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Dyer County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for attempting to obtain a controlled substance by misrepresentation fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge. Following a jury trial on July 28, 2004, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant to four years as a Range II multiple offender. The defendant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine her regarding her prior convictions contrary to Rule 609 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. We find that there was sufficient evidence and the trial court did not err in allowing the entry of the prior convictions into evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Cocke County grand jury indicted the defendant, Joshua Parker, on one count of aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to twelve years to be served at 100% as a Range II multiple offender. The defendant appeals this conviction. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument. We have determined that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated sexual battery. Therefore, we reverse and dismiss the judgment of conviction for that offense. However, the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and we therefore reduce the conviction to that of attempted aggravated sexual battery, and remand for entry of judgment to that effect and re-sentencing.

The Appellant, Lamario Sumner, was convicted bya Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery and received an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, Sumner has raised five issues for our review: (1) whether Sumner’s prior conviction for aggravated robbery was admissible for impeachment purposes; (2) whether the trial court erred by precluding examination of the police investigator regarding exculpatory statements made by Sumner; (3) whether the elements of a prior felony conviction, introduced solely for purposes of impeachment, may be developed through examination of the witness; (4) whether the trial court properly responded to a jury question regarding criminal responsibility; and (5) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the convictions.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Robert Lee Roberts, of driving under the influence (DUI), and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspending all but six months of the sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence is insufficient. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While I concur in most of the majority opinion, I write separately to express my disagreement with a portion of the analysis by the majority. Specifically, I am not comfortable with the analysis pertaining to the trial court’s order requiring DNA testing.

The petitioner, Leonard Maysonet, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for carjacking, a Class B felony, and kidnapping, a Class C felony, and resulting concurrent sentences of twelve years in the Department of Correction. He claims the trial court erred in finding his petition was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations. He asserts that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), announced a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application to his case. We affirm the trial court's summary dismissal of the petition.

The State appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s grant of post-conviction relief to the Petitioner, Tommy Nunley. In February 1998, Nunley was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated rape and was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. A petition for post-conviction relief was filed alleging grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nunley’s principal claim asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek state-funded expert assistance for “DNA testing of specimens collected” by the police. At the conclusion of one of the several hearings conducted by the post-conviction court, the court, on its own motion, directed DNA testing of biological specimens shown to be in the custody of the State. The court was subsequently informed that the specimens had been “misplaced and/or destroyed.” Upon learning of this fact, the post-conviction court granted Nunley’s petition for post-conviction relief concluding “that said evidence could and should have been tested at the time of [Nunley’s] trial, and that because said evidence has been lost and/or destroyed, petitioner’s constitutional right to a fair trial was violated.” Because we conclude that the proof fails to establish prejudice under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, the grant of post-conviction relief is reversed, and the judgment of conviction is reinstated.

This appeal centers around the Trial Court’s award of attorney fees to Plaintiffs in this Tennessee Consumer Protection Act case. Following remand after the first appeal, the Trial Court awarded attorney fees of $2,000 for work performed in preparation for and the jury trial of this case, and an additional $4,500 in attorney fees incurred on the first appeal. Plaintiffs appeal claiming the Trial Court’s award of $2,000 in fees incurred at the trial court level was unreasonably low. Defendant appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in awarding any fees incurred on the appeal. We reverse the award of fees incurred on the appeal, and modify the Trial Court’s judgment to award $6,500 in fees for work performed at the Trial Court level.

This is a divorce case. Husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property, award alimony in futuro to Wife, naming of Wife as primary residential parent, and child support order. We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals from failure of the trial court to allow interest on a child support arrearage judgment pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101(A)(5). The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

This appeal involves a parental dispute over the payment of child support for a fifteen-year-old child. One year following the divorce, the child's father filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Franklin County seeking to modify his $2,100 per month child support obligation because his visitation with his daughter had increased and because his daughter was receiving Social Security benefits as a result of his retirement. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the father was willfully unemployed and declined to lower his child support obligation. However, the court determined that the father was entitled to an offset in the amount of the Social Security benefits that the child was receiving as his dependent. Both the mother and the father take issue with the judgment. The father asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to lower his child support obligation. The mother insists that the court erred by giving the father credit for the Social Security benefits the child was receiving. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Sarah Leigh Pannell, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court's denial of alternative sentencing. The record supports the court's order, and we affirm.

The petitioner, Allen Oliver, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to numerous offenses and received a total effective sentence of twenty-three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that his attorneys were ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a motorcycle rider who was seriously injured while crossing two heavy steel plates placed over the surface of a portion of a state highway that was under construction. The rider filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission asserting that the front tire of his motorcycle became lodged in a gap between the two steel plates and that this gap was the dangerous condition that caused his injuries. Following a hearing, a claims commissioner dismissed the claim after concluding (1) that the rider had failed to prove that the State, rather than the highway contractor, was responsible for maintaining the steel plates, (2) that the rider had failed to prove that the State had notice of the gap between the plates, and (3) that the rider’s negligence exceeded that of the State. The motorcycle rider has appealed. We have determined that the claims commissioner erred by concluding that the State was not on notice of the dangerous condition on the highway and that the motorcycle rider’s negligence exceeded the State’s negligence.

Mr. Chatman was a policeman in Chattanooga. He was fired on September 15, 2003 for untruthfulness during an investigation, and for conduct unbecoming a police officer. He appealed to the Chattanooga City Council which upheld his dismissal. His petition for certiorari was denied and he appeals. We affirm.

The trial court modified the parties’ decree of divorce, changing custody of parties’ minor child from joint custody to Father, and transferred control of a custodial account from Mother to Father. The trial court also denied Mother’s petition to set visitation and ordered Mother to have no contact with child. Mother appeals. We vacate the trial court’s order regarding visitation and the award of attorney’s fees and remand on these issues. The remainder of the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

The appellant, Joe Mac Pearson, was convicted by a jury in the Marshall County Circuit Court of selling a Schedule II controlled substance, namely oxycodone, and he received a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the sentence imposed. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur completely in the majority’s conclusion that “the facts preponderate against the Trial Court’s holding that only $2,000 in fees was a reasonable amount for work performed at the trial court level.” I also agree with the majority’s decision that $6,500 is a reasonable fee for counsel’s work at the trial court level.

The petitioner, Ben Mills, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and attempted first degree murder convictions, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that he was prejudiced as a result of any alleged deficiency in counsel’s representation. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Currie Lee Byrd, pled guilty to arson and vandalism over $60,000 and was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years and eight years, respectively, to be served under the supervision of a community corrections program after serving 140 days in jail. He reserved as a certified question of law whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements. Following our review, we concur with the trial court’s determination that the motion to suppress was without merit.

The Defendant pled guilty to and was convicted of misdemeanor casual exchange of marijuana not in excess of one-half ounce, Class E felony possession with intent for resale of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana, and possession of a handgun as a felon, also a Class E felony. The Defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction, and three years as a Range II, multiple offender for each felony conviction. The trial court ordered the two felony conviction sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective six year term of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges his sentence, claiming the court erred by: 1) imposing consecutive sentences, and 2) denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves issues arising out of the parties’ divorce. The chancery court designated and divided the parties’ assets and placed an equitable lien on the separate property of the husband. The chancery court did not award alimony or attorney’s fees and discretionary costs to the wife. We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. Further, we decline to award attorney’s fees and costs on appeal

Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the preparation of his case. Specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel’s failure to interview and call Andre Jackson as a witness at trial was deficient conduct. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by any deficiencies in his trial counsel’s performance, and we thus affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Marcus E. Thompson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.