APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Preston U. Pendergrass, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the indictment, which charged him with two counts of attempted first degree murder, failed to state the facts constituting an offense, thereby depriving the convicting court of jurisdiction and rendering his judgments void. The petitioner further argues that the court erred by not appointing appellate counsel as requested. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The defendant, Barry Wayne Dunham, was convicted by a Macon County Criminal Court jury of the first degree premeditated murder of his father and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) restricting defense counsel’s voir dire of the jury venire; (2) interfering with defense counsel’s examination of a witness and denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the court’s allegedly prejudicial commentary on the witness’s testimony; and (3) disallowing a defense expert witness on the subject of domestic violence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We dismiss this appeal from a granting of summary judgment because the appeal was not from a final judgment and the issues are moot.

This case involves a petition filed by the co-executors of the Estate of Billy F. Hawk, Jr. to approve a sale of real estate partially owned by the Estate. The issue presented is whether the trial court should have approved the private sale. The trial court held that the proposed sale was not in the best interest of all the beneficiaries of the Estate. The proposed buyer appeals. We hold that the trial court’s decision was not contrary to the preponderance of evidence, nor was it arbitrary or capricious, and therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Phyllis Hathaway, appeals from the trial court’s order modifying her probation and setting her restitution. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court erred in (1) imposing consecutive sentences and probation on December 7, 1989 because the judgments had become final; and (2) in determining restitution fourteen (14) years after the sentencing hearing. Following review, we conclude that the judgment expiration issue is without merit. In addition, we affirm the trial court’s modification of the petitioner’s probation. However, after review of the record, we conclude that the trial court failed to follow the criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304 when setting restitution. Therefore, regarding the issue of restitution, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Faron Douglas Pierce, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and request for a delayed appeal. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to allow him to testify at his sentencing hearing, and in failing to file a Rule 11 application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. After review of the record, we grant the petitioner a delayed appeal, and we stay further proceedings on his remaining post-conviction claim.

The defendant, Patrick Harris, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder. In this appeal, he insists that he acted in self-defense and that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. Finding that the evidence is sufficient and that it entitled the jury to reject the defendant’s claim of self-defense, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

This case involves the alleged breach of a real estate sales contract. The plaintiffs argue that the defendant home builder is in breach of contract because he refused to sell them the house contracted for unless, in addition to the price stated in the contract, they paid him for costs attributed to changes in construction. None of these changes were implemented pursuant to written change orders as required under the contract. The builder countersued arguing that the changes for which he sought payment were agreed to orally after the contract was executed, that the written change order requirement of the contract was waived, and that the plaintiffs breached the contract by refusing to pay him the original contract price, plus the amount attributed to the changes. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendant. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

The defendant, Steven Skinner, was convicted by jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder for which he received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions because there is no proof connecting him to the crimes other than uncorroborated accomplice testimony, and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to two consecutive life sentences.  Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Annette Reynolds, was convicted of facilitation of possession of cocaine for resale, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to concurrent sentences of fifteen years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that there was prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. She also claims that the trial court made several errors: by denying discovery regarding the identity of the confidential informant whose information led to the search warrant for her residence; by denying her motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search; by admitting the presentence report at sentencing; and by sentencing her as a career offender. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Stevie W. Caldwell, was convicted in 1995 in the White County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder, aggravated arson, and conspiracy to commit arson against personal property, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to life, nineteen years, and six months, to be served concurrently. In a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, he claimed that the indictment was defective, thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal followed. After review, we affirm the dismissal.

Christa A. Avenell,¹ sometimes referred to herein as “the plaintiff,” brought this action against James Allen Gibson (“the creditor”), seeking to recover funds taken out of the Avenells’ two joint accounts by their bank in response to a levy of execution. The trial court held that the 1988 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703 (2000) changed the law with respect to bank accounts held by individuals as tenants by the entirety; that Mrs. Avenell failed to prove she was entitled to the levied upon funds; and that the creditor was entitled to retain the funds paid into court by the Avenells’ bank. The plaintiff and her husband appeal. We reverse.

The petitioner, Paul K. Flannigan, appeals pro se from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that his judgments, indictments, and jury
verdicts are invalid. He further argues that the trial judge and district attorney have acted improperly.  Finding no merit in this appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with the majority opinion’s analysis until it undertakes consideration of the 1988 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703(a). As quoted in the majority opinion, the amendment states:

Any balance so created, including, without limitation, any balance held by spouses, shall be subject to assignment by, or the claim of any creditor of, either depositor, as if such depositor were the sole owner of the funds; provided that is such creditor realizes its claim by any means other than enforcement of an assignment, pledge, or the grant of a security interest made by any one (1) of such depositors, any other depositor not indebted to the creditor may, by commencing a separate action against the creditor, establish such rights as that depositor may have in the funds.

This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Deborah Kay Parker Hoxit Ohme ("Wife") a divorce from Frederick Herman Ohme, IV ("Husband"), divided the parties' marital property and debts, and awarded Wife transitional alimony of $500 per month. In addition, the court approved Wife's parenting plan, in which she was designated as the primary residential parent of the parties' child, and ordered Husband to pay child support of $854 per month. Husband appeals the granting of the divorce to Wife, the division of debt, the award of alimony, and the trial court's decree regarding responsibility for transporting the parties' child to and from visitation. We affirm.

The petitioner, Michael Holman, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and sentence of twenty years. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction. See State v. Michael Andrae Holman, M2002-01471-CCA-R3-CD, Marshall County (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2003). The petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed (1) to interview and subpoena witnesses adequately; (2) to obtain phone records and motel documents; (3) to contact witnesses who could provide the petitioner with an alibi defense; (4) to cross-examine the informant and co-defendant thoroughly; (5) to argue sufficiently that the petitioner could not have been in constructive possession of the drugs found; and (6) to prepare adequately for trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case wherein J.R.R., who is neither the biological father of the twins nor the husband of the mother of the twins, resists the termination of his parental rights. The trial court terminated his parental rights, and we affirm the judgment.

Allstate Insurance Company paid a fire loss to the landlord then brought an action against the tenant asserting subrogation rights. The trial court held the tenant to be blameless as to the fire but found him liable under the terms of the lease, which provided that the tenant would be "responsible for all damages to the apartment, intentional or non intentional". Since we find the tenant to be an additional insured under the Allstate policy, no subrogation rights exist, and we reverse the trial court.

Plaintiff sued her employer for misrepresentation relating to health insurance coverage and sought to recover amounts incurred by her husband for medical bills. The trial court found for plaintiff awarding her treble and punitive damages. We reverse the trial court's finding of treble and punitive damages and affirm the trial court's award of a refund to plaintiff for amounts contributed as premiums.

This appeal involves the termination of a biological father's parental rights with regard to his nine-year-old daughter. After determining that the child had been sexually abused by her father, the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Grundy County seeking to terminate the father's parental rights. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the father had committed severe child abuse and that his daughter's interests would be best served by terminating his parental rights. The father asserts on this appeal that the Department failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he had committed severe child abuse. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the father committed severe child abuse and that terminating his parental rights is in his daughter's best interests.

The defendant, Charles Sawyer, was arrested by the police for aggravated sexual battery. Following his arrest, Sawyer made an oral statement to the police after an officer read to Sawyer an affidavit supporting the arrest warrant but before the officer advised Sawyer of his Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Sawyer filed a motion to suppress his oral statement. Based upon the nature of the facts contained in the affidavit supporting the issuance of the arrest warrant and the circumstances surrounding his arrest and detention, we conclude the statement resulted from an unconstitutional custodial interrogation and therefore should be suppressed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Ronald Joseph Reece pleaded guilty to statutory rape for which he received a two-year probationary sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court’s refusal to grant judicial diversion, he now appeals his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the sentence imposed by the lower court.

The defendant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences, based on the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Blakely v. Washington. Our courts have previously held that neither Apprendi nor Blakely affect the trial court’s ability to impose consecutive sentences. Furthermore, upon reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences based on the defendant’s extensive record, consisting of twenty prior convictions. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Upon entering guilty pleas, the two Defendants were convicted of attempted first degree murder and attempted second degree murder respectively, and received sentences of fifteen and ten years’ incarceration.  The Defendants filed petitions for post-conviction relief, and after a consolidated evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief to both Defendants. The Defendants now appeal to this Court raising the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary pleas. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents of A.R.G., DOB 12-26-2000. Only Mother, C.S., appeals. Grounds for termination were substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan and failure to remedy conditions in her life permitting the child's return in the near future. We affirm the action of the trial court.