APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Randolph Anderson, appealed a conviction in the Sumner County General Sessions Court for simple possession of marijuana. In the trial court, the defendant filed a motion to suppress which was granted. In this appeal from the order of suppression, the state argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the arresting officer lacked any basis to stop the vehicle driven by the defendant. The judgment is affirmed.

Grethy Hirt ("Wife") filed for divorce from Ernst H. Hirt ("Husband") after twenty-seven years of marriage. The parties had five financial accounts. Two of these accounts clearly were marital property, were divided evenly by the Trial Court, and are not at issue on appeal. As to the three remaining accounts, the Trial Court concluded two were marital property with the third being Wife's separate property. After making these findings, the Trial Court distributed the property with Husband receiving 54% of the marital property, and Wife receiving the remaining 46%. Husband appeals claiming the Trial Court erred when it classified two of the accounts as marital property and the third as Wife's separate property. Both parties claim the Trial Court's overall distribution of the marital property was inequitable. We conclude the Trial Court properly classified the three accounts at issue and did not abuse its discretion when distributing the marital property. The judgment of the Trial Court is, therefore, affirmed.

This is a premises liability case. Plaintiff, Alice Holden, appeals from the order of the trial court granting summary judgement to defendant, Fred’s Stores of Tennessee, Inc.

The majority concludes that modification of the defendant’s sentence is required in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). I must respectfully dissent.

This case involves a dispute over the enforcement of non-compete and confidentiality agreements in an employment contract. A company selling satellite telephone and GPS equipment filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking to enforce a non-compete agreement against a former employee who was allegedly interfering with its business relations with customers and suppliers. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court determined that the employee had breached the agreements and enjoined the employee from competing with his former employer for one year in North America. The employee has appealed, asserting that the non-compete agreement is unenforceable or, in the alternative, that its geographic coverage is too broad. We have determined that the non-compete agreement is enforceable but that its geographic coverage should be limited to the United States rather than to North America.

In this divorce case, the trial court designated Adrienne Scaife ("Mother") as the primary residential parent of the parties' children, Laniesha Scaife (DOB: August 10, 1992) and Kevin Scaife, Jr. (DOB: July 18, 1996). The children's father, Kevin Scaife ("Father"), appeals. We affirm.

The Appellant, Derrell Bender, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his "Motion for Reduction or Modification of Sentence" filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35(b). Bender pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and received an agreed-upon sentence of ten years as a Range III career offender. In his motion, Bender requested that the trial court impose a sentence within the sentence range of a Range I standard offender. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Bender was "not an appropriate candidate for a suspended sentence." Bender seeks review pursuant to a "Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari." Because the trial court's order fails to address Bender's request for sentencing as a Range I offender, we reverse and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the Rule 35 motion.

This appeal involves a prisoner's concerns about overcrowding at the correctional facility in which he is incarcerated. The prisoner filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking an order compelling the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole to advance his release eligibility date. The trial court granted the Board's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, and the prisoner appealed. We vacate the judgment and remand the case with directions to dismiss the petition because it was filed in the wrong county.

This appeal involves a prisoner who desires to rescind a waiver he signed in 1986 to become entitled to earn sentence reduction credits. The prisoner filed a pro se petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County requesting an order directing the Tennessee Department of Correction to permit him to withdraw his waiver. The Department moved to dismiss the prisoner's petition because it was not timely filed. The trial court granted the motion, and the prisoner has appealed. We vacate the judgment and remand the case with directions to dismiss the petition because it was filed in the wrong county.

The appellant, Tiffany Lea Packard, pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. She received a total effective sentence of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court denied the appellant alternative sentencing, and the appellant now appeals that denial. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the construction of a will. The decedent died owning farmland in excess of twenty acres in size. Wife admitted the decedent's properly executed will, which named her as executrix, into probate. The decedent's children by a prior marriage filed an action in the probate court asking the probate court to construe conflicting provisions in the decedent's will. One section of the decedent's will purported to devise to his children the entire farm subject to the wife's life estate, while the second provision purported to devise to the wife a life estate in the "homeplace." The decedent's children argued the term "homeplace" encompassed something significantly less than the entire farm. The probate court disagreed, interpreting the term "homeplace," as used by the decedent, to mean the entire farm. In addition, the probate court ruled that, pursuant to section 66-1-106 of the Tennessee Code, the decedent's will created in his wife an unlimited power of disposition as to the farm. The decedent's children have appealed the interpretation of the decedent's will reached by the probate court to this Court. We affirm the decision of the probate court in all respects.

The defendant, Christy Mechelle Thompson,¹ broke into a private residence and stole personal property worth more than $500.00. The Cocke County Grand Jury indicted her for one count of aggravated burglary and one count of theft over $500.00. The defendant pled guilty. As part of her plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant to three (3) years as Range I offender for the aggravated burglary and one (1) year for the theft over $500.00. She also agreed to pay restitution in the amount of $1,016.85. Under the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the method and manner of sentence. The trial court sentenced the defendant to incarceration with the Tennessee Department of Corrections. The defendant appeals her sentence, arguing that: (1) the trial court improperly weighed the enhancing and mitigating factors; and (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and especially aggravated robbery. The Defendant received an effective thirty-year sentence for these crimes. This court affirmed the judgments on direct appeal. See State v. Carlos C. Beasley, No. W1999-00426-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 527715 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, May 2, 2000). The Defendant subsequently filed for postconviction relief on the ground that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Thomas L. Jackson, was convicted of possessing drugs in a penal facility, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. This conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Eric Phillips, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel both at trial and on appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully dissent from the opinion filed by the other members of the Panel.

Mr. Thetford had a pre-existing arthritic condition. I find the evidence presented in this case preponderates against a finding that his pre-existing condition was advanced and anatomically changed by his work for Tower.

The trial court denied the parties a divorce upon finding the Wife failed to prove inappropriate marital conduct. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Billy Ray Sanlin, was convicted by jury of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. On appeal he contends that: (1) he was substantially prejudiced when the trial court improperly allowed the State to call his codefendant to testify after the codefendant previously indicated his unwillingness to testify; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to allow his defense counsel to argue the difficulties inherent in cross-racial identification in closing argument; and (3) the evidence relating to the defendant’s identification as the perpetrator of the offenses was insufficient to support his convictions. Because we determine that reversible error occurred in the State’s direct examination of the codefendant as a witness, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Freddie Alton Moss, appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking the probation based upon charges for driving under the influence and violation of the implied consent law. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

M.B. and P.B. were husband and wife with four children born during the marriage. L.C.B., the fourth of these children, was born in 1997, nine years after M.B. had undergone a vasectomy. P.B. had engaged in an extramarital affair with R.D. and subsequent to the divorce of M.B. and P.B., the relationship between R.D. and P.B. ripened into marriage with P.B. becoming P.D. In the case at bar, R.D. and P.D. sued to establish R.D. as the biological father of L.C.B. and to terminate the parental rights of M.B. An answer and counterclaim was filed by M.B. denying the allegations of the complaint and seeking to terminate the parental rights of R.D. Holding that the claim of R.D. was barred by laches, the trial court dismissed the complaint. We hold that the complaint of R.D. is not barred by laches but affirm the action of the trial court.

This is a direct appeal as of right from a bench trial conviction of first degree premeditated murder. The Defendant, William Keith Matthews, was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant argues four issues: (1) there was insufficient evidence to find the Defendant guilty of first degree premeditated murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and in the alternative, the defense of insanity was established; (2) the trial court erred in not granting the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) the Defendant was not competent to stand trial; and (4) the Tennessee statute providing for the insanity defense is unconstitutional. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Vick R. Nichols, Jr., appeals his convictions by a Lewis County jury finding him guilty of two counts of felony reckless endangerment as lesser included offenses of the indicted charges of aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, Nichols was granted judicial diversion. On appeal, Nichols raises five issues for our review: (1) whether felony reckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault; (2) whether the trial court violated Tenn. R. Crim. P. 30(c) by failing to reduce supplemental jury instructions to writing; (3) whether the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury with regard to certain hunting rules and regulations contained in Title 70, Tennessee Code Annotated; (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the defense of third parties; and (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts. The State concedes that felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault as indicted. We agree. Notwithstanding reversible error, we conclude that no appeal of right, as provided by Rule 3, Tenn. R. App. P., lies, as the Appellant was granted judicial diversion and no judgment of conviction has been entered. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The plaintiff sought a common law writ of certiorari to review the action of a prison disciplinary board. The Circuit Court held that the correction of the Board's decision was not subject to judicial review. We affirm.

The defendant, Robert Wilson, was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of six years and twenty-five years, respectively. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) that the evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to support the finding of the indictment; (3) that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to adequately respond to the motion for a bill of particulars; (4) that the state elicited and failed to correct false testimony in violation of his due process rights; (5) that the trial court failed to exercise its role as the thirteenth juror; and (6) that the sentence is excessive. The judgments of conviction are affirmed. The sentences are modified to four years and twenty-three years, respectively, and are to be served consecutively.