APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce case. Plaintiff-appellant Cheri Owens Tuncay was granted a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. Mrs. Tuncay appeals the trial court’s division of the marital debts as well as the court’s failure to award her alimony beyond $5,000 in attorney fees.

In this divorce action, the appellant (husband) appeals from the judgment of the trial court questioning the amount of child support he was ordered to pay, the division of marital property and alimony, including the amount, nature, and duration. The appellee (wife) seeks attorney fees for this appeal. No issue is presented relating to the granting of the divorce. We note that at the time of the trial, the husbanc had more than enough life insurance in force to satisfy this requirement.

This is a divorce case.  On appeal, Brenda Pierce (wife) raises the issues of whether the tril court erred by refusing to grant her periodic alimony, by failing to grant her the divorce, and by failing to grant her discretionary costs and attorney's fees. We modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

Plaintiff/Appellant, Citizens for Collierville (“CFC”) appeals from the order of the 2 Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, which declared valid the decision of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the Town of Collierville approving of Resolution 96-35 with respect to the application of Baptist Memorial Hospital (“BMH”) for a planned development pursuant to the Town of Collierville’s zoning ordinance. For reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The husband, William Jeffrey Tarkington, has appealed from a judgment of the Trial Court finding him and his wife, Rebecca Juanita Tarkington, guilty of inappropriate marital conduct and declaring them to be divorced pursuant to TCA § 36-4-129.

This is a post-divorce decree proceeding in which the defendant husband has appealed from an unsatisfactory disposition of his counter petition to terminate alimony.

This is an action whereby the plaintiff seeks to enforce a convenant not to compete in an employment agreement between the defendant, Warren, and the plaintiff. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The motion did not set out any grounds for relief but simply stated that defendants "file this motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Tennesse Rules of Civil Procedure" and referred the court to grounds stated in their briefs in support of themotion. The brief is not included in the record. Apparently, the parties did not make a designation of record and the Clerk of the court correctly omitted the brief pursuant to Rule 24, Tennessee rulesof Appellate Procedure.

In this slip and fall case in which a child slipped on some ice cubes in the vestibule of a large department store, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff but attributed 70 % of the fault to the unknown person who placed or dropped the ice on the floor. Ruling on a post-trial motion, the trial judge held that the store’s fault was 100% because the plaintiff could not sue the unknown tortfeasor. On appeal, the defendant asserts that there is no evidence to support the verdict and that the trial judge erred in modifying the jury’s verdict with respect to the degree of fault. We find that there is evidence from which the jury could have found that the store was negligent and that the store cannot attribute part of the fault to the unknown tortfeasor. We, therefore, affirm the lower court’s judgment.

This appeal involves a suit filed by plaintiffs, Gina (“Mrs. Franklin”) and Barnee Franklin (“the Franklins”), against defendant, Allied Signal, Inc. (“Allied”), for personal injuries sustained when Mrs. Franklin tripped and fell on Allied’s premises on a metal loading ramp which protruded above the dock floor by one to two inches. The trial court granted Allied’s motion for summary judgment. The Franklins appeal and pose the following issues for our consideration: (1) whether the trial court committed error in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment; and (2) whether the “open and obvious rule” bars plaintiff’s recovery or is only a factor to be considered in assessing comparative negligence. For reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.