APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Robert Fusco, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, which were merged, and one count of each of the following offenses: conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -12-103, -13-202, -13-304, -13-305, -13-402, -13-403, & -14-403. The trial court determined that the Defendant was a Range II, multiple offender for sentencing purposes and imposed an effective 65-year sentence. We first decided this appeal several months ago in February 2012. See State v. Robert Fusco, No. M2010-01724-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 368224 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2012). Our decision was vacated by the Tennessee Supreme Court, and the case was remanded to this court for reconsideration in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties addressing any White issues. When this case was previously before this court, the Defendant raised the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the lesser-included offense of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping; (2) whether the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (3) whether the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping; (4) whether his dual convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery violate due process concerns because the restraint of the victim was not beyond that necessary to complete the robbery; (5) whether the trial court erred by not merging his two conspiracy convictions because the offenses were the object of the same agreement; (6) whether the trial court erred by using certain out-of-state convictions to enhance his sentencing range; and (7) whether his sentence was excessive. We reissue our previous opinion as follows with a new section dealing with the White issues. Upon further consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case with those in White, we again affirm the Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery. The case is remanded to the Montgomery County Circuit Court for the entry of corrected judgments to reflect merger of the Defendant’s conspiracy convictions. In all other respects, we conclude that there is no reversible error in the judgments of the trial court and affirm.

The Petitioner, Albert James Saavedra, was ultimately convicted of voluntary manslaughter and attempted second degree murder and, thereafter, received an effective fourteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and, following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s (1) allegedly providing the prosecution with information about the location of the Petitioner’s vehicle and (2) failing to adequately address issues surrounding the video recording of the Petitioner’s statement to authorities. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Father’s parental rights to two children were terminated as a result of his confinement in a correctional facility for more than ten years; he appeals, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the holding that termination of his parental rights would serve the best interest of the children. We disagree and affirm the decision terminating his rights.

Appellee, Jose Luis Gonzalez, was indicted by the Blount County Grand Jury for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of a firearm with intent to go armed in the commission of a felony. Prior to trial, Appellee filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on an illegal traffic stop. The trial court determined that the evidence seized during a traffic stop should be suppressed, granting the motion filed by Appellee. The State sought an interlocutory appeal on the matter, asking this Court to reverse the grant of the motion to suppress. After a review of the record, we determine police had probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for improper brake light operation, or at minimum a reasonable and articulable suspicion the lights violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-402. As a result, we conclude based on the facts herein that the officer effectuated a lawful traffic stop of Appellee. Consequently, the trial court’s grant of the motion to suppress is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Rhonda Brown-Montague aka Rhonda Brown, pleaded guilty to theft of property over $60,000.00, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Appellant challenges her sentence as excessive and argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Kacy Dewayne Cannon, of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted a TBI report detailing the DNA on substances found on the victim’s pantyhose; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the case after the victim died; (3) the trial court erred when it denied his request for a forensic scientist to testify about the procedure for handling evidence and the possibility of evidence contamination; (4) the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody for the victim’s pantyhose; (5) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce testimony about the emergency room’s protocol; (6) a State witness, Nurse Ardyce Ridolpho, was not qualified to testify as an expert; (7) the trial court erred when it determined that the State did not commit prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; (8) the trial court erred when it allowed a doctor to testify about the victim’s medical records; and (9) he is entitled to relief based upon cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pro Se Petitioner, Herman Shurn, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner was originally indicted for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. A jury convicted the Petitioner of criminally negligent homicide and aggravated robbery for which the Petitioner received an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his indictment for aggravated robbery, as amended, is void. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Joseph Scott Turk, was indicted for simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; failure to obey a traffic control device, a Class C misdemeanor; failure to operate a motor vehicle within a single lane of traffic, a Class C misdemeanor; failure to use a turn signal, a Class C misdemeanor; driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the implied consent law, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage while operating a motor vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-418, -17-425, 55-8-109, -8-123, -8-143, 55-10-401, -10-406, -10-416. The Defendant filed a suppression motion alleging that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop his car. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. The Defendant subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the State. The Defendant pled guilty to DUI, first offense, and received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days with forty-eight hours to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on unsupervised probation. As part of the plea agreement, the remaining charges were dismissed and the Defendant reserved a certified question of law for appellate review pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence against him. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, William K. Paulson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of postconviction relief from his convictions of reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest, driving without a license, and violating the state registration law. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in determining that he received effective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Michael L. Webster, for one count of first degree premeditated murder. A jury found Appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty-five years at 100% as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The State argues that the trial court erred in determining that Appellant was a Range I, standard offender and should have sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender based upon prior convictions out of Georgia. On appeal, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction because the jury rejected his claim of self-defense and Appellant was unable to raise reasonable doubt. We also determine that the trial court correctly determined that Appellant qualified as a Range I, standard offender because his Georgia conviction for burglary was equivalent to a Tennessee conviction for burglary and, therefore, Appellant did not have the requisite amount of the correct classification of prior felonies for him to qualify as a Range II, multiple offender. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Petitioner, Antonio Bobo, entered a guilty plea to assault and received probation on the sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to enter a guilty plea that was not knowing and voluntary. He now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Christopher Terrell Robinson, was found guilty by a Bedford County jury of violating the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender (“HMVO”) Act, evading arrest, and violating the light law. In a separate case, Petitioner pled guilty to felony failure to appear. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an effective sentence of twelve years, to be served as a Career Offender at 60 percent. Petitioner’s convictions and sentence were upheld on direct appeal. See State v. Christopher Terrell Robinson, No. M2010-01183-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1671809, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 29, 2011), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jul. 13, 2011). Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition was dismissed after an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief because Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
 

The Putnam County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Gary Randall Moser, for two counts of aggravated kidnapping and one count of aggravated assault resulting from an altercation with his girlfriend. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two lesser included offenses of false imprisonment. These offenses were merged into one count, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to 319 days in the county jail. Appellant appeals his conviction based upon his arguments that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony alleging it violated Appellant’s right under the Confrontation Clauses of both the Tennessee and United States Constitutions. Appellant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We have determined the statement in question was nontestimonial and properly admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule and, therefore, there is no error in its admission. We have also determined that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Joseph Brennan, pled guilty to two counts of incest and two counts of attempted rape of a child in Sumner County. As a result, he was sentenced to ten years for each attempted rape conviction and three years for each incest conviction. The trial court ordered the attempted rape convictions to run consecutively with one another but concurrently to the incest convictions, for a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. State v. Joseph Brennan, No. M2009-00895-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1425540, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 9, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2010). On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the denial of an alternative sentence. Id. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s sentence. Id. Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition in which he alleged that the sentencing judge was impartial. Petitioner also requested a new sentencing hearing and recusal of the trial court. The trial court denied the request for recusal. An amended petition was filed by Petitioner along with a second motion for recusal of the trial court. The trial court denied the motion for recusal and the petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the post-conviction judge properly denied recusal and where the record indicates that Petitioner was sentenced by an impartial tribunal, properly denied post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Randy Maray Cheairs, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of second-degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and possession of a handgun in the commission of a felony for which he received an effective forty-year sentence. In this appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Kimberly Holliday, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for coram nobis relief. In 2000, the Petitioner entered a “best interest” guilty plea to theft of services and issuing a false financial statement and received an effective four-year-suspended sentence. Over ten years later, in 2011, she filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that failure to report earnings to a public housing authority does not constitute “theft of services” based on State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558 (Tenn. 2010). In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because (1) “a person cannot be guilty of something that is not a crime;” (2) “due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations;” (3) “this case is timely filed as a petition for postconviction relief;” and (4) “a best interest plea rather than a voluntary admission of guilt preserves the appellant’s right to bring a petition for writ of error coram nobis.” Upon review, we affirm dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Amanda Kay Profitt, pled guilty to four counts of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud and to one count of willful abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an adult. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years incarceration as a Range I, standard offender, at thirty percent, for the controlled substance offenses and to two years incarceration as a Range I, standard offender, at thirty percent, for the willful abuse of an adult offense. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of three years at thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered the Defendant to serve her sentence in confinement, specifically when it: (1) denied judicial diversion; and (2) denied alternative sentencing or probation. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Victor Armando Martinez ("the Defendant") appeals his jury convictions for possession with intent to sell twenty-six or more grams of cocaine, simple possession of Alprazolam, possession with intent to sell one-half (1/2) ounce or more but less than ten pounds of marijuana, possession of a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, simple possession of diazepam, simple possession of 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine ("MDMA"), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of his residence. He also alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in applying no mitigating factors in its sentencing of the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The pro se Petitioner, Manuel Haynes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. Because the petition was untimely and the Petitioner has not shown that due process concerns tolled the one-year statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Tyrone Douglas, was placed on community corrections after his plea of guilty to the sale of less than .5 gram of cocaine in Davidson County. After the trial court found a violation of community corrections in 2011, Appellant was reinstated to community corrections on the condition that he complete a drug and mental health assessment and comply with any recommendations made in the assessment. Subsequently, another affidavit was filed alleging Appellant had violated the terms of his community corrections sentence by failing to attend required meetings with his case worker and pleading guilty to new charges. The trial court revoked Appellant’s community corrections sentence, reinstating Appellant’s sentence of thirteen years, to be served as a Persistent Offender at forty-five percent incarceration. Appellant appeals that revocation. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse it’s discretion. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

We granted review in this divorce case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the trial court’s denial of transitional alimony. The trial court divided the parties’ real and personal property, awarded custody of their children to the wife, and declined to award spousal support to the husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s custody determination and, except for the trial court’s refusal to divide the wife’s post-separation income, upheld the classification and division of the marital estate. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding spousal support and ordered the wife to pay the husband transitional alimony in the amount of $2000 per month for thirty-six months. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award the husband transitional alimony. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment awarding the husband transitional alimony but affirm in all other respects the intermediate appellate court’s decision.

This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. Sean and Amber G. (“the Petitioners”) filed a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights with respect to Hope A.P. (“the Child”) against Jessica N. (“Mother”) in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”). The petition alleged that Mother willfully failed to visit or support the Child in the four month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition. The Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child after finding that Mother’s willful failure to support had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence showed that it was in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm.

This appeal involves the petitioner’s efforts to be paroled. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole declined to recommend the petitioner for parole, he filed a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari. The Board filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the Board’s motion, and the petitioner appeals. We affirm.

On June 6, 2012, Esmat Eslami (“Plaintiff”) filed a notice of appeal of an order entered by the Trial Court on May 9, 2012. On November 5, 2012, this Court entered an order directing Plaintiff to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Plaintiff did not respond to the show cause order. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of motions for recusal in two post- ivorce cases involving custody of the parties’ minor children. Having reviewed the appellant’s petition for recusal appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the Trial Court.