APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue is whether there is liability insurance coverage for the plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of the insured’s bar and restaurant. The insurer denied coverage and declined to defend the insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. We hold that based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there is no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there is no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage. We further hold that estoppel by judgment does not apply to collaterally estop the insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
 

Franklyn Nathaniel Morgan (“Father”) filed this divorce action after his spouse, Kandi Tonyelle Morgan (“Mother”), was hospitalized because she had ingested an overdose of medication. Father was given temporary custody of the parties’ daughter who was four years old when the parties separated. Mother then obtained temporary custody based on proof that the Father allowed the marital residence to become filthy and dangerous. After a hearing, the court entered a temporary parenting plan based on “week-about” parenting. After a trial, the court made Mother the primary residential parent during the school year and Father the primary residential parent during the summer. The court also awarded Father parenting time during the spring break and two-thirds of the Christmas break. The court further ordered that Father would pick up the child after school and exercise parenting time from then until he went to work at 6:00 p.m. on his workdays, or until 7:00 p.m., when Mother got off from work on her workdays. Mother had 252 parenting days and Father had 113. The court set Father’s child support according to the Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”), but allowed Father a downward deviation of $30 per month based on the extra parenting time after school, which the court found was not taken into account by the Guidelines. Mother appeals. We modify the judgment to designate Mother the sole primary residential parent. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal from an order of the Tennessee RegulatoryAuthority(“TRA”). The appeal was filed by the Consumer Advocate and Protection Division of the Office of Tennessee’s Attorney General. It challenges the TRA’s authority to allow a gas company to recover attorney fees that were incurred in a proceeding before the TRA that did not involve ratemaking, and the TRA’s authority to order that the attorney fees be recovered from asset management funds. We conclude that the TRA has the authority to order that such litigation fees be recovered as any other reasonable and prudent operating expense of the utility, and that the TRA acted within its authority in ordering that the fees be paid out of asset management funds. The TRA’s decision, therefore, is affirmed.
 

In this case, we address the following two matters: (1) the proper procedure for obtaining appellate review of a judgment of a probate court created by private act upholding a claim filed by the Bureau of TennCare against the estate of a TennCare recipient and (2) the right of TennCare to obtain reimbursement for properlypaid TennCare benefits from real property owned by the recipient at the time of her death. After the decedent’s will was admitted to probate in the Putnam County Probate Court, TennCare filed a claim against her estate seeking reimbursement for services provided through theTennCare program. The decedent’s personal representative filed an exception to this claim. After the probate court upheld TennCare’s claim, the estate appealed to the Circuit Court for Putnam County. The circuit court determined that the decedent’s real property was not subject to TennCare’s claim, and TennCare appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal from the probate court and that the appeal should have been filed with the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, it vacated the circuit court’s judgment and affirmed the judgment of the probate court. In re Estate of Trigg, No. M200902107-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 497459, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011). We granted the estate’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the estate’s appeal from the probate court’s order upholding TennCare’s claim and whether real property owned by the recipient at the time of her death is subject to TennCare’s claims. We have determined that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the estate’s appeal from the probate court’s judgment regarding TennCare’s disputed claim and that the real property owned by the decedent at the time of her death is subject to TennCare’s claims for reimbursement.
 

The defendant, Brandi Nichole Miller, appeals the revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her original twelve-year sentence, arguing: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation; (2) that her due process rights were violated by the fact that the trial court relied on grounds that had formed the bases for her prior probation revocations and were not alleged in the instant revocation warrant; and (3) that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve sentences that had already expired. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating her twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction.
 

Deceased, a resident of Iowa, an employee of plaintiff, delivered materials to the State of Tennessee, and while the materials were being unloaded sustained injuries which resulted in his death, which arose out of the course and scope of his employment. His widow could claim benefits either under the Iowa worker's compensation laws or the State of Tennessee worker's compensation laws, which contain essentially similar provisions. The widow claimed benefits under the Iowa worker's compensation law, and the employer under both laws was entitled to seek subrogation recovery for benefits paid from the alleged third party tort feasors. The State of Iowa would not have jurisdiction over some of the alleged tort feasors, and the employer brought his subrogation action in the State of Tennessee under the Tennessee worker's compensation statutes. Defendants moved for summary judgment and the Trial Court concluded that since the claimant elected to sue under the Iowa worker's compensation statutory scheme, that the employer could not rely on the Tennessee worker's compensation statutes to maintain its action in Tennessee, and dismissed plaintiffs' action. On appeal, we hold that the employer was entitled to employ the Tennessee worker's compensation statute in an effort to recover subrogation benefits against the third party tort feasors.

The defendant, tried and convicted of two counts of first degree murder, was sentenced to death for each offense. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. In our review, we have found that the trial court erred by admitting detailed evidence of a prior claim of child sex abuse and by allowing references to the defendant’s refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. Further, the record demonstrates several instances of prosecutorial misconduct during the opening statement and during the final arguments of both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Because, however, the defendant admitted to at least three witnesses that he committed the murders and the evidence of guilt was otherwise overwhelming, the errors had no effect on the verdicts rendered at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial. Each of the convictions is, therefore, affirmed. Nevertheless, because certain of the inadmissible evidence was particularly inflammatory and the prosecution made several inappropriate comments, the sentences of death must be set aside. The Court of Criminal Appeals is, in consequence, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded to the trial court for new sentencing hearings.
 

The defendant, Maurice Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of rape, a Class B felony. He was subsequently sentenced, as a Range II offender, to twenty years in the Department of Correction, to be served at 100%. On appeal, he raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record before us, we find no error and affirm the conviction.

This appeal arises from an employment dispute between Ronnie Summey (“Summey”) and the Monroe County Board of Education (“the Board”). Summey worked as head football coach and as a teacher at Sequoyah High School (“Sequoyah”) in Monroe County. Summey sued the Board in the Chancery Court for Monroe County (“the Trial Court”), alleging, among other things, breach of contract and violation of various constitutional rights stemming from when Summey was relieved as head coach and offered a new assignment in the school system. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Board, finding that it was Summey who had breached the contract when he refused to accept the new assignment. Summey appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Robert Wiggins, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of eighteen years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony regarding the perpetrator’s cellular telephone number. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Rain and Hail, Inc. (“the plaintiff”) obtained a judgment in the state of Iowa against Craig A. Stewart (“the defendant”). The plaintiff filed this present action to register and enforce the foreign judgment in Tennessee, where the defendant resides. The defendant denied being served with a copy of the complaint in Iowa. The court set a hearing date at which neither the plaintiff nor its counsel appeared. The plaintiff’s counsel advised the court that it would submit the matter on the papers it had filed in support of its position. The court dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Delawrence Williams, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that: (1) prior to trial, his counsel did not inform him of the possibility of consecutive sentencing and (2) his counsel failed to research and sufficiently argue against the imposition of consecutive sentences at his sentencing hearing. Because the petitioner has not shown deficiency by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the denial of the post-conviction petition.

This is a termination of parental rights case with respect to Johnny J.E.M. (“the Child”), the minor son of Amanda M. (“Mother”) and Joshua D. (“Father”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Child from Mother’s home as a result of “serious environmental neglect.” The Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected in Mother’s care; he had no relationship with Father, who was serving a lengthy prison sentence throughout these proceedings. After taking the Child into custody, DCS soon placed him with Janice M. (“Foster Aunt”) and her husband, Sonny M. (collectively “Foster Parents”), the prospective adoptive parents, where he remained for a year and a half before DCS sought to permanently sever the rights of the biological parents to the Child. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition to terminate based on its dual findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination were established as to both parents, and that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Mother and Father, represented by separate counsel, appeal. We affirm.

This appeal involves a lawsuit by a taxpayer. The taxpayer filed this action on behalf of the citizens of the municipality to prevent a disputed disbursement of funds, naming as defendants the municipality, the municipality’s utility district, and three private citizens. By the time the initial hearing in this matter took place, the only defendants who remained in the suit were the three private citizens. Finding that the taxpayer lacked standing to pursue this action, the trial court dismissed the case. The taxpayer then filed a motion to alter or amend, seeking to continue to pursue the lawsuit, pursuant to Bennett v. Stutts, 521 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. 1975). The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The taxpayer appeals. We affirm, finding the exception in Bennett v. Stutts inapplicable.

In 2005, Plaintiff purchased a subdivision lot believing it could later be traded toward the purchase of a condominium. Because no condominiums had been built by 2010, Plaintiff filed suit, seeking to rescind the sale and to recover damages. The trial court rescinded the warranty deed and awarded Plaintiff a return of the purchase price, plus city and county taxes paid and prejudgment interest from the filing of his complaint. Finding no failure of consideration, we reverse the trial court’s rescission of the warranty deed and its damage awards. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims. All remaining issues are deemed either waived or pretermitted.

Defendant, Rachel Leigh Jessie, was indicted by the Carroll County Grand Jury in a seven count indictment for two counts of selling  Methylendioxymethamphetamine (MDMA or “Ecstasy”), a Schedule 1 controlled substance; one count of selling 13.5 grams of marijuana; and four counts of selling counterfeit MDMA. Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of selling MDMA, both Class B felonies, and one count of selling marijuana, a Class E felony, with the manner and length of her sentence to be determined by the trial court. The remaining charges were dismissed. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a standard offender to eight years in community corrections after serving one year incarcerated for each of the two counts of selling MDMA, and two years in community corrections after serving 180 days incarcerated for selling marijuana. Defendant’s sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. Defendant appeals her sentences and asserts that the trial court erred by denying a sentence of full probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Claimant filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission to recover for the wrongful death of his father, a resident of Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute; the Commission awarded damages for loss of consortium, pain and suffering, and medical and funeral expenses. Claimant appeals the amount of damages awarded for loss of consortium and pain and suffering. We affirm the damages awarded for loss of consortium and modify the award of damages for pain and suffering.

The Defendant, Brenda Whitesides, pled guilty to violating the habitual motor vehicle offender law, driving on a revoked license, and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court merged the Defendant’s convictions for driving on a revoked license and violating the habitual motor vehicle offender law and then sentenced her to five years of probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant that alleged that she had violated the terms of her probation by failing to report and by moving out of the State. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly based its revocation finding on considerations that were not presented by the warrant or supported by the facts adduced at the hearing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Bruce Turner, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2010). He was sentenced to twentyfive years’ confinement and community supervision for life. On appeal, he contends (1) that he did not receive a unanimous jury verdict and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify about a sexual assault that occurred in Louisiana; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify that she saw a handgun in the Defendant’s bedroom; and (4) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to refer to herself as a hostage. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We accepted this appeal to clarify the procedures an inmate must follow to dispute the determination of parole eligibility when the inmate is serving consecutive determinate sentences imposed pursuant to the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (“1989 Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-101 to -505 (2010 & Supp. 2011). We clarify that the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) governs an inmate’s challenge to the Tennessee Department of Correction’s (“TDOC”) calculation of a release eligibility date. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-101 to -325 (2011). Under the UAPA, an inmate must request a declaratory order from TDOC before filing a declaratory action in court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(b). Petitioner failed to seek a declaratory order from TDOC; thus, the trial court properly dismissed his petition for common law writ of certiorari naming TDOC and TDOC officials. The UAPA does not govern an inmate’s challenge to a decision of the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“Board”) concerning parole. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-106(c). Rather, the petition for common law writ of certiorari is the procedural vehicle for bringing such challenges. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 (2000). While Petitioner also named the Board and Board officials in his petition for common law writ of certiorari, the trial court properly granted their motions to dismiss because the allegations of the petition fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The method for calculating release eligibility and custodial parole discussed in Howell v. State, 569 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1978) is not applicable to inmates sentenced pursuant to the 1989 Act and serving consecutive determinate sentences for parole-eligible offenses. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the chancery court dismissing the petition is reinstated.
 

Former inmate challenged the calculation of his prison sentence, contending the Tennessee Department of Correction erred in failing to award him pretrial jail credit. The orders of judgment TDOC relied upon to calculate the prison sentence apparently did not indicate the inmate had earned pretrial jail credit. The former inmate filed a complaint against individuals employed by the prison and TDOC, contending they violated his constitutional rights and were liable to him for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). The trial court dismissed the former inmate’s complaint because the defendants calculated the former inmate’s sentence based on the judgments as they were required to do by statute. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

Upon petition by the State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services and following a trial, the Putnam County Juvenile Court terminated father’s parental rights to his three minor children. We affirm because there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s decision and because there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest.
 

In this appeal,the Mother and Father of three children appeal the termination of their parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. We reverse the termination of parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to support; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
 

A Montgomery County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Antonio Dwayne Johnson, for six counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and six counts of delivering .5 grams or more of cocaine. Following a jury trial on counts nine and ten of the indictment (alternate theories of selling and delivering .5 grams of cocaine on August 22, 2008) Defendant was found guilty of selling more than .5 grams of cocaine. The remaining counts of the indictment were apparently tried separately. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Multiple Offender to twelve years at 35% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bryan Keith Bradford, appeals from his conviction upon his guilty plea for robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-401 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years’ incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying him a community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.