APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Michael Lee McKinney, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his eight-year sentence for reckless aggravated assault. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing or the appointment of counsel. Because the Petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites for seeking habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

This lawsuit for damages arises out of an explosion. The plaintiff customers went to the defendant  propane gas facility to fill their recreational vehicle with propane. Soon after they arrived, one of the propane hoses began to leak, and propane gas vapor began to envelope the premises. After a short period of time, the propane gas tank exploded, causing devastating property damage and destroying the plaintiffs’ recreational vehicle. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the defendants, alleging that they were near the explosion site when the explosion occurred, and that the explosion caused them numerous physical and psychological injuries. The defendants admitted liability and compensated the plaintiffs for their property damage. The defendants claimed, however, that the plaintiffs were not present  at the explosion site when the explosion occurred and did not sustain any personal injuries caused by the explosion. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, determining that the explosion did not cause any personal injuries to the plaintiffs and awarding zero damages. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm.

This appeal involves a trial court’s order vacating an arbitration award. The parties engaged in arbitration over a dispute in which the respondent investors asserted that the petitioner investment company mismanaged their funds. The investors prevailed and received a substantial arbitration award against the investment company. The investment company filed a petition in the trial court to vacate the arbitration award, alleging partiality and bias on the part of two members of the arbitration panel. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order vacating the arbitration award and remanding the matter to the regulatory authority for a rehearing before another panel of arbitrators. The respondent investors now appeal. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Defendant, Kristie M. Smith, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for the first degree premeditated murder of her boyfriend, Curtis Phoenix. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction; 2) the admission into evidence of Defendant’s recorded phone calls from jail was error; 3) the admission into evidence of letters written by the Defendant while in jail was error;and 4) Defendant received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained after falling down a staircase while working on the construction of a home. Plaintiff filed a negligence action against the general contractorand the subcontractorresponsible for the construction ofthe custom staircase. The matter was tried before a jury, and the jury returned a verdict finding Plaintiff fifty percent at fault, the subcontractor thirty-five percent at fault, and the general contractor fifteen percent at fault. After his motion for new trial was denied, Plaintiff filed this appeal. Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the subcontractor’s employees used marijuana while working on the construction of the staircase, and erred by excluding evidence of misdemeanor convictions and probation violations of one of the subcontractor’s employees. Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding notice, negligence, and foreseeability. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence of alleged marijuana use or the evidence of misdemeanor convictions and probation violations. Similarly, we find that the jury instructions on notice, negligence, and foreseeability were proper. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the  defendant, Jonathan Ray Swanner, of three counts of rape of a child, see T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2006), and one count of aggravated sexual battery, see id. § 39-13-504(a)(4). The trial court imposed sentences of 24 years’ incarceration for each rape of a child conviction and 11 years’ incarceration for the aggravated sexual battery conviction, to be served concurrently at 100 percent. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court’s ruling that the defendant could not testify about the victim’s prior allegation of molestation resulted in a denial of the defendant’s right to testify; that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use leading questions in its direct examination of the victim; that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the victim; that the State violated the rules of discovery by not disclosing the victim’s statement prior to trial; and that the trial court erred by not giving a limiting jury instruction regarding prior inconsistent statements. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Tennessee corporation located in Montgomery County filed a breach of contract action against a Tennessee corporation located in Sullivan Countyto collect moneyallegedlyowing for services rendered in North Carolina. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint because it concluded the proper venue was Sullivan County, where the defendant resides. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. The plaintiff’s action is transitory and therefore governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-4-101. We conclude the cause of action arose in North Carolina and, pursuant to the statute, venue is proper in Tennessee where the defendant resides.
 

This is an appeal from an order granting a partial summary judgment in an action to modify a final decree of divorce. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties but rather orders the remaining issues set for trial, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.
 

Appellant appealed a non-final judgment and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Defendants, Eryk N. Carrasco and Luis Prieto, pled guilty as Range I offenders to possession with intent to deliver less than 0.5 gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a), (c)(2)(A) (2010). Each defendant was sentenced to serve four years. The Defendants’ plea agreements reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to their arrests. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Respondent father asserts the petition for dependency and neglect filed by the Department of Children’s Services in juvenile court should be dismissed for insufficient service of process, and that Tennessee Code Annotated 37-1-102(b)(23) is unconstitutional as applied to him. Upon de novo appeal, the circuit court affirmed the finding of dependency and neglect and dismissed the Constitutional challenge. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Appellant, Jacob Haliburton, of theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony, and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class E felony. He received a five and two year sentence, ordered to be served consecutively, for an effective seven year sentence. In this appeal, the Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury with instructions regarding duress and necessity; (3) whether the sentence imposed was excessive; and (4) whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The state appeals from the post-conviction court’s judgment granting the petitioner a new sentencing hearing. A Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner on two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, one count of assault, and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court - Division One of the Shelby County Criminal Court - sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with a release eligibility of thirty-five percent on all counts. The petitioner’s habeas corpus petition alleged that a release eligibility of thirty-five percent was illegal for his aggravated kidnapping convictions. The habeas court - Division Five of the Davidson County Criminal Court - agreed, and it vacated his sentences for aggravated kidnapping. The habeas court remanded the case to Division One of the Shelby County Criminal Court - for a new sentencing hearing in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501. On remand, the trial court corrected the judgment forms to reflect the 100% release eligibility required by statute for the aggravated kidnapping convictions but did not conduct a hearing. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the corrected judgments were void and that the entry of corrected judgments violated double jeopardy. The post-conviction court - Division Eight of the Shelby County Criminal Court - granted relief, vacating the corrected judgments and remanding the case to Division One of the Shelby County Criminal Court for a new sentencing hearing. The state appeals the post-conviction court’s order, arguing that the only possible remedy for the petitioner was the entry of corrected judgments. Following our review, we reverse the postconviction court’s order granting relief and dismiss the post-conviction petition.

In this post-conviction appeal, we must determine whether Petitioner Henry Zillon Felts was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial for aggravated burglary and attempted first degree murder. The post-conviction court vacated Petitioner’s convictions after concluding that trial counsel’s representation was ineffective because he: (1) pursued self-defense exclusively, rather than pursuing self-defense along with the alternative strategy of convincing the jury to convict Petitioner of the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and (2) failed to keep a promise to the jury made during opening statements that Petitioner would testify at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the courts below erred by concluding that trial counsel performed deficiently. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case for reinstatement of Petitioner’s convictions.
 

The petitioner filed pro se a writ of error coram nobis regarding two convictions for aggravated assault. The trial court summarily denied relief and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Alvin Young, of aggravated kidnapping and domestic assault. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eight years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated kidnapping conviction and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Kimberly Mangrum, was indicted by the Dickson County Grand Jury for especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and four counts of criminal conspiracy, related to the commission of each of those offenses. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted first degree premeditated murder, and felony murder. Her conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder was merged into her felony murder conviction, and she was sentenced to life imprisonment for her first degree felony murder conviction, twenty-five years for especially aggravated kidnapping, and six years for aggravated burglary, with the sentences to be served concurrently. In this direct appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and asserts that the trial court erred by not dismissing the indictment following what, Defendant contends, was the State’s misuse of the grand jury proceedings. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief alleging (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea to aggravated assault; and (2) that his plea was not voluntary as constitutionally required. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

While touring a model home in a new residential home development, the plaintiff fell when she failed to see a four-inch step as she walked from the foyer into the sunken living room. This premises liabilityaction followed. The defendant constructed, owned, and managed the model home in which the plaintiff fell. Upon motion of the defendant, the trial court summarily dismissed the complaint upon two findings: that the defendant did not owe a legal duty to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was more than fifty percent at fault. We affirm upon the finding that the plaintiff cannot establish that a duty was owed to her by the defendant.
 

Appellant, Antonio Durrell Hubbard a/k/a Antonio Bradford, was indicted by the Fayette County Grand Jury in March of 2010 for possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver, driving with a suspended license, and speeding. Prior to trial, Appellant sought to suppress the results of an inventory search. The motion to suppress was denied. After a trial, Appellant was convicted of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver and driving on a suspended license. The speeding charge was dismissed. As a result of the convictions, Appellant received an effective sentence of one year. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant has appealed. The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. After a review, we determine the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress and the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Derrick Rice (“the Defendant”) appeals jury convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder, claiming that the trial court erred in denying extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the testimony of a witness and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

The Memphis Police Department terminated the employment of Petitioner Police Officer for conduct unbecoming an officer following a physical altercation with a parking lot attendant. On appeal pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, the chancery court affirmed. On appeal to this Court, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred by refusing to admit additional evidence of disparate treatment in violation of his equal protection rights. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns a note executed by Robert Denton (“Husband”) and Susan L. Denton (“Wife”) and payable to Husband’s sister, Carolyn L. Denton-Preletz (“Lender”). When Lender sought recovery of the note, Wife denied liability and filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the statute of limitations for recovery of the note had passed. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case as it related to Wife. Lender filed a motion to alter or amend the order and a motion to amend the complaint, which were denied. Lender appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Kenneth Edward Watts, of vandalism resulting in $10,000 to $60,000 in damages, a Class C felony, and theft of property under $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years for the Class C felony and as a career offender to twelve years for the Class D felony. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify as to the estimated cost of repair; that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and that the trial court improperly calculated his sentencing range. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, James David Moats, stands convicted of driving under the influence (“DUI”), fourth or greater offense, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and motion for judgment of acquittal. Following our review, we conclude that under the facts of this case the police officer seized the defendant when she pulled up behind the defendant’s parked vehicle and activated her blue emergency lights. We further conclude that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure. As such, the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court.