In Re Homer D., et al. - Dissent
The majority opinion dismisses this appeal due to the failure of the appellant, Sarah R. P. B., the child’s mother, to sign the initial notice of appeal as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) or to file an amended notice that included her signature within the thirty-day time period for perfecting appeals. The majority has concluded that although the amended notice of appeal “did contain Appellant’s signature, it was filed . . . more than thirty days after the entry of the trial court’s judgment. As such, it, too, is insufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on this Court.” I recognize that the majority opinion is based on two recent Court of Appeals decisions, but I respectfully disagree with those decisions and with the notion that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) is jurisdictional. I also disagree with the notion that the statute compels this court to dismiss appeals in parental termination cases without affording the parent the opportunity to cure the defect by subsequently signing an amended notice of appeal even if that occurs after the expiration of the thirty-day time period set out in Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Roy Zumstein v. Roane County Executive/Mayor, Assessor Of Property, Trustee
This appeal arises from a taxpayer’s successful challenge of the appraisal value assigned to his real property by the Roane County Property Assessor. The taxpayer filed a petition for judicial review challenging an administrative decision that affirmed the assessor’s valuation. The trial court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, overturning the administrative decision and ordering Roane County to pay the taxpayer’s attorney’s fees. On appeal, Roane County argues that the trial court had no authority to assess attorney’s fees against it. We agree and reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dae'Jrien T.
This is an appeal from a final decree of adoption following the entry of an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant to her minor child. The only notice of appeal filed by the appellant within the time provided by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) for the filing of a notice of appeal did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-124(d), which states: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” Because this notice of appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Keith Morelock v. Ruth Ellen Mick Morelock
In this divorce case, Edward Keith Morelock (Husband) appeals the trial court’s decisions regarding (1) co-parenting time with the parties’ child; (2) division of marital property, (3) valuation of one of the marital assets, and (4) refusal of the court to award him spousal support. Husband argues that the trial court should have designated him primary residential parent and granted him more residential time with the child. He also asserts that the trial court overvalued the business owned by the parties, and that the court should have equally divided the assets and liabilities of that business rather than awarding and assigning all of them to him. Finally, he argues that the trial court should have ordered Ruth Ellen Mick Morelock (Wife) to pay him alimony. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Holly Rader, Et Al. v. Ruby Tuesday, Inc.
Holly Rader (“Plaintiff”) appeals the August 4, 2016 order of the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Ruby Tuesday, Inc. (“Ruby Tuesday”) in this slip and fall action after finding that Ruby Tuesday did not have superior, actual, or constructive knowledge of the condition that caused Plaintiff’s slip and fall. We find and hold that Ruby Tuesday did have superior, actual, or constructive knowledge of the condition that caused the slip and fall and owed a duty to Plaintiff. We, therefore, vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin D. Kinsey v. Jacob P. Schwarz, et al
A prison inmate filed a health care liability action against two physicians and a medical center without providing the defendants with pre-suit notice, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a), and without attaching a certificate of good faith to the complaint, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The inmate appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Franklin-Murray Development Company, L.P. v. Shumacker Thompson, PC, Et Al.
This is a legal malpractice action in which the trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, a law firm and its owners, on the plaintiff’s claim for lost profits and, in due course, granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims. The underlying suit arose from a failed real estate transaction in which a judgment for $200,000 for failure to perform a contract to purchase land for development was entered against the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff appeals, contending that the court erred in various respects in granting the motions for summary judgment. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Carlisa Elmi v. Cheatham County Board of Education, et al.
This is an appeal of the termination of a tenured teacher’s employment pursuant to the Tenure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-5-501 |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
In Re David P. Et Al.
This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant to his minor children. The only Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant within the time provided in Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for the filing of a notice of appeal, did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-124(d), which states: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” Because this Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Sonja Broyles Williams v. Stewart Ashley Williams
This is an appeal from a divorce case dissolving a long-term marriage with two minor children. Following a four and one-half day trial, the court awarded Wife a divorce, designated Husband as the primary residential parent of the parties’ children, distributed the marital property, awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony, and denied Wife’s request for attorney’s fees. Wife appeals the designation of Husband as primary residential parent, the value and division of certain items within the marital estate, the court’s decision to award her rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro, and the denial of her request for attorney’s fees. We vacate the trial court’s order regarding retroactive child support and remand the issue for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the remainder of the judgment of the trial court. We deny Wife’s request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Mardoche Olivier v. City of Clarksville, et al.
This action arises out of an alleged violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights by the City of Clarksville (“the City”) and a group of police officers employed by the City (“the Officers”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The plaintiff was arrested on June 1, 2015, for driving on a revoked or suspended license, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-504 (2012), and making a 911 telephone call in a nonemergency situation, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-86-316 (2015). The plaintiff filed a complaint on August 11, 2016, alleging that as a result of his arrest, the Officers caused him to suffer damages from false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, malicious harassment, outrageous conduct, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, and inverse condemnation. The plaintiff also alleged violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on October 5, 2016, asserting, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s claims were statutorily barred due to the immunity granted to Defendants by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205 (2012). The trial court entered a final order regarding Defendants’ motion to dismiss on November 17, 2016, granting the motion and dismissing all claims. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Latisia Upshaw v. Sunrise Community Of Tennessee, Inc.
This appeal concerns a claim of retaliatory discharge. After a trial before a jury, judgment was entered against the defendant employer. The plaintiff was awarded $225,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. The employer appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sue Ann Templeton v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in a Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) premises liability case. Appellant was exiting Jackson-Madison County General Hospital/Appellee when she was hit by an automatic door, fell, and sustained a broken femur. Appellee moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from suit under the GTLA. Appellant argued that Appellee failed to make a reasonable inspection of the automatic door, so as to discover the alleged dangerous or defective condition. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, finding that the condition was not dangerous or defective, the condition was latent, and Appellee had no actual or constructive notice of the condition. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Charles Edward Fant, III
This is a will contest. The affidavit attached to the purported will was signed, in the presence of the testator, by two witnesses. At the hearing on the will contest, both witnesses and the notary public testified as to the validity of signatures on the purported will. The trial court held that the will and accompanying affidavit were not in strict compliance with the statute and denied admission of the will to probate. On appeal, the proponent of the purported will argues that the will satisfied the recent statutory requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 32-1-104(b) such that the signatures of both witnesses were integrated into the will. Concluding that the witnesses’ signatures were integrated into the will pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 32-1-104(b), and that the other statutory requirements were met, we reverse the trial court’s ruling. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Audrina E. et al.
This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant to his minor children. The only notice of appeal filed by the appellant within the time provided in Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for the filing of a notice of appeal did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-124(d), which states: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” Because this notice of appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nevaeh B.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights to the minor child by order of July 15, 2016. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. However, Appellant failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-124(d) (Supp. 2016) in that she failed to sign the notice of appeal. Because this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nevaeh B. - Dissent
The majority opinion dismisses this appeal due to the failure of the appellant, Makayla B., the child’s mother, to sign the notice of appeal as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d). The majority has concluded, “[i]n the absence of full compliance with the statutory requirements, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal.” I recognize that the majority opinion is based on a prior Court of Appeals decision, but I respectfully disagree with the decision and the notion that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) is jurisdictional or that the statute compels this court to dismiss appeals in parental termination cases when the parent fails to sign the notice of appeal without affording the parent the opportunity to cure the defect. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah J. Meadows v Ronald E. McCarter Et Al.
The Defendant, Ronald E. McCarter (“Defendant”), seeks to appeal from a ruling of the Trial Court which does not constitute a final judgment. Specifically, the ruling to which the Notice of Appeal is directed in this case did not resolve the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the Plaintiff, Deborah J. Meadows (“Plaintiff”), nor did it fully resolve Plaintiff’s claims against Tiffany Sharp. As such, it is clear that there is not a final judgment from which an appeal as of right would lie. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kendall H.
This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant to her minor child, Kendall H. The only Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant was signed only by her attorney. The appellees have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing that the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction because it did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-124(d), which states: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” The absence of appellant’s signature on the notice of appeal deprives us of jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, this case is dismissed. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Dewayna M. Killen v. Phillips Wrecker Service And Garage
This dispute stems from an agreement for the purchase and installation of a used automobile motor. The parties to the agreement both claim the other breached the agreement. Following a trial, the circuit court determined that the purchaser breached the agreement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. James T. Jones, et al
The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for failure to prosecute and for failing to respond to affirmative defenses. The trial court also denied plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because disposition of litigation on the merits is favored over procedural dismissals, we reverse. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Alfonzia Biles, et al. v. Tiffany Roby
This case involves residential property that was purchased after a foreclosure. The purchaser filed this detainer action against the original homeowners, who refused to vacate the property. The general sessions court ruled in favor of the purchaser, and after a de novo trial in circuit court, the circuit court ruled in favor of the purchaser as well. We do the same. The decision of the circuit court is hereby affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Michael B., Jr., Et Al
The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her two children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jayden R., et al.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Warren County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Dara C. (“Mother”) to her minor children Jayden R., Kara C., and Jaxson C. (collectively, “the Children”). DCS also sought to terminate the parental rights of Jonathan C. (“Father”) to Kara C. and Jaxson C. After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children and Father’s parental rights to Kara and Jaxson. Mother and Father appealed. DCS argues that Mother’s and Father’s failure to sign their notices of appeal renders this appeal jurisdictionally deficient. We agree that Mother’s and Father’s failure to sign their notices of appeal as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) renders this appeal jurisdictionally deficient, and it is dismissed on that basis. Even if the appeal were not jurisdictionally deficient, we would, given this record, affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jayden R., et al. - dissenting
The majority opinion dismisses this case due to the failure of Mother and Father to sign the notice of appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d). I recognize that the majority opinion is based on a prior Court of Appeals decision, but I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion. |
Warren | Court of Appeals |
