Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

I join with the majority in this case. I write separately, however, to further elaborate on whether the trial judge’s status as a “Facebook friend” with a prospective witness, standing alone, is sufficient to require recusal. Here, Appellant moved for recusal alleging the trial judge was biased based on his affiliation with MTSU, the judge’s alma mater. Specifically, Appellant claimed she was denied a fair and impartial trial due to the trial judge’s Facebook connections with the MTSU women’s basketball team and their coach, a prospective State’s witness. Rather than an actual conflict of interest, Appellant contends that the trial judge’s Facebook connection gave the appearance of impropriety in violation of the Tennessee’s Code of Judicial Conduct.

The defendant was found guilty after trial by jury of second degree murder and tampering with evidence. She received an effective sentence of twenty-nine years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying her motion to recuse, that her constitutional rights were violated by the manner in which the trial court allowed jurors to ask questions during her trial, and that her sentence is excessive. After review, we find that the defendant has failed to establish her entitlement to any relief on these claims. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly.

I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court’s orders granting the suppression motions filed by Defendant Jones and Defendant McClanahan, reverse the orders of dismissal of the cases, and reinstate the charges for further proceedings. Since the search of Defendant McClanahan was a different search than the one challenged by Defendant Jones, I will discuss each Defendant separately. Initially though it is necessary for me to specifically address a portion of Judge McMullen’s lead opinion. The State filed separate Notices of Appeal for Defendant Jones and Defendant McClanahan, so the issue of the trial court’s order suppressing all evidence seized pursuant to execution of the search warrant at Defendant Jones’ home was preserved for appeal. I acknowledge that the State, for reasons I do not know, in its brief declined to specifically address the issue of the suppression of evidence in Defendant Jones’ case. The trial court’s decision in Defendant Jones’ case rested solely upon the conclusion that the evidence seized as a result of the stop of Defendant McClanahan was illegally seized and therefore could not be used to support probable cause to search Defendant Jones’ home. Perhaps the State assumed that arguing only the facts of Defendant McClanahan’s stop would suffice to address Defendant Jones’ case. Both defendants were represented by the same counsel and both defendants’ cases were included in one brief in this appeal. Despite the fact the State omitted any specific argument about suppression of evidence in Defendant Jones’ case, counsel for Defendants made the following argument in their brief: “All fruits of the stop as initiated by Officer Agee were of the poisonous tree as it pertains to the search of the residence of Ricky Jones. [citations omitted].” Under the circumstances I have no problem procedurally addressing the issue concerning the search warrant for Defendant Jones’ home.

I write separately because my review and interpretation of the record leads me to a different conclusion that those reached by my colleagues in their reasoned and well-written opinions. While I do concur with the results reached by Judge McMullen, I do so based upon different reasoning as herein expressed. Because I do agree with her conclusion, Judge McMullen writes as the majority.

The Defendant-Appellee, Shane Eugene McClanahan, was indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-150 for possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, driving while under the influence of marijuana while accompanied by a child under thirteen years of age, and possession of drug paraphernalia. McClanahan was later indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-193 for driving a motor vehicle on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license and driving a motor vehicle on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, second or subsequent offense. McClanahan’s charges stemmed from evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle. In a separate case, the Defendant-Appellee, Ricky J. Jones, was indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-147 for the manufacture of marijuana consisting of not less than 100 marijuana plants nor more than 499 marijuana plants, possession of not less than ten pounds, one gram nor more than seventy pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Jones was later indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-268 for money laundering. Jones’s charges stemmed from evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant that substantially relied on the evidence recovered during the warrantless search of McClanahan’s vehicle. McClanahan and Jones filed motions to suppress the physical evidence recovered in their cases. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted McClanahan’s and Jones’s motions to suppress and dismissed their indictments. In this appeal as of right, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting McClanahan’s suppression motions and in dismissing his cases. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments

A jury convicted the defendant of two counts of the delivery of dihydrocodeinone, a Class D felony, and one count of the casual exchange of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-17-417 and -418 (2009). The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years of probation for each conviction for delivery of dihydrocodeinone and to eleven months and twenty-nine days of probation for the marijuana conviction, with all the sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant hired a new attorney to file his motion for a new trial, and his new attorney challenged the trial court’s denial of a continuance prior to trial. New counsel also asserted that the defendant had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. We discern no error and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William F. Chumley (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of rape of a child and sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. See State v. William Franklin Chumley, No. W2011-01832-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3134033, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 1, 2012). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

In Madison County Circuit Court case number 12-285, Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of driving on a suspended license in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-504(a)(1) and of operating a motor vehicle without a valid registration in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-114(d). Defendant was sentenced to serve six months in the county jail for the driving on a suspended license conviction. His punishment for the violation of registration law conviction was a $25.00 fine. Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction for driving on a suspended license and the sentence of incarceration imposed by the trial court. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court pursuant to Rule of the Court of Criminal Appeals 20.

Marquest Mays (“the Defendant”) was indicted for first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse. A competency hearing was held, and the trial court found that the Defendant was competent to stand trial. The Defendant proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty on both counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction and dismissed the aggravated child abuse conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it declared him competent to stand trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; and (3) the trial court prevented him from presenting a defense when it excluded expert testimony regarding his vulnerability to giving a false confession. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On December 11, 1995, appellant, Marcus Deangelo Lee, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to employ it during the commission of a crime, and the sale of cocaine. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve concurrent sentences of three years, one year, and three years, respectively, in the county workhouse. After numerous unsuccessful attacks on his convictions, on December 3, 2012, appellant filed a motion to correct clerical errors entitled “Motion to Correct Clerical Errors in the Judgment or Entry that Renders the Judgments Void Nunc Pro Tunc.” The trial court determined that appellant’s motion was time-barred and dismissed the motion. On appeal, appellant alleges that: (1) the trial court made a clerical error in appellant’s judgments; (2) the trial court erred by failing to vacate his judgments under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) his judgments should be corrected in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 because he received illegal sentences. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Mashaal Arradi, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of three counts of tax evasion and one count of theft of property valued at over $1,000 but under $10,000. He received an effective sentence of three years, to be released after serving 10 days incarceration, and was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in (1) permitting admission of unreliable scientific evidence through a non-expert witness; (2) allowing multiple references to 404(b) evidence without a jury-out hearing; (3) permitting the felony theft charge to be based on an aggregation of evidence; (4) permitting multiple references to the Defendant’s Yemeni background and Arabic language; and (5) allowing instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.