Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Tammy Lynn Walker, was convicted of passing a worthless check, a Class D felony. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining that she made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her right to counsel and by requiring her to proceed pro se at trial when she had not executed a written waiver to the effect. The State, after initially contending that the trial court did not err, alternatively argues that the Defendant implicitly waived her right to counsel by failing to retain counsel in a timely manner. In addition, the Defendant, as a separate issue, contends that the trial court violated her constitutional rights when it compelled her to testify against herself. We conclude that the non-indigent Defendant knowingly and voluntarily explicitly waived her right to counsel by her statements and conduct and that she was not compelled to testify against herself. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Michael E. White, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original
nine-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation by imposing the original sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Brian Howard, Defendant, was indicted for one count of second degree murder, one count of convicted felon in possession of a firearm, one count of attempted second degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. A co-defendant, Quinton Brown, was also indicted for his role in the offenses and the two were tried together. Defendant asked the trial court to bifurcate the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon count prior to trial. The trial court denied the motion. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter as well as possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony as charged in the indictment. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of 67 years, to be served consecutively to a fifteen-year federal sentence. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals to this Court arguing that the trial court erred by denying the motion to bifurcate the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions where the proof indicated that Defendant acted in self-defense. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter for correction of the judgment form in Count 4 to reflect that the conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a felony is a class C felony.

On July 12, 2019, Defendant-Appellant, Robert Collier, entered a guilty plea to criminal attempt aggravated sexual battery and indecent exposure, for which he received an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, all of which was to be served on supervised probation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-504 (2019). As part of his sentence, the Defendant was also ordered to register as a violent sex offender and placed on community supervision for life. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-524 (2014). Within three months, on October 15, 2019, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s supervised probation based on a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(d)(1)(B) (2019), which restricts movement of violent sex offenders, and ordered the Defendant to serve the original sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals the order of the trial court arguing that subsection (d)(1)(B) is unconstitutional in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because certain terms including “playground,” “any other specific or legitimate reason,” “stand,” “sit idly,” and “remain” are not defined and ambiguous.” He additionally argues that subsection (d)(1)(B) is overbroad in violation of his First Amendment rights because (1) it applies to all sex offenders even if the offense did not involve a child victim; and (2) the term “playground” can include a church, an offender’s front yard, and places where other adults are present. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Milton Simpson, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and imposing an effective ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he violated the terms of his probation by breaking the law and that (2) his right of confrontation was violated when a court liaison testified in lieu of his probation officer and when a certified copy of an indictment was introduced as evidence. Following our review, we affirm.

The defendant, Robert Earl Grady, Jr., pleaded guilty to two counts of felon in possession of a firearm for which he received consecutive twelve-year sentences for an effective sentence of twenty-four years’ confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred by imposing consecutive terms. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, John William Anderson, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and criminal simulation. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentencing decision of the trial court. The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, but the trial court erred by imposing a sentence in the absence of a presentence report. Consequently, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but reverse the sentencing decision of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

The petitioner, Joshua Michael Stewart, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. He argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

James Howard Theus, III, Defendant, was indicted for four counts of violating the sex offender registry. He pled guilty to the charges as stated in the indictment with an agreed upon sentence of three years with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied alternative sentencing, ordering Defendant to serve his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The Petitioner, Tywan Montrease Sykes, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely and as a second impermissible petition. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that due process requires tolling of the one-year limitations period, that he should have been given an evidentiary hearing to present additional proof of tolling, and that his first petition was not resolved on the merits. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition as untimely.

A jury convicted Caitlyn Metz, Petitioner, of first-degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect in the death of her twenty-three-month-old son, the victim, and the trial court sentenced her to an effective life sentence. Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, a Brady violation, and improper prosecutorial argument, and the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to pursue a motion for severance from Joshua Starner, Co-Defendant, and other pretrial motions; failure to investigate Co-Defendant’s military records and Petitioner’s mental health; failure to present witnesses; and cumulative error. Following a thorough review, we conclude that Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, vacate and set aside the judgments of conviction, and remand for a new trial.