State ex rel. Appaloosa Bay, LLC et al. v. Johnson County, Tennessee, et al.
Two owners of separate lots in a planned residential subdivision of twenty lots brought this action against the Johnson County Regional Planning Commission and several state entities after the subdivision’s developer went into bankruptcy and development of the subdivision was halted. When the developer had earlier posted a performance bond securing the completion of the subdivision’s infrastructure, the planning commission had approved the subdivision plat, although infrastructure, including roads and utilities, had not been completed. After developer’s bankruptcy, the State of Tennessee bought the land comprising all of the subdivision lots, except the two owned by the plaintiffs. All of the remaining land in the intended subdivision, except for several other lots purchased by individuals before the bankruptcy, is now part of the Doe Mountain Recreation Area — an entity subsequently created by the State. Plaintiffs brought this action for breach of contract between developer and the planning commission. Plaintiffs also asked the trial court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the county to complete the proposed subdivision infrastructure. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda Sue Griffis Grubb v. James Wesley Grubb
This appeal arises from a divorce. Rhonda Sue Griffis Grubb (“Wife”) filed for divorce against husband James Wesley Grubb (“Husband”) in the Chancery Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”). Trial in this matter was bifurcated. The validity of the parties’ antenuptial agreement (“the Agreement”) was tried first. The Trial Court found that the provision in the Agreement purporting to cap Wife’s alimony was unenforceable but otherwise upheld the Agreement. Later, trial was conducted on the remaining issues in the case. Citing her adultery and a clause in the Agreement, the Trial Court declined to grant Wife alimony. However, the Trial Court awarded Wife a substantial portion of the marital estate. The Trial Court also ruled upon child support, parenting time, and education for the parties’ two daughters. Husband appealed to this Court raising numerous issues. Wife raised additional issues of her own. We find and hold that Husband failed to carry his burden as to the validity of the Agreement. As to the second stage of this bifurcated matter, we find that the Trial Court’s final judgment is devoid of factual findings to such a degree that we cannot effectively review the remaining issues in this case. We reverse as to the validity of the Agreement. We vacate and remand for further proceedings as necessary and for entry of a new final judgment containing detailed factual findings and conclusions of law as to the remaining issues. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond Cass Ballard v. Gertrude Cayabas
This is an appeal arising out of a petition to change the primary residential parent and a petition for civil and criminal contempt. The notice of appeal for the criminal contempt finding was not timely filed, and the appeal is therefore dismissed as to the criminal contempt. With respect to the remaining issues, we remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing regarding the timeliness of this appeal. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Jessica Marcel Broadnax v. Quentin Elliott Lawrence
This case is again before this Court after being remanded to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) for a determination of whether it was in the best interest of the parties’ minor child (“the Child”) to relocate to New Jersey with Jessica Marcel Broadnax (“Mother”). Mother appeals the Trial Court’s May 5, 2016 order upon remand, which found, inter alia, that it was in the best interest of the Child to remain with Quentin Elliott Lawrence (“Father”) and not to move with Mother to New Jersey. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings. Finding no error on the part of the Trial Court, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Nichole Neveau v. Adam Paul Neveau
This is an appeal from a divorce. The trial court granted the parties an absolute divorce and named the mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. The father filed this appeal challenging the designation of the mother as the primary residential parent and questioning the number of days of parenting time he received in the parenting plan. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s designation of the mother as the primary residential parent; however, the evidence does preponderate against the parenting plan that greatly limits the parenting time awarded to the father. Because we have concluded that the evidence preponderates against the parenting plan, we remand this issue to the trial court to adopt a plan that affords the father additional parenting time and to modify the child support award to comport with the new parenting plan. We also conclude that the tax exemption should be awarded to the father until such time as the mother becomes employed, at which time the issue can be revisited. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Ally Financial v. Tennessee Department of Safety & Homeland Security
The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security forfeited a finance company’s interest in a vehicle after determining that the finance company failed to timely file a claim to contest the forfeiture after receiving notice. The finance company thereafter filed a petition for judicial review. The trial court reversed the forfeiture on the basis that the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security failed to prove that it sent proper notice to the finance company. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings before the administrative agency. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gunner F.
The trial court determined that the primary residential parent should be changed from mother to father without any change in the equal division of parenting time. Because the trial court failed to address the best interest of the child in its order, we vacate and remand for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re E.C.
In this termination of parental rights action, Father’s parental rights were terminated based on the following grounds: (1) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child; (2) that placing the child in Father’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child’s physical and psychological welfare; (3) failure to establish or exercise paternity; and (4) abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. We affirm the grounds of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child and failure to establish or exercise paternity. However, we reverse with respect to the remaining grounds. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel L. Graham, Jr., et al. v. The Family Cancer Center, PLLC, et al.
This is a medical malpractice action. The plaintiffs timely filed suit against the defendants concerning the failure to timely diagnose the husband’s prostate cancer. After voluntarily dismissing the initial suit, the plaintiffs provided pre-suit notice before filing a second suit pursuant to the saving statute. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient expert testimony to establish their claim. The court agreed and granted summary judgment. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mitch Goree, et al. v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
This is the second appeal of this employment discrimination case involving two plaintiffs. In the first appeal, Goree v. United Parcel Service, 490 S.W.3d 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 23, 2016), this Court reversed the judgment as to one plaintiff and affirmed the judgment as to the other plaintiff, the Appellant in the instant case. On remand, the trial court determined that the specific attorney’s fees chargeable to each plaintiff could not be determined and reduced the previous award of attorney’s fees and costs by 50%. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Walnut Run Homeowner's Association, Inc. v. Jerry Wayne Wilkerson
The owner of property in a residential subdivision appeals the order of the trial court prohibiting construction of an eight-foot wooden fence. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Dale J. Montpelier, et al. v. Herbert S. Moncier, et al.
This is a common law abuse of process case. The plaintiffs contend that the defendant attorney abused otherwise lawful process without authorization and for an improper purpose. The trial court dismissed this case as a matter of law for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6). We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Dale J. Montpelier, et al. v. Herbert S. Moncier, et al. - DISSENT
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “the complaint fails to state a cause of action for abuse of process.” Applying the appropriate standard of review as correctly articulated by the majority, I believe the complaint does state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the abuse of process claim. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
David Lamar Hayes v. Glen Turner, Warden
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a pro se inmate’s complaint for failure to prosecute. After filing his complaint in 2005, the plaintiff took no action in the case for more than 10 years. In 2015, the trial court directed the plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Instead of providing an explanation for the delay, the plaintiff sought a default judgment against the defendant. The trial court then dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Eagle CDI, Inc., et al. v. Michael J. Orr, et al.
This appeal involves a contract dispute between a general contracting company and a husband and wife who sought the company’s assistance to build a log cabin home. After the husband and wife defaulted on the original construction contract, the husband and wife and the company signed a second contract, a promissory note, for the remaining balance. The husband and wife subsequently defaulted on the promissory note. The trial court held that the husband and wife breached the second contract, the terms were clear and unambiguous, and a potential ambiguity in the first contract regarding a nonrefundable deposit and/or retainer was legally irrelevant in determining the amount owed under the second contract. Because the second contract was clear and unambiguous, we hold that the total sum owed by the husband and wife is proper despite any ambiguity in the first contract. Further, we hold that the trial court properly denied the husband and wife’s motion to amend their answer because of undue delay. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
L.J. Jackson, et al. v. CitiMortgage, Inc.
This appeal involves a dispute between a loan servicer and a family who subsequently defaulted on a mortgage for a piece of property. The loan servicer foreclosed and sold the property according to the express terms of the mortgage note and deed of trust after the family had been in default for multiple years and after multiple failed attempts to seek loan modification. The family sued for breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and intentional misrepresentation, asserting that the loan servicer promised to postpone the foreclosure sale until after completion of the most recent loan modification review process. The trial court granted summary judgment to the loan servicer on all claims. The family appealed on all four issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Candice H., et al
This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jeffrey H. (“Father”) to his minor children Candice, Danonie, and Izabella (“the Children”). The Children had entered DCS custody after a domestic incident between Father and the Children’s mother. After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father appealed. Finding it inapplicable to putative biological parent Father, we reverse the ground of failure to establish paternity found as regards the child Danonie. We affirm the rest of the Juvenile Court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re James V., et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her two sons. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination were proven and that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate parental rights. Mother appeals but only challenges the best interest determination. We have also reviewed the evidence regarding each ground for termination. We vacate the trial court’s finding regarding one ground for termination but otherwise affirm the trial court’s order and affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Lemuel Lewis v. Lynn Moore, et al.
In this breach of contract action, the plaintiff entered into a contract with a sole proprietor whereby he purported to purchase 10% of the sole proprietorship. The contract entitled the plaintiff to 10% of the cash withdrawals made from the business's account. It further provided that, should the sole proprietor dissolve the business and form a new entity of which she was a majority owner, the plaintiff would be entitled to 10% of the cash withdrawals taken by the sole proprietor from the new entity. Two years later, the sole proprietor closed the business and formed a new entity, a limited liability company, with another individual. The plaintiff filed suit, alleging breach of contract and violations of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court found for the sole proprietor, concluding that the sole proprietor was free to close her business at will. It further found that the sole proprietor did not breach the express terms of the contract, nor did she breach her implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, in closing her business and forming the LLC. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Transfill Equipment Supplies & Services, Inc. v. Advanced Medical Equipment, LLC
In this breach of contract case, Transfill Equipment Supplies & Services, Inc. (TESS) sued Advanced Medical Equipment, LLC (AME) for delinquent payments of (1) rent due on TESS’s equipment, (2) purchases of medical oxygen, and (3) the fair market value of rented equipment that AME had not returned to TESS. AME filed a separate lawsuit against TESS seeking damages for conversion of oxygen tanks. After consolidating the cases, the Sumner County General Sessions Court awarded damages to TESS and dismissed all of AME’s claims. AME appealed to the trial court. The court found that AME was guilty of breach of contract due to its failure to make timely payments. As a consequence, the court awarded judgment to TESS in the amount of $34,999.45. The trial court also found that TESS had not converted AME’s oxygen tanks. AME appeals. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney And Tammy Henderson, et al. v. The Vanderbilt University
The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendant hospital on the ground that the plaintiffs could not establish that they witnessed or perceived an injury-producing event for purposes of their negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. We hold that the alleged failure of the defendant hospital to provide care to the plaintiffs’ daughter, despite repeated assurances from the hospital that it would occur, constitutes an injury-producing event that was witnessed by plaintiffs. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claims on this basis. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney And Tammy Henderson, et al. v. The Vanderbilt University - dissenting opinion
“The law of negligent infliction of emotional distress has been called ‘one of the most disparate and confusing areas of tort law.’” Lane v. Estate of Leggett, No. M2016-00448-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 1176982, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017) (citing Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tenn. 1996)). While this is a statement with which I agree, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I certainly do not dispute that the Plaintiffs in this case have suffered extreme emotional distress, nor do I mean to discount their grief and suffering as a result of the death of their daughter, Halle Henderson. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Paschedag v. Patricia L. Paschedag
This is an appeal from the trial court’s designation of a child’s primary residential parent. After an analysis of the best interest factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a), the court concluded that it would be in the child’s best interest to designate Mother as the child’s primary residential parent. Father appealed. Mother has requested attorney’s fees incurred in defending this appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, grant Mother’s attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, and remand to the trial court to determine the proper amount of Mother’s award of attorney’s fees. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Town of Collierville, et al. v. Town of Collierville Board of Zoning, et al.
This is the third appeal in an ongoing dispute between the Town of Collierville and the owner of property on which two billboards are situated. On February 12, 2013, the Town filed a petition for writ of certorari, challenging a decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals. Because the petition for writ of certorari does not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106, the trial court and, therefore, this Court lack subject matter jurisdiction. We vacate the judgment of the chancery court and dismiss the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tom Watson v. Rosemarie Ralston-Good et al.
The plaintiff business owner, who provided carpet cleaning services, filed an action in the Hamilton County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”) against a customer, alleging that the customer had failed to compensate him for services rendered. The customer subsequently filed a counterclaim against the business owner, alleging that he had ruined an oriental rug in her home and sprayed chemicals on her furniture. The general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of the customer. The business owner appealed to the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial court”). Following a de novo trial, the trial court also found in favor of the customer, determining that the business owner had damaged the customer’s carpet. The trial court awarded damages to the customer in the amount of $500.00. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
