Quinton Clovis v. Tennessee Human Rights Commissions
This appeal arises from a complaint filed with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission in which Plaintiff alleged he was denied public accommodation at the Metropolitan Public Library in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-301 and -501. More specifically, Plaintiff contended that the Library discriminated against him based on his Christian beliefs and in retaliation for filing a previous religious discrimination complaint against the Library. After conducting an investigation, the Commission found no reasonable basis for Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff appealed the Commission’s decision to the Davidson County Chancery Court. Following a hearing, the chancery court upheld the decision of the Commission. This appeal followed. We affirm.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Jamie Joy Williams v. Deadrick Donnell Woods, Sr.
This is a child support action involving one child, who was born in 1995 and had reached the age of majority by the time of trial. Upon the father’s voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, the trial court entered an order of legitimation in April 1996. The State of Tennessee (“the State”), acting on behalf of the mother, filed a petition to modify a child support order in April 2002. The father filed a motion to dismiss, and the State subsequently withdrew the petition because no prior child support order had been established. The mother then filed a petition for child support in September 2014. Following a bench trial before a special judge, the trial court established the father’s retroactive child support obligation in the amount of $79,647.00, giving credit to the father for $59,229.00 he previously had paid toward the child’s support and expenses. The court incorporated three income shares worksheets representing three different time periods during the child’s minority. The father has appealed, asserting, inter alia, that the trial court erred by finding that the child had resided with the mother for 285 days per year during the time period of January 1, 2010, through May 31, 2014, because the child resided with the mother’s stepfather on weekdays while attending high school. To correct an apparent mathematical error in the judgment, we modify the number of months for which the first income shares worksheet is to be applied from eighty-one to ninetytwo and the number of months for which the third income shares worksheet is to be applied from sixty-four to fifty-three, resulting in a total reduction in the father’s retroactive child support obligation from $79,647.00 to $74,818.00. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Conner C., et al.
Mother appeals the circuit court’s dismissal of her de novo appeal of the juvenile court’s dependency and neglect order. We agree with the circuit court that the juvenile court’s adjudicatory order was not a final order subject to appeal to the circuit court. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Old Republic Life Insurance Company v. Roberta Woody, et al
This case involves the interpretation and application of the prior suit pending doctrine. Old Republic Life Insurance Company (Insurer) brought this action in the McMinn County Circuit Court (the trial court) as subrogee of Darrell King, its insured, who had been injured in an accident. King’s attorneys filed three separate notices of appearance on his behalf. King also moved to intervene in his Insurer’s suit, but later withdrew his motion. Still later, Insurer moved to join King as a necessary and indispensible party. The trial court granted the motion. More than two and half years after Insurer’s complaint was filed, King filed a complaint in Davidson County seeking compensation for his injuries. The trial court granted King’s motion to dismiss this action based on the prior suit pending doctrine. We hold that, under the prior suit pending doctrine, the trial court, McMinn County Circuit Court, is the proper forum. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for futher proceedings. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth A. Parigin et al. v. M. Shane Mills
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the defendant, who was actively involved in the formation of a limited liability company, is a member of the company. The trial court held that the defendant’s prospective membership interest was contingent on making a financial contribution of $180,000 plus business equipment, and because he failed to make the required contributions, he was not a member. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Promise A., et al.
The Department of Children’s Services received custody of two children as a result of a petition it filed to have the children declared dependent and neglected; the children’s mother had died, and they were unable to be placed with their father due to uncertainty regarding his paternity of the children and housing arrangement. After custody was granted to the Department and a permanency plan developed, the father established his paternity; the permanency plan required that he continue to address his housing and employment situations, among other matters. Eleven months after the children came into custody, the Department filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit or support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. After a trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed as to all grounds and that termination was in the best interest of the children. Father appeals, contending that the evidence preponderates against various findings of the court, that the evidence does not support a conclusion that any of the grounds were established, or that termination is in the children’s best interest. Inasmuch as the children were not removed from the Father’s home at the time they came into the Department’s custody, we reverse the judgment terminating the Father’s rights on the grounds of persistence of conditions and abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In re Braxton L.
This is an appeal by the appellant, Jessica L., from an order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, Braxton L. The order terminating the appellant’s parental rights was entered on December 29, 2016. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until February 2, 2017, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the final order. The Attorney General, on behalf of the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based upon the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Southwind Residential Properties Association, Inc. v. Kelvin Ford
The association obtained a favorable judgment for unpaid assessments against property owner of 1.6 lots as well as attorney’s fees in the trial court. Property owner appeals. We vacate the trial court’s attorney’s fee award in favor of the association and remand for consideration of the reasonableness factors as outlined in the Tennessee Rules of Professional Responsibility. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gala Johnson-Murray, et al. v. Rodney Burns, et al.
Nieces of the decedent contest the validity of a quitclaim deed and the decedent's will on the ground they were the result of undue influence exerted upon the decedent by her stepson and his wife. The quitclaim deed conveyed the decedent's real property to herself, her stepson, and his wife as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The will bequeathed the decedent's entire estate to her stepson. Following a jury trial, the jury found that the deed and will were both valid. The nieces appeal, contending there is no material evidence to support the jury's verdict. They also contend the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the stepson, who was the decedent's attorney-in-fact, had the authority to sign the will and deed on behalf of the decedent. We have determined that the record contains material evidence to support the jury's verdict. As for the jury instructions, the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the stepson had the authority to sign the will on behalf of the decedent as her attorney-in-fact because it would not comply with mandatory requirements of the Tennessee Execution of Wills Act. With regard to whether the stepson could sign the deed on behalf of the decedent, the answer and jury instruction were incomplete to such an extent as to constitute an erroneous instruction. Nevertheless, having considered the jury instruction in its entirety, we are unable to conclude that these errors more probably than not affected the outcome of the verdict. Therefore, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Xingkui Guo v. Woods & Woods, PP
A former client sued his former attorney for breach of contract, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the client for $3,500. Because the trial court found that the attorney had “justifiable reasons” for terminating the contract, and because the contract provided that the $7,000 set fee paid by the client at the beginning of the representation was earned upon payment, we have determined that the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of the client. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., James Frederick Roberts v. Elizabeth Dale Crafton
The Notice of Appeal filed by James Frederick Roberts (“Father”) states that Father is appealing from the February 1, 2016 order of the Juvenile Court for Shelby County (“the Juvenile Court”). The February 1, 2016 order, however, is not a final judgment, and the case remains pending in the Juvenile Court. As such, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and it is dismissed without prejudice. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth A. Popick v. Vanderbilt University
The plaintiff filed this health care liability action against the defendant hospital after the death of her husband, alleging that his death was the result of negligent medical treatment. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court committed reversible error in: (1) excluding certain email messages as hearsay; (2) overruling her objections to defense counsel‟s cross-examination of a witness; (3) failing to instruct the jury to ignore statements made by defense counsel in closing argument; (4) refusing a request for a special jury instruction; and (5) declining to change the special verdict form. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James William Taylor v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
An inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction appeals the dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment. He claims his sentence is calculated incorrectly, and he is entitled to custodial parole and safety valve hearings. Upon motion of the Respondents, the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the petition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Denise Elliott v. State of Tennessee
This appeal arises from a claim against the State by the driver of a motor vehicle who seeks damages resulting from a single-car accident. Claimant contends the accident was the proximate result of the State’s negligence in the design, construction, and maintenance of the roadway where the accident occurred for which the State is liable pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I). Following a trial, the Claims Commissioner found that Claimant failed to prove the State was negligent in the design, construction, or maintenance of the roadway; therefore, Claimant failed to prove a claim for negligence under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I). Finding the evidence does not preponderate against the Claims Commission’s findings, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Herbert S. Moncier v. Nina Harris, et al.
This appeal involves a request for access to examine records under Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-505 in which the plaintiff sought the release of civil forfeiture documents from the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security. The trial court held that the plaintiff did not show sufficient cause for release of the sought after documents in a non-redacted format. We find that the issue has become moot owing to the legislative enactment of 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Chapter 722, § 5. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss this case. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie Treadwell v. Gary Thomas Lamb
This appeal involves the financial aspects of a divorce, which ended a twelve-year marriage. The trial court granted both parties a divorce, divided the marital estate, and awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony for twenty-four months, provided she actively pursued a teaching degree at Middle Tennessee State University. Wife filed a motion to alter or amend the award of alimony to remove the education and vocation requirements. The trial court denied the motion. Wife filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 seeking relief from the trial court’s order dividing the marital estate due to Husband’s alleged fraudulent withdrawals from the parties’ marital stock account. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Wife takes issue with the educational and vocational requirements the trial court placed on the spousal support award and with the trial court’s division of the marital estate. She also appeals the trial court’s denial of her Rule 60.02 motion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Sophia Elaine Taylor
This appeal arises from the removal of a conservator. The Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services (“the Department”) filed a petition in the Probate Court for Davidson County (“the Probate Court”) seeking removal of Cheryl R. Russell (“Russell”) as conservator for Sophia Elaine Taylor (“Taylor”). Russell, Taylor’s mother, was alleged to have interfered repeatedly with Taylor’s medical treatment. After a hearing, the Probate Court removed Russell as Taylor’s conservator and named ComCare, Inc. (“ComCare”) as temporary conservator. Russell appeals to this Court. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Probate Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ethan R.
A mother, who was designated the primary residential parent of the parties’ son when she and the father divorced, filed a dependent and neglect petition in juvenile court in Tennessee when the child was hospitalized in Arkansas after ingesting some of the father’s methadone tablets. In the course of the juvenile court proceeding Father filed a petition opposing Mother’s relocation to Kentucky and seeking a change in custody. The juvenile court dismissed both petitions, and Father appealed. The circuit court held a trial de novo and denied Father’s petition. Mother appeals, contending that because she did not appeal the juvenile court’s dismissal of the dependent and neglect proceeding, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the matter further and, alternatively, that the case should have been transferred to Kentucky. Finding no error in the disposition of the case, we affirm the judgment in all respects. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Mervin et al. v. Ken Davis et al.
This appeal arises from a dispute between neighbors regarding the construction of a sign that precipitated the exchange of threats followed by the filing of a civil warrant and criminal charges, a global settlement agreement, the alleged breach of the settlement agreement, and the commencement of this action. After Ken and Martha Davis sued John and Sharon Merwin in general sessions court on a variety of tort claims and filed criminal charges against Mr. Merwin, the parties entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to which Mr. Merwin agreed to remove the sign he erected and the Davises agreed to dismiss the civil warrant and the criminal charges. The Davises promptly dismissed the civil warrant but when the criminal case came on for hearing, the district attorney declined to dismiss the criminal charges against Mr. Merwin and the case was continued so Mr. Merwin could retain counsel. At the subsequent hearing, the criminal charges were dismissed and, in the interim, Mr. Merwin removed the sign. Thereafter, the Merwins commenced this action asserting a variety of tort claims, including a claim for malicious prosecution, and a claim for breach of contract based on the Davises’ failure to dismiss the criminal charges at the initial hearing. Upon the motion of the Davises, the trial court summarily dismissed the tort claims on the grounds of res judicata because they had been asserted in the civil warrant that was dismissed with prejudice. At the conclusion of the trial on the remaining claims, the trial court granted the Davises’ motion for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim upon the ground it was legally impossible for the Davises to dismiss the criminal complaint and because the Merwins could not establish that the Davises breached the settlement agreement. The Merwins appeal. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
J.W. Smith, et al. v. TimberPro, Inc., et al.
J.W. Smith d/b/a J.W. Smith Logging (“Smith”) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Don Bush d/b/a Bush Forestry Equipment (“Bush”) and Woodland Equipment, Inc. (“Woodland”). Smith filed this lawsuit against Bush and Woodland seeking damages for breach of contract and breach of express and implied warranties. His claims arose from his purchase of an allegedly defective harvester from Woodland. The trial court granted summary judgment to Bush based on the absence of contractual privity between Smith and Bush. The trial court granted summary judgment to Woodland based on the absence of evidence that it breached any express warranties to Smith and based on a disclaimer of implied warranties included in its contract with Smith. On appeal, Smith argues that the record contains issues of disputed fact as to (1) whether Bush was a joint-seller of the harvester with Woodland, (2) whether Woodland and Bush breached express warranties to Smith, and (3) whether the disclaimer of implied warranties was part of Smith’s contract for purchase of the harvester. We agree with the trial court that the record does not contain any evidence of contractual privity between Smith and Bush and therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Bush on all of Smith’s claims. We also agree that the record does not contain evidence that Woodland breached express warranties to Smith and therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Woodland on Smith’s claim for breach of express warranties. We do not agree, however, that the disclaimer of implied warranties was included in Smith’s contract with Woodland for purchase of the harvester. We therefore reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Woodland on Smith’s claim for breach of implied warranties. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and this case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Henry Fletcher v. CFRA, LLC
Henry Fletcher (“Plaintiff”) sued CFRA, LLC (“CFRA”), which owns and operates an International House of Pancakes (“IHOP”) restaurant in Antioch, Tennessee, alleging that CFRA was liable for the actions of its IHOP employee, Kenneth W. Hale, Jr. (“Hale”), in connection with an assault upon Plaintiff committed by Hale. The Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) granted summary judgment to CFRA. Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment. We find and hold that CFRA made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, that Plaintiff failed to show that there are genuine disputed issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment, and that CFRA was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment to CFRA. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Madelyn Cleveland
In this probate matter, the decedent was a party to divorce proceedings in Georgia with her estranged husband at the time of her death. The decedent and her husband had executed a separation agreement as part of those proceedings, wherein they agreed that each party would individually maintain ownership of specified marital assets and execute any documents necessary to effectuate the agreement as to each asset. The decedent passed away before the respective transfers of property were made, and her personal representative filed an action seeking to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The trial court conducted a hearing in this matter and determined that the agreement had been rescinded by the husband, such that all jointly owned marital assets passed to him at the decedent’s death. The personal representative has appealed. We determine that the husband did not have a proper basis for rescission of the settlement agreement and that any purported rescission was ineffective. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the petition filed by the personal representative and awarding ownership of all marital assets to the husband. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings regarding enforcement of the agreement. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Antonio Allen v. Candy Rachelle Munn Allen
This appeal arises from the post-divorce restriction of an alternate residential parent’s parenting time. The parties divorced in 2010. By agreement, the father was designated primary residential parent of the parties’ two minor children. The original parenting plan gave the mother 160 days of unsupervised visitation per year, including time in the summers and on holidays. In 2014, the father filed a petition requesting that the trial court restrict mother’s parenting time to supervised visitation only. Father’s lawyer then approached the trial court ex parte with an affidavit of the daughter’s psychologist and requested emergency relief restricting the mother’s visitation. The trial judge signed a temporary injunction requiring the mother’s parenting time to be supervised. When the mother attempted to set aside this injunction, the trial court ordered the mother to undergo a Rule 35 evaluation. After performing his examination of the mother, the independent Rule 35 evaluator testified that the mother was capable of caring for her children without supervision. Nevertheless, the trial court entered a final order and permanent parenting plan that substantially decreased the mother’s parenting time and required it to be supervised indefinitely. The trial court also awarded the father $15,000.00 in attorney’s fees. Following a thorough review of the record, we vacate the order of the trial court restricting the mother’s parenting time, reverse the trial court’s order awarding the father attorney’s fees, remand the case to the trial court, and necessarily reinstate the parties’ original parenting plan. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tamara Reece Milton v. Randall v. Harness, Jr.
This is an extraordinary appeal, filed pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, seeking review of the Trial Court’s ex parte injunction temporarily changing custody of the parties’ six-year-old child (“Child”), born out-of-wedlock, pending the final adjudication of the Petition for Custody and Injunction (“Petition” or “Petition for Custody”) filed by the Petitioner, Randall V. Harness, Jr. (“Father”), in which he seeks to legitimate and obtain custody of Child. We conclude that an extraordinary appeal is warranted, that both the ex parte injunction changing custody and the Trial Court’s subsequent order continuing that injunction should be vacated, and that custody of Child be restored to the Respondent, Tamara Reece Milton (“Mother”), pending further action by the Trial Court. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Laura Lee Demastus v. University Health System, Inc.
Plaintiff Laura Lee Demastus brought this action against her former employer, University Health System, Inc., doing business as the University of Tennessee Medical Center (Employer). After Plaintiff had worked roughly three years as a nurse at the UT Medical Center, Employer suspected that she was illegally diverting medications. When Plaintiff’s supervisors confronted her with evidence of several suspicious transactions recorded by the medication monitoring systems, Plaintiff denied doing anything wrong or improper. She, however, could not explain the suspicious transactions. She was terminated shortly thereafter. Plaintiff brought this action under the Tennessee Disabilities Act (TDA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103 et seq. (2016), alleging that she was fired solely because Employer perceived her to have the disability of drug addiction. Employer argued that it did not fire her because she was considered a drug addict, but because it thought she was stealing medications. Following discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment, holding that under the undisputed material facts, Plaintiff could not establish that Employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reason was a pretext for illegal discrimination. We affirm |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
