Joseph Brennan, et al. v. Board of Parole For The State of Tennessee
This appeal arises from a decision by the Tennessee Board of Parole (the “Board”) to deny an inmate parole after his initial parole review hearing. In 2009, the inmate pled guilty to two counts of attempted rape of a child and two counts of incest and was sentenced to 20 years in prison with parole eligibility after serving 30% of his sentence. Apparently because of his good behavior, the Board considered the inmate for release on parole after he had served only 20% of his sentence. Without further explanation, the Board denied the inmate parole based solely on its finding that “[t]he release from custody at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which the offender stands convicted or promote disrespect of the law,” and deferred review of his parole application for five years. The inmate filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari, arguing, among other things, that the Board acted arbitrarily in denying him parole based solely on the seriousness of the crime without providing any support or explanation for its decision. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision and this appeal followed. On appeal, we conclude that the Board acted arbitrarily in deferring further review of the inmate’s parole application beyond the time when he would have otherwise been parole eligible—at 30% of his 20-year sentence. Because the inmate has already served more than 30% of his 20-year sentence, we hold that he should immediately be granted a new parole hearing. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. Winslow v. John Bruce Saltsman, Jr., et al.
Mark Winslow brought suit against Charles Fleischmann and his campaign advertising consultant, John Saltsman, to recover for allegedly false and defamatory statements made in the course of Mr. Fleishman’s campaign for election to the United States Congress, and related contractual claims. Mr. Fleishman and Mr. Saltsman moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statements were not false or capable of defamatory meaning or published with actual malice, and that they took no action to induce a breach of contract or otherwise interfere with the relationship between Mr. Winslow and the Tennessee Republican Party. Mr. Winslow did not contest the grant of summary judgment on the contract claims; the trial court granted the motion as to the defamation and false light claims, holding that there was no evidence from which to infer malice, that the statements were not defamatory or capable of a defamatory meaning, and that any statements upon which the action was based which related to Mr. Winslow were either true or substantially true and, therefore, not actionable. Mr. Winslow appeals. Because Mr. Fleishman and Mr. Saltsman demonstrated that the undisputed facts negate the element of actual malice which is essential to the defamation and false light claims, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: William K.
This is an appeal from an order designating a primary residential parent and setting visitation and child support. The juvenile court found that naming Father as primary residential parent was in the child’s best interest and set child support accordingly. Mother appealed both the designation of primary residential parent and the amount of child support owed to father. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
F&M Marketing Services, Inc. v. Christenberry Trucking and Farm, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff brought an action to pierce the corporate veil of defendant company and hold its sole shareholder personally liable for a debt. The trial court conducted a bench trial on the issue and found in favor of the defendant company and shareholder. The trial court initially declined to issue findings of fact in its final judgment. After both parties submitted their own proposed findings of fact, the trial court adopted the defendants‘ version nearly verbatim, incorporating two additional findings of fact of its own. However, because we find the trial court‘s findings of fact and conclusions of law insufficient to facilitate appellate review, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Greg S.
This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Greg S. (“Father”) to his minor child Greg S., Jr. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Father appeals to this Court arguing only that it is not in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Kaedince M. et al.
This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Bridgetta M. (“Mother”) to her minor children Greg S. and Kaedince M. (“the Children”). The Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children on the grounds of wanton disregard and severe abuse. Mother appeals to this Court arguing only that it is not in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Tino C. Sutton v. Bedford County Tennessee Sheriff Department
An individual who sought records from a county sheriff’s department was provided the records outside the seven business day period required by the Tennessee Public Records Act. The individual, who was acting pro se, requested an award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(g). The trial court denied the request because the individual plaintiff did not incur attorney’s fees and did not incur the types of costs contemplated by Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The individual appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Zia Mousavi Kabiri v. Shirin Davari Kabiri
This is a divorce action in a marriage of a long duration. The trial court granted the parties a divorce and divided the marital property. The wife appeals the trial court’s classification of the parties’ separate property, the valuation of their pensions, and the division of the marital property. We affirm |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Duff Brumley v. The City of Cleveland
A former police officer with the City of Cleveland brought this retaliatory discharge action, alleging that he was fired for reporting his superior for the crime of official misconduct and official oppression. During the pendency of the retaliatory discharge action, the officer’s termination was upheld in the administrative appeal process. A panel of this court affirmed the administrative decision. Thereafter, the City of Cleveland moved for summary judgment in this action, arguing, in pertinent part, that the claim was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because the issues raised were addressed in the administrative appeal of the termination. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Honey Bunch v. B.F. Bunch
Honey Bunch (“Plaintiff”) filed suit seeking partition by sale of a parcel of real property located in Anderson County, Tennessee. B.F. Bunch (“Defendant”) filed a counterclaim alleging, in pertinent part, that a quit claim deed of a portion of the property was void for lack of capacity, undue influence, or fraud, and that the property at issue should be partitioned in kind. After a trial, the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) found and held, inter alia, that the quit claim deed was valid and that the remaining property should be partitioned by sale. Defendant appeals raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding the quit claim deed valid, whether the Trial Court erred in finding that the property should be partitioned by sale, and whether the Trial Court erred in prohibiting Defendant from using a common driveway. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we find no error by the Trial Court. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Angeli Chan Selitsch v. Michael John Selitsch
Husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to set aside an agreed upon Final Decree of Divorce. He claims the agreed order was the result of a mutual mistake concerning one of his military benefits and that he lacked the mental capacity to understand the agreement. The parties married in 1989. Husband retired from the military in 2009 with 100% disability. Wife filed for divorce in 2012. Over the course of several months, the parties negotiated an agreement as to the division of all of their marital property. The agreement was announced in court in August 2013, at which time both spouses were called to testify concerning their understanding and approval of the agreement. The final divorce decree was subsequently approved by the trial court and entered in January 2014. Pursuant to the final decree, Husband received the entirety of his Veterans Affairs disability benefits, and Wife received one-half of Husband’s other retirement benefit. Husband subsequently filed a Rule 60.02 Motion to Set Aside Marital Agreement for Lack of Capacity and Mistake. He contended that the parties mistakenly believed that his military retirement benefit was marital property when, as a matter of law, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act prohibits the courts from treating a disability benefit as marital property. He also contended that he lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the nature of the hearing in which he agreed to the division of marital property due to the pain and stress related to his disease, as well as his medication. The trial court denied relief on both grounds. We affirm. The trial court acted within its discretion by denying Rule 60 relief on the finding that Husband failed to present sufficient proof to obtain relief on the ground of mental incapacity. Furthermore, a mistake of law is not a ground for Rule 60.02 relief and the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied relief on this ground and enforced the parties’ agreement. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Lynn Morgan v. John David Drauss
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of a motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.02. The trial court denied the appellant’s request to elicit testimony from the appellee during the Rule 52.02 hearing and denied the appellant’s motion. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
John A. W. Bratcher, Clerk And Master/Special Commissioner, et al v. Beverly M. Hubler, et al.
This appeal involves a suit to condemn an easement or right-of-way to access landlocked property. The plaintiff named as defendants all neighboring landowners, including the State of Tennessee and the Town of Smyrna. The State and the Town filed motions to dismiss, asserting sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss but granted the State and the Town permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. This Court granted the applications for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We hold that the State and the Town are entitled to dismissal based on sovereign immunity and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Nance McLucas v. Shawn Michael Nance
This appeal arises from a detainer action originally filed by a landlord against a tenant in general sessions court. The general sessions court entered judgment by default against the tenant for $25,000. The tenant filed a notice of appeal to circuit court, along with a pauper’s oath and affidavit of indigency. The circuit court found that the tenant failed to properly perfect the appeal and dismissed the appeal. The tenant appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Thomas Church et al v. Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc. et al.
This action stems from a motor vehicle accident resulting in two fatalities that occurred at the intersection of the newly constructed State Route 91 and Old State Route 91 in Johnson County, Tennessee. Alleging that the design and construction of the intersection were negligent, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Johnson County Circuit Court against Johnson County and the general contractor who constructed the intersection. The plaintiffs also filed claims against the Tennessee Department of Transportation with the Tennessee Claims Commission, asserting that the intersection constituted a dangerous condition on a roadway. The claims filed with the Claims Commission were transferred to Johnson County Circuit Court, and all claims were subsequently consolidated in this action. Johnson County and the general contractor were later dismissed as defendants, such that the trial proceeded regarding the claims against the State only. Following a bench trial, the court granted judgment to the plaintiffs, determining the State to be 53% at fault and the deceased driver to be 47% at fault. The court awarded damages accordingly. The State timely appealed. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination that the intersection constituted a dangerous condition on the roadway or that the risk involved was foreseeable. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney Glover v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This appeal involves the dismissal of a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by a prison inmate. The prisoner raises several issues regarding violations of the Tennessee Department of Correction's (TDOC) uniform disciplinary procedures. The prisoner was found guilty of refusing to participate in his assigned educational class. After exhausting his administrative appeals, he filed an application for a writ of certiorari in the trial court. The trial court granted the writ of certiorari, and upon review of the record, granted the TDOC's motion to dismiss. The prisoner now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Mitch Goree, et al. v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
This appeal involves two employees‘ claims of racial discrimination and retaliation pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101, et seq. After a five-day jury trial, the jury found in favor of both employees on their claims of racial discrimination and retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The jury awarded one employee $2,600,000 and the other employee $2,042,000 in back pay, benefits, and compensatory damages. The trial judge granted the employer‘s motion for remittitur of the jury verdict and suggested remittitur of the awards to $1,225,933.33 and $676,000, respectively. The plaintiffs accepted the remittitur under protest. The employer appeals, claiming that the trial court should have granted its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the plaintiffs failed to establish essential elements of their claims. Alternatively, the employer argues that a new trial is necessary due to erroneous jury instructions. The employees argue that the trial court erred in reducing the jury verdict. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Mackey v. Elizabeth Anne Mayfield
Father, the primary residential parent with substantially more parenting time, sought to relocate to Wisconsin with the parties’ minor son. After learning that Father was about to relocate, Mother filed a petition in opposition to the relocation alleging that she had not received notice of Father’s intent to relocate as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(a) and contending that relocation was not for a reasonable purpose and not in the child’s best interest. After a hearing on the issue of notice, the trial court found that Mother received certified mail from Father more than 30 days prior to commencing this action, but it did not contain notice of Father’s intent to relocate; thus, the court allowed Mother’s challenge to the relocation to proceed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(g). Following a two-day trial on Mother’s petition, the court found that the testimony of Father and his wife was not credible, that Father did not have a reasonable purpose to relocate, and that relocation was not in the child’s best interest. The court also entered an order prohibiting Father from relocating with the child and designating Mother as the primary residential parent. Father appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it found that Mother had not received notice of his intent to relocate, and that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose and was not in the child’s best interest. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Melissa A. Phillips v. Burns Phillips et al.
This is an unemployment compensation case. The employee filed a claim for benefits following her termination from her employer. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development granted the claim. The Appeals Tribunal reversed the decision, finding that the employee was ineligible for benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-303(a)(1)(A). The Board of Review upheld the reversal. The employee filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court reversed the decision. The employer and the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development appeal. We affirm the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Watson v. Karla Myers
In this post-divorce dispute, Father argues that the trial court erred in failing to make him the primary residential parent because of Mother’s alleged failure to facilitate a close relationship between Father and the child. The trial court found a material change in circumstances, but concluded that a change in the primary residential parent was not in the best interest of the child. We affirm because the evidence does not preponderate against the decision of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Nolan G., et al.
Two children came into the custody of the Department of Children’s Services in July 2012 after members of their extended family made allegations that their parents were abusing them. The children were adjudicated dependent and neglected, and subsequently, the Department instituted proceedings to terminate the parental rights of both parents. After a hearing, the court held that the parents had willfully abandoned their children by failure to support, substantial non-compliance, and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jaylah W., et al.
In this termination of parental rights case, Mother appeals the trial court’s findings of the following grounds for termination: abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; abandonment by an incarcerated parent; abandonment by willful failure to visit; abandonment by willful failure to support; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and the persistence of conditions. Mother also appeals the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the children’s best interest. We reverse as to the trial court’s findings of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and abandonment by an incarcerated parent. We vacate the trial court’s findings of abandonment by willful failure to support and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans due to the trial court’s failure to make specific findings of fact. We affirm the trial court’s findings of abandonment by willful failure to visit and persistence of conditions. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interest of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
The Bank of New York Mellon v. Littleton Price
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Zoe Jeanette Naylor v. William Lee Naylor
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
In re Chase R.
This is a Title IV-D child support case. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court's modification of his child support obligation on grounds that: (1) the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Circuit Court's child support order; and (2) the trial court erred in applying the Child Support Rules and Regulations in calculating Appellant's monthly child support obligation. Appellant also appeals the trial court's award of attorney's fees in this case. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
