Avenue Bank v. Guarantee Insurance Company
Appellee Avenue Bank (“the Bank”) filed suit against the Appellant Guarantee Insurance Company (“GIC”), alleging breach of contract with respect to a “Funds Held Agreement” entered into between the parties. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the Bank agreed to disburse proceeds of a letter of credit to GIC. In turn, GIC agreed to hold the funds in a separate “Funds Held Account” and disburse the funds to pay unpaid premiums and certain claims that might become payable pursuant to policies of workers' compensation insurance. The agreement further provided that upon the resolution of all workers' compensation claims filed within the applicable statute of limitations period, GIC would, upon request of the Bank, return to the Bank any funds remaining in the Funds Held Account. Following the resolution of all claims filed within the limitations period, the Bank demanded the repayment of the remaining balance. GIC failed to comply with this demand. In its answer, GIC alleged that it was unable to perform in light of a Delaware court order concerning the liquidation of a third-party, Ullico Casualty Company (“Ullico”). It contended that the terms of the Delaware order barred disbursement of the funds at issue. The Bank ultimately moved for judgment on the pleadings by asserting that the undisputed facts showed that it was entitled to relief. The trial court granted the motion and concluded that the facts admitted by GIC's answer established the Bank's right to recover on its breach of contract claim. In doing so, the trial court rejected GIC's arguments that Ullico's liquidation and/or the Delaware court order had any effect on its performance. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania v. State of Tennessee
Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Wendy A. McCulley v. Robert McCulley
This is a breach of contract case. In 2012, the parties entered into a contract to resolve an issue of past-due child support owed by Appellant to Appellee. The contract provided that Appellant would grant a remainder interest in his home to Appellee, reserving a life estate interest for himself. In exchange, Appellee agreed to forgive the past-due child support owed to her by Appellant. The contract provided, among other things, that Appellant would pay the taxes on the property during his lifetime and would make monthly payments to Appellee's attorney to repay Appellee's attorney's fees. In 2014, Appellee filed a petition alleging that Appellant breached the contract by, among other things, failing to pay the taxes on the property. After a hearing, the trial court found that Appellant breached the contract and that forfeiture of his life estate in his home was the appropriate remedy. On appeal, Appellant admits that he breached the contract but argues that the trial court erred in holding that forfeiture was an appropriate remedy. Because the trial court failed to provide any reasoning for its decision, we are unable to perform a meaningful review of this issue on appeal. We affirm in part but vacate the trial court's revocation of Appellant's life estate and remand for further findings and conclusions on that issue. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jatavious M.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her severely disabled son. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the child's best interest. On appeal, the mother challenges only the best interest finding. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Austin Davis v. Covenant Presbyterian Church of Nashville, et al.
A former church member brought suit against the pastor and other defendants not involved in this appeal. The trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims against the pastor with the exception of the causes of action for defamation and outrageous conduct. We have concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint does not make out claims for defamation or outrageous conduct. The decision of the trial court is, therefore, reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint in in its entirety. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Americus C., et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of parental rights to an adopted child. The boyfriend of the adoptive mother physically and sexually abused the child. Upon a petition filed by the Department of Children’s Services, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the adoptive mother had committed severe child abuse. The juvenile court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The adoptive mother appeals claiming that she was not the perpetrator of the abuse and that she had not been given an opportunity to adjust her circumstances. We affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Clay | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. Cohen v. Richard A. Demonbreun
This appeal arises from the dismissal of suit for unpaid fees. An expert and an attorney entered into a services agreement in March 2005. The expert first invoiced for his services in January 2006. Additional services were rendered after that date, and the expert sent additional invoices. Despite repeated requests from the expert and promises from the attorney, invoices went unpaid except for a small partial payment. On September 19, 2013, the expert filed suit against the attorney in general sessions court and obtained a default judgment. Attorney then appealed to circuit court. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Lisa Holt v. Jeremy B. Holt
The matters in dispute pertain to a retroactive child support judgment for a period of time prior to the filing of the child support petition. The trial court assessed a retroactive judgment that included a period of time prior to the filing of the petition, holding that the petition filed by the State on behalf of Mother was to “set” child support not to “modify” support. Father contends a prior support order was in effect when the petition was filed; thus, the trial court violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) by awarding a judgment based on an increase in child support for several months prior to the filing of the petition. In the trial court the State insisted that the petition was to set support; however, on appeal, it concedes that a child support order was in effect when this petition was filed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) directs that a judgment for child support shall not be subject to modification as to any time period or amounts prior to the date a petition for modification is filed. Therefore, we vacate the retroactive child support judgment and remand for the trial court to calculate the judgment from the date the petition to modify support was filed. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Eileen F. Carman Ex Rel. Rodney Carman v. Tracy L. Carman-Thacker
The defendant appealed from a judgment entered on May 12, 2014, and a post-judgment order entered on October 2, 2014. Because the defendant did not file her notice of appeal within the thirty day time period required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Libertad Claborn v. Bobby L. Claborn
In 2013, Libertad Claborn (Wife) obtained a “default judgment for dissolution of marriage” from a trial court in Illinois. Wife had resided in Illinois since 2011. The Illinois court ordered the sale of the marital residence in Chattanooga and directed Bobby L. Claborn (Husband) to “cooperate fully” in the sale. The Illinois judgment also ordered Husband to pay child support and educational expenses for the parties’ children. Wife properly enrolled the judgment in Tennessee and sought its enforcement. The trial court in Tennessee accorded full faith and credit to the Illinois judgment. Husband appeals, arguing that (1) the Illinois court did not have jurisdiction to order the sale of the marital residence; (2) the foreign judgment contains provisions at odds with Tennessee public policy; (3) the trial court improperly declined to transfer the matter to chancery court; and (4) the trial court entered a “default” judgment without allowing him to present defenses. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Ewin B. Jenkins et al v. Big City Remodeling et al.
The plaintiffs filed this action to recover damages they incurred when, during construction, their home was completely destroyed by fire. The plaintiffs sued the project's general contractor as well as various subcontractors employed by the general contractor. The complaint included allegations of negligence, based in part on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the general contractor regarding claims based upon the general contractor's own negligence and res ipsa loquitur, but we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment regarding the negligence of the flooring subcontractors. We also reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the general contractor regarding the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. Finally, we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Ewin B. Jenkins et al v. Big City Remodeling et al. - Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. What was the proximate cause of the fire and explosion that led to this lawsuit? That was the central question before the trial court. The plaintiffs' theory on this subject is correctly set forth in the majority's opinion: . . . [the plaintiffs] asserted that Flooring Subcontractors [(the subcontractors)] allowed flammable rags to remain on or near the exterior deck and also smoked cigarettes in the area. As claimed by [the plaintiffs], the improper disposal of cigarette butts resulted in the stain-soaked rags igniting, thereby causing the fire. The subcontractors were on the construction site to “stain[ ] . . . the hardwood floors.” In my judgment, the problem in this case is an absence of evidence showing a nexus between the subcontractors' conduct – negligent as it certainly was – and the fire. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Jordan Leanne (Parker) Roland v. Ryan Lee Roland
Mother and Father are the parents of two minor children. Mother and Father each filed a complaint for divorce and sought to be named the primary residential parent. The trial court designated Father the primary residential parent and created a permanent parenting plan that was materially different from the plan proposed by either party. The court also entered a child support order. Mother appealed the trial court’s judgment, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) designating Father the primary residential parent; (2) setting up the residential schedule and parenting plan based entirely on Father’s work schedule, with the result that Mother has the children only one day at a time; and (3) imputing a higher income to her for child support purposes than is warranted by the evidence. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent, but we vacate the trial court’s residential plan and child support order and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Historic Sylvan Park, Inc., et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, et al
Residents of the Sylvan Park neighborhood of Nashville filed a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking review of a decision by the Metropolitan Planning Commission to recommend that the Metropolitan Council disapprove an ordinance which would expand the historic conservation overlay district in the neighborhood. The Planning Commission moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the Planning Commission’s decision “was only a recommendation and not a ‘final order’ from which an appeal may be taken with a writ of certiorari.” The court granted the motion, holding that the decision by the Planning Commission was not a final order, and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Residents appeal. Because the Metropolitan Council must take further action on the Planning Commission’s recommendation before the zoning ordinance is enacted, the decision of the Planning Commission is not a final order or judgment for purposes of judicial review; accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Malina W., et al.
In this termination of parental rights case, the father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to his two daughters on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support the children in the four consecutive months preceding his incarceration and conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. The father also asserts the court erred in finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. We fail to find clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the father abandoned the children by failing to visit or support them in the four months preceding his incarceration; however, we affirm the trial court’s finding that father engaged in conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. Likewise, we affirm the court’s best interest determination. The trial court’s finding that father’s parental rights should be terminated is affirmed. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Frances E. Miller Ex Rel. Arnold Edward Miller, Sr. v. Cookeville Regional Medical Center, et al.
Plaintiff filed this medical malpractice action on September 8, 2011, pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act (“the TMMA”) against Cookeville Regional Medical Center, which is a governmental entity subject to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). The Medical Center filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. 2013), to support its assertion that Plaintiff’s suit was untimely filed because it was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the GTLA, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-305(b) (2012). Plaintiff responded contending that the Cunningham decision should be applied prospectively only, so as to preserve Plaintiff’s claim as timely. The trial court found the decision in Cunningham controlling and dismissed the complaint as untimely filed. We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin Dewayne Echols v. Elke Monika Echols
This appeal arises from a divorce involving a challenge to the validity of the marriage. Marvin Dewayne Echols (“Husband”) filed suit for divorce against his wife Elke Monika Echols (“Wife”) in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). Husband later alleged that his marriage to Wife was void. Husband and Wife had married shortly after a German court had pronounced Wife divorced, and Husband’s position is that Wife’s divorce was not yet legally binding under German law when they married in Kentucky. The Trial Court, among other things, found the marriage valid and granted the parties a divorce. Husband raises several issues on appeal, chief among them the issue of the validity of the marriage in the first place. We hold that Husband failed to prove that his marriage to Wife was invalid. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Wayne Holtsclaw et al v. Darrell Johnson et al.
This is a dispute over a narrow strip of real property adjacent to the boundary line of tracts of land owned by plaintiffs Wayne Holtsclaw and Willie Holtsclaw and defendants Darrell Johnson and Brenda Johnson. The Holtsclaws brought this action seeking ejectment and a declaration that they owned the disputed property. The Johnsons asserted, among other things, that they were entitled to the property because of their many years of adverse possession. The Holtsclaws responded by arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110 (2000 & Supp. 2015) bars the Johnsons' adverse possession claim because, for more than twenty years, the Johnsons had not paid property taxes on the disputed property. The Johnsons responded that the Supreme Court's opinion in Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tenn. 2007), which held that § 28-2-110 is not applicable “when the tracts are contiguous, a relatively small area is at issue, and the adjacent owners making claims of ownership have paid their respective real estate taxes,” applied in this case. The trial court ruled that the Johnsons established ownership by adverse possession and that the “Cumulus exception” applies. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Mickel G. Hoback v. City of Chattanooga
This case involves the 2009 termination of a city police officer's employment on grounds of unfitness for duty due to post-traumatic stress disorder suffered as a result of the officer's active military service while on leave from his employment. Following an administrative hearing in November 2009, the city council originally upheld the police chief''s termination of the officer's employment. The officer commenced this action in state court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the trial court. Upon hearing, the trial court found, inter alia, that the city council had incorrectly applied a statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-106, which had been overruled by an agreed consent order previously entered into between the United States and the State of Tennessee. See United States v. Tennessee, Civil Action No. 1:98-1357. The trial court therefore reversed the city council's decision and ordered the officer's reinstatement with back pay. The city appealed to this Court. In a 2012 decision, this Court affirmed the trial court's finding regarding the incorrect application of Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-106 and remanded the case, directing the trial court to instruct the city council regarding the appropriate legal standard. See Hoback v. City of Chattanooga, No. E2011-00484-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2974762 at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2012). Following remand, the city council conducted a second hearing and again voted to uphold the prior termination of the officer's employment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kathleen N. Barrett, et al v. Thomas M. Chesney, MD
This interlocutory appeal arises from a health care liability action and concerns the question of proper venue. Plaintiff filed her original lawsuit in Shelby County against the Appellants, a pathology group located in Shelby County. Appellants answered the complaint and raised, as an affirmative defense, the comparative negligence of Appellees, plaintiff's primary care physician and his employer, who are residents of Sumner County. Plaintiff then moved, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-1-119, for leave to amend her complaint to add the Sumner County residents to the lawsuit. Leave was granted, and plaintiff filed an amended complaint under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01. Appellees answered the complaint and averred that venue was improper in Shelby County under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-4-101(b). Appellees asked for dismissal of the lawsuit; however, rather than dismissing the lawsuit, the Shelby County court transferred the case to Sumner County. Appellants appeal. We affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Darryl F. Bryant, Sr. v. Darryl F. Bryant, Jr.
Owner of real property conveyed, by quitclaim deed, an interest to herself and her son as joint tenants, with the right of survivorship. Owner then conveyed her interest to her grandson by quitclaim deed a year later. In the deed to her grandson, Owner expressly referenced the earlier deed to her son, the grandson’s father. After Owner died, the son filed a declaratory judgment in which he asked the court to rule that he owns the property in fee simple. The son filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The grandson appealed the trial court’s judgment. We affirm. Owner transferred her right of survivorship to her grandson; but this right would come into play only if her son predeceased her. Because Owner died first, the son exercised his right of survivorship and became the sole owner in fee of the property. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jodi Lynn Jenkins v. Steven Louis Jenkins
The plaintiff, Jodi Lynn Jenkins (“Wife”), filed this divorce action against the defendant, Steven Louis Jenkins (“Husband”), on March 20, 2014. Prior to trial, the parties reached an agreement regarding certain issues, including an equitable division of their marital property, a permanent parenting plan, and child support. The trial court conducted a hearing on September 10, 2014, regarding the remaining issues of alimony and attorney's fees. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order awarding Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $3,500 per month until Husband's child support obligation terminated and $4,500 per month thereafter. The court also awarded Wife $5,000 in attorney's fees.1 Husband timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment. We remand this action to the trial court for a determination regarding the issue of a reasonable award of attorney's fees to Wife incurred in defending this appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In re E.T. P.
In this parental termination case, A.J.S.P. (Mother) appeals the termination of her rights to her minor son, E.T.P. (the Child). After the Child was placed in state custody and adjudicated dependent and neglected, custody was awarded to a non-relative. Subsequently, physical custody was returned to the Department of Children’s Services (DCS). At that time, both parents were incarcerated. As to Mother, DCS filed a petition to terminate her rights to the child based on her wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. After a trial, the court granted the petition based on its findings, said to be made by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) grounds for termination exist and (2) termination is in the best interest of the Child. On appeal, Mother challenges only the court’s best interest determination. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of Vida Mae McCartt
This case involves an agreement among most of the heirs of Vida Mae McCartt (Decedent) regarding the distribution of the assets of her estate. After Decedent’s will was admitted to probate, five of her grandchildren filed an action to contest its validity. Following mediation, the grandchildren and Decedent’s three living children entered into a settlement agreement, which the trial court approved and incorporated into an agreed order distributing the assets of the estate. Thereafter, Sara Shannon Armes, the daughter of Decedent’s deceased son, J.D. McCartt, Sr., brought this action alleging that she was entitled to a share of the estate under the terms of the agreed order. Armes, who was not a party to the settlement agreement, also alleged that her siblings perpetrated a fraud by representing to the court that J.D. McCartt, Sr. had only three children and heirs at law when he actually had four, including Armes. The trial court granted the defendants’ Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Margie Hunt et al v. Sudha Nair M.D. et al.
This interlocutory appeal involves a health care liability action. The plaintiffs, Margie Hunt and husband, Rickey Hunt, claim that Mrs. Hunt suffered injuries proximately caused by the conduct of the defendants with respect to two surgeries. Prior to filing their complaint, the plaintiffs gave timely written notice of their claim to potential defendants. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) (Supp. 2013). Each of the three defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Their separate motions were predicated on their assertion that the plaintiffs' pre-suit notice failed to comply with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, part of the Tennessee's Health Care Liability Act. Specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization with their pre-suit notice. They also contend that the plaintiffs failed to attach to the complaint the medical authorization and also the pre-suit notice served upon the defendants. The defendant Dr. Nitin J. Rangnekar also relies upon the ground of insufficiency of service of process. The trial court denied each defendant's motion. On the defendants' further motions, the court granted them permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We likewise granted the defendants permission to file a Rule 9 appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
