Colette Suzanne Turman v. Fred Turman
The trial court referred this divorce case to a Special Master, indicating that the issues to be decided by the Special Master would be determined by the parties. The Special Master limited her consideration to the valuation of the parties’ property. The trial court subsequently entered an order purporting to resolve all the remaining issues in the case. However, the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in its written order. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
In re Alexis B.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Alexis B., the minor child (“the Child”) of Katie R. (“Mother”) and Johnny R.B. (“Father”). On August 26, 2013, the Child's paternal grandparents, Johnny B. and Deborah B. (“Grandparents”), filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents and adopt the Child. Father subsequently agreed to surrender his parental rights to the Child, and he is not a party to this appeal. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of Mother upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to provide financial support and willfully failing to visit the Child in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Child's best interest. Mother has appealed. Having concluded that the evidence preponderates against a finding that Mother had the ability to financially support the Child during the determinative period, we reverse the trial court's finding that Mother abandoned the Child by willfully failing to provide support. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother's parental rights. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Christy L. Griffith v. Glen H. Griffith
This divorce case involves issues of property classification, valuation, and division. The parties were married for fifteen years, with one child born of the marriage. At the time the parties married, the husband owned an interest in his family's motorcycle dealership. The husband inherited remaining interests in that dealership from his parents during the marriage. At trial, the court found that the dealership was a separately owned asset that became marital property by reason of transmutation. The trial court also made determinations regarding the value of the dealership and the real property upon which it operates. Following these determinations, the trial court rendered what it considered to be an equitable division of the parties' marital assets. Husband has appealed. Because we determine the trial court's classification and valuation of the dealership to be in error, as well as the valuation of the business-related real property, we further determine the overall distribution of marital assets to be in error. We vacate the trial court's judgment with regard to those issues and remand for further proceedings. The balance of the trial court's judgment is affirmed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jarett M.
This is a parental termination case. Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights with regard to the minor child at issue. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights based on its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father abandoned the child by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support the child. The trial court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interests of the child. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Fairy Berry v. City of Memphis
This appeal arises from the trial court’s award of damages stemming from an automobile accident. In 2003, plaintiff was injured when her vehicle was struck by a Memphis Police Department officer’s car in an intersection. After a non-jury trial, the trial court awarded plaintiff damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. The City of Memphis appeals these damages, arguing (1) plaintiff’s expert non-treating physician was not qualified to opine as to emergency room treatment or costs; (2) plaintiff should not recover for her failure to mitigate her damages by exacerbating her injury; and (3) plaintiff’s testimony wherein she explains her ongoing pain did not warrant the amount of damages she was awarded. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Johnny L. Smith, et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
The plaintiffs sued the Metropolitan Government, claiming that prior citations that had been issued to them and paid by them were issued without authority and handled by the general sessions court without jurisdiction. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The plaintiffs appealed, and we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Holmes Peacher-Ryan, et al. v. Heirs At Law of Ruth James Gaylor, et al.
This is an appeal of the trial court’s adoption of a special master’s report. The trial court referred the case to the special master for determination of the proper heirs of a residuary trust. Because the procedure in the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 53, we vacate and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Marino v. Board of Administration City of Memphis Retirement System
The order appealed is not a final judgment. Consequently, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jordin M.
In this juvenile court case, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan to make him the primary residential parent. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated that there had been a material change of circumstances. We have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination that it was in the child’s best interest for Mother to be the primary residential parent. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tennessee Walking Horse Forfeiture Litigation
This case arises out of an appeal by the State of Tennessee, from an Order dismissing a Complaint for Judicial Forfeiture. The trial court granted Appellees’, the purported owners of two Tennessee Walking Horses, motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 39-14-210(f) and 39-11-707(c). We vacate and remand. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Destin R.
In this grandparent visitation case the mother of the child appeals the grant of the petition to establish grandparent visitation privileges. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for entry of an order in compliance with Tenn. Rule Civ. P. 52.01. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Morgan v. Superior Catering Services, et al.
The underlying claim in this appeal concerns age discrimination. The action was filed initially against a single defendant. Three additional defendants were later added, but the plaintiff served process for them on the attorney for the initial defendant, instead of the individual defendants, a fact about which the added defendants learned only a few days prior to the trial. The trial ensued after the court refused to grant a continuance. A jury found all the defendants liable. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $70,000. The defendants collectively filed a motion for a new trial and raised the issues of insufficient service and the inadmissibility of direct evidence. In its first order, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a new trial. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to alter or amend, after which the court reversed its prior ruling granting the new trial and reinstated the jury verdict. The defendants appeal. We reverse. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Town of Collierville, et al. v. Town of Collierville Board of Zoning, et al.
The Town of Collierville, Tennessee, passed an ordinance prohibiting the construction of new billboards. The Town, through its Development Department, asserted that two billboards erected prior to the passage of the ordinance were illegal and ordered that they be removed. The owner of the billboards appealed the removal order to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which did not affirm the order. The Town and the Development Department petitioned for writ of certiorari, seeking judicial review of the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals. The Shelby County Chancery Court dismissed the petition for lack of standing. We conclude that the Town and the Development Department have standing. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jay Daniel, et al. v. Allstate Insurance Company
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in an action on a homeowner’s insurance policy that contained a one-year contractual limitations period on actions arising under the policy. The home of the insured parties was damaged by a fire on December 15, 2011. The insured parties submitted a claim with the insurer pursuant to their homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer submitted an estimate and tendered a settlement check to the insured parties on April 2, 2012. Over a year later, on October 3, 2013, the insured parties filed suit alleging they were owed an additional $75,000 for personal use and construction improvements on a new home. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the insured parties’ claims were barred by the one-year contractual limitations period. After reviewing the record, we find no error in the trial court’s decision and affirm its grant of summary judgment. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Walker v. Bank of America, N. A. et al
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Adler v. Double Eagle Properties Holdings, LLC, et al.
This case concerns the proper interpretation of a contract governing an interest in real property. The trial court concluded that the contract unambiguously granted a lease to one party, rather than an easement. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Clifford Swearengen v. DMC-Memphis, Inc., et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss Appellant’s medical malpractice action against defendants named in Appellant’s amended complaint filed more than one year after the cause of action accrued. The trial court found that Appellant’s claims against the additional parties were time barred because the amended complaint adding these parties was not filed within ninety days of the original answer asserting comparative fault against non-parties. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Neveah W.
This extraordinary appeal arises from the trial court’s placement of a minor child while the minor child remains in the legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The minor child was removed by DCS from the home of her Foster Parents, who had cared for her almost since birth, after allegations that the Foster Parents had abused one of their other children. The minor child’s guardian ad litem filed an emergency petition seeking the return of the child to the Foster Parents’ home, or alternatively, for an award of legal custody to the Foster Parents. After a hearing wherein DCS, the Foster Parents, and the GAL presented evidence, the trial court ordered that the child be returned to the Foster Parents’ home, but declined to remove the child from DCS’s legal custody. On appeal, we hold that a trial court may not direct placement of a child in the legal custody of DCS. We reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Wanda Joyce Watkins
This is an appeal from an order in a will-construction suit regarding whether certain heirs to the Estate of Wanda Joyce Watkins (“Heirs”), appellants in this appeal, are entitled to inherit under the residuary clause of the Decedent’s will. Because the order appealed from does not resolve the issue of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the Executrix, Kimberly B. Jenkins (“Executrix”), in connection with the filing of the petition for construction of the will, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
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Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Miracle F.H.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal brought by the mother. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support termination of the mother’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to visit, abandonment for failure to remit child support, and that mother substantially failed to comply with the requirements of the permanency plans. The court also found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
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Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Brooks Monypeny, et al. v. Chamroeun Kheiv
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict. The case arises from a motor vehicle accident. Appellant State Farm defended the case as the original plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist carrier. The original plaintiffs subsequently died, one as a direct result of injuries sustained in the accident, the other some two years after the accident. The plaintiffs’ children were substituted as plaintiffs/appellees. State Farm appeals the judgment on the jury verdict on numerous grounds, including: (1) denial of its motion for directed verdict; (2) scope of cross-examination; (3) denial of its motion for mistrial based upon inappropriate closing argument; (4) exclusion of notations on medical records; (5) various acts of alleged wrongdoing on the part of Appellees’ attorneys; (6) jury instructions; (7) admission of medical bills for original plaintiff’s long term assisted living expenses; (8) excessive verdict; (9) incorrect application of statutory cap on non-economic damages; (10) denial of credit for medical and death payments made by State Farm under the insurance policy; and (11) award of discretionary costs. Because there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Amresco Independence Funding, LLC et al. v. Renegade Mountain Golf Club, LLC et al.
This appeal presents the issue of whether service of process was properly effected upon a nonresident defendant. The defendant filed a limited appearance and motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02, asserting that he had never been properly served with process. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, finding that service of process was never properly completed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jesslyn C.
This parenting dispute arose upon the parents' competing motions for modification of the existing permanent parenting plan as to the parties' minor child. The trial court previously had entered a permanent parenting plan order on May 11, 2010, designating the mother as the primary residential parent and awarding equal residential co-parenting time to both parents in an alternating weekly schedule. Following a hearing, the trial court found that a material change in circumstance warranting modification of the residential co-parenting schedule had occurred since entry of the permanent parenting plan. The trial court further found that reducing the father's co-parenting time to alternate weekends during the academic year, while reversing this co-parenting schedule during the summer break, was in the child's best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Dennis et al. v. Dr. Robert G. Smith et al.
Linda Dennis and Creed Dennis (“Plaintiffs”) filed a healthcare liability action against Dr. Robert G. Smith (“Defendant”) and others. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims after finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and 29-26-122. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their claims to this Court. We find and hold that because Plaintiffs failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-122, their action was subject to dismissal with prejudice upon motion. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims.
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James McMillin et al. v. Paul Lindsey McMillin et al.
The plaintiffs are siblings and two of the four adult children of the decedent. The defendants include a third adult child and his wife. In the months preceding her death, the decedent changed her bank accounts, originally titled solely in her name, to become joint accounts with the defendant son with right of survivorship. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant sibling exerted undue influence over the decedent in these transactions. They sought the return of all monies withdrawn from those bank accounts to the decedent's estate. Following a two-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount of $284,800. The defendants have appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
