Ruth Mitchell v. City of Franklin, Tennessee
This is the second appeal in this personal injury matter involving the plaintiff’s injury from an uneven sidewalk owned by the defendant city. In the first appeal, this Court remanded for the trial court to consider expert testimony that had been erroneously excluded by the trial court. On remand, the trial court heard expert testimony on the issue of the city’s maintenance and inspection of its sidewalks. Because the evidence on remand did not include any new evidence regarding the length of time that the sidewalk defect had existed, we have concluded that the issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal are pretermitted by the law of the case doctrine. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Werner Reichenberger v. Deniece Thomas, Commissioner, et al.
In this appeal, the petitioner sought judicial review of a decision made by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development denying his application for unemployment compensation benefits. The chancery court reversed the Department’s decision, concluding that it was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. The Department appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Easley v. City of Memphis
This is an appeal of a Governmental Tort Liability Act case and concerns a judgment received by the plaintiff, who stepped off of a curb in the middle of the block, not at the crosswalk, and was struck by a city-owned vehicle while attempting to cross between two stopped vehicles when the light changed. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we reverse the trial court’s judgment that the city defendant is liable for the negligent hiring and retention of its employee because the record fails to show that evidence was introduced at trial in support of this claim. Moreover, we reverse the trial court’s allocation of fault, concluding that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the plaintiff is at least 50% at fault. Because the plaintiff is accordingly barred from obtaining a recovery, we dismiss the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dominion Real Estate, LLC v. The Wise Group, Inc. et al.
Appellee Dominion Real Estate, LLC (“Dominion”) filed a malicious prosecution action against the Wise Group, Inc. (the “Wise Group”), the Lux Development Group, LLC (the “Lux Group”) (together with the Wise Group, “Wise and Lux”), and Alan Wise (together with Wise and Lux, “the Wise Defendants” or “Appellants”). The trial court dismissed Dominion’s case, and Dominion appealed. 1 In their brief, the Wise Defendants asked this Court to award frivolous appeal damages. Dominion subsequently moved to dismiss the appeal. Although this Court granted the motion to dismiss, it reserved the issue of frivolous appeal damages, which is the sole issue addressed herein. Because Dominion’s appeal had no reasonable chance of success, it was frivolous, and the Wise Defendants are entitled to damages. Accordingly, we grant the Wise Defendants’ motion and remand the case for calculation of the Wise Defendants’ reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this appeal and for entry of judgment on same. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Heritage Construction Group, LLC v. Karen Vest
A homebuilder sought to modify, correct, or vacate an arbitration award. It claimed the arbitrator exceeded his powers in failing to award attorney’s fees and penalties under its contract with the homeowner. The chancery court denied the requested relief and awarded the homeowner attorney’s fees for defending against the homebuilder’s motion. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Marcie Elizabeth Rasnick v. Jason Dean Rasnick
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer A. Seiber v. David S. Seiber
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Coblentz et al. v. Tractor Supply Company (Dissenting)
A sales representative for a product vendor was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The sales representative received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, a hardware product company, and then proceeded with a tort case against Tractor Supply. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Tractor Supply was the sales representative’s statutory employer within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 113(a) and, therefore, his recovery from his employer was his exclusive remedy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Coblentz et al. v. Tractor Supply Company
A sales representative for a product vendor was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The sales representative received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, a hardware product company, and then proceeded with a tort case against Tractor Supply. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Tractor Supply was the sales representative’s statutory employer within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 113(a) and, therefore, his recovery from his employer was his exclusive remedy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Eric O. Carter v. Howard Gentry, et al.
This appeal concerns subject matter jurisdiction. Eric O. Carter (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against Howard Gentry (“Gentry”), Davidson County Criminal Court Clerk, 1 and Frank Strada (“Strada”), Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), asking that the criminal judgment entered against him be expunged because it was not properly endorsed under the applicable rules and statutes. The Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner appeals, arguing that he only wants a ministerial act performed and is not challenging his sentence. We find that Petitioner is in fact challenging his sentence, and the Trial Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear that challenge. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Green v. Cynthia Panter, et al.
This is a partition in kind action. The three owners of 68 acres entered into a joint stipulation appointing three commissioners to partition the property into three separate parcels. Thereafter, the commissioners filed a written report with a survey that allocated 32.4 acres to the plaintiff Jerry Green, 17.8 acres to the defendant Robert Hale, and 18.1 acres to the defendant Cynthia Panter. After the defendants filed exceptions to the commissioners’ report, the parties agreed to have one of the commissioners testify to state the commissioners’ factual findings and reasoning. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Commissioner Bill Haisten testified in open court, explaining, in part, that more acreage was partitioned to the plaintiff because much of the parcel allocated to him is hilly and rocky and another large portion of the plaintiff’s parcel is encumbered by a TVA power line easement. Commissioner Haisten also testified that while the three partitioned parcels are not equal in area, they are equal in fair market value. Based upon these additional facts, the trial court concluded that the partitioning of the property by the commissioners should be confirmed. The defendants appeal, contending, inter alia, that without sufficient proof of either the value of the property partitioned or of the evaluations from which the commissioners derived their partition division, the trial court erred in confirming the commissioners’ report. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Nehad S. Abdelnabi v. Steven Wayne Sword, Judge
The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss on the ground of judicial immunity. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Neveah W.
In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court found that eight statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed.1 Having determined that the petitioner did not prove the statutory ground of abandonment through failure to visit the child prior to the mother’s incarceration by clear and convincing evidence, we reverse the trial court’s finding as to that ground. Additionally, because the trial court made insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning a separate statutory ground it termed, “abandonment by an incarcerated parent/wanton disregard,” we reverse the trial court’s determination as to that ground as well. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights to the child. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony T. Grose, Sr., et al. v. Charles Stone
This is a wrongful death action that was filed pro se by two sons of the decedent, in their capacity as co-administrators of the estate of the decedent, on behalf of the decedent’s six children. The trial court found that the action was filed by persons not authorized to practice law on behalf of the estate and/or others, and therefore, it was void ab initio and a nullity. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The two pro se sons appeal. We conclude that the complaint was void to the extent that the pro se sons asserted claims on behalf of other heirs of the decedent, as they were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. However, the complaint was partially proper to the extent that the two pro se sons were also asserting their own right of action under the wrongful death statute. Consequently, the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint in its entirety. However, on remand, the additional heirs will be given an opportunity to file a motion to intervene. In the event they do not, the trial court is directed to consider Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 19.01 and 19.02 in order to determine whether the other heirs are indispensable parties and to consider issues related to such a determination. Thus, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert William Del Vicario v. Pamela Joy Miller
In a divorce action, the wife moved for recusal of the trial judge. The motion was denied and the wife appealed pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. Because the wife waited too long to file her motion, we affirm the denial of the motion to recuse. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby County, Tennessee v. Delinquent Taxpayers 2021
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal of the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David Carroll v. Todd Foster
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed jointly by David Carroll (“Plaintiff”) and Todd Foster (“Defendant”) (“Petitioners,” collectively), seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioners, and finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Lisa L. Collins v. Sean R. Harrison
This is a modification of child support case. Mother appeals the trial court’s: (1) discovery rulings regarding Father’s inheritance, banking, and trading accounts; (2) findings with respect to Father’s income; (3) denial of an upward deviation from the Child Support Guidelines; and (4) assignment of the Guardian ad Litem costs to Mother. We reverse the trial court’s order denying Mother’s discovery requests and the assignment of the Guardian ad Litem costs to Mother. We vacate the order establishing Father’s child support obligation and denying Mother’s request for an upward deviation. All other issues are pretermitted, and we remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Isaiah F.
Foster parents appeal the dismissal of their petition to terminate a father’s parental rights and to adopt. The petitioners sought to terminate the father’s rights on two grounds: failure to file a timely petition to establish paternity and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility for the child. The trial court found insufficient evidence to support either ground for termination. Upon review, we find clear and convincing evidence to support one of the alleged grounds. So we vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Eugene Moxley v. AMISUB SFH, Inc. d/b/a Saint Francis Hospital, et al.
This is the second appeal in this healthcare liability case. In the first appeal, which was taken under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, this Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Appellees’/healthcare providers’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion. The trial court held that, although Appellant/patient failed to substantially comply with the pre-suit notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 121(a)(2)(E), Appellant showed extraordinary cause to excuse the noncompliance. The only question certified in the Rule 9 appeal was whether the trial court erred in finding extraordinary cause. We determined that it did and reversed the extraordinary cause finding but left undisturbed the trial court’s finding on substantial compliance. On remand, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss without hearing. Now, in this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 appeal, we review the trial court’s initial finding that Appellant did not substantially comply with the statutory requirements. Because the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in so finding, we vacate the order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss and remand for reconsideration of the question of substantial compliance under the correct legal standard. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Laura Adams v. Timothy Adams, Sr.
Laura Adams (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court for Robertson County (“the Trial Court”) against Timothy Adams, Sr. (“Husband”). In its final judgment of divorce, the Trial Court determined that real estate in Lawrence County (“Lawrence County property”), purchased by Husband prior to the marriage, was marital property because it had become “inextricably commingled.” The Trial Court awarded Wife “40% of the total proceeds” from the Lawrence County property. The Trial Court further awarded Wife the marital residence and any and all equitable interests in the marital residence. Husband has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Connie Reguli v. Rogers Anderson as Mayor of Williamson County, Tennessee
What began as a public records request ended with the trial court imposing sanctions upon the requester for violations of Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court concluded that the public records requester violated Rule 11 by including a false statement and deceptive exhibit in her Public Records Act Petition, by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry before filing her Petition, and by having an improper purpose in connection with her anticipated speech regarding any public records that she might obtain via the Public Records Act. The trial court imposed multiple sanctions upon the requester including a $5,000 penalty, a requirement to associate counsel in any future pro se filing within the judicial district, and a dismissal with prejudice of her Petition. We conclude the trial court properly determined the requester violated Rule 11 by including a false statement and deceptive exhibit in her Petition. Given the context of the Public Records Act, we conclude, however, that the trial court erred with regard to its conclusion that the requester made an inadequate inquiry prior to filing her Petition and had an improper purpose in connection with the requester’s anticipated use of any documents she obtained. We also conclude the monetary penalty imposed by the trial court violates the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. Because of our other findings, we vacate the trial court’s imposition of all three sanctions, and remand for determination of an appropriate sanction in light of our decision. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Nicole Marie Neuman v. Paul P. Phillips
This appeal concerns the attempt to register and enforce a foreign decree purporting to modify the terms of a divorce decree. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the foreign decree was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although appellant raised a second issue for review on appeal concerning attorney’s fees, we conclude appellant is not entitled to any relief on the issue. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Emily Ruth Hughes v. Lucas Hughes
In this post-divorce custody and contempt action, the trial court held the defendant father in criminal contempt for violating the parties’ permanent parenting plan. The trial court sentenced the father to serve 186 consecutive days in jail. The trial court also limited the father’s parenting time with the parties’ minor children and awarded the mother her attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting the action. The father timely appealed to this Court, arguing that he lacked adequate notice of the criminal contempt allegations and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. The father also argues that the trial court erred in limiting his parenting time under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406. The issues related to inadequate notice are waived because the father raises those issues for the first time on appeal. Father’s argument regarding his parenting time is waived for the same reason. We also conclude that the trial court’s sentence for the father’s criminal contempt is appropriate under the circumstances and does not amount to an abuse of discretion. Finally, we award the mother her costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred in defending this appeal. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Misty D. Magee v. Andy W. Franks
The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals |
