In Re Taiden B.
In this action to terminate parental rights, Mother appeals the trial court’s findings by clear and convincing evidence that she abandoned her child and that the termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Dilmer S.M. ET AL.
A mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her four minor children. The trial court held that the evidence presented supported termination of the mother’s rights based on the statutory ground of severe child abuse. The court also found that termination was in the children’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Dilmer S.M. ET AL. - Concurring
The majority thoughtfully addresses the present appeal. I agree with the majority that the record establishes that Mother committed severe child abuse and that the termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children. I respectfully diverge from the majority insofar as the majority opinion suggests that the termination petition’s notice — which specifically alleges severe abuse against the children that are named in the petition (which does not include Ervin Leonard) — extends to a finding of severe abuse by Mother of another child, Ervin Leonard. I concur in the majority’s conclusion affirming the termination of Mother’s parental rights based on harmless error. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Alanna Lee Kummer v. Johnny Kummer, III
A husband never answered his wife’s complaint for divorce, and the trial court entered a default against him. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the wife a divorce and divided the marital estate. Within thirty days of entry of the final decree, the husband moved for relief from the judgment. On appeal, the husband faults the court for denying his motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Marlin Roberts, et al. v. Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, et al.
Homeowners removed underground storage tanks found on their property. After finding evidence of petroleum contamination where the tanks had been located, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation began an extensive cleanup process. The Department subsequently issued a cost-recovery order against the homeowners to recoup its expenditures. The homeowners petitioned for review of the cost-recovery order to the Underground Storage Tanks and Solid Waste Disposal Control Board, which upheld the order. The homeowners appealed this initial ruling to the Board and the order was again upheld. The homeowners then appealed the Board’s final ruling to the trial court, which reversed the Board’s judgment. The Department and the Board now appeal. Because we determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the matter for transfer to the proper court. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Sylvia Carlyle Brainard
After two sets of relatives filed competing petitions for the appointment of a conservator over the respondent, the parties entered into an agreed order and settlement agreement that provided that the respondent was not in need of conservator, but that the parties had certain obligations that were subject to review by the court and guardian ad litem going forward. Months later, appellants filed a petition to set aside the agreed order on the basis that appellees had not complied with its terms; appellees responded with a motion to dismiss appellants’ petition on the basis that they had not alleged proper grounds to set aside the parties’ agreement. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order stating that “[a]ll outstanding orders should be set aside and all petitions and the case dismissed” without explanation. Because we cannot review the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal without an adequate explanation, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Claudine Desjardins v. Kelly Wilson et al.
The appeal arises from a landlord-tenant dispute. Because the appellant’s brief falls well short of the requirements of both the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Remington G.
A father filed a petition to establish parentage of the parties’ child. At the trial on the petition, the trial court limited the evidence to events since a hearing on pendente lite parenting time that took place 47 days before the final hearing. We have determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it limited the evidence in this way. Therefore, we vacate the court’s order in its entirety and remand for a new trial. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
James Henry Whitaker, II v. Viktoria Moor
Following their divorce, a mother informed her children’s father of her desire to move to Germany with the children. The father filed a petition opposing the move. The court found that the relocation was in the children’s best interest and modified the permanent parenting plan accordingly. On appeal, Father contends the evidence preponderates against some of the factual findings and that the court erred in weighing the statutory best-interest factors. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding that relocation was in the children’s best interest, we affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Preston Garner Et Al. v. Southern Baptist Convention Et Al.
The appellees filed suit against the appellants for defamation, defamation by implication, false light invasion of privacy, and loss of consortium. The appellants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the trial court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. They also filed petitions seeking to have the case dismissed pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied in part the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to this case. It also denied the TPPA petitions, finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case. Alternatively, it found that the appellees satisfied their prima facie burden under the TPPA burden-shifting framework. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case and reverse that portion of the judgment. Finding no other error, we otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
James W. Grubb Et Al. v. Joe D. Grubb Et Al.
This appeal concerns the end of a business relationship between two brothers, Joe D. Grubb (“Joe”) and James W. Grubb (“Jim”).2 After many years of working together in the cash advance and rent-to-own businesses, Jim sued Joe in the Chancery Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”), asserting breach of contract, intentional interference with business relationships, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable relief under the LLC dissolution statute. Joe sued Jim in turn. One of the chief issues concerned Jim’s claim to equal compensation from the brothers’ businesses based on an alleged express oral agreement with Joe. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Jim, awarding him damages based on multiple grounds. Centrally, the Trial Court found that an express oral agreement between Jim and Joe provided for equal compensation, even though Jim testified that the alleged agreement was “unspoken” and “just the way it’s been.” Joe appeals. We hold, inter alia, that notwithstanding the Trial Court’s factual findings and credibility determinations in favor of Jim, what Jim testified to did not constitute an express oral agreement or any other kind of contract as a matter of law. Jim’s alternative theories for relief are unavailing as well. We reverse. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Austynn F.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The court found one ground for termination: abandonment by failure to visit. Because the trial court’s order fails to resolve conflicting testimony concerning the father’s visitation with the child, we vacate the judgment and remand for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Craig William Joel v. Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Ladon Relliford v. Jerry Burks, et al.
The plaintiff took his car to a body shop for repair. The owner of the body shop, who had obtained title of the vehicle through an unknown means, sold the car to the defendant, CarMax. The plaintiff brought suit against the owner of the body shop and CarMax, seeking the return of his car. The trial court granted summary judgment to CarMax, finding it held valid title as a good faith purchaser for value. Because we find that the undisputed facts do not support a conclusion that CarMax is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Easley v. City of Memphis
Plaintiff was injured after attempting to cross a street outside of a crosswalk and being struck by a city-owned vehicle driven by a city employee. The trial court found that the city was vicariously liable for the employee-driver’s negligence and directly liable for its negligent hiring and retaining of the employee-driver. The trial court ultimately found the plaintiff 10% at fault for her injuries. The city appealed, and this Court reversed, finding that there was no proof of negligent hiring and that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s allocation of fault. Instead, this Court concluded that the plaintiff was at least 50% at fault, barring recovery. The Tennessee Supreme Court vacated the judgment as failing to afford the trial court’s findings of fact appropriate deference, but acknowledged the plaintiff’s failure to appeal the conclusion that the negligent hiring finding was unsupported. On remand, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter to the trial court for the re-allocation of fault and calculation of damages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Benjamin McCurry v. Agness McCurry
Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of two motions to recuse the trial judge. After a de novo review, we affirm the denial of both motions. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Stephany V. Lopez v. Justin M. Finch
Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal without including either the motion to recuse filed in the trial court or the trial court’s order denying the motion to recuse. As such, we dismiss this appeal. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
SCOTT BAKER ET AL. v. LARRY BASKIN ET AL.
Buyers of a residential home brought action against sellers for 1) breach of contract, 2) |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Clifton Dates, Jr.
This is an appeal from a dispute over a piece of real estate in Shelby County, Tennessee. The property owner executed a quit claim deed transferring ownership of the property to his daughter, who was also his attorney-in-fact, shortly before he died in 2023. After his death, the man’s surviving spouse filed a petition to set the deed aside, claiming that the daughter obtained the deed by undue influence. The trial court held a bench trial and entered an order setting the deed aside. The daughter timely appeals to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Jabrunkaka R. Franklin v. Justin M. Finch
Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal without including either the motion to recuse filed in the trial court or the trial court’s order denying the motion to recuse. As such, we dismiss this appeal. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Ferguson v. M. Brown Construction, Inc. et al.
A property owner hired a local contractor to build a custom-designed home. A payment dispute arose midway through construction, and the contractor stopped working. The owner paid others to repair and complete the home. Then he filed suit against the contractor asserting multiple theories of recovery. Among other things, the trial court found the contractor liable for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. As compensatory damages, it awarded the owner the additional costs he incurred to repair and complete the home above the contract price. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for recalculation of compensatory damages. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Charles B.
Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights. As to Mother, the trial court found three grounds for termination: substantial noncompliance with a parenting plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Regarding Father, the trial court found four grounds for termination: severe child abuse, imprisonment for two years for conduct qualifying as severe child abuse, imprisonment for ten years when the child is under eight years of age, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also determined that terminating each parent’s rights was in the child’s best interest. The trial court properly determined that a termination ground existed as to each parent and that terminating each parent’s rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Van Buren | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Fly et al. v. Haley Rae Fly et al.
A grandparent petitioned for visitation with her grandchild. The juvenile court found that the loss or severe reduction of visitation with the grandparent would cause severe emotional harm. The child’s mother appeals. Because the evidence preponderates against the court’s finding that denial of grandparent visitation would cause severe emotional harm, we reverse. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
John E. Sullivan, Jr. GST Exempt Trust, et al. v. Frank G. Sullivan, et al.
Testator created a generation-skipping trust and instructed the eventual trustee to distribute all remaining trust funds to the “then living descendants of the child per stirpes” upon the death of Testator’s child. Testator’s child later died, leaving two generations of descendants. Each first-generation descendant is the parent of a corresponding second-generation descendant, and neither predeceased the Testator’s child. Trustee brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking to ascertain whether only the first generation of the child’s descendants should inherit trust funds or if, instead, members of both generations should take equally. Relying on Testator’s choice of a per stirpes distribution system, the probate court concluded that trust funds should be split equally between the first-generation descendants, reasoning that the funds do not go any further under a traditional per stirpes framework. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Dorothy A. et al.
In this case involving termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights to two of their minor children, the trial court determined that two statutory grounds had been proven as to each parent by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father and mother have each appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals |
