SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Dennis Harold Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital Corporation (Concur)
M2020-00341-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

This case presents a simple issue: Whether the Tennessee Health Care Liability
Act’s statute of limitation extension prevails over the common law rule that a plaintiff
cannot pursue a vicarious liability claim against a principal when the plaintiff’s claim
against the agent is procedurally barred by operation of law before the plaintiff asserts the
vicarious liability claim against the principal. This common law rule is known as the
operation-of-law exception. Here, the Plaintiff filed a vicarious liability suit against the
principal, TriStar Skyline Medical Center, after the one-year statute of limitations had
expired as to Skyline’s agents but within the Act’s 120-day extension of the statute of
limitations as to Skyline. Was the suit timely filed? Yes—the Act’s provisions prevail over
the common law operation-of-law exception.

Davidson Supreme Court

Dennis Harold Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital Corporation (Dissent)
M2020-00341-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

This appeal presents issues similar to those in Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital
Corp., No. M2020-00341-SC-R11-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. 2023). In that case, I
dissented from the result reached by a majority of the Court, which held that provisions of
the statutory scheme commonly referred to as the Health Care Liability Act (“HCLA”)
abrogated the common law vicarious liability principle known as the operation-of-law
exception. I reach the same conclusion here and respectfully dissent from the result
reached by the majority in this case.

Davidson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Dashun Shackleford
E2020-01712-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

This appeal concerns the criminal gang-enhancement statute, Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-35-121, and specifically what is required in an indictment to sufficiently plead
and provide notice under the statute. Dashun Shackleford (“Defendant”) was arrested for
aggravated robbery as to four individuals in September 2016, along with his friend and
fellow gang member, Jalon Copeland. Defendant’s indictment contained twenty counts:
four alternative counts each of aggravated robbery against four victims and four
corresponding counts of criminal gang offense enhancement. The gang-enhancement
statute requires the State to give notice in separate counts of the indictment of the
enhancement applicable under the statute. The indictment also alleged that Defendant was
a “Crips” gang member and listed the convictions of fifteen alleged fellow Crips members
to prove Defendant’s gang had a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” as also required by
the gang-enhancement statute. A Knox County jury convicted Defendant as charged. The
trial court merged the aggravated robbery convictions into four counts and imposed a total
effective sentence of twenty years to be served at eighty-five percent. In this case, the
gang- enhancement conviction increased Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions from Class
B felonies to Class A felonies. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the
evidence at trial was insufficient to support his gang-enhancement conviction. The Court
of Criminal Appeals agreed, taking particular issue with the allegation in the indictment
that Defendant and the other gang members listed therein were plain Crips. In the
gang-enhancement phase of trial, the proof established that the majority of the gang members
listed in the indictment, including Defendant, were members of several different subsets of
the Crips gang, with only one of the listed men identified as a plain Crip. The intermediate
court concluded that the State failed to prove that Defendant’s subset gang had engaged in
a pattern of criminal gang activity and failed to comply with the notice requirements of the
gang-enhancement statute. In doing so, the court also, sua sponte, determined that a fatal
variance existed between the indictment and proof at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals,
therefore, reverted Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions to a classification lower in
the absence of the gang enhancement. After review, we conclude that the Court of Criminal
Appeals erred in its decision. The gang-enhancement statute is worded broadly and does
not require the State to specify in the indictment a criminal defendant’s gang subset nor
that the defendant is in the same gang subset as the individuals whose criminal activity
establishes the gang’s “pattern of criminal gang activity.” Defendant waived all other issues
by failing to properly raise them before the trial court or on appeal. Therefore, the decision
of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the trial court’s judgments are reinstated.

Knox Supreme Court

Gerald D. Waggoner, Jr. v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
W2022-01294-SC-R3-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge William B. Acree

A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that a Shelby County
attorney’s law license should be suspended for four years based on multiple violations of
the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs), including RPC 5.5(a). The attorney appealed
part of the hearing panel’s decision, and the trial court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and modified the sanction to one year. The Board appeals the trial court’s decision that the
attorney did not violate RPC 5.5(a) by practicing law while his license was suspended. We
find that the attorney violated RPC 5.5(a) by continuing to manage and market his law
practice; by directly or indirectly communicating with office staff, attorneys, and former
clients; and by recruiting and hiring attorneys while his law license was suspended. The
hearing panel’s decision that the attorney violated RPC 5.5(a) is supported by substantial
and material evidence. We hold that the attorney’s law license shall be suspended for two
years, with eighteen months served on active suspension. This sanction is based on the
RPC 5.5(a) violation, as well as the hearing panel’s findings that he violated additional
RPCs, which he did not appeal, the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (ABA Standards), five aggravating factors, and no mitigating factors.
The attorney shall also make appropriate restitution, obtain additional continuing education
as ordered by the trial court, and engage a practice monitor during his probated suspension.

Shelby Supreme Court

Jessie Dotson v. State of Tennessee
W2019-01059-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

This appeal involves a capital post-conviction petitioner’s expert funding requests under
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13. A jury convicted the Petitioner, Jessie Dotson, of six
counts of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. This Court
affirmed the jury’s verdict. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging several
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. He requested funds under Tennessee Supreme
Court Rule 13 to hire expert witnesses to assist in establishing his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court authorized the funds, but the Director of
the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) and the Chief Justice denied approval for
some of the Petitioner’s requested experts. After an evidentiary hearing, the
post-conviction court denied relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the ruling
without deciding the Petitioner’s Rule 13 constitutional challenges. We granted review to
consider the Petitioner’s constitutional issues regarding Rule 13. We hold the provisions
of Rule 13 are constitutional as applied; the Petitioner was not unconstitutionally denied
appellate review of the denial of his request for expert funds; and the Petitioner was not
deprived of a full and fair post-conviction hearing due to the denial of expert funds.

Shelby Supreme Court

In Re: James Ralph Hickman, Jr., BPR #020125
M2022-00755-SC-BAR-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Board of Professional Responsibility Hearing Panel

In this case, we consider the appropriate discipline for Tennessee attorney James Ralph Hickman, Jr. The Board of Professional Responsibility filed a petition for discipline against Hickman alleging that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct while representing an estate in probate proceedings. A hearing panel of the Board adjudicated the petition and recommended a one-year suspension, with “at least” ninety days served as an active suspension and the rest on probation. Any violation of the conditions of probation would result in “reversion to active suspension.” The hearing panel also directed Hickman to obtain a practice monitor during the probationary period, complete fifteen additional hours of estate-management continuing legal education (“CLE”) and three additional hours of ethics CLE, and pay the costs of the matter. Neither Hickman nor the Board appealed. The Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the hearing panel’s judgment. Exercising our authority under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 15.4, we determined that the punishment imposed by the hearing panel appeared too lenient and proposed to increase it. After carefully considering the entire record, “with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case,” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b), we affirm the hearing panel’s one-year suspension but modify the judgment to impose six months of active suspension followed by six months on probation. We also clarify that the period of probation imposed should be fixed rather than indefinite and that violation of a condition of probation does not automatically result in reversion of the probationary period to active suspension. We affirm the decision of the hearing panel in all other respects.

Sevier Supreme Court

Ernest Falls et al. v. Mark Goins et al.
M2020-01510-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

In this appeal, we consider the interplay and applicability of two statutes that relate to suffrage rights of Tennessee residents previously convicted of infamous crimes in other states. Although the Tennessee Constitution recognizes the importance of the right of its residents to vote, the Constitution also allows the General Assembly to restrict the right of a person to vote “upon a conviction by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 5. Ernest Falls, a resident of Tennessee since 2018, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Virginia in 1986, an infamous crime under the laws of Tennessee. In 2020, Mr. Falls was granted clemency in Virginia by then-Governor Ralph Northam. The grant of clemency reinstated Mr. Falls’ rights of citizenship in Virginia, including his right to vote. Subsequently, Mr. Falls attempted to register to vote in Grainger County, Tennessee, in June of 2020. The Grainger County Election Commission denied his restoration of voting rights request and cited “Incomplete/Insufficient Document(s)” as the reasoning for the denial. Mr. Falls and a co-plaintiff, who was left off the voter rolls under similar circumstances, filed a lawsuit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19-143(3) requires the state to re-enfranchise persons convicted of out-of-state infamous crimes as soon as said persons are “pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the governor or other appropriate authority of such other state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) (2014). Respondents, three public employees sued in their official capacity, countered that Mr. Falls also is required to comply with requirements set forth in another statutory provision, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-202, which requires that persons convicted of infamous crimes pay outstanding court costs, restitution, and child support obligations before they can be re-enfranchised. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202 (2018). The Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of the three state officials, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment with Mr. Falls acting as the sole remaining plaintiff. Like the Court of Appeals, we affirm the grant of summary judgment and conclude that, in order to regain the right of suffrage in Tennessee, Mr. Falls and other similarly situated individuals must comply with both section 2-19-143(3) and the additional requirements set forth in section 40-29-202.

Davidson Supreme Court

Ernest Falls et al. v. Mark Goins et al. (Dissent)
M2020-01510-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Ernest Falls’ right to vote is guaranteed under the Tennessee Constitution. Tenn.
Const. art. I, § 5.1 In 1986, almost forty years ago, Mr. Falls was convicted of an infamous
crime in Virginia. He completed his sentence in 1987. In 2018, Mr. Falls moved to
Tennessee. In February 2020, the Governor of Virginia gave him an individualized grant
of clemency, fully restoring his rights to vote, hold public office, serve on a jury, and be a
notary public. With his voting rights fully restored, Mr. Falls tried to register to vote in
Tennessee; he disclosed his previous conviction and verified the restoration of his right to
vote. His application was denied because he provided no evidence that he did not owe
restitution or court costs in Virginia from his 1986 conviction and that he was current on
any child support obligations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202(b)–(c) (2018). Yet, under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19-143(3), Mr. Falls was not prohibited from voting
because his right to vote had been restored by the grant of clemency. The requirement
regarding restitution, court costs, and child support under section 40-29-202 does not apply
to Mr. Falls because he had no need to have his voting rights restored.

Davidson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Johnny Summers Cavin
E2020-01333-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Goodwin, Jr.

The primary issue presented is whether a criminal restitution order is a final and appealable
order under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 when the order directs a defendant
to pay a set amount of restitution without payment terms. A trial court ordered the
defendant who had pleaded guilty to burglary and theft to pay $5,500 in restitution during
his probationary period. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that
the restitution order was not a final and appealable order because it lacked payment terms.
We hold that the restitution order was a final order. Tennessee’s criminal restitution statute,
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304, allows—but does not require—trial courts
to specify payment terms. Here, the trial court’s restitution order resolved all issues, was
reasonable, and appropriately considered the victim’s pecuniary loss and the defendant’s
ability to pay.

Sullivan Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Johnny Summers Cavin (Concur)
E2020-01333-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Goodwin, Jr.

I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court did not err in ordering Johnny Cavin to pay restitution. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court believed there was more to be done, not because it did everything it was supposed to do.

Sullivan Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon
M2020-00359-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

A trial court ordered a defendant to pay a set amount of criminal restitution but did not
state payment terms or consider the defendant’s ability to pay. The Court of Criminal
Appeals dismissed the appeal, ruling the restitution order was not a final order because it
did not include payment terms. We hold the restitution order was a final order even though
it did not include payment terms. See State v. Cavin, No. E2020-01333-SC-R11-CD, ___
S.W.3d ____, 2023 WL _________ (Tenn. ______, 2023). The date for payment of the
restitution was, by default, the expiration of the defendant’s sentence based on Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-35-304(g). The trial court erred by failing to consider the
defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution as
required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(d). We reverse the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals, vacate the trial court’s restitution order, and remand to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Giles Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon (Concur)
M2020-00359-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Joseph Gevedon’s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution.1 I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court had any intention of setting the time for payment, not because the trial court did everything it was supposed to do.

Giles Supreme Court

Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. Division of Tenncare et al.
M2020-01358-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

Article II of Tennessee’s Constitution vests legislative authority in the General Assembly. We have held, however, that the General Assembly may “grant an administrative agency the power to promulgate rules and regulations which have the effect of law in the agency’s area of operation.” Bean v. McWherter, 953 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tenn. 1997). The General Assembly frequently has done so. But it also established important guardrails for administrative agencies by enacting the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. One of those guardrails is the requirement that agencies engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking: a process that gives the public and other affected parties an opportunity to weigh in. Here, we consider whether a reimbursement cap imposed by TennCare is a “rule” within the meaning of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act that should have been promulgated through the notice-and-comment process. We hold that it is and reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision.

Davidson Supreme Court

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al.
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

This appeal primarily concerns the compulsion of a physician’s deposition testimony in a health care liability action. In 2014, a child was born via cesarean section and suffered permanent brain damage and severely debilitating injuries. By and through her next friend and mother Brittany Borngne (“Plaintiff”), the child sued the doctor who delivered her and the certified nurse midwife who was initially in charge of the birthing process, among other defendants. The trial court dismissed all claims of direct negligence against the defendant physician but allowed the plaintiff to proceed against the physician on a vicarious liability theory as the midwife’s supervising physician. However, during his deposition prior to trial, the physician refused to opine on the midwife’s performance outside of his presence. The trial court declined to require the physician to do so, and after a trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, partially reversed the judgment. The intermediate court concluded, among other things, that the trial court committed reversible error in declining to order the physician to answer the questions at issue in his deposition and remanded for a new trial. After review, we hold that a defendant healthcare provider cannot be compelled to provide expert opinion testimony about another defendant provider’s standard of care or deviation from that standard. We therefore conclude that the trial court here properly declined to compel the defendant physician’s testimony. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Hamilton Supreme Court

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately to highlight the flawed and impractical analysis in the concurring in judgment opinion, authored by Justice Campbell and joined by Justice Kirby.

Hamilton Supreme Court

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

I agree with the Court’s decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. But my agreement with the majority ends there. I would not adopt a new evidentiary privilege for expert witnesses because that privilege is not grounded in the Constitution, Tennessee’s statutes, the common law, or this Court’s Rules—the only permissible sources of a privilege under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 501. Although the trial court erred by excluding the expert opinions at issue in this case, that error was harmless and did not warrant reversal of the judgment below or a new trial. For that reason, I join in the Court’s judgment.

Hamilton Supreme Court

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

I am pleased to concur in Justice Campbell’s separate concurring opinion, concurring in the result of the majority opinion but not the reasoning. I write separately on particular problems with the majority’s reasoning, as well as far-reaching unintended consequences of this ill-defined new common-law privilege.

Hamilton Supreme Court

In Re Markus E.
M2019-01079-SC-R11-PT
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Philip E. Smith

In this appeal, we address the standards for severe child abuse as a ground for termination of parental rights. The statute defining severe child abuse includes “knowing” failure to protect a child from abuse or neglect likely to cause serious injury or death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(22)(A)(i) (Supp. 2016). The statutes do not define “knowing.” We hold that, for severe child abuse, a person’s conduct is considered “knowing,” and a person is deemed to “knowingly” act or fail to act, when he actually knows of relevant facts, circumstances or information, or when he is either in deliberate ignorance of or in reckless disregard of such facts, circumstances, or information presented to him. Under this standard, the relevant facts, circumstances, or information would alert a reasonable parent to take affirmative action to protect the child. For deliberate ignorance, a parent can be found to have acted knowingly when he has specific reason to know the relevant facts, circumstances, or information but deliberately ignores them. For reckless disregard, if the parent has been presented with the relevant facts, circumstances, or information and recklessly disregards them, the parent’s failure to protect can be considered knowing. Here, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents of an infant who suffered over twenty rib fractures, in part for knowing failure to protect the child. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse, holding under the particular circumstances of this case that the proof in the record does not clearly and convincingly show that the parents’ failure to protect the child was “knowing.”

Davidson Supreme Court

In Re Markus E. - Concurring
M2019-01079-SC-R11-PT
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Philip E. Smith

I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the termination of parental rights as to both Mother and Father, and I join nearly all of Justice Kirby’s opinion for the majority. In particular, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that this case presents circumstances that call strongly for application of the prior-construction canon. I would hesitate to apply the canon if only one or two intermediate appellate courts had interpreted the language at issue. Here, however, the Court of Appeals had issued at least eight opinions interpreting “knowing” in a uniform manner before the General Assembly’s reenactment of that language. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (finding “the uniformity of . . . judicial precedent construing the [statutory] definition significant”); Kentucky v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 554 (6th Cir. 2023) (noting that the force of the prior-construction canon is “stronger when the lower courts uniformly adopt a particular interpretation of an oft-invoked statute”); cf. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (declining to apply canon where “widespread disagreement exist[ed] among the lower courts”).

Davidson Supreme Court

George Gary Ingram v. Dr. Michael Gallagher Et Al.
E2020-01222-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ward Jeffrey Hollingsworth

The issue before us is whether the voluntary dismissal of a defendant in a multi-defendant case that is governed by the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) may be set aside and the claim against the dismissed defendant reinstated on the motion of a plaintiff pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The plaintiff in this case initiated a healthcare liability action against a physician, a hospital, and two other defendants. Before any responsive pleading was filed by any defendant, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, naming only the physician as a defendant. The plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal that dismissed all of the defendants except the physician, and the trial court entered an order of voluntary dismissal the following day. In his answer to the amended complaint, the physician argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed under the GTLA because the hospital, which was his employer and a governmental entity, was not a defendant. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend in which he sought to set aside the trial court’s order voluntarily dismissing the hospital from the action. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The trial court later dismissed the hospital from the action with prejudice and granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the physician. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the order of voluntary dismissal. Upon our review of this case, we do not reach the question of whether the voluntary dismissal order could be altered or amended pursuant to Rule 54.02. Because the plaintiff removed the hospital from the lawsuit when he filed his amended complaint, the plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal and the trial court’s order of voluntary dismissal were of no legal effect. Accordingly, there was no valid order of voluntary dismissal to alter or amend. As a result, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues it deemed pretermitted as moot.

Hamilton Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lyons, James Michael Usinger, Lee Harold Cromwell, Austin Gary Cooper, and Christopher Alan Hauser
M2019-01946-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The Uniform Commercial Code provides a mechanism for secured creditors to give notice to the world of their security interest in debtors’ property as collateral for debt by filling out a form for a financing statement and posting it on the website for Tennessee’s Secretary of State. In this case, that system was weaponized. Collectively, the defendants filed over a hundred bogus financing statements on the Secretary of State’s website regarding over forty Tennessee residents, including judges, mayors, public officials, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and ex-spouses. The online financing statements falsely claimed liens for the defendants’ alleged security interest in the victims’ property as collateral for millions of dollars in fictitious debt. All were done for the apparent purpose of vexing and harassing the victims. All of the defendants were convicted of multiple counts of filing a lien without a reasonable basis, a Class E felony, and forgery of at least $250,000, a Class A felony. We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the forgery convictions. We hold that the defendants’ conduct fits within the statutory definition of forgery. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the apparent value associated with the fraudulent financing statements was over $250,000. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Davidson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lyons, James Michael Usinger, Lee Harold Cromwell, Austin Gary Cooper, and Christopher Alan Hauser - Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
M2019-01946-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendants’ convictions for forgery. I agree with the majority that the Defendants’ conduct fits within the statutory definition of forgery under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 14-114(b)(1)(B). I write separately to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support sentencing the Defendants for forgery as a Class A felony. Based on the text of the applicable statutes, I would hold that the evidence was not sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the UCC-1s had a fair market value of at least $250,000. 1 I would reverse the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals as to the value associated with the Defendants’ forgery convictions.

Davidson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Kemontea Dovon McKinney
M2020-00950-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge William R. Goodman, III

A Robertson County jury convicted Kemontea Dovon McKinney (“Defendant”), a juvenile at the time of the offenses, of aggravated robbery, premeditated first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree felony murder, and theft of property valued at over $10,000. The trial court merged the murder convictions and merged the theft conviction into the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court imposed a life sentence for the murder conviction and eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction. This appeal concerns whether Defendant’s pretrial statement to detectives was voluntary, whether Defendant validly waived his Miranda rights, and whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress and admitted Defendant’s pretrial statement into evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether the intermediate court erred when it stated that an involuntary confession claim is “inextricably linked” to a Miranda-waiver claim, such that the two inquiries can be considered together. We also granted the State’s application to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in determining that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. After review, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred with respect to the issues raised by the State. We reiterate that the voluntariness test is distinct from the test for Miranda waiver, despite similarities between the analyses. After separately considering both questions, we conclude that Defendant’s overall statement was voluntary and his Miranda waiver was both knowing and voluntary. Additionally, we conclude that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. We reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgments.

Robertson Supreme Court

Kenneth J. Mynatt v. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 39 Et Al.
M2020-01285-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge Darrell Scarlett

Kenneth J. Mynatt (“Plaintiff”) served as the vice president of the local chapter of his union. He filed an action for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy against the union, the local chapter, and several individuals associated with the union. He alleged that after he publicly criticized the union’s financial waste, its leadership accused him of misusing union funds. Those accusations led to his indictment on two felony charges. In the resulting criminal case, the State filed a motion to retire the charges for one year, and those charges were ultimately dismissed after the year passed. In Plaintiff’s complaint for malicious prosecution, he stated that he continued to maintain his innocence, that he refused any plea deals, and that the criminal case terminated in his favor because it was ultimately dismissed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the retirement and dismissal of the criminal charges was not a favorable termination on the merits. Thus, they argued his complaint was missing an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the underlying criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. The defendants sought review from this Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard for determining what constitutes a favorable termination for the purpose of a malicious prosecution claim. We conclude that the prohibition in Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35 (Tenn. 2012), precluding a factintensive and subjective inquiry into the reasons and circumstances leading to dispositions in civil cases also applies to dispositions in criminal cases. We hold that plaintiffs can pursue a claim for malicious prosecution only if an objective examination, limited to the documents disposing of the proceeding or the applicable procedural rules, indicates the termination of the underlying criminal proceeding reflects on the merits of the case and was due to the innocence of the accused. Under this standard, Mr. Mynatt did not allege sufficient facts for a court to conclude that the dismissal of his criminal case was a favorable termination. We therefore reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss.

Rutherford Supreme Court

Paul Zachary Moss v. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board
W2017-01813-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins

The issue presented is whether a civil service merit board acts arbitrarily or capriciously
by not allowing an employee to ask questions in a termination hearing about more lenient
discipline imposed on other civil service employees. A Shelby County Fire Department
employee was fired based on his participation in an altercation involving a firearm at a
political rally and his dishonesty during the subsequent investigation. He appealed his
termination to the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board. During the hearing, the Board
did not allow the employee’s counsel to ask questions about discipline imposed on other
Fire Department employees. The Board affirmed the employee’s termination for just cause.
The employee appealed, and the trial court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the Board’s decision to exclude the questions about other discipline was
arbitrary and unreasonable, and remanded the case for consideration of such evidence.
Under the narrow standard of review provided in the Uniform Administrative Procedures
Act, we hold that the Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by declining to consider
evidence of discipline imposed on other employees. We reverse the Court of Appeals’
judgment and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Supreme Court