APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, TDY Industries Inc., asserts that the trial court erred in awarding the employee 60% permanent partial disability to the right upper extremity and 40% permanent partial disability to the left upper extremity for injuries he incurred during the course of his employment. We conclude that the evidence presented does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge, and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves allegations of employer discrimination by an African-American male employee.  He claimed that he experienced race and gender discrimination because he was treated differently than his co-workers who were African-American females and a white male.  He also claimed to have been retaliated against after he filed various grievances and complaints against his employer, and he alleged outrageous conduct on the part of his employer and his supervisor, individually.  The trial court dismissed the case, and for the following reasons, we affirm.

In this action for damages to personal property caused by an allegedly defective storage container, the Trial Court granted Judgment for plaintiffs. We affirm.

We granted permission to appeal in this habeas corpus case to consider the legality of a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement. The agreed sentence exceeds the maximum available term in the offender Range but does not exceed the maximum punishment authorized for the offense. For the reasons explained herein, we conclude that the plea-bargained sentence is legal. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Dwayne E. Anderson, appeals from the order of the trial court summarily dismissing his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed the petition because it determined that the petition did not state valid grounds for habeas corpus relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Leo H. Odom, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Odom was indicted for first degree murder and subsequently pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to second degree murder, receiving an agreed sentence of thirty years with service of 100% as a violent offender. He is currently an inmate at Northwest Correctional Complex at Tiptonville. On appeal, Odom argues that his 1997 murder conviction and resulting thirty-year sentence are void because his sentence is “erroneous as being contrary to the express provisions of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act.” After review, we affirm the judgment of the Lake County Circuit Court.

Petitioner, Andre L. Mayfield, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, William Arthur Shelton aka John Shelton, was convicted by a jury in the Bradley County Criminal Court of three counts of false imprisonment, two counts of vandalism, and one count of premeditated first degree murder. He received a total effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of a motion for severance of the murder counts from the remaining counts, the trial court’s exclusion of a witness’s complete statement to police, and the sufficiency of the evidence. From our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jorge Herrera, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This matter is before this court following the Petitioner Heck Van Tran’s motion to reopen his postconviction petition for the limited purpose of determining whether the Petitioner is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty. The lower court entered an order denying relief. The Petitioner appeals asserting that the proof established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner is mentally retarded renders his sentence of death unconstitutional. After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the lower court’s denial of relief.

This case involves the legitimation of twin children and two subsequent actions to establish child support. In the first case, the parties agreed to attempt mediation of the issues, and it appears that a permanent parenting plan was agreed upon which provided for equal and joint custody of the
children. Because parenting time was split equally, neither party was to pay support to the other, but certain expenses were to be paid by each parent. The parties allegedly signed the agreement at mediation, and a formal memorandum was subsequently drawn up and presented to the court. The
court approved the formal memorandum and entered the parenting plan as an order of the court. In the second action, the mother claimed that because she had never signed the formal, typed version of the agreement, the parenting plan was void. The trial court agreed and set aside the mediated parenting plan. A new plan was entered by the court awarding primary custody to the mother and ordering the father to pay child support, which was calculated retroactively to the date of the children’s birth. The father timely appealed, and for the following reasons, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.

This is a tort action. The defendant mortgage company serviced the mortgage loans on two homes owned by the plaintiff. After one of the plaintiff’s two homes burned down, the plaintiff received insurance proceeds for the destroyed home. The proceeds were mistakenly applied to the mortgage on the wrong property, and a deed of release was prepared on the intact home. Subsequently, the defendant mortgage company recorded an affidavit to reinstate the trust deed and the funds were paid to satisfy the mortgage on the destroyed home. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant. Liberally construed, the plaintiff’s complaint asserted claims for deprivation of civil rights, tortious interference with business relationships, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff failed to properly serve process on the defendants and the plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiff appeals. We dismiss the appeal, finding that the plaintiff has not appealed from a final judgment.

The petitioner, Diallo J. Lauderdale, was convicted by a Henry County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to life in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Keusi Yamba Donald, was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and possession with intent to sell or deliver more not less than one-half (½) ounce nor more than ten (10) pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve sixteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender for his conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, and six years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, career offender for his conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and (3) his sentence of sixteen years was excessive. After a thorough review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, James Henry Walker, was convicted of one count of burglary, a Class D felony; one count of theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of six years as a Range II, multiple offender, for his felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction, for an effective sentence of six years. Defendant does not appeal the length of his sentences. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements and testimony of his identification. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Brandon Wallace, appeals the sentencing decision of the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. Following a jury trial, Wallace was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and felony reckless endangerment. Wallace’s conviction for attempted especially aggravated robbery was merged with his conviction for especially aggravated burglary. Following a direct appeal of his convictions and sentences, a panel of this court affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing in accordance with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2005). After a resentencing hearing was conducted, Wallace was sentenced to twenty years for each attempted first degree murder conviction, eight years for attempted second degree murder, eight years for attempted especially aggravated robbery, eight years for especially aggravated burglary, and one year for felony reckless endangerment. Based upon the imposition of partial consecutive sentencing, Wallace received an effective sentence of forty-years confinement. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s application of enhancement factors, failure to apply mitigating factors, and imposition of consecutive sentencing. After review, the sentences are affirmed. However, we remand for entry of corrected judgment of conviction forms to properly reflect merger of the offenses and imposition of the aggregate forty-year sentence.

In this case, the paternal grandparents of a minor child whose parents were not married petitioned the Juvenile Court of Gibson County for an order of visitation for the father. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petition and entered an order awarding visitation to the grandparents conditioned on the father’s unavailability. We accepted review of this matter pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to determine whether the trial court’s “conditional” order is governed by the statute allowing visitation rights to grandparents. Upon consideration, we have determined that the order entered by the trial court is, indeed, an order granting visitation to the grandparents and that the grandparents are not entitled to visitation under either the grandparents’ visitation statute or through an “assignment” of the father’s rights. Because section 36-6-306 of the Tennessee Code Annotated vests only the circuit and chancery courts with jurisdiction in grandparents’ visitation matters, the Juvenile Court of Gibson County had no authority to adjudicate the issue of grandparent visitation. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, the judgment of the juvenile court is reversed to the extent it awarded visitation to the grandparents, and the case is remanded to the juvenile court for dismissal. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed
 

On July 21, 2005, the appellant, Joseph Kevan Clark, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-616, a section of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act. On September 27, 2005, the appellant was sentenced to five years’ incarceration as a Range III offender. He appeals the judgment,  contending that his conviction is invalid because the underlying order declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender was not properly entered pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Because we have previously held that an individual must utilize the provisions of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 to challenge an order declaring the individual to be a motor vehicle habitual offender, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The appellant also contends that the five-year sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Because the trial court appropriately considered both mitigating and enhancement factors, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

The defendant, Jason Goolsby, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and burglary and two counts of theft over $1000, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of four years and six months for the aggravated burglary conviction and three years and six months for each of the Class D felonies, with nine months to be served in confinement and the balance on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case began as a breach of warranty and misrepresentation action against a husband and wife as sellers of property. The buyers had been sued in a separate action by adjoining landowners who disputed the boundary between their land and the property purchased by the buyers. After a judgment was entered against the buyers ordering them to convey a portion of the property to their neighbors, they filed suit against the sellers, who had since divorced. The trial court entered a default judgment against the wife after she failed to defend the case. The court then dismissed the husband from the case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19, finding that he had been an indispensable party to the previous boundary dispute lawsuit between the buyers and their neighbors, and that failure to join him in that lawsuit required that he be dismissed from this subsequent suit. The buyers timely filed their notice of appeal. The trial court subsequently entertained and granted the wife’s motion to set aside the default judgment and ultimately dismissed her from the suit as well, finding that she had also been an indispensable party to the boundary dispute action and was not joined in the lawsuit. For the following reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order which set aside the default judgment, reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the claims against the husband, and remand the cause for further proceedings.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Lisa Marie Butler, of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse, see T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, -15-402 (2003), in connection with the June 17, 2003 death of her eight-month-old child, Dewayne Butler. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Violent Offender to life imprisonment at 100 percent for the felony murder conviction and to 20 years and six months at 100 percent for the aggravated child abuse conviction, with concurrent service of the sentences. On appeal, the defendant contests the legal sufficiency of the convicting evidence at trial and argues that her sentence for the aggravated child abuse conviction is excessive. After our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the defendant’s convictions.

In a dispute over death benefits from employer, the trial court held designated beneficiary who later divorced decedent, was entitled to benefits rather than the estate.  We affirm.

We accepted this appeal to clarify whether experts testifying in legal malpractice cases must be familiar with a single, statewide professional standard of care or a standard of care for a particular locality within the state. Because we hold that a single, statewide professional standard of care exists for attorneys practicing in Tennessee, expert witnesses testifying in legal malpractice cases must be familiar with the statewide professional standard. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Commissioner granted defendants summary judgment on a medical malpractice claim. On appeal, we dismiss the case on the failure of plaintiffs to timely file notice of appeal.

The defendant, Marchello Simpson, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and nolo contendere to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to six years for each of the convictions and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences based upon a finding that he was a dangerous offender. We hold that no error occurred, and we affirm the trial court.