APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant is a defendant in a delinquent tax suit by Williamson County for business personal property taxes for the year 2000. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff because the defendant had not utilized his available administrative remedies, and Defendant appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff/Appellant, a computer distribution company, sued Defendant/Appellee, a temporary employment service, for damages resulting from a temporary employee’s allegedly negligent act.  The trial court found in favor of the Defendant/Appellee on the grounds that Plaintiff/Appellant had not met its burden of proof to show negligence. We affirm on the grounds that the temporary employee was the loaned servant of the Plaintiff/Appellant and, as such, Defendant/Appellee is not liable for the negligent act of the temporary employee.

This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Claims Commission. Student of the University of Memphis was struck by two vehicles while crossing the street from the University-owned parking lot to the University campus. Student and husband filed suit in the Claims Commission against the University and the State, claiming that Defendants negligently created or maintained dangerous conditions on state controlled real property. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Claims Commission granted the motion. We affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission in all respects.

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits to an employee injured while attending an employer-sponsored company picnic. After reviewing the evidence and applicable authority, we conclude that the employee's injury did not occur in the course of her employment and therefore is not compensable under the workers' compensation law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment.

The petitioner, Antonio Gibson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Tabatha R. White, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence and (2) that she received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because her attorney failed to object to hearsay testimony, failed to request a circumstantial evidence instruction, failed to file pretrial motions requesting that the State reveal any plea bargain agreements it had made with the State's witnesses, and denied her the right to testify. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case the employee, who had worked third shift for the employer, sustained extensive injuries from a one-car accident about twenty minutes after leaving the workplace. The employee contended that her exposure to the chemical toluene at work caused fatigue and drowsiness which led to her accident. The trial court found that the accident did not arise out of her employment and dismissed the case. For the reasons set out in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Joseph Gunter, was convicted by a Fentress County jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of life without parole and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, he contends that the jury was exposed to extraneous prejudicial information about his case; the trial court erred in various of its evidentiary rulings and made improper commentary on the evidence; the State deprived him of potentially exculpatory evidence by failing to perform scientific testing on physical evidence recovered from the crime scene and by withholding new evidence discovered after the trial; and the cumulative effect of the various errors resulted in the denial of his right to a fair trial. The State argues, inter alia, that the defendant's appeal should be dismissed because his motion for a new trial was untimely. We agree with the State, and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.

This appeal is before us following the reopening of Petitioner's post-conviction petition for the limited purpose of determining whether Petitioner is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty pursuant to our supreme court's decision in Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002). The post-conviction court ultimately determined that Petitioner had failed to prove that he was mentally retarded and that the weight of the proof was that he was not mentally retarded. Accordingly, the court denied Petitioner's request for a new trial and denied and dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal as of right, this court must determine the following issues: (1) whether Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded; (2) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203, as interpreted by the supreme court in Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2004), is constitutional in light of the principles outlined in Atkins v. Virginia; and (3) whether the absence of mental retardation is an element of capital murder requiring the State to bear the burden of proof and requiring submission of the issue to a jury. After review of the record and the applicable law, we find no errors of law requiring reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, James Ray Bartlett, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal as of right, the petitioner asserts that the judgments of conviction for aggravated assault and four counts of theft are void because the sentences are illegal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Jimmy M. Millican, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Millican argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Gay N. Yarbro, was convicted by a jury of introducing a controlled substance into a penal institution. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction for this offense, to be served consecutively to a sentence for
a prior conviction. Additionally, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence for the prior conviction and ordered him to serve the original sentence in confinement. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for introducing a controlled substance into a penal institution and further challenges the length of his sentence for that offense. The Defendant also challenges the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence on the prior conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the instant conviction, and further affirm the trial court’s order of revocation.

The Petitioner, Nicholas Sanders, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Defendant, Lonnie Lee Owens, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, abuse of a corpse, and theft over $10,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years for the murder, one year for the abuse of a corpse, and four years for the theft. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction for an effective term of thirty years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentence for the murder and also challenges the trial court's order that his sentences be served consecutively. We reduce the Defendant's sentence for the second degree murder conviction to twenty-four years. We further reverse the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences.

The trial court determined Plaintiffs had standing to bring this malpractice action against their attorney and that they properly filed the action within the statute of limitations under the discovery rule. The trial court apportioned fault between Plaintiffs, Defendant, and nonparty Shelby County.  The court awarded Plaintiffs damages for costs incurred, but did not award damages for lost property value. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Plaintiffs had standing and brought their action within the limitations period. We reverse the trial court’s finding regarding causation, and hold Plaintiffs were at least 50% at fault in this case. Judgment for Plaintiffs is reversed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. A review of the record reveals that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an appeal as of right from a conviction on a jury verdict of aggravated robbery, and an appeal by the State from the sentencing decision. The Defendant originally received an enhanced sentence of eighteen years as a Range II, multiple offender, but his sentence was subsequently reduced to fifteen years by the trial court based upon Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). On appeal, the Defendant argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. The State appeals the modified sentence, arguing the trial court erred in reducing the Defendant's sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the conviction, but remand for re-sentencing in accordance with this opinion.

Appellant filed suit against the county alleging violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, and the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Approximately three years later, Appellant filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant appeals. We affirm.

We granted review to address several issues regarding the Tennessee Department of Correction's protocol for executing inmates who have been sentenced to death by lethal injection. After our review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the lethal injection protocol in Tennessee, which includes intravenous injections of sodium Pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride, (1) does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution, (2) does not violate due process provisions under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions, (3) does not deny access to the courts in violation of the United States or Tennessee Constitutions, (4) does not violate the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, (5) does not violate the Nonlivestock Animal Humane Death Act, (6) does not violate provisions governing the practice of medicine and provision of healthcare services, and (7) does not violate the Drug Control Act or Pharmacy Practice Act. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The Appellant, Lonnie M. Maclin, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, misdemeanor reckless endangerment, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, reckless aggravated assault, and two counts of aggravated assault.  As a result of these convictions, Maclin received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Maclin raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the indictment was invalid for failure to provide “adequate notice of the offenses charged in the indictment, or the court erred in the instruction to the jury”; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for felony murder; and (3) whether his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping violates State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). After review of the record, we affirm the judgments of
conviction.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Angie Delene Jackson, was convicted of driving a commercial vehicle under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04 or greater, a Class A misdemeanor, and for violation of the motor carrier safety rules and regulations, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the results of her blood alcohol test; (2) that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence discovered during a search of her vehicle; and (3) that the trial court erred in ordering Defendant to serve five percent of her effective sentence in confinement. We find that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence discovered during a search of her vehicle. We find the trial court's error harmless as to Defendant's DUI conviction, and affirm that conviction. Because we find the evidence insufficient, however, to support Defendant's conviction for violation of the motor carrier safety rules and regulations, we reverse it and dismiss that charge. We further reverse Defendant's sentence for her DUI conviction and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

This appeal involves the parental rights of a father to his eight-year-old daughter. When the child was approximately 17 months old, the mother moved with the child to Ohio. The father did not know their whereabouts for many months. In the parties' divorce, the mother was awarded custody of the child and the father was awarded specific visitation privileges. The father failed to exercise his visitation rights and failed to visit or support the child for more than four months. The mother, who had remarried, filed a petition to terminate the father's rights on the grounds of abandonment. Father presented proof at trial of his meager earnings due to a physical impairment, limited education and the loss of his job. Father also presented proof that he had tried to contact the child by telephone but was unable to do so. The trial court declined to terminate the father's parental rights because there had not been proof by clear and convincing evidence of abandonment or that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest. After a careful review of the record and the applicable law, we agree with the trial court that the father's lack of visitation and support was not willful and that termination of the father's parental rights was not in the child's best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a prisoner's challenge to a decision of the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. After the Board denied the prisoner parole and scheduled his next hearing for the year 2016, the prisoner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The Chancery Court dismissed the petition on the grounds it was not timely filed and was not verified. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court correctly granted the Defendant Insurance Company of North America ("ICNA") summary judgment based on its finding that the claimant, Jason Simms, failed to follow the loss provisions of the insurance policy and that ICNA's agent did not possess authority to waive the loss provisions. We hold there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding the apparent authority of ICNA's agent, and therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand for trial.

The appellant, Michael Dean Baugh, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of burglary and theft of property under $500. He was sentenced as a multiple offender to seven (7) years, six (6) months for the burglary conviction and eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days for the theft conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal ensued. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the charges against him and that his sentence is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.