APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case arose from the divorce of Tina M. Lunsford and Robert W. Lunsford, his untimely death, and a dispute between the estate of Robert W. Lunsford and Tina M. Lunsford as to the right to a pre-retirement death benefit provided by the Young Men’s Christian Association Retirement Fund in which Mr. Lunsford participated. Even though Tina M. Lunsford was the designated beneficiary of the death benefit at the time of Mr. Lunsford died, the trial court determined the intent of the parties evidenced by their marital dissolution agreement was to divest Tina Lunsford of any interest in his retirement plan. The trial court, by qualified domestic relations order, directed the death benefit be paid to the contingent beneficiaries and Tina M. Lunsford appealed. Because of the specific language of the marital dissolution agreement, we affirm.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant in this premises liability action in which the plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell on a substance located in the defendant’s supermarket. The plaintiff appealed. Because the appellate record in this case is inadequate to determine the basis for the appellee’s motion or the trial court’s judgment, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Steven Paul Deskins, was convicted of seven (7) counts of rape of a child and four (4) counts of aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, this Court reversed one (1) of the petitioner's convictions for aggravated sexual battery, finding that it violated due process and double jeopardy, but otherwise affirmed the remaining convictions. See State v. Steven Paul Deskins, No. M2002-01808-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21957083 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 14, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 5, 2004). The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff filed an action to compel arbitration. Defendant filed an action for damages. The Trial Court combined the actions and denied arbitration and the parties proceeded to trial and final judgment. The Trial Court inter alia held that plaintiffs waived issue of arbitration. On appeal, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Joseph B. Thompson, was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty years. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the State caused exculpatory evidence to be lost and unavailable to the Petitioner; (3) the trial court denied his right to allocution; (4) the trial court improperly limited trial counsel's time for closing argument; (5) the trial court erred when it ruled that the Petitioner could not instruct his trial counsel about trial strategy; and (6) the trial court erred by instructing the jury concerning the amount of fines to be imposed. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Fredrick Sledge, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that his counsel’s representation at trial was deficient because he failed to file a motion to suppress Petitioner’s statement to the police, and he failed to investigate Petitioner’s case or interview any witnesses. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Deon Larkins, was convicted by a jury of carjacking. As a result, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve (12) years. On appeal, the appellant argues: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to sustain the objections regarding hearsay; (3) that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss based on a false warrant; (4) that the trial court should have granted a mistrial because the jury made a statement that was unfairly prejudicial; (5) that the appellant's constitutional rights were violated because of a "second setting" of the jury after the first panel of jurors was dismissed; (6) that the trial court erred by not "bringing" a material witness to testify; (7) that the evidence was insufficient to support the appellant's conviction; and (8) the appellant's sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the evidence, we determine that a number of the appellant's first six (6) issues are waived for failure to prepare an adequate record for our review. As to the remaining issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, we must determine: (1) whether the defendant, a doctor, is immune from liability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-410(a) (1996) in connection with his review of a child abuse victim's medical records as requested by authorities investigating allegations of child abuse; (2) whether the defendant has a common law duty to report suspected child abuse; and (3) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-401, et. seq. (1996) provides a private right of action for failure to report suspected child abuse. We conclude that immunity under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-410(a) is afforded only to those who actually report harm. Because the determination of whether the defendant reported harm involves a genuine issue of material fact, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue. We further conclude that by reviewing the victim's medical records, the defendant undertook a duty to use reasonable care in reviewing the records and reporting his findings and conclusions to the investigators. Finally, we hold that because the plaintiff did not assert a private right of action pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-401, et. seq. in her complaint, the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the issue. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner pled guilty to one count of failure to appear in case number 00-99 stemming from the terms included in a previous guilty plea in case number 99-228. The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief stating he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel in case number
00-99. The post-conviction court denied this petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel in his guilty plea for case number 00-99 and that his guilty plea for case number 99-228 is unenforceable because it lacks clarity. We affirm the denial of the petition by the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner of several crimes including first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder and aggravated robbery.  On direct appeal, we reversed and dismissed the conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder. The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging several grounds. The post-conviction court denied his petition in a written order. We affirm the post-conviction court’s
judgment.

The petitioner, Jason Crawford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Cortez Bennett, of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. This court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals, contending that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that there exists no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Testator's two children, individually and as co-administrators of testator's estate, brought a suit against alleged transferee to whom testator purportedly conveyed real property, seeking to set aside the deed evidencing such transaction on the grounds of forgery. The Chancery Court for Robertson County, Tennessee, Judge Carol A. Catalano, held that the signature of testator was forged and set aside the deed. The Court affirms the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

The defendant, Michael R. Harness, pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, and the Union County Criminal Court sentenced him as a child rapist to five years to be served at one hundred percent in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factors in sentencing, in denying him alternative sentencing, and in sentencing him as a child rapist to serve his sentence at one hundred percent. We hold the trial court erred in classifying the defendant as a child rapist, in applying an enhancement factor, and in failing to apply a mitigating factor based on the defendant's poor health. We modify his sentence to four years with a release eligibility of thirty percent to reflect his status as a Range I, standard offender. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, and we remand the case for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Kenneth Beard, entered a plea of guilty to rape, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed a Range I, eight-year sentence. Although the defendant was granted probation, the first year was intensely supervised and the entire term involved special conditions of release. After violating the terms of probation by testing positive for cocaine use and serving nine months in jail, the defendant was reinstated to probation. Shortly thereafter, another probation violation warrant was issued and the trial court required the defendant to serve an additional year in jail as a part of a split confinement sentence. Upon review after the one year period of incarceration, the trial court ordered execution of the original judgment, requiring service of the balance of the term in prison. The judgment of the trial court must be reversed and the cause remanded for service of the sentence on conditional probation.

The petitioner, Joe Davis Martin, Jr., appeals from the trial court's denial of his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief. In that petition, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus to release him from his sentences for attempted first degree murder, first degree murder, and attempted second degree murder based on what he alleged was the trial court's improper interpretation and application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(a). We are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Trial Court, while finding a material change in circumstances, refused to change custody of the minor child on the ground that it would not be in the best interest of the child.

The City of Memphis terminated the employment of Jack Vincent, a police officer. The Civil Service Commission reversed, and Memphis appealed to the Shelby County Chancery Court under a writ of certiorari. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the Commission, and Memphis appeals. We reverse.

Plaintiffs, certified low voltage electricians, filed a personal injury action against university for negligently informing them that university's switchgear cabinet was low voltage, when in fact, it was high voltage, for failing to provide a conspicuous high voltage warning sign on the high voltage switchgear and for obscuring the manufacturer's identifying product plate. Plaintiffs suffered injuries as a result of university's alleged negligence. The Circuit Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, Judge Walter C. Kurtz granted university's motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs appealed. The decision of the trial court is reversed and case remanded.

The petitioner, John E. Carter, appeals from the trial court's order construing his untitled pleading as one for writ of habeas corpus and denying relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that  his court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal involves a dispute arising from the sale of a used motorcycle. After discovering that the motorcycle was not new, the purchaser filed suit and then settled with the dealer from whom he had purchased the motorcycle. Later, the purchaser filed suit against the motorcycle's manufacturer in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging that the motorcycle's aluminum frame was defective. The trial court granted the manufacturer's summary judgment motion and dismissed the purchaser's products liability and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims. The purchaser has appealed. We have determined that the manufacturer was entitled to a summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court.

The Defendant, John L. Wright, was convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI"), fifth offense, and of violating the implied consent law. The Defendant now appeals, contending that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements the Defendant made to the police; (2) the trial court improperly concluded that the Defendant's arrest was lawful; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his DUI conviction. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Wilson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Robert Louis Gibson, on one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The defendant filed an application for pretrial diversion, which the prosecutor denied. On petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court affirmed the prosecutor's decision to deny pretrial diversion. In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant contends that the prosecutor abused his discretion in denying his application for pretrial diversion by improperly and unfairly weighing the factors used to determine whether diversion should be granted. Based upon our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendants of conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than seventy pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced each of them to fifteen years confinement at one hundred percent in the Department of Correction. The defendants appealed their convictions, with various defendants claiming that the evidence was insufficient, that the Tennessee Drug Free School Zone Act was unconstitutional, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, that the state's continued reference to the defendants' ethnicity was overly prejudicial, that the state's introduction of evidence concerning the presence of weapons was irrelevant and overly prejudicial, and that the jury's verdict lacked unanimity. However, before oral argument, this court stayed the appellate proceedings based upon the defendants filing petitions for coram nobis relief in the trial court. The trial court thereafter granted the petitions for coram nobis relief and vacated the defendants' convictions, and the state now appeals, claiming the trial court improperly granted coram nobis relief to each defendant. In these consolidated cases, we affirm the trial court's coram nobis judgment as to the defendants Luis Vasquez and Victor Garza but reverse the judgment as to the other defendants. On direct appeal of the underlying convictions, we hold the trial court erred in not instructing the jury about facilitation but that the error did not affect a substantial right of Roberto Vasques, Luis D. Vidales Romero, Kevin Joel Hernandez, or Hector Alonzo, and we affirm their convictions.

This case involves the contest of a will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity. The Probate Court, Davidson County, found that the evidence failed to establish that the Testator lacked the requisite testamentary capacity to execute his will. We affirm.