APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Terry Edward Jones pleaded guilty to solicitation of first degree murder, for which he received an eight-year incarcerative sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court's failure to grant his request for alternative sentencing, he brings the instant appeal challenging his manner of service. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Debra Ann Williams ("Mother") and George Jay Williams, IV ("Father") were divorced in 1998. Mother was designated the custodial parent of the parties' two minor children. In 2003, Father filed a Petition for Modification and Contempt seeking, in part, a change in custody or visitation, and relief from the requirement that Father carry life insurance or, in the alternative, that Mother also be required to maintain life insurance. Mother filed a counter claim requesting, in part, increased child support and the right to claim the tax exemption for both children. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order holding, inter alia, "that there has been no change in circumstances which would justify the modification of the final judgment" as requested by Father and dismissing Father's petition for modification. The Trial Court, however, increased child support in accordance with the guidelines and held that for purposes of calculating child support under the guidelines, Father was not entitled to a reduction in his annual earnings for state income taxes he may pay. Father appeals raising issues regarding custody, visitation, life insurance, child support, and attorney's fees. We reverse as to the award to Mother of the tax exemption for one child, and affirm as to all other issues.

The Trial Court awarded fees to the Guardian Ad Litem who asked the Trial Court to award him fees and costs for collecting the initial award. The Trial Court refused. On appeal, we affirm.

The defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of her probation based upon a new law violation, to wit: introduction of contraband into a penal facility. Specifically, she contends that: (1) no proof was presented that Soma is a controlled substance or legend drug; (2) the trial court improperly took judicial notice that Soma is a controlled substance; (3) no proof was presented of unlawful intent; and (4) the revocation order does not properly state the evidence relied upon and reason for revoking probation. Upon our review, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of a new law violation; we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. In imposing a death sentence for each count of first degree murder, the jury found three aggravating circumstances, i.e., that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that they involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, and that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another, had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (6) (2003). In addition, the jury found that the evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (2003). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the death sentences.

After the case was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying numerous issues for oral argument. We now hold as follows: 1) the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant was competent to stand trial; 2) the trial court did not err in excluding evidence during the competency hearing; 3) the trial court did not err in refusing to hold a new competency hearing on the basis that a court-appointed expert was biased; 4) the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions; 5) the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the aggravating circumstances were not stated in the indictment; 6) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to amend the indictment; 7) the trial court did not commit reversible error in limiting extrinsic evidence of inconsistent statements; 8) the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstances found by the jury; 9) the death sentences were not arbitrary or disproportionate as imposed in this case; 10) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances; 11)the capital sentencing statutes are not unconstitutional on the basis that they allow evidence to be admitted in violation of due process and confrontation under the United States Constitution; 12) the trial court did not err in admitting photographs of the victims at the crime scene during sentencing; 13) the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to charge the jury on the “catch-all” statutory provision as to mitigating circumstances; and 14) the trial court did not err in denying a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct during sentencing. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Antonio Dewayne Bledsoe, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. On appeal, Bledsoe contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and, as a result, his nolo contendere plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant challenges the District Attorney General's denial of pretrial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Specifically, he avers that the District Attorney General abused his discretion and failed to consider all relevant factors. Upon careful consideration, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the District Attorney General's further consideration of all applicable factors, discussion of the evidence supporting those factors, and an explanation of the weight accorded to each.

The defendant, Jeffery Hayes, entered an open guilty plea to one count of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, two counts of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine, Class B felonies, and one count of possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence and denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jonathan Harris, was convicted by jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony; and theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for the attempted second degree murder conviction, six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, and five years for the theft of property conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in not suppressing the defendant’s statements and journal; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) and the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Eugene Yates, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Howard Duty, Jr., appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Alfonzo Silvestre Arze (“Father”) and MaryAnne Bracken Arze (“Mother”) were divorced in 2000.  The divorce was based upon stipulated grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the parties submitted a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) to the Trial Court for approval. The terms of the MDA were agreed upon through mediation. At the time of the divorce, Father was employed as a physician with gross earnings of approximately $150,000. Mother was unemployed. Due to the significant disparity in income, Father agreed to pay Mother $2,000 in child support even though he was not obligated legally to do so since he was the primary residential parent for the parties’ four children. When the oldest child turned eighteen, Father reduced his child support payments by twenty-five percent, $500. After Mother challenged Father’s unilateral reduction in child support,  the Trial Court entered an order which required Father to pay child support in an amount consistent with the Child Support Guidelines (“Guidelines”). We conclude that because Father was not legally obligated under the Guidelines to pay any child support, the payment of $2,000 was purely a contractual obligation which was not governed by the Guidelines. We also conclude that Father was within his contractual rights when he reduced the child support payments by $500 when the oldest child became emancipated.

The petitioner, Kenya Davis, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This case involves a question of whether an insurance policy covers the injuries sustained by the plaintiff under the facts of this case. The original suit filed by plaintiff against Justin Harkins, Andrew Keon, and James Keon was settled out of court, leaving Great River Insurance Company, an unnamed defendant. After granting the plaintiff’s motion for declaratory and partial summary judgment on whether the plaintiff was a covered insured under the policy, the parties agreed to send the matter to arbitration. The arbitrator returned an award in favor of the plaintiff, and the trial court confirmed the award but reduced the amount, accounting for the insurance policy’s limit. The trial court also awarded the plaintiff pre-judgment interest but stated that the total award to the plaintiff could not exceed the limit in the insurance policy. Great River Insurance Company appealed to this Court, and the plaintiff filed a cross-appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Tyrone Chalmers, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petition for post-conviction relief is time-barred by the statute of limitations, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Joseph L. Tims, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In Tennessee, a determination of child support is statutory. Jones v. Jones, 870 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. 1994).¹ Accordingly, I would approach resolution of this appeal by resort to the applicable statutes.

The Petitioner, Christopher Robertson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to file a timely notice of appeal document. This Court finds that justice does not require waiver.  Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Kelvin Lee Howard, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntaryguilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, James C. Breer, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Breer argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and prepare for trial, and (2) failing to advise him of his right to testify at trial in violation of Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999). After review, we conclude that issue (1) is without merit. However, with regard to issue (2), we conclude that the record does not support the trial court’s finding that Breer personally waived his right to testify as required by Momon.  Moreover, because the procedural guidelines adopted in Momon for determining whether the error was harmless were not followed, we find it necessary to remand for resolution of this issue.

A Dyer County jury convicted the defendant, Syrus Maurice Coleman, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a multiple offender to fourteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review of the evidence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Otis Miller, III, pled guilty to four (4) counts of aggravated sexual battery. As a result of the guilty plea, the trial court sentenced the appellant to ten (10) years on each conviction and ordered the first two counts to be served concurrently and the last two counts to be served concurrently. The trial court ordered that the first two counts be served consecutively to the remaining two counts, for an effective sentence of twenty (20) years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's application of certain enhancement factors in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and the trial court's decision to order consecutive sentences. Because our supreme court recently determined that Blakely has no application in Tennessee, we have reviewed the appellant's sentence de novo. Despite the trial court's improper application of several enhancement factors, we affirm the appellant's sentence because we determine that the existence of enhancement factor (16) justifies enhancement of the sentence from eight (8) to ten (10) years. We also affirm the trial court's decision to order consecutive sentences.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of two counts of sale of a Schedule III controlled substance (Lortab), a Class D felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent four-year sentences. He appeals to this Court contending that: (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to show that the defendant acted knowingly; (2) the evidence presented was insufficient to show that the transaction constituted a sale; (3) the trial court erred in finding that the dispensing of prescription drugs creates a high risk of harm to human life; and (4) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

Plaintiff sued for damages incurred to correct condition of roadway caused by defendants' motor vehicle which destroyed a section of guardrail. Defendants appeal from Judgment awarding damages to plaintiff on grounds damages were not proved. On appeal, we affirm.