APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Antonio Bonds, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based upon its filing beyond the statute of limitations. He argues his petition was timely filed. We hold that for purposes of the post-conviction relief statute of limitations, the final action of the Tennessee Supreme Court is the date of its denial of an application for permission to appeal, not the date it denied the petition to rehear. Because the instant petition was filed more than one year from the date of denial of the application for permission to appeal, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Ernesto Gonsales, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault. After determining that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had a detainer out for the defendant, the trial court modified the defendant's sentence to six years' unsupervised probation and release to the INS, noting that the defendant would immediately be deported to Mexico. In this appeal, the state contends that the trial court exceeded its authority by modifying the terms of the plea bargain agreement. Because the initial judgment should not have been altered, the order of modification is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court.

The Appellant, Terrance G. Motley, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of forty-four years in the Department of Correction. At trial, Motley waived his right to be represented by counsel and proceeded pro se. On appeal, Motley raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court denied him his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel by failing to ascertain if his waiver was knowingly and intelligently given; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. After a review of the record, we conclude that issues (1) and (3) are without merit. With regard to issue (2), we conclude that failure to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter was error, but harmless. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are
affirmed.

I fully agree with my colleagues that the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure do not recognize a petition to rehear the denial by our supreme court of an application for permission to appeal. In several instances, our supreme court had observed that there is no authority for such a petition. See, e.g., John Wayne Slate, Jr. v. State, No. 03C01-9201-CR-00014 (Tenn., at Knoxville, Feb. 6, 1995) (stating that “a petition to rehear the denial of a Rule 11 application for permission to appeal is unknown to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure”). In this case, however, as in some others, our supreme court “denied” the petition, thereby acting on the request. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202(a) requires a post-conviction petition within one year of “the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken.” In Lease v. Tipton, 722 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1986), our high court issued an opinion resulting from a petition to rehear its denial of an application for permission to appeal. Further, the Advisory Commission Comments to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 provide that the court “generally disfavors petitions to rehear following denials of applications for permission to appeal.” (Emphasis added.) The Comments do not indicate that such petitions are prohibited.

The defendant pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault of her three-month-old son and was sentenced to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court incorrectly applied some of the enhancement factors. However, the factors that were correctly applied substantially outweighed any incorrectly applied factors. There were no mitigating factors. The record does not indicate that the sentence was excessive. In light of the defendant's extensive criminal history, the trial court did not err in denying alternative sentencing.

I concur in the result reached and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. However, I do not believe that we should rely on T.C.A. § 40-18-110 to bar relief in this case relative to a jury instruction for the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The state has not raised the statute to bar the defendant’s jury instruction claim, and, obviously, the defendant has not had an opportunity to address the validity of the statute. In this respect, I believe that legitimate questions exist about the constitutionality of, at least, part of T.C.A. § 40-18-110 but that this case is not the one to answer those questions. The fact that no harm could flow to the defendant under the circumstances in this case is sufficient, by itself, to warrant affirming the judgments of conviction. Therefore, I concur in the majority opinion.

The petitioner, Dennis Gilliland, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1996 felony murder conviction. He contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the issue of alibi. He also raises ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not request an alibi instruction, requested the dismissal of the premeditated murder count instead of the felony murder count after the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts, and did not raise relevant arguments about the jury seeing the petitioner in handcuffs. Last, the petitioner claims that he was denied the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because the jury was allowed to hear evidence that he had been involved in two other, recent shooting deaths. We affirm the denial of the post-conviction petition.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. He argues the post-conviction court erred in determining he received the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Larry S. Reese, was found guilty of aggravated assault based, in part, on the violation of a protective order obtained by the victim, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(c), and public intoxication, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-310. Upon finding that the order of protection had not been served on the defendant prior to the assault, the trial court modified the aggravated assault conviction to simple assault and ordered a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days. In this appeal, the state asserts that the trial court erred by reducing the defendant’s conviction to simple assault. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

On August 19, 1999, the petitioner, Devon M. Crawford, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery and first degree murder. Counsel was appointed and an evidentiary hearing was held. In this appeal, petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a decision on the merits of the post-conviction petition as it relates to indictments 97-02686 and 97-03493.

The appellant, Tavares Hill, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court dismissed as an untimely petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that due process tolled the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there was no valid order of protection at the time of the instant offense, I must respectfully dissent. Orders of protection are governed in general by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-3-601 through 36-3-324. Initially, an ex parte order of protection is issued, followed by a hearing to determine whether a permanent order should be entered:

The Defendant, Calvin Lyons, Sr., appeals as of right from the judgment of the trial court, which revoked the Defendant’s probation and reinstated his original sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Mitchell Wayne Hiles, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a class B felony, following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced Hiles to an eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Hiles raises the single issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. After review of the record, we affirm the conviction.

The defendant pled guilty to aggravated burglary, theft over $1000, and vandalism and was sentenced to five years probation. Subsequently, after the defendant tested positive for marijuana and his probation officer filed a probation violation report, the trial court revoked his probation following a hearing. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in relying upon a laboratory report showing marijuana in his urine because the accompanying affidavit had not been executed by the technician who performed the test but by the assistant laboratory director. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court revoking the defendant's probation.

The defendant, Albert G. Gassaway, appeals his conviction for DUI, second offense. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with six months to be served in the county workhouse and the remainder on probation, ordered him to pay a $600 fine, and suspended his driving privileges for two years. The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI, second offense, and that the court erred in imposing more than the minimum sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Trial Court terminated parents’ parental rights. The father has appealed. We affirm the Trial
Court.

The defendant pled guilty to the sale of less than .5 gram of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and two counts of the sale of a Schedule VI controlled substance, Class E felonies, receiving an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's request for judicial diversion, concluding he was eligible for diversion because he had not previously been convicted of a felony or a Class A misdemeanor and his history and circumstances demonstrated he was a suitable candidate for judicial diversion. The State appealed, arguing that the defendant was eligible for diversion only because the trial court modified his prior conviction from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class C misdemeanor. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.