APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Vickie Swift, was convicted of one count of theft over $1000. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years to be served on probation. Later, probation was revoked. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by revoking her probation and ordering her incarcerated for the balance of her sentence.

The defendant, Colico Walls, was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of 11 years for the aggravated robbery and a Range II sentence of 10 years for the aggravated assault. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgment is affirmed as to the aggravated robbery. The aggravated assault is modified to simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor, having an 11-month, 29-day sentence. The sentences, as modified, shall be served consecutively.

On December 6, 1996, the petitioner was convicted of armed robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated kidnaping. On direct appeal, those convictions were affirmed. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on May 10, 1999. On June 21, 2001, the petitioner filed, pro se, a document titled "motion for extraordinary relief." The trial court dismissed the motion, characterizing it as a petition for post-conviction relief, and barred by the one-year statute of limitations. We affirm the dismissal from the trial court.

The defendant, Joseph B. Thompson, was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twenty years for each offense for an effective sentence of forty years. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) that his convictions for both aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping violate the rule established in State v. Anthony; (3) that a pretrial photographic array was unduly suggestive; (4) that the trial court erred by the admission of photographs of the victim; (5) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial; (6) that the offenses should have been severed for trial; (7) that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment when the state failed to disclose exculpatory information; (8) that the trial court erred by admitting a receipt that was not properly authenticated; (9) that the trial court impermissibly limited closing argument to forty minutes; and (10) that the sentence is excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief from her conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that she received effective assistance of trial counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner failed to demonstrate either a deficiency in counsel's performance or a resulting prejudice to her case. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Jonathan Thornton, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the sentence imposed by this court on direct appeal is illegal. Because the sentence imposed by this court upon direct appeal is in direct contravention of a statute, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the petitioner's sentence is modified. With regard to the petitioner's felony conviction, we modify the sentence to a term of split confinement, with 7.2 months to be served in the local jail and the balance to be served on probation. The sentence for the misdemeanor sentence remains the same, 11 months and 29 days with thirty percent to be served in confinement.

On August 27, 2001, pursuant to a bench trial, the Circuit Court of Tipton County found the defendant, Raymond N. Wallace, guilty of driving under the influence, second offense. For this offense, he received an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine (29) days, suspended on the service of forty-five (45) days. The court fined the defendant $600.00 and suspended his license to drive for two years. The defendant contends that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to support the conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating beverages. After a thorough review of the record before this Court, we affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

An Obion County jury convicted the defendant, Eric Gene Island, of attempt to commit robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of four years for each conviction. On direct appeal, the defendant contends: (1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the case and secure witnesses; and (2) he was denied his right to testify at trial. Upon reviewing the record, we conclude the failure to conduct a Momon hearing to determine whether the defendant personally waived his right to testify was plain error. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for a full hearing on the issue.

The Appellant, Jason R. Garner, appeals his conviction by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The convictions arose from Garner's involvement in the robbery and shooting of Charles Bledsoe. Garner received consecutive sentences of twenty years for second degree murder and twenty years for especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Garner argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the convictions are "irreconcilable;" (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to file untimely notice of sentence enhancements; (4) the trial court erred by failing to submit an instruction with regard to accomplice testimony to the jury; and (5) his sentences were excessive and the imposition of consecutive sentences was error. After review, we find these issues without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Mario C. Estrada, appeals the sentencing decision of the Maury County Circuit Court imposing a sentence of twelve years incarceration in the Department of Correction. The sentence arose from guilty pleas by Estrada to one count of arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. The indictment returned against Estrada charged him with one count of aggravated arson, eight counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. In this appeal, Estrada raises the issue of whether the trial court erred by ordering that his sentence be served in total confinement. After review, we find that plain error dictates that the convictions be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings because aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder.

The petitioner, Reginol L. Walters, was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and two counts of aggravated rape and, while his direct appeal was pending, filed a petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-403 requesting forensic analysis of DNA evidence. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, as well as a petition to reconsider, concluding that the petitioner could not proceed with his petition while his direct appeal was pending. Following our review, we conclude that the applicable statute does not prohibit the petitioner from proceeding simultaneously with a direct appeal and a petition for analysis of DNA evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the post-conviction court and remand for consideration of the petition.

The petitioner, Michael Anthony Scruggs, pled guilty to forgery and theft under $500. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences of six years for the forgery and eleven months, twenty-nine days, for the theft. No appeal was taken. Later, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, finding that the petitioner had failed to prove that his appointed counsel fell below the required level of competency. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.