APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on December 17, 1996, and the petitioner’s brief was filed on February 7, 1997. The petitioner was originally indicted for aggravated rape in February 1987, and the petitioner was subsequently convicted of the same. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

In this capital case, the defendant, Michael Dean Bush, was convicted of Although not relevant to this appeal, the trial judge imposed a three-year sentence concurrent to the death penalty for the burglary conviction. 2 "Whenever the death penalty is imposed for first degree murder and when the judgment has become final in the trial court, the defendant shall have the right of direct appeal from the trial court to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The affirmance of th e conviction and the sentence of death shall be automatically reviewed by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Upon the affirmance by the Court of C rim inal Appeals, th e clerk shall docket the case in the Supreme Court and the case sha ll proceed in accordance with the T ennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.” -2- premeditated first degree murder and first degree burglary.1 In the sentencing hearing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;” and (2) “[t]he murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) and (6) (1991). Finding that the two aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution.

This case involves a petition to change child custody1 and modify child support. 2 Wife is employed by the State of Tennessee as a secretary in the District Attorney’s Office and earns a gross monthly salary of $1507.00. Husband is employed by Electric Motor Service and earns a gross monthly salary of $2,456.84. Respondent-appellant, Mildred Louise McCollum (Wife), appeals the trial court’s order reducing the amount of the future child support obligation of petitioner-appellee, Kliff Andrew McCollum (Husband), to reflect the change in the custody of one of the parties’ children.

The case is before the Court on a petition for writ of mandamus. This is one of three cases1 in which landowners have filed suit against U.S. Sprint Communications Company (Sprint), asserting claims for inverse condemnation and trespass and seeking certification as a class action. Buhl v. Sprint and the instant case, Meighan, have been before this Court on appeal.2 The relief sought is an order directing the trial court in McCumber v. Sprint to vacate its order certifying a class action and to defer to the trial court in this case on that issue. The Court, heretofore, entered an order staying the proceedings in all three cases pending this hearing.

Rebecca H. Moore Brown appeals the trial court’s order which awarded Appellee 1In the event of a spouse’s death, the surviving spouse is entitled to the following exempt property from the deceased spouse’s estate: [T]he family Bible and other books, the family automobile, all wearing apparel of the deceased, all household electrical appliances, all household musical and other amusement instruments, and all household and kitchen furniture, appliances, utensils and implements. T.C.A. § 30-2-101(a)(1) (Supp. 1988). 2In the event a spouse dies intestate, the surviving spouse is entitled to [A] reasonable allowance in money out of the estate for such surviving spouse’s maintenance during the period of one (1) year after the death of the spouse,
according to such surviving spouse’s previous standard of living, taking into account the condition of the estate of the deceased spouse. T.C.A. § 30-2-102(a) (Supp. 1988). Ellis Truett, Jr., one year’s support in the amount of $21,500, as well as exempt property, from the estate of Truett’s deceased wife, Marian English Truett.

Plaintiff William P. Newton appeals the trial court’s order awarding him a $28,125 judgment against his former attorney, Defendant/Appellee James S. Cox, but denying Newton’s claim for prejudgment interest. Newton’s claim arose out of Cox’s retention of a contingency fee in excess of the maximum permitted by statute. We affirm the judgment entered in favor of Newton, but with certain modifications hereinafter set forth.

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of PPeals, reversing the trial court, that the action of retaliatory discharge "for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities" does not require a showing that the employer expressly or implicitly directed the employee to remain silent about the illegal activitey. This Court affirms the decision and ratoinale of the Court of Appeals.

The appellant, Billy Joe Baggett, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced him to fifteen (15) years as a Range III, Persistent Offender. On appeal, he presents ten (10) issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for aggravated burglary; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce tape recordings of four (4) telephone conversations between Baggett and a state informant; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce a prybar into evidence; (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to use prior convictions for impeachment purposes; (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to present evidence of Baggett’s escape from jail; (6) whether the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial following a state witness’ prejudicial remarks; (7) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of Baggett’s preferential treatment while in jail; (8) whether the charge to the jury as to reasonable doubt was unconstitutional; (9) whether the trial court erred in sentencing Baggett; and (10)  whether the delay in hearing the motion for new trial violated his right to a speedy appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant Philip Mark Nunley appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On March 23, 1993, Appellant pled guilty to seconddegree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Appellant received a sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment for second-degree murder and twenty years imprisonment for especially aggravated robbery. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On July 10, 1993, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that he involuntarily entered his guilty plea. The post-conviction court dismissed his petition, finding Appellant’s petition without merit. On appeal, Appellant argues that his guilty plea was involuntarily entered. For the reasons discussed below, we reject Appellant’s claim and affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.