APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Michael Gentry, entered a plea of guilt to one count of official misconduct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-402(a)(5). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court imposed a Range I sentence of two years and granted probation but denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-313; State v. Dishman, 915 S.W.2d 458 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant judicial diversion; he also insists that the district attorney general was guilty of prosecutorial vindictiveness.

The appellants, Mario A. Lavender and Eric Hobbs, were found guilty of two counts of robbery, a Class C felony, and one count of theft over $1,000, a Class D felony, by a jury of their peers. The trial court found that Lavender was a standard offender and imposed Range I sentences as follows: (1) count 1, robbery, confinement for six (6) years in the Department of Correction, (2) count 2, robbery, confinement for six (6) years in the Department of Correction, and (3) count 4, theft, confinement for four (4) years in the Department of Correction. The trial court found that Hobbs was a multiple offender and imposed the following Range II sentences: (1) count 1, robbery, confinement for ten (10) years in the Department of Correction, (2) count 2, robbery, confinement for ten (10) years in the Department of Correction, and (3) count 4, theft, confinement for four (4) years in the Department of Correction. The trial court ordered that the sentences are to be served consecutively. The effective sentence for Lavender is sixteen (16) years, and the effective sentence for Hobbs is twenty-four (24) years. In this Court, both Lavender and Hobbs contend that the sentences imposed by the trial court are excessive. Hobbs also contends that the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by (a) denying his motion to suppress a statement he made to police and (b) denying his motion in limine, which sought to deny the State of Tennessee the right to use his prior convictions to impeach him if he opted to testify. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law applicable to the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

The captioned plaintiff, an inmate of the Department of Correction, filed this suit against the Governor, Commissioner of Correction and Commissioner of Correction, seeking a declaration of his rights to release from incarceration. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss supported by affidavit of an official of the Department of Correction. The motion was therefore a motion for summary judgment. T.R.C.P. Rule 12.02.

Plaintiff-Appellant, TY Farming Company, Inc. (“TY Farming”), appeals the judgment of the trial court denying TY Farming’s claims against Defendants-Appellees Dyer County (“Dyer County”) and George Belew (“Belew”) relative to a dirt road which crossed properties owned by TY Farming, Belew, and other landowners in Dyer County. The trial court found that the dirt road had been abandoned by the County and the general public, that the road was no longer a public road, and, therefore, that the County had no obligation to maintain the road. Accordingly, the judgment denied TY Farming’s claim for damages against the County and dismissed the County from the lawsuit. With regard to TY Farming’s claim against Belew, the judgment granted TY Farming an easement across the property of Belew. The trial court further found that Belew had deprived TY Farming of its previously existing easement of ingress and egress to its property, but the court found that TY Farming had suffered no damages because it had continuous access to its property by another route. Accordingly, the trial court denied TY Farming’s claim for damages against Belew and dismissed TY Farming’s complaint in its entirety.

This Board added this language in its amendment to the original version of the rule. This case involves a challenge to the validity of a rule promulgated by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners. Gate Pharmaceuticals appeals the judgment of the trial court upholding the rule’s validity. We affirm.

The captioned plaintiff, an inmate of the Department of Corrections, filed this suit for certiorari from an adverse decision of the Board of Paroles. The Trial Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

The majority has decided that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-510 (1994) permits the purchaser of a used jet aircraft to reduce his state tax liability by deducting the value of a previously owned prop-driven aircraft from the purchase price of the jet aircraft. I do not agree that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-510 applies to the purchase of the jet because the transaction does not involve a trade or series of trades.

The petitioner, James J. Benson, appeals as of right from the Williamson County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief. He is presently in the custody of the Department of Correction, serving as a Range II, multiple offender, an effective sentence of one hundred and twenty-eight years for convictions of two counts of aggravated kidnaping and one count each of armed robbery, conspiracy, and accessory before the fact to armed robbery, receiving a sentence of sixty years for each of the crimes except the conspiracy, for which he received a sentence of eight years. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal on September 7, 1987, and reaffirmed on a petition to rehear on February 16, 1990. State v. Bobby Mitchell, Richard Cook, and James Benson, Williamson County, No. 87-185-III (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 1989), app. denied, (Tenn. April 2, 1990).

The majority has decided that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-510 (1994) permits the purchaser of a used jet aircraft to reduce his state tax liability by deducting the value of a previously owned prop-driven aircraft from the purchase price of the jet aircraft. I do not agree that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-510 applies to the purchase of the jet because the transaction does not involve a trade or series of trades.

This is a suit brought by Plaintiffs-Appellants, David Via and his wife Patty Via (“Via”), against Defendants-Appellees, Jimmy Joe Welch, Herman Reed and Tommy Reed (collectively
“Welch”). In this appeal, Via seeks to revive a decree for specific performance entered by this Court on August 28, 1984. Specific performance is no longer available since the property was lost to foreclosure. Via now seeks to have the decree revived and converted to a judgment for money damages. The trial court ruled that Via is not entitled to the relief sought and dismissed Via’s lawsuit. We affirm.

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.1 Defendant-Appellants Sidney and Betsy Feuerstein (“Feuersteins”) appeal the Chancery Court’s order in favor of Plaintiff-Appellees Tyrus Ragland and other neighbors enjoining the Feuersteins from building a greenhouse on their property in violation of a restrictive covenant.

Defendant-Appellant, Robert Alan Beem (“Husband”), appeals the judgment of the trial court ordering him to pay child support, alimony, and attorney’s fees to Plaintiff-Appellee, Barbara Beem (“Wife”).

This case involves a petition for increase of child support. Petitioner, Stephen David Scofield (Father), appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition to modify the parties’ final decree of divorce to increase child support payments by Respondent, Helen Bond Scofield 2 (Mother).

The Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga and Dr. Harry Reynolds, Superintendent of Chattanooga schools, appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision finding that Leonard L. Rowe was deprived of liberty without due process of law by a Board policy which renders any employee previously terminated “for cause, inefficiency, or immorality” ineligible for future employment within the Chattanooga school system. The primary issue for our review is whether adoption of Board policy 4117.5 deprived Rowe of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest to which the requirements of procedural due process apply.1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that due process is not implicated because the Board policy did not deprive Rowe of either a protected property or liberty interest. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

The Trial Court granted summary judgement dismissing one of the defendants, Mercantile Properties, Inc., and ordered entry of final partial judgment pursuant to T.R.C.P. Rule 54.02. Plaintiff has appealed. The remaining defendant, Brenda L. Allgood, is not involved in this appeal.

The plaintiff/wife has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court declaring the parties divorced pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-129, placing child custody in the wife and awarding child support. The issues on appeal relate only to support.

Richard P. Rienholtz, an inmate in the Tennessee prison system petitioned the Chancery Court of Davidson County for a declaratory judgment arguing that the Department of Correction’s decision to extend his parole eligibility date for escape was illegal. The chancellor dismissed the petition and we affirm.

Kevin Mosley, a prisoner in the custody of the Department of Correction, was twice considered for parole. On each occasion the Parole Board declined to release him, citing as its reason the seriousness of his offense. Mr. Mosley filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Chancery Court of Davidson County, contending that he was entitled to a more definite statement of the Parole Board’s reasons. The prisoner also argued that the Board erred in failing to consider the results of a psychological study it had ordered. The Chancery Court dismissed the petition. We affirm the trial court.