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| Glenn H. Hall v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. and Insurance Company of The State of Pennsylvania
01S01-9510-CH-00175
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee, Glenn Hall, workers' compensation benefits for the total loss of hearing in his left ear. On appeal the employer asserts that the employee failed to notify the employer of the injury as required by the workers' compensation statute. We affirm the trial court's finding that the proper notice was given. I. Mr. Hall testified that on June 22, 1993 his left ear began hurting after an explosion occurred in the department where he worked. Explosions are not uncommon in that department, and Mr. Hall customarily wore ear plugs to protect his ears from the noise. At the time of the accident, however, Mr. Hall had removed the ear plugs because he was shutting down the process to investigate a problem. Mr. Hall told a co-worker that his ear was hurting and went to see his supervisor. He told the supervisor that his ear hurt, and the supervisor referred Mr. Hall to the company nurse. The company nurse was not called to testify but the forms generated by Mr. Hall's visit to the nurse were introduced as business records. The records show that Mr. Hall had an inner ear infection, was out of the antibiotic he had been taking, and was referred to the company doctor. The records do not reflect that Mr. Hall claimed his ear problems were work-related. Neither do the doctor's notes from that same day reflect that Mr. Hall was claiming a work-related injury. Mr. Hall, however, - 2 -
Authoring Judge: Ben H. Cantrell, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III, |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/20/96 | |
| 01C01-9507-CC-00232
01C01-9507-CC-00232
|
Williamson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/20/96 | |
| Donna F. Peace v. Southern Home Carpet, Inc.
03S01-9512-CH-00134
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue on appeal is whether the Chancellor correctly denied the motion of the appellant that her award of benefits should be paid in lump sum. The husband of appellant suffered a fatal heart attack on February 1, 1995. For his death, she sought workers' compensation benefits as the sole surviving beneficiary, and the settlement of her claim, $382.79 weekly for 4 weeks, was approved by the Chancellor who declined to approve a lump sum payment. Accrued benefits were $8,2., timely paid. The plaintiff is 45 years old, a high school graduate, and is currently employed as a dental assistant, earning net pay of $1,3. monthly. She has no children and is the sole support of her disabled mother for whose care she pays $866.67 monthly. Her disposable income from all sources (inclusive of her mothers' SSI of $4.) is $3,358.76. The balance owing on her home mortgage is $45,., which she proposed to discharge; her monthly living expenses, including a mortgage payment and the expenses of her mother's care, are about $2,9.. The Chancellor observed that this is not a case where periodic payments are not needed as a substitute for wages. See Ponder v. Manchester Housing Auth., 87 S.W.2d 282 (Tenn. 1994). TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-279 authorizes lump sum payments of awards, with instructions to the trial court to consider the best interest of the employee together with his ability to wisely manage and control the award. The Chancellor expressly found that a lump sum would not be in the best interest of the plaintiff, whose ability to manage a large sum was questionable since she could not account for 25% of the accrued payments and has failed to file income tax returns for the last five (5) years. We fully concur in the Chancellor's judgment and find no abuse of discretion. Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 813-14 (Tenn. 1993). The judgment is affirmed at the costs of the appellant.
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. H. David Cate |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/20/96 | |
| Appeal, The Petitioner, Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-
02C01-9612-CC-00464
|
Lake County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/20/96 | |
| Corbin B. Scroggins v. Kenneth Ray Ely
03S01-9510-CH-00121
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue in this case is whether the trial judge erred in granting a summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's petition for workers' compensation benefits because there is no jurisdiction over this case in Tennessee. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts in the case are simple. On or around May 17, 1991, the plaintiff learned that Ely's Trucking, a Knoxville company, had a possible opening for a driver. The plaintiff learned this from another driver, who lived, as did the plaintiff, in Nebraska. The plaintiff called Ely's Trucking Company from his home in Nebraska. Ray Ely, the owner of the trucking company, and plaintiff discussed plaintiff's desire to work for Ely. The plaintiff's testimony, taken by deposition, clearly shows Ely made an offer of employment to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff accepted the offer at his home in Nebraska, where he was when the discussion took place. There was no written contract of employment between the plaintiff and Ely. The only document signed by the parties was a listing of benefits the plaintiff had with Ely's Trucking. This was signed on May 21, 1991 in Knoxville. The injury of which the plaintiff complained did not occur in Tennessee. The Chancellor found there was no jurisdiction to try the case in Tennessee. The evidence supports this finding. There was no contract of employment entered into in Tennessee, nor was the employment principally localized within this state as required by TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-115 to give jurisdiction to this state. The contract was completed in Nebraska when the plaintiff accepted the employment offer from Ely. Tolley v. General Accident Fire & Life Ins. Corp., 584 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1979). We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case thereto with costs assessed to the plaintiff. 2
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Originating Judge:Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/20/96 | |
| The Petitioner, Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-Cc-00267
02C01-9611-CC-00409
|
Lake County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/20/96 | |
| 1996. In The Present Appeal, The Petitioner, Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill,
02C01-9612-CC-00452
|
Lauderdale County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/20/96 | |
| Eunice Irene Freeman v. Sportswear and Associates and Liberty Mutual Insurance
01S01-9511-CV-00193
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special 1 Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff had suffered a 65% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and entered judgment accordingly. The issues raised by the defendant are: 1) Whether the proof preponderates against the trial court's judgment as excessive. 2) Whether the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff's award was not limited to two and a half times the medical impairment rating. 3) Whether the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff a lump sum payment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. There is no dispute that the plaintiff, who is 58 years of age, with a high school education, whose primary job was as a sewing machine operator, was injured in an industrial accident. Further, there is no dispute that the plaintiff sustained a permanent vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The plaintiff submitted the only medical evidence in this case. The physician testified that the plaintiff had sustained a 17% permanent medical impairment to the body as a whole. The plaintiff, her husband and a co-worker testified concerning the plaintiff's condition subsequent to the injury. Each of these witnesses testified to the limitations of the plaintiff's ability to perform work as a result of her injuries. Without question the plaintiff sustained a significant injury in this accident. The trial judge saw and heard the witnesses who testified in court and credited their testimony. Credibility of these witnesses is for the trial judge to find, and we do not, and can not, reweigh the credibility on appeal. On appeal, we review the judgment of the trial court with a presumption of correctness. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). We are required, however, to 2
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Originating Judge:Hon. Bobby Capers, |
Macon County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/20/96 | |
| Johnson Controls v. Shelby J. Cotham and Larry Brinton, Director, Second Injury Fund
01S01-9511-CV-00212
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Donald P. Harris, |
Johnson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/20/96 | |
| 01A01-9504-CH-00134
01A01-9504-CH-00134
Originating Judge:Vernon Neal |
Clay County | Court of Appeals | 06/19/96 | |
| 01A01-9511-CH-00515
01A01-9511-CH-00515
Originating Judge:Vernon Neal |
Pickett County | Court of Appeals | 06/19/96 | |
| 01A01-9603-CH-00131
01A01-9603-CH-00131
Originating Judge:Ellen Hobbs Lyle |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 06/19/96 | |
| Christopher v. Sockwell,
01A01-9511-CH-00505
Originating Judge:Jim T. Hamilton |
Lawrence County | Court of Appeals | 06/19/96 | |
| 01A01-9602-CH-00063
01A01-9602-CH-00063
Originating Judge:Robert S. Brandt |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 06/19/96 | |
| 01A01-9603-CH-00102
01A01-9603-CH-00102
Originating Judge:Robert S. Brandt |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 06/19/96 | |
| 02A01-9505-CV-00103
02A01-9505-CV-00103
Originating Judge:Robert L. Childers |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 06/17/96 | |
| State vs. Roy Smith
02C01-9712-CR-00468
|
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/17/96 | |
| 02S01-9410-CC-00069
02S01-9410-CC-00069
|
Supreme Court | 06/17/96 | ||
| 02C01-9410-CC-00248
02C01-9410-CC-00248
|
McNairy County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/17/96 | |
| 02S01-9410-CC-00069
02S01-9410-CC-00069
|
Supreme Court | 06/17/96 | ||
| 01A01-9509-CH-00397
01A01-9509-CH-00397
Originating Judge:Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 06/14/96 | |
| 01A01-9509-CH-00421
01A01-9509-CH-00421
Originating Judge:John J. Maddux |
Clay County | Court of Appeals | 06/14/96 | |
| 03C01-9505-CR-00141
03C01-9505-CR-00141
|
Hamilton County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/14/96 | |
| 01A01-9511-CH-00514
01A01-9511-CH-00514
Originating Judge:Leonard W. Martin |
Dickson County | Court of Appeals | 06/14/96 | |
| X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
|
Sevier County | Court of Appeals | 06/13/96 |