APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Ramone Lawson, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel which led to his convictions of one count of first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After reviewing the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, James Dominic Stevenson, appeals his Marshall County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment involving the use of a deadly weapon. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the element of identity. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the Petitioner for two counts of burglary of a building. In March 2018, before being convicted of the charges, the Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition seeking appointment of counsel and “an updated trial in another courtroom.” The habeas corpus court denied the petition because the Petitioner had not yet been convicted of the charged offenses and based upon the numerous procedural deficiencies in the petition. The Petitioner appeals the habeas corpus court’s denial. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

This is a dispute over a lease agreement for property upon which the lessor permitted the lessee to mine limestone. After the original lessor died, his estate demanded that the lessee provide weight tickets as provided in the lease agreement. When the lessee failed to comply, the estate filed suit and the lessee counterclaimed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the estate on its claim for declaratory judgment and declared that the lease agreement was terminated. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the estate on the lessee’s counterclaim for intentional interference with a business relationship. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

This appeal arises from a finding of dependency and neglect. S.Z. (“Mother”) is the mother of both E.Z. and B.G. (“the Children,” collectively). C.G. (“Father”) is the father of B.G.1 In the wake of certain non-accidental injuries sustained by B.G., Father’s father filed a petition seeking custody of the Children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) intervened, and the Children’s maternal grandfather filed a petition, as well. Mother and Father both denied abusing B.G. The Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) found the Children dependent and neglected. The Trial Court found also that Mother or Father abused B.G. and the other parent knows who committed the abuse, but the Trial Court held it could not determine which parent committed the abuse. Consequently, the Trial Court declined to find severe child abuse. DCS appeals to this Court, and Mother raises additional issues. We find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual finding that Mother or Father abused B.G. and the other knows who committed the abuse. Given that and other findings, we hold that the Trial Court erred in concluding that it could not find severe child abuse. We, therefore, reverse that aspect of the Trial Court’s judgment and hold that severe child abuse was proven by clear and convincing evidence. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

In this post-divorce petition to modify, the Appellant (former Husband) contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his obligation to provide life insurance for the benefit of Appellee (former Wife) was part of a property settlement and therefore not subject to modification.  The trial court’s order included an upward deviation for support of the parties’ youngest child for the twelve month period prior to her emancipation.  The trial court also ordered Appellant to pay college tuition equal to that of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville without providing any allowance for scholarships and sponsor fees received by the parties’ daughter.  The trial court further found that Appellant was not guilty of civil contempt for failure to make payments into Appellee’s retirement account under the terms of the parties’ Agreed Order of Legal Separation (AOLS).  However, the trial court refused to relieve Appellant of his obligation to continue funding Appellee’s retirement account at the same level as he funds his own retirement account.  We conclude from our review that the life insurance policy obligation constitutes spousal support, which is subject to modification.  We vacate the trial court’s judgment concerning college tuition and hold that Appellant is obligated to pay the cost of tuition and books, less scholarships and sponsor fees received by the parties’ daughter.  All other aspects of the trial court’s order are affirmed.  Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

This is a taxation dispute between the Commissioner of the Department of Revenue and a Tennessee corporation. The primary point of contention concerns the proper tax classification of the corporation under Tennessee’s Business Tax Act. After paying an amount of taxes that it deemed improper, the corporation filed a claim for refund. The Department of Revenue subsequently denied the claim for refund, and the corporation thereafter filed suit seeking a refund in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The litigation quickly advanced with the filing of competing cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the chancery court ruled in the corporation’s favor, specifically rejecting the Commissioner’s tax classification of the business. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

This is the second appeal of this wrongful termination of employment case. Appellant/Employee appeals the amount of post judgment interest awarded. Because the trial court’s order does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we cannot conduct a meaningful review. As such, we vacate and remand.

Appellant Mid South Title Services, LLC agreed to act as escrow agent for a real estate transaction in which Appellee Penklor Properties, LLC was the buyer. Appellee tendered earnest money, which, under the Purchase and Sale Agreement, was to be held by Appellant unless and until the parties to the Purchase and Sale Agreement submitted a signed written agreement changing the terms of the escrow. Very shortly after the Purchase and Sale Agreement was signed, Appellant received a purported amendment from the seller’s former attorney and real estate broker. The amendment requested that Appellant release $53,000.00 of the escrowed funds in satisfaction of the attorney/broker’s “former legal fees.” Without inquiring further, Appellant issued the requested check. Appellant later discovered that the amendment was not, in fact, authorized by the parties to the Purchase and Sale Agreement. Appellee filed suit against Appellant for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and the trial court entered judgment against Appellant. Appellant appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Louis Dane Devillier, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor theft, driving under the influence (“DUI”), and perjury, in exchange for concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the agreed-upon sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contests the manner of service of the sentence, contending that the trial court failed to find specific facts supporting enhancement factors and failed to give “due weight” to mitigating factors. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

I concur in the conclusion that the judgments of the trial court should be affirmed if the decision of this court must be made addressing the merits of the case. However, I would dismiss the appeal because, as the State correctly points out, the notice of appeal was not timely filed, and Defendant has failed to seek a waiver of the timely filing of the notice.

Because appellants’ notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days following the trial court’s final, appealable judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In this parental termination case, the juvenile court found four statutory grounds for termination of a mother’s parental rights and that termination of parental rights was in her children’s best interest. We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support all four grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest. So we affirm.

This case arises out of a dispute involving conflicting claims to the charter of a local affiliate of a national veteran’s service organization, the ownership of real property held by the local affiliate, and the right to manage a clubroom being operated on the property. The appellants, plaintiffs in the trial court, seek review of an order setting aside the deed upon which their claim to ownership derives and dismissing their claim for damages. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

A Morgan County jury convicted the Defendant, Erskine Andy Hunt, Jr., of one count of second degree murder, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, one count of attempted unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and two counts of reckless endangerment; the Defendant pleaded guilty to an additional count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-three years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder; (2) the State failed to disclose evidence it planned to introduce at trial; and (3) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury about the mental state required for a conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint, which ostensibly alleged declaratory judgment, inverse condemnation, and due process violations. We vacate the dismissal of Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim because that claim was not actually addressed in the trial court’s order of dismissal. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s ruling regarding retroactive child support. The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, the trial court’s order contains an inconsistency regarding the amount of the retroactive child support award. Specifically, the amount of arrears ordered does not comport with the accrual date for arrears listed in the trial court’s order. Because there are no findings, to resolve the inconsistency, we vacate the trial court’s award of retroactive child support. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

This appeal concerns a derivative action brought on behalf of a non-profit corporation. Citing alleged embezzlement and misappropriation of funds by the directors, plaintiffs, members of the non-profit at the time of filing, brought a derivative action on behalf of the fraternal and charitable organization. After filing the derivative suit, plaintiffs established and became members of a competing organization. Pursuant to the original organization’s constitution, this caused the plaintiffs to surrender all their membership rights in the original organization. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on plaintiffs’ lack of standing to maintain the derivative action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23.06. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims against defendants, holding that plaintiffs could not fairly and adequately represent the interest of the organization’s remaining members because they themselves were no longer members and because of the conflict of interest inherent in their establishment of the competing organization. We affirm.

This action concerns the closing of two estates and a conservatorship. A beneficiary appeals the court’s award of attorney fees and expenses to the attorney of record and the subsequent denial of his motion to continue the settlement of the estates. We affirm.

A business retained a professional accounting firm to value its common stock and stock options. Almost four years after the requested valuation report was provided, the president of the business claimed that one of the firm’s accountants had disclosed confidential information about the valuation to a third party. The president and the accounting firm entered a tolling agreement for his individual claim. But after attempts to resolve the dispute failed, the president and the business filed a complaint against the accounting firm for breach of contract, accounting malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty. The accounting firm moved for summary judgment, claiming the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Applying the one-year statute of limitations for accounting malpractice actions and concluding that the tolling agreement established a filing deadline for the president, the trial court ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims were untimely. Upon review, we conclude that the tolling agreement paused the running of the statute of limitations on the president’s confidentiality claim. So we vacate the dismissal of the president’s confidentiality claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.   

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, James Lucas Green, for driving under the influence (“DUI”), fifth offense, violation of the implied consent law, and violation of a habitual motor vehicle offender restriction. The trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence to be served at thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for DUI; (2) the trial court improperly overruled his Batson challenge; (3) the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentencing; and (4) cumulative error entitles him to relief. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a person listed as a joint tenant with right of survivorship on checking and savings accounts sufficiently alleged claims for relief against a bank by asserting that the bank removed his name from the accounts without his consent and breached its duty to him as a co-owner of the account by accepting forged signature cards. We conclude that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to survive the bank’s motion to dismiss because, under Tennessee law: (1) each joint tenant with right of survivorship of a multiple-party account is deemed an owner of the account; (2) all joint tenants have presumptively equal ownership of account funds; (3) a contractual relationship arises between a bank and joint tenants upon the creation of joint tenancy bank accounts; (4) contracts cannot be modified except upon consent of the parties; and (5) no statute affords banks protection from liability for removing a joint tenant’s name from an account without the joint tenant’s consent. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s judgment granting the bank’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Ellen Becker Goldberg, of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, misdemeanor assault, and stalking for offenses committed against her neighbor, who suffered from chronic illness and physical disability. The Defendant was sentenced to serve three years of supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the value of the vandalized property, the mens rea for vandalism, or ownership of the property; that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for assault; that the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of stalking, particularly in light of the statutory exclusion for constitutionally protected conduct; that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence regarding the value of the vandalized property; and that the Defendant was erroneously sentenced under the incorrect theft statute. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the savings statute in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112 applies to the revisions to the theft statute in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-105(a). Accordingly, we remand for resentencing and for the correction of errors on the judgment forms. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This matter involves the grant of summary judgment to defendant, K-VA-T Food Stores Inc. (Food City), in a slip and fall case. Plaintiff, Leah Keirsey, filed an action alleging that, on a rainy day, defendant negligently maintained its premises and failed to warn her of hazardous conditions. Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that it exercised reasonable care to prevent injury to its customers and warned them of potentially wet conditions; its motion was granted. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Owners of a cat filed a wrongful death complaint against the cat’s veterinarian and animal hospital. The defendants admitted liability for wrongly placing a feeding tube into the cat’s trachea rather than her esophagus, causing the cat to aspirate and die when she was fed through the tube. The trial court found the defendants were not liable because the cat was so ill she likely would not have survived long anyway, and it dismissed the complaint. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a determination of damages.