APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Derrick Pierce, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial which forced him to plead guilty after the trial began, and the State had presented proof. Following a review of the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, James Carroll, filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of aggravated assault and driving under the influence (DUI), second offense and effective four-year, six-month sentence. In the petition, the Petitioner alleged that (1) the State violated his due process rights by failing to collect and preserve evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), and that (2) his trial counsel was ineffective (a) by failing to challenge the State’s Ferguson violation and (b) by advising the Petitioner to waive his motion for new trial and his direct appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendant on a premises liability claim. Because the plaintiff offered no evidence to support an essential element of her premises liability claim at the summary judgment stage, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Narrell Pierce, filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of attempted aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a felon. The Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his attempted aggravated robbery conviction, (2) failing to object to his co-defendant’s testimony, (3) depriving the Petitioner of his constitutional right to testify, and (4) failing to present a ballistics expert. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Lamar M. Cullom, appeals the White County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance with regard to Exhibit 6, an unedited audio/video recording of the drug transaction between the Petitioner and a confidential informant that was not shown to the jury. The Petitioner specifically contends that (1) trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s comment that the unedited recording did not have “substance”; (2) trial counsel failed to use the unedited recording during his cross-examination of the confidential informant; (3) trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s comment to the jury that the unedited recording contained just transportation, that no one was there, and that anything else on it was irrelevant; (4) trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s comment to the jury that the trial court was correct in stating that the unedited recording contained just transportation, that no one was there, and that anything else on it was irrelevant; (5) trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s ruling that the jury could not view the unedited recording; and (6) the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors prejudiced him. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This opinion is being filed contemporaneously with our opinion in Cox v. Lucas, No. E2017-02264-COA-R3-CV. Each case involves a custody dispute between Laura Nicole Lucas (mother) and one of her two ex-husbands. In the present case, Lewis Alvin Minyard (father) filed a petition in the trial court for ex parte emergency relief and modification of the permanent parenting plan. Over two and a half years later, mother filed a motion to dismiss all orders resulting from father’s petition as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mother argued that father’s petition included allegations of dependency and neglect, which implicated the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied mother’s motion. Mother appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This opinion is being filed contemporaneously with our opinion in Minyard v. Lucas, No. E2017-02261-COA-R3-CV.1 Each case involves a post-divorce custody dispute between Laura Nicole Lucas (mother) and one of her two ex-husbands. In the present case, Bradley James Cox (father) filed a petition in the trial court for ex parte emergency relief and modification of the permanent parenting plan. Nearly two years later, mother filed a motion to dismiss all orders resulting from father’s petition as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mother argued that father’s petition included allegations of dependency and neglect, which implicated the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied mother’s motion. Mother appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Alexander R. Carino, pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to forty-three years of incarceration. The Petitioner did not appeal his convictions and did not file a timely post-conviction petition. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas corpus court summarily dismissed. This court affirmed. Alexander R. Carino v. State, M2017-00345- CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3311196, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 3, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017). The Petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred and should have waived the statute of limitations because his trial counsel did not give him his case file to prepare the petition and because he had been denied access to the prison legal library, thereby delaying the filing of his petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Petitioner, O’Dell Taylor Wisdom, appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se pleading in which he alleges that his convictions for failure to appear and contempt violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Rico Eugene Mallard, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his convictions for first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and first degree premeditated murder and his effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-two years. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A trial court terminated a father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support, abandonment by willful failure to visit, and persistence of conditions. The father appealed, arguing that the evidence did not support the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that it was not in the child’s best interest for his rights to be terminated. We reverse the trial court’s judgment terminating the father’s rights based on persistence of conditions because the child was not removed from the father’s home by an order of the court, as Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) requires. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

The petitioner, Terrence Justin Feaster, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his 2012 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Quinton Dujaun Primm, was convicted in the Dickson County Circuit Court of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and selling less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony, and received consecutive sentences of twenty-five and fifteen years, respectively. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing a lay witness to testify about what the witness heard on an audiotape, that the trial court erred by refusing to declare a mistrial when a witness revealed that the Appellant had been incarcerated previously, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Edwin Millan, appeals his Bradley County Criminal Court jury convictions of filing a false or fraudulent insurance claim, initiating a false police report, and tampering with evidence. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence, that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to correct false testimony offered by a State’s witness, that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that certain witnesses were accomplices as a matter of law, that the trial court erred by permitting a witness to testify as an expert, that the trial court erred by permitting certain testimony, that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the evidence tampering charge, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by ordering a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In 2014, the Petitioner, Randall Wallace Kidd, pleaded guilty to filing a false police report; he later filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, which the trial court denied. While released on bond, the Petitioner failed to appear for his sentencing hearing and was indicted and convicted at trial for failure to appear. The trial court imposed a nine-year sentence for the false police report conviction and a consecutive three-year sentence for the failure to appear conviction. In 2016, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had not entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily due to intoxication and that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his guilty plea hearing and at trial. The post-conviction court held a hearing on the petition and denied relief. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, David Englebert, entered guilty pleas to aggravated robbery and four counts of aggravated assault pursuant to a plea agreement, in exchange for an effective sentence of twelve years to be served with an eighty-five percent release eligibility date. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was never informed of the elements of the offense of aggravated robbery. The post-conviction court denied his claim without making any findings of fact, and the Petitioner appeals. We conclude that the Petitioner has not established prejudice with regard to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment denying that claim. Because there is inconsistent evidence regarding whether the Petitioner was informed about the elements of the offense, we remand for the post-conviction court to make factual findings and credibility determinations relevant to the claim that the Petitioner’s pleas were not knowing and voluntary.

Plaintiff real estate developer appeals the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to the defendants on claims of tortious interference with a contract, inducement of breach of contract, and promissory fraud. Because the plaintiff failed to construct any argument responsive to the stated basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we affirm. 

Defendant, Richard Lee Diviney, Sr., contends that his guilty plea should be set aside because the fee provision of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-420(h)-(j) is unconstitutional and that the trial court erred by not “actually” applying a mitigating factor during sentencing. After a thorough review, we determine that Defendant’s challenge to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-420(h)-(j) was resolved by the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Decosimo, 555 S.W.3d 494 (Tenn. 2018). Additionally, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion when sentencing Defendant. Thus, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but remand for entry of corrected judgments that properly indicate the merger of Counts Two and Three into Count One.

An inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed this action to challenge the confiscation and destruction of his property and the decision of the prison grievance board concerning said property. The respondents denied the allegations. The trial court dismissed the petition as to all respondents. We affirm.

The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based on the post-conviction court’s finding that the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his pro se petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing, and the State concedes that the post-conviction court erred. After a review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for the appointment of counsel and for an evidentiary hearing.

Father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

The Petitioner, Michael J. McCann, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that a probation revocation involving certain 1994 drug convictions was in error and that the erroneous probation revocation led to an incorrect calculation of his pretrial jail credits. After a review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the habeas corpus court did not commit error, and we affirm the habeas court’s dismissal of the petition.

An inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed this action to challenge the confiscation and destruction of his property and the decision of the prison grievance board concerning said property. The respondents denied the allegations. The trial court dismissed the petition as to all respondents. We affirm.

Petitioner, Raymond Arthur Klein, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After thorough review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to prove that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur in the conclusion that the Circuit Court for Davidson County correctly denied the petition of Ms. Nancy Maureen Jarman to increase her alimony.  But I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the award of attorney’s fees to Ms. Jarman.  I share the view of Franklin N. Jarman that the trial court lacked the authority to award attorney’s fees in this instance.