APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Donald Douglas, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a direct appeal in exchange for a sentence of eight years and that his trial counsel was ineffective. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the postconviction court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Marshall County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, William Waylon Hanson, of violating an order declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender, failing to provide evidence of financial responsibility, and passing another vehicle in a no passing zone. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to prohibit the Appellant from collaterally attacking the order declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender, by limiting the defense’s closing argument, and by admitting the Appellant’s driving record into evidence through an employee of the Department of Safety and Homeland Security. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Joseph Langlinais, of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and attempted rape of a child, and he received an effective sentence of twenty eight years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The Defendant also challenges the admission of his recorded statement to law enforcement, alleging that the recording was inadmissible due to its poor quality, that the recording contained inadmissible evidence of the Defendant’s bad acts, and that the recording violated his right to confront witnesses. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Kimberly Johnson Hart, of facilitation of possession with intent to sell one-half ounce or more of marijuana and facilitation of possession with intent to sell less than two pounds of tetrahydrocannabinol, a schedule VI narcotic. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction, thirty days to be served in jail, with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred when it denied her request for judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Trial Court in this custody proceeding attempted to certify as a final judgment, pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the order entered on March 31, 2017, which resolved all issues in the proceedings below except those related to the payment of child support for the benefit of the parties’ minor child. Because the order fails to expressly determine in accordance with the rule that “there is no just reason for delay,” the order is not appealable as a certified final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02. See Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983). We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal and it is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new appeal once a final judgment or appropriately certified final judgment has been entered.

This is an appeal in a divorce proceeding wherein the Mother of the parties’ child appeals the trial court’s designation of Father as primary residential parent and designation of the residential parenting schedule, contending that the trial court failed to properly consider Father’s history of domestic violence and abuse against her. Upon our review we have determined that the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court did not include a discussion of the impact of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406 on the finding of domestic violence; accordingly, we vacate the decision and remand the case for the court to make appropriate findings in that regard.

This is an animal cruelty case. The circuit court entered an order finding Appellant guilty of numerous violations of the city’s animal cruelty, animal hoarding and vaccinations ordinances. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we vacate the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff brought an action against a local utility district for damages allegedly arising from the construction and maintenance of a water line on plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief. The utility company moved to dismiss, asserting that it was immune from suit or, alternatively, that plaintiff’s action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the utility company’s motion. The court concluded that plaintiff’s claim for damages were barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The court further concluded that plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was barred by the GTLA’s one-year statute of limitations. And the court determined that the action would be barred by the one-year statute of limitation applicable to governmental takings. We conclude that the gravamen of plaintiff’s claim was for inverse condemnation, and the action was time barred.  

In February 2013, the Defendant, Joshua Teffeteller, pleaded guilty to identity theft, and the trial court granted judicial diversion and ordered him to serve three years on Community Corrections. On September 17, 2015, the Defendant was charged with numerous offenses and, the following day, the Defendant’s Community Corrections officer filed an affidavit, alleging that the Defendant had violated his Community Corrections sentence on multiple grounds. The Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges on March 7, 2016, and received additional Community Corrections sentences. On August 25, 2016, another probation violation warrant was issued and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentences and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement rather than reinstating his Community Corrections sentences; and (2) that one of his sentences had expired. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Claimants asserted monetary claims against the State of Tennessee for personal injuries and property damage resulting from an automobile accident with a state employee. The Tennessee Claims Commission found the State liable and awarded compensatory damages. On appeal, the State argues that the Claims Commission erred in awarding damages for medical expenses based on the claimants’ unadjusted medical bills. Upon review, we conclude that the collateral source rule precludes introduction of evidence of insurance adjustments to claimants’ medical bills. Accordingly, we affirm.

The Appellant, Randel Lee Burnett, II, pled guilty in the Fayette County Circuit Court to vehicular homicide by intoxication, aggravated child neglect, and three counts of vehicular assault. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences and erred by ordering consecutive sentencing based upon his being a dangerous offender. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court improperly applied two enhancement factors during sentencing but that the length of the Appellant’s sentences is not excessive. We also conclude that the trial court did not err by ordering consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Hardin County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Darlene F. Hottiman, of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, a Class E felony, and driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor, and she received an effective four-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions due to her defense of necessity; that the trial court made improper comments to an alternate juror, made improper comments about the length of jury deliberations, and made improper comments about plea negotiations during the sentencing hearing; and that the trial court improperly enhanced her felony sentence based upon her prior criminal history and should have granted her request for probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Cedric Taylor, filed a post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. In the petition, the Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by calling an alibi witness whose testimony was not favorable to the Petitioner. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee appeals the Claims Commission’s award of damages to a mother and daughter who were injured in an automobile accident with a state employee driving a state-owned vehicle. Discerning no error in the award of damages, we affirm the decision.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right from the denial of a motion for recusal. The petition for recusal appeal was filed twenty-four days after entry of the order denying the motion. Because the appeal was untimely, we dismiss. 

This case involves an order of protection sought by the petitioner against the respondent, who is the petitioner’s brother-in-law, on behalf of the petitioner and her two minor daughters. The petitioner previously had obtained an order of protection that had expired in May 2016. On March 24, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition seeking a one-year, no-contact order of protection, alleging that, inter alia, since entry of the prior order, the respondent had repeatedly attempted to influence her by following through on threats to obtain custody of the petitioner’s two minor daughters. The trial court initially granted an ex parte order of protection as to the petitioner but denied the petition as to the children, questioning whether standing existed because the petitioner did not at that time have physical or legal custody of her daughters. Following a subsequent bench trial, the trial court found that the petitioner had standing to petition for an order of protection on behalf of her children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-602(b). Also finding that the respondent posed a danger to the petitioner and her children, the trial court extended the ex parte order into a one-year, no-contact order of protection against the respondent on behalf of the petitioner and modified the order of protection to include the petitioner’s children. The court also awarded to the petitioner reasonable attorney’s fees. The respondent appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of the pro se plaintiff’s discrimination action against Tennessee State University and certain administrators. The court determined that the plaintiff had requested relief beyond its authority to award and granted the motion to dismiss in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Regina Mullins (petitioner) sought an order of protection against Amy Hernandez (respondent), the grandmother of one of petitioner’s children. The parties were living together in an apartment when respondent allegedly threatened petitioner and her mother with a handgun. After a hearing, the trial court found that respondent did threaten petitioner, and that “there was a gun involved,” but held that these facts did not constitute “legally sufficient proof for an order of protection to be issued.” We hold that the facts found by the trial court provide a legal basis for the issuance of an order of protection under the statutes governing such orders, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601 et seq. (2017). Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the issuance of a protective order.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the grounds of: (1) failure to establish/exercise paternity; (2) abandonment by willful failure to support; and (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because Appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services did not meet its burden to show that Father has the ability to pay support, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

After a bench trial, a judge found the Defendant, Artt Tanner Horne, guilty of theft of property valued less than $500 and sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days of unsupervised probation. The trial court also ordered that he stay away from Walmart, where the theft occurred, and continue with his mental health treatment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is the fourth appeal in a case primarily concerned with whether two individual defendants are liable on loan guaranties. Following the third appeal, we remanded the case to the trial court to determine: (1) whether one of the defendants is liable under a Guaranty of Validity of Collateral (“GVC”); (2) whether prejudgment interest should be awarded to the lender on personal guaranties both defendants signed; and (3) whether the lender is entitled to recover additional attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing the guaranties since the previous appeal. On remand following the third appeal, the trial court found that the defendant was not liable on the GVC. The trial court also found that the lender was not entitled to prejudgment interest because the lender committed fraud, and it declined to award the lender any additional attorney’s fees. Although the defendants prevailed on all three issues, they appeal, seeking reconsideration of this court’s determination in an earlier appeal that the defendants failed to prove their claim of fraud, which would relieve them of any liability. The lender counters, insisting that this court’s previous decision, wherein we affirmed the trial court’s determination that the defendants failed to prove fraud, is the law of the case. The lender also raises its own issues for our consideration, including whether the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning fraud, as stated in the final order drafted by counsel for the defendants, reflects the trial court’s independent judgment. A careful review of the trial court’s oral ruling from the bench and the written order, as well as previous findings of fact made by the trial court, leads us to conclude that some of the findings of fact stated in the final order do not reflect the trial court’s independent judgment. Therefore, the presumption under Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) that a trial court’s specific findings of fact are supported by the evidence shall be limited to those findings that appear to reflect the independent judgment of the trial court. We have also determined that the law of the case doctrine precludes us from reconsidering the defendants’ claim of fraud. We affirm the trial court’s determination that one of the defendants is not liable on the GVC, albeit, on different grounds. We reverse the trial court’s decision not to award the lender prejudgment interest and additional attorney’s fees, finding that the lender has a statutory right to prejudgment interest and a contractual right to recover reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees that the lender incurred to enforce the guaranties. Therefore, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Stewart County jury convicted the defendant, Toby Shane Earhart, of two counts of child abuse. On appeal, the defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; the trial court erred by admitting a videotaped forensic interview of the victim; the trial court erred by excluding the defendant’s expert witness; and the trial court erred when imposing consecutive sentences. Based upon our thorough review of the record, we agree the trial court erred when admitting the forensic interview; however, this error was harmless. Additionally, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when excluding the defendant’s expert witness, and the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Stephen D. Demps, the Defendant, was convicted of five counts of rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court merged counts six and eight, aggravated sexual battery, into counts two and four, rape of a child. He received a total effective sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, he argues that: (1) his statement during his December 2013 interview with law enforcement should have been suppressed because he was in custody and was not informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (2) his statement during his January 2014 interview with law enforcement should have been suppressed because he was coerced into confessing; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after individuals spoke to the sequestered victim during trial; and (4) the State failed to properly submit a bill of particulars and he was prejudiced by this failure. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

This complaint is a forcible entry and detainer action. Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for default judgment. The order appealed is not a final judgment so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. Because the trial court entered its order dismissing Appellant’s complaint while the appeal was pending in this Court, we vacate the order of dismissal.

The Petitioner, Bobby Daniel Pettie, appeals from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief due to numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.