APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Robert C. Clanton, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Lavonte Dominique Simmon, appeals as of right his jury convictions for first degree premeditated murder and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the following errors: (1) that the Defendant was deprived of his right to present a viable defense when the trial court permitted Charles Maples to assert the privilege against self-incrimination and, thereafter, refused to allow defense counsel to withdraw so that defense counsel could testify about Mr. Maples’ past statements; (2) that the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment after the State failed to preserve exculpatory evidence in the form of Mr. Maples’ testimony; (3) that the trial court should have granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to the police in light of testimony that the Defendant suffered a brain injury causing intellectual impairment, that the Defendant invoked his right to counsel, and that the Defendant did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights; (4) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce numerous photographs of weapons, weapons-related items, and ammunition found during the search of the home where the Defendant was apprehended; (5) that the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions because the State failed to prove that the Defendant was the person who shot the murder victim or that the Defendant acted with premeditation; and (6) that the trial court should have instructed the jury on diminished capacity.Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In a prior appeal, this Court remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of its marital property division. The trial court affirmed its previous award and awarded an additional sum to former wife as her equitable portion of the parties’ marital property. The trial court, however, declined to calculate post-judgment interest on the additional award as of the effective date of the divorce, pursuant to this Court’s holding in Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). On appeal, former wife argues that Watson did not deprive the trial court of discretion to calculate post-judgment interest as of the earlier date. We affirm.

This is an action by the ex-wife of the decedent to establish a constructive trust to the proceeds of a life insurance policy that are payable as a consequence of the death of the plaintiff’s ex-husband. In the 2011 Final Decree, the ex-husband was ordered to maintain a specified life insurance policy in the amount of $500,000 with the plaintiff to be designated as the sole beneficiary. Following the divorce, the ex-husband allowed the specified policy to lapse; however, he maintained a second life insurance policy that had a death benefit of $250,000 with seventy percent of the death benefits payable to the plaintiff and thirty percent to the decedent’s mother. Following the ex-husband’s death, the plaintiff commenced this action against the decedent’s mother and the insurance company. The decedent’s mother filed an answer in which she claimed the plaintiff had no legal rights to the insurance policy at issue. The decedent’s mother also claimed she had a vested right to her share of the death benefits based on an oral contract. The insurance company deposited the insurance proceeds into court and was dismissed from the case. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, relying principally on the holding in Holt v. Holt, 995 S.W.2d 68 (Tenn. 1999). We affirm, finding the decedent’s mother had no vested interest in the policy.

The Petitioner, Allen Craft, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective (1) for not filing a motion to sever his case from his codefendant; and (2) for failing “to introduce expert testimony which would tend to negate the requisite mental state required for the offense.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issues on appeal involve the proper number of days upon which to base the calculation of child support, the propriety of the award of extraordinary educational expenses under the parties’ permanent parenting plan, and attorney’s fees. Having determined that the trial court erred in its determination of child support and extraordinary educational expenses, we affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.  

The Defendant, Damarko D. Clay, appeals as of right from his convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s decision to apply the amended version of Code section 39-14-105, which provides the grading of theft offenses, when calculating the defendant’s sentence. The defendant asserts that the State has no right to appeal the ruling of the trial court and, in the alternative, that the trial court correctly applied the amended statute in this case. The defendant also appeals the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to adequately establish the value of the stolen property. We agree with the defendant that no appeal of right lies for the State pursuant to either Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 or Code section 40-35-402. Because we have concluded that the trial court exceeded its authority by the application of the amended version of Code section 39-14-105 before the effective date, we could treat the improperly-filed Rule 3 appeal as a common law petition for writ of certiorari. We need not do so, however, because, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13, this court acquired jurisdiction of the State’s claim when the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Following our review of the issues presented, we hold that sufficient evidence supports the defendant’s conviction but that the trial court erred by applying the amended version of Code section 39-14-105. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction but vacate the six-year sentence imposed by the trial court and remand the case for the entry of a modified judgment reflecting a 12-year sentence for a Class D felony conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000.

In this appeal concerning insurance coverage, Jefferson County Schools (“Plaintiff”) sued its insurers, Tennessee Risk Management Trust and Travelers Indemnity Company (“Defendants”), in the Chancery Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”). Building 8 at Jefferson County High School collapsed during a rainstorm. The Tennessee State Fire Marshal’s Office ordered Plaintiff to implement repairs to prevent a future collapse of both the damaged and undamaged portions. Plaintiff asserted that, pursuant to an “ordinance or law” provision in its insurance policy, Defendants were responsible for coverage for additional work in undamaged portions of Building 8 in order to comply with the Fire Marshal’s directive. Defendants argue in response that the additional work was discretionary and went beyond what the insurance policy covered. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We hold that the Fire Marshal’s directive, issued under that office’s authority, qualified as an “ordinance or law.” Defendants were, therefore, required to cover the additional work. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for determination and entry of a monetary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.

A landowner hired an individual she supervised at work to paint her house outside of work. The landowner provided the painter with material and ladders for the job. While he was using the folding ladder and painting one of the house’s eaves, the painter fell to the ground and injured his wrist. The painter sued the landowner for damages, asserting the landowner was negligent for providing him with old ladders that were unsafe. The landowner moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted after finding the painter was unable to prove cause in fact or proximate cause. The painter appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Deandrey Peterson, appeals his convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony for which he received an effective thirty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) in allowing the State to present evidence of offenses committed against other victims. We conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting evidence of other criminal offenses. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Joseph Ellison, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because “there was no factual basis for” them. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Deandrey Peterson, appeals his convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and his effective thirty-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) in admitting evidence of other offenses. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions but remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing for the firearm conviction.

Mario Antoine Leggs, the Defendant, filed a motion requesting an ex parte injunction and hearing, arguing that the judgments in his case were invalid because they did not have a file stamp date. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion because the judgments were signed by the trial court and entered on November 29, 2001. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying relief. The State contends that the Defendant does not have an appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 from the denial of a motion requesting injunctive relief. Additionally, the State argues that the lack of a file stamp date does not invalidate the Defendant’s judgments. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal.

The Defendant, Timothy R. Maness, appeals his convictions for one count of rape, one count of misdemeanor assault, one count of incest, and two counts of sexual battery, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal, and the interest of justice does not support waiver of the timely filing requirement. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Christopher L. Williams, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The coram nobis court summarily denied his petition on the grounds that it was untimely filed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the petition was timely filed and that the coram nobis court erred in denying relief without a hearing. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

Doris Annette Christenberry (“Plaintiff”), pro se, appeals the April 19, 2017 judgment of the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., among other things. Plaintiff’s brief on appeal fails to comply in any meaningful way with Tenn. R. App. P. 27. We, therefore, find that Plaintiff has waived her issues on appeal.

This appeal presents the issue of whether a trial court may properly transfer a probate proceeding that was allegedly filed in the wrong county to the county where the decedent was residing when he passed away. The administratrix of the probate estate was appointed by the Campbell County Chancery Court upon the filing of a verified petition alleging that the decedent died in Lake City, Tennessee. A defendant in a wrongful death lawsuit, subsequently filed by the administratrix regarding the death of the decedent, filed a motion in the Campbell County Chancery Court, seeking to have the previously issued letters of administration revoked because the decedent was residing in a nursing facility in Anderson County at the time of his death. Rather than revoking the letters of administration, the Campbell County Chancery Court transferred the probate matter to Anderson County. Subsequently, the Anderson County Chancery Court denied a similar motion, stating that it had no jurisdiction to revoke letters of administration issued by the Campbell County Chancery Court. The movant has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the Campbell County Court’s order transferring the probate action to Anderson County.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint with prejudice based upon collateral estoppel and res judicata. The record before us reveals that as many as ten other actions have been commenced by the same parties in state and federal courts in which Plaintiffs have repeatedly challenged the validity of Defendants’ efforts to foreclose on property in Eads, Tennessee. To commence this action, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint to Set Aside Foreclosure and Declare Foreclosure a Nullity, for Damages, and for Legal and Equitable Relief. Defendants challenged the complaint by filing a Motion to Dismiss Complaint, contending that Plaintiffs waived their right to contest the foreclosure pursuant to a settlement agreement they entered into following mediation in one of the federal court proceedings. Defendants also contend that the same issues that are raised in this action were litigated in the federal courts, and that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable. The chancellor granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed this action based on collateral estoppel and res judicata. We affirm.

A Bedford County jury convicted the Defendant, Steven W. Davis, of attempted rape and attempted incest. The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him by misapplying an enhancement factor and by denying his request for alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

After a bench trial, the trial court found the Defendant, Hugh Everret Burt, guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor for knowingly possessing less than fifty sexual images of minors. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years and six months, with six months to be served in jail and the remaining served through Community Corrections. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence against him is insufficient and that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve a portion of the sentence in jail. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal involves a homeowner’s lawsuit against a construction company for breach of contract and negligence. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the homeowner for $135,383.93 and denied a counterclaim filed by the construction company for the balance of the contract price. The construction company appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its calculation of damages and in denying the counterclaim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant appeals the dismissal of this action on the ground of res judicata. We hold that an essential element of res judicata—that the underlying judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction—is not met in this case. Here, the court that rendered the judgment relied upon lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the doctrine of prior suit pending. The trial court’s judgment of dismissal is therefore reversed.

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Kentucky State Reformatory, who brought an action against the Clerk and Master of the Davidson County, Tennessee, Chancery Court, appeals the dismissal of his suit for failure to comply with statutory provisions applicable to suits brought in Tennessee by inmates incarcerated in Tennessee facilities and for failing to pay the filing fee. Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering that the filing fee be paid from his inmate trust account. Upon a review of the record, we determine that neither the statutes relied upon by the court in dismissing the suit nor those relied upon by the plaintiff in contesting the dismissal apply to the case at bar; we have further determined that the dismissal was proper for Plaintiff’s failure to pay the fees required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-21-401 or secure such relief from the requirement as may be available to him. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of this action.      

An Anderson Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Melissa L. Lopez, of aggravated child neglect, and the trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction, arguing that the State failed to prove her neglect resulted in the victim’s injuries. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.