APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case arises out of the dissolution of a law firm and the resulting accounting. The trial court held that Appellant, who withdrew as a member of the Appellee/Firm, converted a portion of an earned fee by withdrawing the fee directly from the Firm’s trust account. The trial court further held that the conversion was done through concealment so as to warrant an award of punitive damages. Appellant appeals the trial court’s finding of conversion, the award of punitive damages, and its award of various accounts receivable and payables. We reverse the trial court’s award of punitive damages against Appellant and reduce the compensatory damages award.  

The Petitioner, Warren Pratcher, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his second petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that his first petition had been withdrawn with prejudice. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

I respectfully concur separately in this case to clarify a distinction between, on the one hand, the post-conviction court’s ordering a dismissal of the first petition with prejudice and, on the other hand, the petitioner’s waiver of post-conviction relief upon the voluntary dismissal of the first petition. Although I believe the latter may be effectual, I believe the former is not effectual apart from the petitioner’s waiver.

The petitioner, John Valentine, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Brandon Washington, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his convictions of aggravated assault, evading arrest, and various drug offenses. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Julius Perkins, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree felony murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his conviction is void because of a faulty indictment and that the court erred by dismissing his petition without appointing counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, James A. Kilgore, pled guilty to attempted conspiracy to manufacture more than 300 grams of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and attempted initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class C felony, in exchange for respective ten- and five-year sentences, to be served consecutively. The five-year term was to be served on supervised probation; whereas, the manner of service for the ten-year term was to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve the ten-year sentence in confinement, which, on appeal, the Defendant challenges as error. We affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Andrew Shearin, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to sexual exploitation of a minor involving more than 100 images, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by misapplying enhancement factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. The juvenile court found three statutory grounds for termination of parental rights: abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions. The juvenile court also found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing that the mother abandoned the children by failure to support. But the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the other grounds for termination and that termination is in the children’s best interest. Thus, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Defendant, Kenneth Bernard Scott, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of the sale and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and two counts of the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective term of sixteen years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by allowing laboratory reports into evidence without the testimony of the technician who conducted the testing and prepared the reports; and (2) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Claimant estate appeals the dismissal of its claim against the State related to the failure of a State prison to provide medical care to an inmate. Following a trial, the Claims Commission dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A jury convicted LaJuan Harbison of four counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in denying Harbison’s request for a separate trial, that his multiple convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, and that the evidence was insufficient to support one of the counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion by denying Harbison’s motion for severance; whether Harbison waived the double jeopardy issue; and if not, whether Harbison’s convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violate the prohibition against double jeopardy where he used one firearm but was convicted of multiple dangerous felonies against different victims. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harbison’s request for a separate trial; Harbison did not waive the double jeopardy issue; and his multiple convictions for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, reinstate Harbison’s three convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and three convictions for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and remand to the trial court for resentencing and corrected judgments.

This appeal arises from the modification of a parenting plan in a post-divorce action. The original 2010 parenting plan awarded the parties equal parenting time. When the parties’ only child started school in 2012, the parents informally modified the parenting schedule so that Father had parenting time every other weekend and the parents split the holidays equally. In 2015, Mother commenced this action seeking court approval of the informal parenting schedule. The trial court granted Mother’s petition to modify and adopted Mother’s proposed parenting plan. Father appeals, claiming the trial court erred by, inter alia, failing to make findings of fact as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, miscalculating Father’s parenting time, awarding Mother sole education and
non-emergency healthcare decision-making authority, ordering the child to attend a certain elementary school, awarding Mother a judgment for her attorney’s fees, and assessing post-judgment interest at 5.5%. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Mother is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c).

In March 2004, the trial court entered a final order finding the employee permanently and totally disabled and awarding benefits of $274.49 per week “until he is eligible for full benefits in the Old Age Insurance Benefit Program under the Social Security Act.” The trial court also ordered that 180 weeks of benefits and attorney’s fees would be paid to the employee in a lump sum. In May 2016, the employer filed a motion to amend, alleging that the order should have reflected the employee’s retirement age as sixty-five (65) and should have stated “with specificity when [the employer] shall receive a credit for the commuted portion of the award.” The trial court found that the motion was untimely and that, in any event, the final order provided the employee with weekly benefits “through the date of his eligibility for full benefits in the Old Age Insurance Benefit Program under the Social Security Act as of the date of the entry of the Final Judgment,” i.e., age sixty-seven (67). We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

The defendant, Jeffrey Wayne Hughes, pled guilty to one count of theft over $250,000, one count of theft between $10,000 and $60,000, and six counts of money laundering. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred when failing to apply certain mitigating factors, denying probation on the money laundering offenses, and ordering his theft convictions to be served consecutively to his money laundering convictions. Following our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. The child’s physical custodians petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights. The trial court found that the petitioners had established, by clear-and-convincing evidence, three grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent, with the parent having exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to his incarceration; (2) incarceration with a child under age eight and a prison sentence of ten years or more; and (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal from the father’s home. The trial court also determined that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. The father appeals the three grounds for termination found by the trial court. The father also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We reverse as to the ground of persistence of conditions, but affirm termination of the father’s rights on both other grounds. We also affirm the trial court’s conclusion that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Father filed a petition for modification of a permanent parenting plan seeking designation as the primary residential parent of the parties’ two children. Mother filed a counter-petition for modification of the residential parenting schedule in the permanent parenting plan. After a hearing, the trial court denied Father’s petition and granted Mother’s petition, reducing Father’s parenting time by twenty-four days. Father appealed. Because the trial court did not conduct an appropriate best interest analysis, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings as necessary.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Curtis Johnson, Jr., was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and was sentenced to twenty-four years’ imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing partially consecutive sentences. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Trevial Moss, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to twelve years’ confinement. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the verdict is contrary to the law and weight of the evidence; (3) the State withheld discovery material in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); and (4) the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence. Upon our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Joseph D. Sexton, entered an open guilty plea to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced the Defendant to five years of incarceration. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in calculating the length of the sentence based on the enhancing and mitigating factors presented and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that there was no abuse of discretion, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Dannie Weaver, the Petitioner, entered a best interest plea to driving under the influence, possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with prior convictions, possession of a Schedule II drug, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a violation of the seat belt law. The Petitioner received a total effective sentence of four years with thirty-five percent release eligibility, which was suspended to probation following the service of thirty-five days in jail. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and alleged that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that, absent the deficient performance, the Petitioner would have proceeded to trial. The Petitioner also alleged that his best interest plea was involuntary and unknowing. The post-conviction court denied relief and the Petitioner appealed. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Keenan Scott McNeal, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for the sale of one-half gram or more of a substance containing cocaine within 1000 feet of a child care facility, for which he is serving an eight-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Purchasers of an unimproved parcel of real property filed suit against their grantor’s seller, claiming that the seller violated the warranty of title that it issued to the purchasers’ grantor. This action was filed several years after a related class action lawsuit was concluded in which the trial court ruled that the class plaintiffs’ units were properly classified as condominiums rather than fee simple estates. The trial court in the instant action dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata and estoppel by deed, among other grounds. The purchasers appeal, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.  

The Defendant, Joshua Michael Stewart, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-15-522 (2014) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2014) (aggravated sexual battery). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years for rape of a child, twelve years for aggravated sexual battery, and eight years for aggravated sexual battery. The court ordered partial consecutive service, for an effective sentence of thirtythree years at 100% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the court erred by denying his request to exclude references to his tattoos and relationship with his father from the recording of his police interview. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Shelby County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Kenneth F. (“Father”) to his minor child Ken’bria B. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child. Father timely appealed to this Court. On appeal, Father argues, among other things, that he has an upcoming opportunity for parole and, therefore, the ground of incarceration for ten years or longer when the child is less than eight years of age should not apply. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.