APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from an action for divorce wherein the trial court ordered the parties’ marital debt to be divided in a nearly equal fashion. The trial court awarded child support to the wife, who was designated primary residential parent and who received a greater share of co-parenting time with the children. The court also awarded child support retroactive to the date of the filing of the divorce complaint. In addition, the court allocated both federal tax exemptions for the children to the wife. The husband has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment with a slight modification in the amount of the child support arrearage award.

This is an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission involving a contract dispute. The Claims Commissioner concluded that the Appellants were not entitled to damages other than for services rendered because their services contract with the State was terminated for cause. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant appeals the trial court‘s order enforcing a settlement agreement, arguing that the agreement was the product of coercion on the part of her attorney. We affirm.

A Knox County jury found Curtis Scott Harper (“the Defendant”) guilty of three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, three counts of vehicular homicide by creating a substantial risk of death and serious bodily injury, one count of reckless endangerment, one count of tampering with evidence, one count of leaving the scene of an accident, one count of driving under the influence, and, in a subsequent deliberation, one count of driving under the influence (second offense). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective thirty years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant claims that: (1) the introduction of fifty crime scene and autopsy photographs, many of which were gruesome, graphic, or horrifying, deprived the Defendant of a fair trial by inflaming the passions of the jury; (2) the State presented false expert testimony concerning the speed of the Defendant's vehicle, thereby depriving the Defendant of due process; (3) the State violated Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to provide to the Defendant a copy of the article the forensic pathologist relied upon during his testimony; (4) the prosecutor engaged in improper argument, including personal attacks on defense counsel, that violated the Defendant's right to a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences; and (6) the cumulative effect of the error requires a new trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting numerous graphic and gruesome crime scene and autopsy photographs, the prejudicial effect of which far outweighed their probative value, and such error was not harmless. We, therefore, reverse the judgments of the criminal court and remand the case for a new trial.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court's denial of the husband's motion to terminate his spousal support obligation and to add his current wife as a beneficiary to his life insurance policy. We affirm the court's denial of the termination of the support obligation but reverse the court's denial of the request to amend the life insurance policy.

Appellant TennCare enrollee has been receiving 24/7 care from a private duty nurse in the home of his grandparents in Martin, Tennessee. TennCare determined that he could receive adequate care for less cost in a special respiratory care unit in St. Francis Hospital in Memphis. Enrollee, through his grandparents as his co-conservators, filed an administrative appeal. The administrative law judge agreed with TennCare. Appellants appealed that decision to chancery court, which reversed the administrative law judge’s decision as being arbitrary and capricious. TennCare appealed. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and affirm the administrative law judge’s opinion.

On August 13, 2010, following a violation of his probation, Donald Nichols began serving a sentence at the Knox County Detention Facility (KCDF). He was assigned to a second floor cell. The only bed available there was a top bunk. On August 20, 2010, Nichols was subjected to a physical examination by KCDF's medical staff. The staff detailed his medical history as pain in his lower back and extremities, as well as surgeries on his knee, foot, and ankle. On August 27, 2010, while he was asleep, Nichols rolled off his bed and hit the floor. As a result, his head was bloody, and he had intense pain in his neck and back. The on-duty nurse examined him and gave him ibuprofen for pain. In the weeks that followed, Nichols continued to have ongoing pain. He made multiple requests for medical assistance. He had an x-ray on November 5, 2010. That x-ray and a subsequent CT Scan and MRI revealed that he had several cervical fractures as a result of his fall. Through the efforts of his criminal attorney, Nichols was released from KCDF on November 10, 2010. Thereafter, in January 2011, he had surgery and incurred medical expenses of approximately $240,000. He filed a complaint against Knox County, alleging common law negligence. Nichols filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Knox County filed a motion for summary judgment.

The petitioner, Richard Anthony, filed a post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his 1990 convictions for aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and resulting concurrent sentences of twelve years and six years, respectively. As we understand, the petitioner claims that, although he has had no contact with trial counsel in the last twenty-five years, he was unaware that counsel was not pursuing a second-tier appeal of the convictions. As relief, he asks that his convictions be vacated or, in the alternative, that he have counsel appointed to pursue a second-tier direct appeal of his convictions. The post-conviction court determined both that his petition was untimely and without merit, even if considered as a motion to reopen a similar 1997 petition. Following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, James Smith, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2000 conviction of first degree murder, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the indictment was void. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of summary dismissal.

This products liability case arises out of an accident which resulted from the failure of a tire purchased less than three months before the accident. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff’s vehicle was totaled. Subsequently, the entire vehicle, including the tire, was destroyed. This case presents the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss this case as a sanction for spoliation of evidence; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the Defendants on the issues of causation and whether the tire was defective or unreasonably dangerous; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment on the issue of the application of the apparent manufacturer doctrine. Upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err with respect to any of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Rocky Joe Houston, appeals as of right from the Roane County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing as untimely his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion to affirm the post-conviction court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

The majority has resolved the summary judgment issue by applying the federal standard recently adopted by this Court in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, No. W2013-00804-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. 2015). As explained in my dissent in Rye, I disagree with the adoption of the federal standard and would instead retain our former summary judgment standard. In this instance, however, I would reach the same conclusion as the majority pursuant to the former standard. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.

In February 2013, the Williamson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Brent Hicks, for theft of merchandise over $1,000, a Class D felony.  Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jason Martindill, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the motion.

Ray Rowland (“the Defendant”) filed a Motion for Return of Property pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case and dismissed the Defendant’s motion. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court does have jurisdiction. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a hearing.

After her daughter was injured in an ATV accident, Plaintiff filed suit against her daughter’s step-grandmother, in whose home the daughter was staying on the night of the accident and who owned the ATV, alleging numerous causes of action sounding in negligence. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment; Plaintiffs appeal as to the claims for negligent entrustment and negligent supervision. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.

Yuell Frank Reeves (“the Defendant”) appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. In September 1990, the Defendant was sentenced to four years for burglary, an offense which the Defendant committed in May 1990 (“the May offense”). In November 1990, the Defendant pleaded guilty to two additional burglaries committed in June and July 1990 (“the June/July offenses”) and received an effective four-year sentence which was ordered to run concurrently with the four-year sentence for the May offense. Approximately twenty-four years later, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion seeking to set aside his plea alleging he was released on bail for the May offense when he committed the June/July offenses. The Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion, and the State concedes that the case should be remanded for a hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the Rule 36.1 motion as to the May offense and reverse the judgment summarily dismissing the motion as to the June/July offenses and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal concerns the dismissal of an allegedly untimely petition for writ of certiorari due to the trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the petitioner has alleged that he filed an administrative appeal, the disposition of which would render his petition timely, we reverse the dismissal of his petition. We remand this matter to the trial court for a determination regarding the timeliness of the petition following the conclusion of the administrative appeal.  

In 2013, the Defendant pleaded guilty in case number F-13761 to two counts of theft of property valued over $1,000, one count of theft of property valued between $500 and $1,000, and one count of simple possession of a controlled substance.  The Defendant also pleaded guilty in case number F-14140 to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine.  For these convictions, the trial court imposed a six-year sentence in case number F-13761 and a two-year consecutive sentence in case number F-14140, for a total effective sentence of eight years, to be served on supervised probation.  In 2014, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a revocation of his probation.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Monoleto D. Green, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for having been untimely filed.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, filed suit against St. Thomas Hospital alleging claims for ordinary negligence and a derivative loss of consortium. The complaint alleged that St. Thomas was liable for injuries Plaintiffs sustained as a result of the hospital’s employees’ failure to properly support the wife as they attempted to transfer her from a bariatric stretcher to her automobile. St. Thomas moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds Plaintiffs failed to comply with the pre-suit notice and good faith certificate filing requirements of the health care liability statute set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and -122. Plaintiffs responded that the complaint was not subject to the filing requirements because it sounded in ordinary negligence, not health care liability. The trial court held that Plaintiffs’ action is a health care liability action subject to the filing provisions of the health care liability statute and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim with prejudice, finding it undisputed that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and -122. Plaintiffs appeal. Having applied the clear language of the health care liability statute to Plaintiffs’ complaint, we conclude that the allegations contained therein meet the definition of a health care liability action as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101(a)(1) and that Plaintiffs were required to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and -122. Therefore, we affirm.

The issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in its calculation of child support when it omitted from the calculation support due from Larry W. Shipe, Jr. (Father) during a period of time when he was incarcerated. We hold that the Child Support Guidelines, Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)(2)(ii)(I) (2008), which provide that “incarceration shall not provide grounds for reduction of any child support obligation,” mandate that incarceration does not absolve an individual from his/her obligation to pay child support. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a recalculation of Father’s child support arrearage.

This case arises from a contract for home improvement services. After the work was completed and Homeowners failed to pay the contract price, Contractor filed a civil warrant and was awarded a judgment in general sessions court. Homeowners failed to timely appeal the judgment to circuit court. They subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas in circuit court contending Contractor was not duly licensed and the Home Improvement Contractor’s Act prevented Contractor from recovering on the contract. Homeowners subsequently filed a complaint asserting a claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The circuit court denied the petition for writ of certiorari and dismissed the complaint as res judicata. We affirm.