APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Gary Lee Emory, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief, which petition challenged his multiple convictions of aggravated robbery, robbery,
aggravated burglary, and facilitation of aggravated burglary, alleging that he was deprived
of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of postconviction
relief.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the construction of a swimming pool. The defendant entered into a written contract with the plaintiff for the construction of a pool at the defendant’s home. The plaintiff later filed a complaint alleging that the defendant failed to pay the amount due under the contract. The defendant filed a counter-complaint and alleged breach of contract, fraud and/or misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for relief from the judgment, which the trial court denied. The defendant appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand for determination of appellate attorney’s fees.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s determination that Tennessee law does not require a testator to sign their will prior to an attesting witness subscribing their signature as a witness to the will. Upon review of the relevant statutory language and associated case law, we conclude that Tennessee law requires that a testator sign their will prior to an attesting witness subscribing their own signature, and therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Appellant filed this premises liability action against Appellee after she fell inside Appellee’s store. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant failed to establish that a dangerous condition existed or that Appellee had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition, if it did exist. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a legal malpractice suit filed by John Doe Corporation (“Plaintiff”) against its former counsel, Kennerly, Montgomery & Finley, P.C. (“Defendant”). The case arises from the expiration of a judgment obtained by Plaintiff against a defendant (“the third party”) in a suit that concluded more than a decade ago, and
Defendant’s alleged failure to advise Plaintiff of the judgment’s impending expiration. The legal malpractice
action was before Judge William T. Ailor, who had represented the third party in the underlying suit before
becoming a judge. Judge Ailor granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to bring the
action within the time set by the relevant statute of limitations. After becoming aware of Plaintiff’s and the
third party’s identities, Judge Ailor recused himself while Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment was
pending. Plaintiff sought to void the judgment dismissing the case. Chancellor Christopher D. Heagerty was
assigned to sit by interchange over the case and denied Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff appealed. Discerning no
reversible error, we affirm.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court found that three
statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further
found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in
the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred by failing to make
sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and the best interest analysis, we vacate those portions of the trial court’s judgment and remand for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a tragic motor vehicle accident caused her husband’s death and her minor child’s serious injuries, the plaintiff filed this products liability action against several manufacturers and sellers. The plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., a booster seat manufacturer. Based on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Carolyn Coffman, et al. v. Armstrong International, Inc., et al., 615 S.W.3d 888 (Tenn. 2021), and the relevant provisions of the Tennessee Products Liability Act, we affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Demetrius A. Brooks, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his eight-year sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jarvis Miller, appeals his twenty-five-year sentence at 100 percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) for his second degree murder conviction. Specifically, he challenges the length and manner of his sentence as excessive because the trial court (1) failed to mitigate the Defendant’s sentence based on “mistakenly recollected” facts from trial; (2) misapplied and gave improper weight to two enhancement factors; and (3) failed to give meaningful consideration to imposing an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Brandon Marquell Brown, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, challenging his guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of coercion of a witness and one count of aggravated assault. The Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that (1) his guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and prepare the Petitioner’s cases by interviewing pertinent witnesses and for failing to meet with the Petitioner and review discovery with him. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willis Holloway, of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to 135 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After an unsuccessful appeal, post-conviction filing, and extraordinary relief filing, in December 2022, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion challenging an unconstitutional jury instruction. He then filed a supplemental motion claiming “actual innocence.” The trial court denied his Rule 36.1 motion. The Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied, and the Petitioner now appeals. The State asserts that, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), the appeal is untimely. After review, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.

After a 2022 bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant, Rickie Lumley, of felony evading arrest, and subsequently sentenced him as a Career Offender to twelve years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his Class D felony conviction for felony evading arrest because his flight did not create a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties. He contends that his conviction should have only been for a Class E felony. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Appellant, Gardtrella Marie Day-Knowles, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of neglect of an impaired adult, for which she received a sentence of seven years’ supervised probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-6-117 (2017) (amended 2019, repealed 2020). On appeal, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) allowing witnesses to describe conditions of animal neglect in her home; (2) refusing to redact an unfairly prejudicial comment from the victim’s medical records; and (3) allowing a witness to testify about her memory of the contents of a report under the public records hearsay exception. After review, we conclude there was no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Andre Terry, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief. Petitioner asserts on appeal that the post-conviction court erred
in concluding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel, specifically as it
related to his failure to procure a plea offer from the State. The State counters that the postconviction
court properly denied relief. We ordered supplemental briefing as to whether
the post-conviction court had jurisdiction to consider this petition. We hold that the postconviction
court did not have jurisdiction to consider the petition because the pro se postconviction
petition was deficient, and thus a nullity, and the amended petition was filed
outside of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the postconviction
court and dismiss the petition.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because the mother did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Keedrin Coppage, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed a life sentence for count one, and a consecutive sentence of six years for count two. Defendant raises twelve issues on appeal: (1) sufficiency of the evidence to support his first degree premeditated murder conviction; (2) admission of the Defendant’s prior bad acts against the victim under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (3) admission of the victim’s statements under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6); (4) denial of his motion for a continuance of the trial date; (5) denial of his motion to admit recordings and photographs; (6) exclusion of portions of body camera footage; (7) denial of Defendant’s motion for mistrial; (8) exclusion of the victim’s family’s civil law suit; (9) allowing the jury to use transcripts of audio recordings; (10) not allowing defense counsel to question an officer regarding explicit recordings sent to him by Defendant; (11) not allowing defense counsel to question whether Defendant was charged for the prior bad acts admitted under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); and (12) that he is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After a thorough review of the entire record, the briefs, oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an action to rescind a quitclaim deed conveyed pursuant to a durable general power of attorney. On August 1, 2006, Richard Petersen (“Plaintiff”) appointed his sister, Margaret Georgiades (“Defendant”) as his attorney-in-fact. The power of attorney was recorded on July 8, 2009. In April 2010, Defendant conveyed, via quitclaim deed, one-half of Plaintiff’s undivided interest in his residence to herself for no consideration. Plaintiff contends that he did not discover the transfer until the fall of 2020, at which time he revoked Defendant’s power of attorney. Then, on February 4, 2021, he filed suit against Defendant to rescind the conveyance on the basis that the deed was void ab initio as the power of attorney did not authorize Defendant to make gifts or transfers “without consideration to anyone.” He also contended that the conveyance should be set aside because Defendant’s conduct “constitutes a clear breach of the fiduciary duty” she owed to Plaintiff as his attorney-in-fact. For her part, Defendant contends that the action is barred by the ten-year statute of limitations. She also contends that Plaintiff instructed her to make the conveyance and that he subsequently told others that he had consented to the conveyance. Following discovery, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the deed was void ab initio. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the power of attorney did not grant Defendant “the authority to transfer [Plaintiff’s] property by gift to her or to any third party” and, on this basis, declared the deed “void ab initio and to have no effect whatsoever.” This appeal followed. As provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-6- 110(a), because the power of attorney expressly authorized Defendant “[t]o exercise or perform any act, power, duty, right or obligation whatsoever that I now have,” Defendant had “the power and authority to make gifts, in any amount, of any of the principal’s property, to any individuals, . . . in accordance with the principal’s personal history of making or joining in the making of lifetime gifts.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-6-110(a). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Because the trial court did not rule on other issues, including, inter alia, whether Plaintiff’s claim is time barred, whether Plaintiff approved of the conveyance, whether the gift was in accordance with Plaintiff’s history of making lifetime gifts, and/or whether the conveyance constitutes a breach of Defendant’s fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is an appeal by a pro se appellant. Due to the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Deondre Raymon McClain, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his effective six-year probationary sentence stemming from his guilty-pleaded convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon and possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with the intent to sell. On appeal, he argues that the trial court’s findings were insufficient to support its decision to fully revoke his probation and order him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case began with a March 14, 2024 petition to terminate the parental rights of
Respondent/Appellant Agness M. (“Mother”) filed by Petitioners Benjamin M. (“Father”)
and Kelly M. (together with Father, “Petitioners”) in the Washington County Chancery
Court (“the trial court”). The petition alleged as grounds abandonment by failure to visit
and support, mental incompetence to provide care, and failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to parent.

The Defendant, Renardo Dixon, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and kidnapping, both Class C felonies, in exchange for concurrent sentences of eight years at 30% release eligibility, with the service left to the trial court’s determination. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for probation and ordered that he serve his sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction consecutively to his sentence in a prior case in which his probation had been violated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Valerie Ann Dollar, was convicted by a Johnson County Criminal Court
jury of first degree felony murder in perpetration of kidnapping, especially aggravated
kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit especially aggravated kidnapping. See T.C.A. §§
39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-305 (2018)
(especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-12-103 (2018) (conspiracy). The trial court
imposed an effective life plus twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends
(1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and (2) that the trial court
erred by excluding evidence of the State’s pretrial offer to dismiss the murder charge. We
affirm the judgments of the criminal court.

This appeal involves claims of breach of contract and employment discrimination filed by a graduate student/teaching assistant at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville. The plaintiff claimed that he was fired for discriminatory reasons and that the University of Tennessee had breached its employment contract with him. The trial court dismissed the breach of contract claim based on sovereign immunity and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court dismissed the employment discrimination claims by reason of the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.