APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Wendolyn Walden, pled guilty to the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief almost two years after pleading guilty, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The issues on appeal in this financially catastrophic divorce proceeding include who is liable for the debt of $240,000 that Wife incurred after the complaint for divorce was filed. The trial court held Wife liable for the entire sum and Husband jointly and severally liable for $75,889.59 of that amount upon the finding that $75,889.59 was used to preserve the parties’ principal marital asset, the residence, pending its sale. Husband contends this was error for he expressly refused to be liable for this debt. The court also awarded a judgment against Husband in favor of Wife for $101,714 of expenses she incurred to maintain the marital residence. Wife was awarded one half of Husband’s pension and $75,000 of her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, and sixty months of rehabilitative alimony, at $1,250 per month. Husband contends that all of these awards were error. Husband, however, provided no transcript of the evidence or statement of the evidence; therefore, there is no evidence before this court upon which to find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s findings of fact in all respects. Further, we find no error with the trial court’s legal conclusions or judgments by classifying the award as alimony in futuro. All other rulings by the trial court are affirmed.
 

The Petitioner, Jermeil Tarter, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2005 conviction for sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school and his twenty-year, Range I sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) of the manner in which counsel conducted voir dire regarding the issue of the Petitioner’s race, (2) counsel failed to advise him adequately regarding his right to testify or remain silent and the advantages and disadvantages of testifying, and (3) counsel failed to inform him fully regarding possible sentencing, the strengths and weaknesses of the State’s case, and the benefits and detriments of going to trial or accepting a plea agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Gerald Huffman and Dorothy Jean Riley Hale (“Petitioners”) filed suit seeking to terminate the testamentary trust of Buford Taylor (“the Trust”) and have the remaining assets distributed. Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, in pertinent part, that contingent remainder beneficiary Tommy Hamer previously had received an advancement of his portion of the Trust, and therefore, his heirs were not entitled to any further distribution from the Trust. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted the motion for summary judgment after finding and holding, inter alia, that an affidavit given by Sherrie Hamer was not properly before the court, and that Tommy Hamer previously had received an advancement of his portion of the Trust and, therefore, his heirs were not entitled to any portion of the remaining Trust assets. The heirs of Tommy Hamer appeal the grant of summary judgment to this Court. We find and hold that neither Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-203 nor Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101 bars consideration of the affidavit of Sherrie Hamer, and that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding a grant of summary judgment. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Jamie N. Grimes, was convicted of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of an elementary school, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, -432. The trial court classified the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, and sentenced him to twenty-five years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that this offense should have been mandatorily joined with another offense for which he had previously been tried and convicted; (2) that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated; (3) that the indictment against him was defective because it failed to cite to the drug-free school zone statute; (4) that the State improperly withheld its “contract” with the confidential informant used in this case; (5) that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view a transcript of an audio recording of the offense; (6) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction; and (7) that his sentence is void because the trial court checked the box for a release eligibility of thirty-five percent on the judgment form rather than the box for 100% of the minimum sentence as mandated by the drug-free school zone statute. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence. However, we remand the case to the trial court for correction of a clerical error regarding the Defendant’s release eligibility.

This is a wrongful death action against the Town of Jasper. The surviving spouse of the decedent, who died of complications resulting from a myocardial infarction, alleges that the town was negligent and negligent per se by failing to register its three automated external defibrillators with the emergency communications district dispatch as required byTennessee Code Annotated § 68-140-703 and that such negligence contributed to the decedent’s injuries and death. The town filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the basis the statute did not create a private right of action; the trial court denied the motion to dismiss but granted a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal. We have determined there is no express language creating a private right of action in the statute, and, looking to the statutory structure and legislative history of the statute, we have also determined the legislature did not intend to create a private right of action by implication. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and enter judgment accordingly.

The Appellant, William Eugene Hall, was convicted of two counts of felony murder, three counts of first degree burglary, three counts of grand larceny, and one count of petit larceny. The Appellant received the death penalty for one of the murder convictions, a life sentence for the other, and an effective eighty-year sentence for the remaining convictions. The Appellant was unsuccessful in his original direct appeal. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1998). The Appellant subsequently pursued post-conviction relief. This Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of that relief. William Eugene Hall v. State, No. M2005-02959-CCA-R3-PD, 2008 WL 2649637 (Tenn. Crim. App., July 7, 2008). The supreme court, however, has granted the Appellant a delayed appeal. This appeal stems from the original and amended motions for new trial, which the trial court denied. Following our review, we affirm.

Joshua Taylor (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell and simple possession of marijuana. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant received an effective sentence of eight years. The plea agreement provided that the manner of service would be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Bruce Rishton (“Rishton”), formerly an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court for Bledsoe County (“the Trial Court”) against officials Warden Jim Morrow, Deputy Warden Andrew Lewis, and, Associate Warden of Operations C. Owens (collectively “the Respondents”). Rishton alleged that the warden acted illegally and arbitrarily in denying him his musical instrument. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. The Trial Court dismissed the case, holding, inter alia, that the warden’s decision was administrative in nature and not subject to review by writ of certiorari. Rishton appeals. We hold that, as Rishton has since been released from TDOC custody, this case has become moot on appeal. We affirm the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Joann G. Rosa, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding her conviction for first degree murder, for which she is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial judge who presided over her jury trial pleaded guilty to official misconduct, that the judge’s misconduct was newly discovered evidence entitling her to a new trial, that the judge’s misconduct created structural error entitling her to a new trial, and that the trial judge who denied coram nobis relief had a conflict of interest because she was mentioned in the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) report regarding the misconduct allegation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gregory A. Hedges, filed in the Morgan County Criminal Court a habeas corpus petition, seeking relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and aggravated kidnapping. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The pro se appellant, Adrian Brown, appeals as of right from the McMinn County Circuit Court’s order denying his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct clerical error. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion to affirm by memorandum opinion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the McMinn County Circuit Court.

The appellant, David Eugene Breezee, was convicted by Benton County Circuit Court juries of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. On appeal, the appellant contends that his effective thirty-two-year sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marcus Frazier Thompson, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of five counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-402 (2010). He was sentenced as a career offender to ninety years to be served at sixty percent. On appeal he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of a prospective juror’s race, (3) a witness’s testimony should have been excluded due to a violation of the rule of sequestration, and (4) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of ammunition found during a search of the Defendant’s apartment. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the summary denial of his fourth pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 1999, the petitioner pled guilty to driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender and received a two-year sentence, which was to be served in Community Corrections after ninety days incarceration. Based upon a blood sample taken from the petitioner as part of the intake process, he was later convicted, in two separate cases, of two counts of rape, one count of sexual battery, and one count of aggravated burglary. He is currently serving an effective thirty-four year sentence in the Department of Correction on those convictions. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily denying his petition. Following review of the record, we affirm the court’s determination.

The issue in this post-divorce proceeding is whether a parent seeking to modify a residential parenting schedule in a permanent parenting plan must prove that an alleged material change in circumstances could not reasonably have been anticipated when the residential parenting schedule was originally established. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) (2010), enacted in 2004, abrogated any prior Tennessee decision that could have been read as requiring such proof. Accordingly, because the father who sought modification in this case was not required to prove that his remarriage, relocation, changed work schedule, and natural aging of his children were unanticipated, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s judgment modifying the residential parenting schedule to give the mother 222 days and the father 143 days of residential parenting time with the two minor children.

Subcontractor B hired subcontractor A to install bathrooms in fulfillment of subcontractor B’s contracts with general contractors. After it was terminated by subcontractor B, subcontractor A sued to recover payments owed for work subcontractor A completed before termination. Subcontractor B filed a counterclaim for damages and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court dismissed subcontractor B’s counterclaim and found that subcontractor A was entitled to quantum meruit recovery. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the application of a statutory amendment to a contract the plaintiff had with the city. The plaintiff claims the amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55- 8-198, effective July 1, 2011, violates article I, section 20 of the Tennessee Constitution. In the alternative, the plaintiff argues that the amendment does not apply to existing contracts. The trial court concluded that the retroactive application of the amendment was not a constitutional violation. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Appellant, Xavion Lyndon Underwood, was convicted of aggravated robbery, for which he received a ten-year sentence. He appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. Upon our review, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, David Enrique Leon, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery convictions, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, William Richard Hicks, alias Billy Richard Hicks, appeals from his convictions for various alcohol- and driving-related offenses, which we will detail, the most serious of which were DUI, tenth offense, and violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender (“HMVO”) statute. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to six years for each of these convictions, with the HMVO sentences to be served consecutively and the DUI and misdemeanor convictions to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of eighteen years. From these sentences he appeals, arguing that his sentences are excessive and that the court erred in ordering they be served consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Case No. 91142, Count 5, to reflect the length of the defendant’s sentence as eleven months, twenty-nine days, which was omitted.

The Defendant, Justin Gibson, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence, first offense. He agreed to a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, all of which was suspended after seven days’ incarceration. As a condition of his guilty plea, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the warrantless search of his home as not justified by either consent or exigent circumstances. After a thorough review of the applicable law, we conclude that the officer’s entry into the Defendant’s home was supported by neither exigent circumstances nor as a part of the community caretaker function; therefore, the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge against the Defendant.

The petitioner, Jarrett Inman, pled guilty in the Roane County Criminal Court to rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to seventeen years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his petition for writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence of the victim’s recantation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Yovonda Sherith Chambers, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is a health care liability action wherein the trial by jury resulted in a judgment for the Defendant, Dr. Timothy Renfree. Plaintiffs, Larry and Dinnie Burchfield, filed this lawsuit against Dr. Renfree alleging that he negligently performed surgery on Mr. Burchfield’s right arm and caused nerve damage. After the jury returned its verdict in favor of Dr. Renfree, the Burchfields filed post-trial motions seeking relief from the judgment and alleging numerous errors in the administration of the trial. The trial court denied the post-trial motions and affirmed the jury’s verdict as thirteenth juror. The Burchfields appealed. We vacate the jury’s verdict, finding reversible error in the administration of the trial, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.