APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on four minor children (“the Children”) of the defendant, Tabitha W. (“Mother”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took the Children into custody in July 2010 because of Mother’s continuing drug use and the Children’s truancy problems. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother in July 2011, alleging that numerous grounds for termination exist. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with her permanency plan, and that the conditions originally leading to removal still persisted. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm.

James Bostic (“the Claimant”), an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee and others seeking money damages. The claim against the State was transferred from the Division of Claims Administration to the Claims Commission pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(c) 2012). The State filed (1) a motion to dismiss raising several defenses and (2) the affidavit of Brenda Boatman. Based upon the affidavit, the Claims Commission granted the State summary judgment and dismissed the Claimant’s claim. We affirm.

This case involves the sale of a home in 1994. The purchaser and her husband filed a complaint against the seller, alleging that they discovered extensive fire damage to the home in 2010. The complaint alleged misrepresentation, mistake, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court granted the seller’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss on the basis that the claims were barred by various statutes of limitations, as the trial court found that the discovery rule was inapplicable. We find that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to survive a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, as they implicate the discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Therefore, we reverse in part the order of dismissal, to the extent that the purchaser’s claims were dismissed on the basis of the statutes of limitations, and we remand for further proceedings. We affirm in part the portion of the trial court’s order that addressed a separate issue, as that ruling was not challenged on appeal.

Following the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police, the Defendant-Appellant, Leston Parker, entered open guilty pleas to his charged offenses of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, driving while one’s driver’s license is canceled, suspended, or revoked because of a conviction for driving under the influence, a Class B misdemeanor, and violating the registration law, a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court subsequently sentenced Parker to an effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Parker argues that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress, and (2) imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we conclude that only the sentencing issue is properly before this court because Parker failed to reserve a certified question of law regarding the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Accordingly, we dismiss the portion of the appeal regarding the denial of Parker’s motion to suppress, and we affirm his effective sentence of ten years. However, we remand the case to the trial court for the purpose of merging the conviction for driving while one’s driver’s license is canceled, suspended, or revoked because of a conviction for driving under the influence with the conviction for driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license.

I respectfully dissent. I believe that the record shows that the Defendant deserves judicial diversion and that substantial evidence does not exist to justify the trial court’s denying diversion. The majority opinion accurately describes the many positive factors that support diversion and succinctly states that the trial court denied it because of the Defendant’s "lack of amenability to correction based upon not being credible in his testimony and a lack of honesty with his employer." I do not see this lack of amenability in the record.

This is an action for breach of contract to purchase real property. The trial court found that a valid contract existed between the parties and that Buyer breached the contract. The trial court found that Seller failed to prove general damages, however, where Seller failed to prove the fair market value of the real property at the time of breach. The trial court further found that Buyer was entitled to a credit against special damages proven by Seller, and that Seller was not entitled to attorney’s fees as the prevailing party where the provision for attorney’s fees had been crossed out on the standard form contract. Seller appeals and Buyer cross-appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Misty Lynn Nanney, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony; one count of forgery, a Class E felony; one count of possession with intent to sell less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -14-105(a)(2), -14-114, -16-503, -17-417(c)(2)(A), -17-425(a). Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jermaine R. Carpenter, filed for post-conviction relief from his conviction of simple possession of cocaine and two convictions of the sale of .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Mershaun William Scott, was convicted in a bench trial by the Davidson County Criminal Court of simple possession of marijuana and received a thirty-day sentence, suspended to unsupervised probation, and a $250 suspended fine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418 (2010). The Petitioner contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 The Petitioner, Brittany Scott Pye, appeals from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. He was convicted of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and sentenced as a multiple offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to communicate his acceptance of the State’s offer of settlement prior to trial. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to accept his guilty plea after a trial date had been scheduled. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

Defendant, Andrew Cross, pled guilty in the Polk County Criminal Court, to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and one count of Class E felony theft. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the minimum allowable sentences of three years for aggravated burglary and one year for theft, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court also ordered the effective sentence of three years suspended, to be served on probation, but the trial court denied Defendant’s request to be granted judicial diversion. In this appeal, Defendant argues that he should have been granted judicial diversion. We disagree, and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that trial counsel’s actions regarding the Petitioner’s acceptance of the plea agreement did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. With respect to the Petitioner’s remaining issue, I concur with the majority’s decision.

In this post-divorce appeal regarding child support, we have concluded that the trial court erred in requiring mother to establish a trust account for gifts to the parties’ minor child. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The orders of the trial court were designated as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because we find that certification of the judgment under Rule 54.02 was in error, we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The Defendant, David Eugene Breezee, was found guilty by a Benton County Circuit Court jury of rape, a Class B felony, and incest, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-503(b); 39-15-302(b). At the sentencing hearing, the incest conviction was merged with the rape conviction, and the Defendant was sentenced to ten years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that he erroneously received more than the minimum sentence of eight years because the trial court applied the multiple victims enhancement factor. We affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence for rape, but we reverse the trial court’s merger of the incest conviction into the rape conviction, reinstate the incest conviction, and remand for sentencing as to that conviction.

Sonya Wyche (“the Putative Daughter”) was named as one of the heirs of James Sheperd Smith, deceased (“the Deceased”), in the petition for letters of administration filed by James B. Smith and Jacqueline Smith Gunn (collectively “the Adminstrators”). The Administrators filed a “Motion to Determine Identity of Heirs” approximately 13 months after the Deceased died. The court held that the Putative Daughter’s claim as a child born out of wedlock was not perfected in a timely fashion. The court also held that the Putative Daughter did not carry her burden of proving that the Administrators, by naming her as an heir in the petition, acted with intent to trick her into not filing a timely claim. The Putative Daughter appeals. We affirm.

Carlos Burris (“the Defendant”) appeals his convictions in two separate trials for attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud and driving on a suspended license, fourth offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years for the attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving on a suspended license conviction. The trial court also ordered that the two sentences run consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at both trials was insufficient to support his convictions. Additionally, the Defendant contends that his sentence for the first conviction was excessive and that the trial court erred by running the two sentences consecutively. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Gregory Allen, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in failing to acknowledge his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and dismissing his petition based solely on finding that the issues raised therein were previously determined. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing with regard to the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Jarvis Q. Williams (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and denial of a public trial. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief in the form of a reduced sentence but otherwise denied relief. This appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff appeals a jury verdict awarding her damages in the amount of approximately $5,000 in her action for damages against her uninsured motorist insurance carrier. We affirm.

In this modification of custody case, Mother appeals only the trial court’s failure to make a specific finding that modification is in the child’s best interest. Concluding that the trial court failed to make the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, we vacate the order of the trial court naming Father primary residential parent and remand to the trial court for the entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Deborah Davis, was convicted of one count of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401. The Defendant was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days with forty-eight hours to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on unsupervised probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress all evidence gathered by the police pursuant to an accident investigation because such evidence was protected by the accident report privilege of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-114(b); and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction. Following our review, we conclude that these issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Branch Banking and Trust Company (“BB&T”) provided financing for a construction project and recorded a deed of trust. The excavation contractor, Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc., started work on the project and had done substantial work when Marshall & Ilsley Bank (“M&I Bank”) made a loan and recorded its trust deed. BB&T was paid off out of the proceeds of the loan from M&I Bank. Blalock was also paid current with the proceeds from the M&I Bank loan. BB&T released its trust deed. The developer later defaulted, and Blalock filed this action to enforce its statutory lien. M&I Bank’s assignee, Cay Partners, LLC, filed a counterclaim asserting that it should be entitled to the priority position of BB&T. Blalock and Cay filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Blalock’s motion. Cay appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Memory Gayle Hall, entered open pleas of guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), speeding, and failing to provide evidence of financial responsibility. At sentencing, the trial court ordered her to serve forty days on consecutive weekends in the county jail, followed by probation for the balance of the eleven months and twenty-nine day sentence. She challenges the trial court’s denial of full probation, contending that she was a favorable candidate. After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Shelby County. Appellants, former employees of the Shelby County Department of Homeland Security, filed suit against Appellee for retaliatory discharge under both the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-1-304, and the Tennessee Public Employee Political Freedom Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-50-603. The trial court determined that Appellants had failed to meet their burden to show that the termination of their employment was causally connected to any whistleblowing activity and granted judgment in favor of Appellee. Discerning no error, we affirm.