APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a dependency and neglect petition with respect to four children, two of whom are the eldest children of the mother and her first husband and two of whom are the youngest children of the mother and her current husband. DCS filed the petition upon receiving a referral that the mother’s sevenyear- old daughter from her first marriage had been sexually abused by her stepfather, the mother’s current husband. The stepfather sought to call the seven-year-old child as a witness during the trial, but the trial court denied his request upon balancing the probative value of the child’s testimony with the potential emotional and psychological harm the child could suffer from testifying. The mother and stepfather have appealed. Upon thorough review, we conclude that the trial court erred in utilizing this balancing test and precluding the stepfather from calling the child as a witness. We therefore vacate the trial court’s final judgment adjudicating the children dependent and neglected and remand the case so that the trial court may hear the child’s testimony, provided that the child is competent to testify and that the court does not exclude the testimony pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. If the child is allowed to testify, the trial court should consider utilizing the accommodations set forth in Tennessee Rule of Juvenile Practice and Procedure 306 to ameliorate any potential harm that testifying may cause the child.

The pro se petitioner, Michael Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Hardeman County Circuit Court, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition because his sentence is illegal. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Randall R. Ward, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Joe L. Ford, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Mandon Rogers, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

Pro se petitioner, Julius Q. Perkins, filed a motion seeking relief from his felony murder conviction pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 and the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021. Said motion was summarily dismissed by the trial court. Because the instant notice of appeal was not timely filed, and the petitioner has failed to provide any basis to excuse the untimely filing, we dismiss the appeal.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant-Appellant, Clifton Lawrence Still, entered a guilty plea to one count of kidnapping, a Class C Felony, and received an eight-year sentence, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s application for alternative sentencing and ordered the eight-year sentence to be served in confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Adam S. Massengill, entered a guilty plea to sixteen counts of aggravated statutory rape, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration pursuant to the plea agreement. Thereafter, the Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Phillip David Daniel, Defendant, violated the terms of his probation by incurring new criminal charges and ordered the execution of the sentence as originally entered. On appeal, Defendant concedes that he violated his probation but claims that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence. Following a de novo review of the record, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jerry Burkes, appeals from the Greene County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for money laundering, theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, and twelve counts of sales tax evasion. On appeal, he argues he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Petitioner also contends that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding records relevant to his tax liability; that he was convicted upon an invalid presentment; that he was deprived of a fair and impartial grand jury in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that the trial court admitted evidence at trial in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for money laundering.1 After reviewing the record, we conclude that the Petitioner failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance from appellate counsel and that the remainder of the Petitioner’s claims have been previously determined, waived, or do not entitle him to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Defendant-Appellant, Bradi Baker, was found guilty of second degree murder by a Madison County circuit court jury based on the shooting death of her ex-husband. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: 1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Exhibits 4B and 4C, two cell phone videos taken from the victim’s phone depicting his shooting death;2 2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Exhibit 4D, a “video compilation of other exhibits manipulated and edited by law enforcement”; 3) the trial court committed plain error by admitting Exhibit 4D in violation of the Defendant’s due process rights; 4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder; and 5) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant to twenty-five years imprisonment. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal considered pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically at issue is the trial court’s ruling that a contract entered into between the parties is valid and enforceable. The City of Friendship insists that the contract at issue, which involves its purchase of a water distribution system, is void due to the operation of the Municipal Purchasing Law of 1983, Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-56-301 et seq. For the specific reasons stated herein, we respectfully reject the City’s argument and affirm the trial court’s holding that the contract at issue is enforceable.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Keyshawn Devonte Fouse, of attempted first-degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-six years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted first-degree murder. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in allowing reference to the defendant’s nickname, “Shoota,” and in misapplying the law regarding presumptive sentences and sentencing factors. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County Circuit Court adjudicated the defendant, Chasity Tanesha Yancey, not guilty by reason of insanity for one count of first-degree murder, one count of first-degree murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, and two counts of aggravated child abuse. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303, the trial court ordered the defendant be diagnosed and evaluated on an outpatient basis and to comply with the recommended Mandatory Outpatient Treatment (“MOT”) plan. In a subsequent order, the trial court modified the MOT plan by imposing additional conditions upon the defendant. As a result of the modification order, the defendant filed a direct appeal, an interlocutory appeal, and an extraordinary appeal under Rules 3, 9, and 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, respectively. After the trial court denied the defendant’s Rule 9 motion, this Court consolidated the Rule 3 and Rule 10 appeals in order to address both the jurisdictional issue and the merits of the case. Upon our review, we conclude the jurisdiction of this Court lies with an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rules 9 or 10 and grant the defendant’s Rule 10 application. In doing so, we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of whether modifications should be made to the defendant’s MOT plan.

Mother appeals the trial court’s order naming Father primary residential parent. Because the trial court’s findings of fact are at times vague, inconsistent, and appear to improperly rely on the trial judge’s recollection of testimony from a prior hearing rather than appropriate proof, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and award Mother her reasonable attorney’s fees.

This appeal involves a healthcare liability action. The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant hospital, which is a governmental entity, alleging negligence by physicians practicing medicine within the hospital emergency department. The supervising physician was not an employee of the defendant hospital but an employee of a company contracting with the defendant hospital. The medical resident physician and medical student treating the patient in the emergency department also were not employees of the defendant hospital. During summary judgment proceedings, the plaintiffs presented no evidence of direct liability by the defendant hospital or of negligence by the nursing staff at the defendant hospital. Plaintiffs presented such evidence only as to physicians not directly employed by the defendant hospital. Determining that the physicians were not employees of the defendant hospital, the trial court held that the defendant hospital could not be held vicariously liable for the actions of these non-employee physicians under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). As such, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant hospital. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Carlos Darnell Dixon, was convicted after a jury trial of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and sentenced to an effective thirty years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder; that the State infringed upon his Second Amendment right to bear arms by cross-examining him about his experience with guns and gun ownership; and that his sentence for second degree murder is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a grant of an involuntary dismissal. The plaintiff brought suit against the City of Humboldt for damages to his real property due to the collapse of a portion of his parking lot into his adjacent drainage ditch. At trial, the court granted the defendant’s motion for an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2) at the close of the plaintiff’s proof and dismissed the case. We affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, James R. Trent, III, of two counts of aggravated assault in concert with two or more people and one count of aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the offenses into a single aggravated assault conviction and sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal is an action subject to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, in which a pedestrian suffered injuries after she tripped and fell on a sidewalk in Franklin, Tennessee.  The pedestrian filed a complaint claiming that the city was negligent.  After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the city and dismissed the case.  The pedestrian appeals.  We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Lonnie Lynn Graves, pled guilty to possession of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and felon in possession of a firearm but specifically reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The question pertained to the legality of the search of Defendant’s vehicle during a traffic stop for speeding which was the subject of an unsuccessful suppression motion. Because the judgments failed to comply with the strict requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A), Defendant did not properly reserve a certified issue for review. As a result, we are without jurisdiction to review the merits of Defendant’s claim, and accordingly dismiss his appeal.

The Petitioner, Bernard Woodard, was convicted of burglary, theft, and evading arrest. He later filed a petition for post conviction relief alleging various grounds, including that his lawyer was ineffective, that the jury was drawn from an unrepresentative venire, and that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing arguments regarding his right to remain silent. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the petition failed to state a colorable claim for relief. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the dismissal of his petition. We hold that the post-conviction court properly dismissed claims that have been waived. However, we also hold that the Petitioner has stated colorable claims for relief by alleging sufficient facts showing that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel. As such, we respectfully remand these claims for the appointment of counsel and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Benjamin Hartshaw, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of six counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, for which he is serving an effective forty-six-year sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504(a)(4) (2018) (aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than thirteen years of age), 39-13-522(a) (2018) (rape of a child). On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after one of the prosecutors referred in closing argument to the Defendant’s having been “arrested and . . . put in jail,” (2) the court erred in giving a curative instruction, contrary to the defense request for no instruction, and (3) he is entitled to relief due to cumulative trial error. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.