APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A landlord and tenant entered into a lease-purchase agreement.  Near the end of the lease term, the tenant sought to exercise the purchase option.  The landlord claimed that the tenant could not do so because she defaulted on rent payments.  The landlord also argued that he terminated the agreement before the tenant exercised the option.  The trial court rejected both arguments and granted the tenant specific performance of the purchase option.  We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s decision to deny a motion to compel arbitration. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s order.

A wife sought relief from a default judgment that granted her husband a divorce and awarded him alimony.  The wife argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the default because she was not properly served with the complaint and that jurisdiction was not proper under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-2-214.  The trial court denied the wife’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion.  Finding that the wife was entitled to a hearing on her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, George Steven Waters, was convicted by a jury of one count of reckless homicide. The trial court imposed a sentence of four years, suspended to ten years of supervised probation after service of 364 days in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion; and that his sentence is excessive. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The former manager of a country music recording artist sued the artist and related business entities for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.  He also sought damages from the artist’s business manager for inducement of breach of contract.  The defendants moved for summary judgment.  They argued, in part, that the undisputed facts showed that the parties had mutually agreed to modify the contract.  And the former manager had been paid in full under the terms of the modified contract.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  On appeal, the manager argues that genuine issues of material fact as to whether he agreed to modify the contract preclude summary judgment.  We conclude that the unambiguous course of dealing between the parties showed mutual assent to the modification.  So we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

Plaintiff Deborah Lacy brought this action against Dr. Nagendra Ramanna, alleging that he committed a battery upon her by shaking her hand too forcefully during a visit in which Plaintiff was seeking medical treatment for an alleged heart condition. Following discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted after finding no evidence that the handshake caused injury to Plaintiff’s right hand. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a circuit court order dismissing an appeal from a general sessions court judgment. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal to this Court within thirty days after entry of the circuit court’s final order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

In this breach of contract case, Appellee law firm sued Appellant former client for unpaid attorneys’ fees.  Appellant argued that the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches barred Appellee’s breach of contract claim.  Alternatively, Appellant argued that the unpaid attorneys’ fees were unreasonable.  The trial court held that neither the statute of limitations nor the doctrine of laches barred Appellee’s breach of contract claim, and that Appellee’s attorneys’ fees were reasonable.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this appeal, we review the trial court’s dismissal of the action upon its finding that it was an “abusive civil action,” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-41-101 to -107, and res judicata. The appellee also seeks her attorney’s fees for this appeal. Discerning no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm the dismissal of the suit as to the former wife and award her the attorney’s fees she incurred defending this appeal. We remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michelle Bennington, appeals the dismissal of her second pro se Rule 36 motion to correct a clerical error on an order revoking her probation. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36. The sole issue presented is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not applying jail credits the Defendant-Appellant earned on a concurrent sentence in another jurisdiction to the order of revocation. We affirm the dismissal.

The appellant, Darrell Stamper, has appealed the December 16, 2021 order of the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). As the December 16, 2021 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Petitioner, Joshua Simpson, was convicted upon his guilty pleas to aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated burglary, for which he received an effective twenty-year sentence. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied after a hearing. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter his guilty pleas. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Glenn Bohanan, Jr., Defendant, was charged with one count of rape of a child, three counts of rape, and four counts of incest, for events that took place over the span of several years. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of all counts of the indictment and sentenced to an effective sentence of 40 years. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for rape of a child in Count 1, rape in Counts 3 and 4, and incest in Counts 5-8 because the victim did not testify specifically that Defendant penetrated her on each occasion; and (2) the sentence is excessive. After a review of the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Bryan Williams, Petitioner, was convicted of multiple sex offenses and a panel of this Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. State v. Bryan Williams, No. W2013-00418-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 280398, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2014), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner now appeals from the Gibson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record, oral argument, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 2009, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dustin Shawn Price, of first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, two counts of reckless endangerment, and three counts of attempted first degree murder.  The trial court sentenced him to life plus forty years of incarceration.  The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments.  State v. Dustin Shawn Price, No. M2012-00117-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 4539034, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 26, 2013), no perm. app. filed.  Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support and by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 36-1-113(g)(1), and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); and (2) incarceration as a result of a criminal act, under a sentence of ten (10) or more years, and the child is under eight (8) years of age at the time the sentence is entered by the court, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). Appellant also appeal the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because the relevant statutory time period is not specified in the trial court’s order and in view of the sparsity of evidence, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the remaining grounds, and on its finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Petitioner, Tondreon Bowles, also known as Tondreon Merriweather, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues that his guilty plea to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class C felony, was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner claims that he believed he was pleading guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony, and therefore, his sentence is illegal. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court; however, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of judgment forms in counts two and four.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Garet Myers, of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class E felony; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; speeding, a Class C misdemeanor; and driving without a license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of two years, with thirty days to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the court’s refusal to approve the Defendant’s request for a special jury instruction, the exclusion of evidence, and the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, oral argument, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Hans Banks, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for second degree murder. After a trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense, voluntary manslaughter, and received a sentence of six years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements given to the police and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of voluntary manslaughter. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from an unorthodox procedural history, wherein the trial court made its findings of facts and conclusions of law in an order granting summary judgment, the result of which terminated the mother/appellant’s parental rights. The court determined that the undisputed material facts clearly and convincingly established five grounds on which to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The court also found the undisputed material facts established that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother appeals, asserting that the trial court violated her due process rights by terminating her parental rights without affording her an effective opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. She contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to continue the hearing on the petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. She also contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on each of the alleged statutory grounds for termination as well as the issue of the child’s best interests. Following a careful review of the record, we have determined that the mother’s due process rights were not violated, and the trial court did not err in denying her motion for a continuance. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that Petitioners proved the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility; however, we affirm the trial court in all other respects. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Garric Dorsey, for one count of Class B aggravated sexual battery, one count of Class C solicitation of a minor, and one count of Class B felony sexual exploitation of a minor. Although Petitioner’s criminal history was that of a Range II offender, Petitioner entered a guilty plea as a Range III offender to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation of a minor, both Class C felonies. The State dismissed the count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to eleven years’ incarceration on both counts and ran the sentences concurrently. Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, which the post-conviction court denied following a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his due process rights were violated. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Robert Glen Gray, appeals as of right from the McNairy County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for two counts of delivery of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel (1) told Petitioner that he could “beat the charges” and obtain convictions for simple possession/casual exchange of methamphetamine; (2) failed to file a motion to sever; (3) failed to review the entirety of the discovery materials with Petitioner, specifically the laboratory report on the methamphetamine and photographs of Petitioner exchanging money and drugs; and (4) failed to explain the State’s plea offer “in its entirety.” Following our review, we affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s entry of a permanent parenting plan involving one minor child.  The mother appeals the trial court’s designation of the father as the primary residential parent of the minor child.  We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact to facilitate appellate review. 

This appeal concerns an alleged conversion of funds. Rebecca Durbin, Teresa Fletcher Kidd, and Ramona Lewis ("Plaintiffs," collectively), the adult children of the late Charles Lewis ("Charlie"), sued Bernice Lewis ("Defendant"), Charlie's widow, in the Chancery Court for Washington County ("the Trial Court").Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant exercised undue influence over Charlie in his later years and converted funds in a bank account that Charlie had intended for them to have. After a trial, the Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant appeals, arguing among other things that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs' claim had expired. Defendant also argues that the Trial Court erred by not awarding her any darnages for Plaintiffs' failure to maintain Charlie's house, which Defendant continued to live in pursuant to Charlie's will. We hold that Plaintiffs were on constructive notice of their claim against Defendant no later than October 5, 2009, and thus their lawsuit filed in October 2019 is time-barred. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Trial Court with respect to Plaintiffs' claim against Defendant. However, we affirm the Trial Court as to its declination to award Defendant any damages for Plaintiffs' failure to maintain Charlie's house as Plaintiffs owed her no duty to maintain the house; per Charlie's will, that was his Estate's responsibility. We thus affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the Trial Court's judgment.