APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, John M. Bailey, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and failure to appear, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010), 39-16-609 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years’ confinement for aggravated assault and a consecutive four-year sentence for failure to appear. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred during sentencing by affording undue weight to enhancement factors and by failing to apply mitigating factors supported by the evidence. Without the guilty plea hearing transcript, we presume the trial court’s determinations were correct. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Paul Williams, a/k/a Paul Williams El, was convicted by a Carroll County Circuit Court jury of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, second offense, and was sentenced to six months in the county jail. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court’s method for selecting the alternate juror resulted in the exclusion of the only African-American on the panel; (2) there is newly discovered evidence that should be considered; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred in revoking his probation on a previous conviction and in sentencing him. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Homeowners’ Association of a high-rise condominium building filed this action against an owner/occupant of a condominium unit alleging she was in violation of the Master Deed and Bylaws due to grossly unsanitary conditions in the defendant’s unit and extremely offensive odors that emanated from her unit into common areas. The Association requested that the defendant’s condominium unit be sold at a judicial sale and that it be awarded its attorneys’ fees. The trial court found the defendant’s acts and omissions violated the Master Deed and Bylaws and that the Association was entitled to the relief it requested; accordingly, the court ordered that the unit be sold and awarded $116,037.77 in attorneys’ fees against the defendant. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

At issue is when Husband shall pay $250,000 in cash awarded to Wife in the division of the marital estate and whether post-judgment interest shall accrue. In the Final Decree, payment of the $250,000 was deferred pending Husband’s receipt of an expected inheritance from his recently deceased uncle. The Decree, however, expressly provided that Wife could petition the court for relief in the event the deceased uncle’s estate was not closed within one year. As authorized by the trial court, one year later, Wife filed a motion requesting that Husband be ordered to pay the $250,000 award. The trial court denied Wife’s request for immediate payment of the money and denied her request for post-judgment interest. Wife appeals contending that the trial court erred in not awarding the immediate payment of the full amount and post-judgment interest. Finding it inequitable for Husband to have the use and benefit of the marital estate, much of which is income producing, while Wife is deprived of the bulk of her share of the marital estate, we reverse and remand with instructions for the entry of a judgment in favor of Wife of $250,000 plus post-judgment interest from the filing of the motion for relief.

In this breach of contract action, the defendant appealed the Judgment of the Trial Court, who entered a monetary judgment against defendant and awarded attorney's fees. Defendant has appealed, and on appeal we reverse the award of attorney's fees, vacate the Trial Court's Judgment and remand, with directions for the parties or the Court to prepare a complete Statement of Evidence.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained a compensable injury. She returned to work for her employer in the same job, at the same hourly wage. However, her earnings were reduced because she declined offers of additional work, which she had usually accepted before her injury. She declined these offers because she could no longer safely perform them. The trial court held that she did not have a meaningful return to work, and awarded benefits in excess of one and one-half times the impairment. Her employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by finding that she did not have a meaningful return to work. We affirm the judgment.

This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee healthcare provider after its determination that Appellant patient’s medical expert did not meet the locality requirement, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-115(a)(1). Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Tony Ray Billings, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, Multiple Offender to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to amend the indictment; (2) the trial court committed plain error when it denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude identification testimony; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Bedford County jury convicted the Defendant, Larry Randall Henry, II, of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it set the length of his sentence. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In 2002, the employee was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the course and scope of his employment. The employee filed suit for benefits. The employer disputed the claim, asserting that the employee had failed to give proper notice and had not sustained any permanent injury as a result of the accident. The trial court awarded benefits, and the employer has appealed. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Jeffrey White (“Employee”) sustained work-related injuries while employed by Nissan North America, Inc. (“Employer”). He returned to work after each injury and settled both claims. In 2005, he was terminated, allegedly for failure to comply with Employer’s policies concerning medical leave. He filed for reconsideration of his previous settlements, as permitted by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 241(a)(2). Employer contended that he had been terminated for misconduct and was not eligible for reconsideration. Following a full trial, the trial court found that Employee was eligible for reconsideration, but that Employee failed to prove that his industrial disability was greater than the amount of the settlements. Employee filed a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04, requesting that the trial court permit the taking and presentation of additional evidence. The trial court granted the motion. After a second trial, the trial court awarded additional permanent partial disability (“PPD”) benefits. Employer has appealed. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the motion to alter or amend and reverse the judgment.

The Defendant, Bryan K. Howard, pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, with the length of his sentence and manner of service left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing and sentenced the Defendant to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying all forms of alternative sentencing. Following our de novo review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee filed a pro se post-judgment petition alleging that her employer had improperly denied court-ordered medical benefits to her, and she sought damages. Her employer moved to dismiss based upon expiration of the statute of limitations and other grounds. The employee contended that she was incompetent for an extended period of time after the alleged denial of medical care and that the limitation period was therefore tolled. The trial court held that her petition was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed it. The employee has appealed from this decision. We affirm the judgment.

This defamation action arises out of the publication of a statement to an internet website. The trial court held that plaintiffs were unable to show actual malice in order to sustain defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims and granted summary judgment to the defendant. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant in malpractice action was granted summary judgment. Plaintiff filed two motions seeking to set aside the grant of summary judgment, which were denied. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse for reconsideration of the motion filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this action, Stanley Jenkins (“Employee”) sustained a compensable injury to his left leg in the course and scope of his employment with Yellow Transportation, Inc. (“Yellow Transportation”). Employee settled his workers’ compensation claim with Yellow Transportation and returned to work. A few months later, Yellow Transportation merged with another corporation to create YRC Inc. (“YRC”), a completely new corporation. After the merger, Employee was laid off due to an economic downturn and thereafter sought reconsideration of his earlier settlement. The trial court ruled that Employee was no longer employed by his pre-injury employer after the merger and was entitled to reconsideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241. The trial court awarded him additional permanent partial disability benefits. Yellow Transportation has appealed, arguing that Employee is not entitled to reconsideration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Employee, a truck driver, sustained an on-the-job injury during a motor vehicle accident. The treating physician assigned 7% anatomical impairment to the body as a whole due to the injury. Employee’s evaluating physician assigned 17%. The trial court adopted the latter impairment and awarded 60% permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant in malpractice action was granted summary judgment. Plaintiff filed two motions seeking to set aside the grant of summary judgment, which were denied. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse for reconsideration of the motion filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.

The Defendant, Chad Allen Kirk, pled guilty to one count of driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor, in the Blount County General Sessions Court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-504(a)(1). The General Sessions Court sentenced the Defendant to six months with 75 percent of the sentence to be served in confinement. The Defendant appealed the decision to the Blount County Circuit Court, which dismissed the appeal and remanded the case back to the General Sessions Court for execution of the judgment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the Circuit Court failed to conduct a de novo review of the sentence. Following our review, we reverse the decision of the Circuit Court and remand the case for a new sentencing.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee sustained bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of her employment. She had two surgeries on her left arm to treat the condition. Prior to reaching maximum medical improvement, she voluntarily retired. The trial court found that her retirement was reasonably related to her work injuries, and therefore the statutory limit to permanent partial disability benefits contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) did not apply to her award. The employer, Pinnacle Foods Group, appealed. We affirm the judgment of trial court.

In a divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of the residence he owned before the parties’ marriage as marital property and its award of one-half of the equity in the residence to Wife. We affirm.

The defendant, Bronche Blair, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Leonard Lamont Currie, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s rejection of his claim of self-defense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed a cause of action against Defendant judge, alleging Defendant wrongfully refused to grant his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm.

The Defendant, Danny Ray Smith, was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-504, 522. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify about instances of sexual contact between her and the Defendant other than those charged in the indictment; (2) the trial court erred by allowing a videotape of the victim’s forensic interview to be played for the jury; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine the Defendant about an expunged criminal conviction; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction on count two of the indictment because the State’s proof materially varied from the allegations in the indictment; (5) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on counts two, six, and seven; (6) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a new trial which was based on newly discovered evidence; and (7) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.