APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the majority opinion, but concur separately only to elaborate on establishing the similarity of medical communities for the purpose of qualifying a medical expert witness.

Defendant appeals the award of summary judgment to plaintiff in this action for specific performance of an option to purchase real property which plaintiff asserts is contained in a lease agreement. Finding a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the authenticity of the option to purchase, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This lawsuit was filed by Charles Beard ("Plaintiff") against Jepco, Inc. ("Jepco"), and Mike Phillips (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff rented a storage unit from Jepco. Mike Phillips is a manager for Jepco. Plaintiff essentially claims that Jepco raised the rent on the storage unit he rented in violation of the rental agreement. Plaintiff initially filed this lawsuit in the Hamilton County General Session Court. He appealed the unfavorable sessions court judgment to the circuit court. Thereafter, defendants filed a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's response to that summary judgment motion failed to create any genuine issue of material fact and, accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiff/Appellant appeals from the trial court's disqualification of her expert witness and grant of the defendant/appellee's motion for directed verdict. Finding that the appellant failed to show that her expert was familiar with the standard of care in a community similar to the defendant's community, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

In 2001, the trial court found that Employee's coronary artery disease had been advanced by his employment. Medical benefits were awarded in accordance with the workers' compensation law. In 2007, a dispute arose between Employee and Employer as to whether certain medications and tests were related to the work injury. Employee filed a motion to compel Employer to provide the medications under the 2001 judgment. The trial court granted the motion, and ordered Employer to provide all of the medications at issue. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court erred by requiring Employer to provide medications for Employee's diabetes. We otherwise affirm the order.

Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed after she failed to respond to the defendant's motion to dismiss and failed to appear at the hearing on the motion. The trial court denied her subsequent motion to set aside the order of dismissal, finding that she had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she was not served with the motion to dismiss. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside a prior order of dismissal. The trial court dismissed an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari for failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-21-805 and -807, which govern inmate lawsuits. Nearly two years later, the inmate filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the motion and the inmate appealed. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested relief, its ruling is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Terrance G. Motley, of attempted first degree murder and of being a felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court sentenced him to forty-four years in prison. We affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentence on direct appeal. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. The Petitioner now appeals, claiming the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief because: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the trial court improperly refused to appoint him another attorney after he waived his right to counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

Father sought to become the primary residential parent due to the failure of Mother to comply with the parenting plan. The trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed. We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court's award of summary judgment to Defendants. We dismiss the appeal for the failure to appeal a final judgment.

Randall C. Trent ("Plaintiff") was incarcerated at the Sullivan County jail for several months before being transferred to the Tennessee Department of Correction. Plaintiff claims that while incarcerated at the Sullivan County jail, he was denied proper medical care and retaliated against for complaining about the lack of proper medical care. Plaintiff initially brought numerous claims against various defendants. This appeal involves the dismissal of plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. _ 1983, 42 U.S.C. _ 1985, and 42 U.S.C._ 12101, also known as the Americans with Disabilities Act. These various federal claims were dismissed by the trial court after finding that the applicable one-year statute of limitations had expired by the time the complaint was filed. On appeal, plaintiff claims that the "continuing violation" doctrine applies to save his untimely claims. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Edward Pope, pled guilty to attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, with an agreed effective sentence length of seven years and with the trial court to determine manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial [*2] court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, Michael Jermaine Harris, of one count of aggravated arson. The trial court sentenced him to 19 years' incarceration to be served at 100 percent as a violent offender. The defendant appeals his conviction and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in failing to give a proper jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification, and that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence on the basis of factors not determined by the jury. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court.

The petitioner, Kilven Neal, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that we dismiss the appeal based on the petitioner's failure to file a timely notice of appeal, or, in the alternative, affirm the lower court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that there was no timely notice of appeal filed and that the petitioner's claims do not warrant that we waive the timely notice of appeal requirement in the interest of justice. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Harold Gause, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He entered a plea of guilty to reckless driving on April 30, 2003, in exchange for a sentence of seventeen days, which he had already served. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 15, 2009. On appeal, he argues that: it was improper for the post-conviction court to summarily dismiss the petition; his allegations established a colorable claim for relief; the State failed to adequately answer the allegations contained in his petition; and this court should take judicial notice of the petitioner's complaint filed with the Board of Professional Responsibility regarding the representation of trial counsel. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal from the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Darrell W. Lunsford, appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that his sentence was illegal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Guy Henry White, entered into an open guilty plea to one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. See T.C.A. _ 40-3-103 (2006). The trial court sentenced him to five years to be served as 90 days' incarceration with the remainder on supervised probation. The defendant appeals from the trial court's denial of judicial diversion and its imposition of a five-year sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal of a criminal contempt hearing in which the appellant father was found to be in contempt for non-payment of child support pursuant to court order. Upon review of the record, we vacate.

The petitioner, William Earl Robinson, a.k.a. Edward Baxter, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to rape, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight years, which was suspended to probation upon acceptance of the plea. After his probationary sentence was revoked, the petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, he specifically contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to properly advise the petitioner of his potential range of punishment for the charged offenses prior to his acceptance of the plea. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Irespectfully dissent from the conclusion that the incorrect release eligibility date (RED) was not a material part of the plea agreement. I do not believe the record justifies such a conclusion without an evidentiary hearing. I also do not believe that the habeas court should be the forum to determine whether the Petitioner should be entitled to withdraw his plea. Once the habeas court determines that an illegal sentence has been imposed and vacates the judgment of conviction, what then occurs in the original case should be left to the convicting court to decide.

The petitioner, Joseph R. Wiggins, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In his petition, he contends that the five-year sentence he received for a simple rape conviction in 1983, is illegal because of a defective indictment. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the habeas corpus court's dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the State's motion is meritorious because the petitioner's challenged sentence has long expired and he is no longer "restrained of his liberty" pursuant to that conviction. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the dismissal.

The mother of a minor child appeals her conviction of eighteen counts of criminal contempt for willful failure to pay child support. She contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions for criminal contempt. We agree and reverse the finding of the trial court.

The Nashville Metropolitan Council approved a Planned Unit Development (PUD) for a large residential subdivision to be constructed by Habitat for Humanity. The Metropolitan Planning Commission subsequently approved a site plan for the first phase of the subdivision, over the objections of neighboring landowners, who then challenged the approval by filing a petition for writ certiorari in the Chancery Court. The petitioners also mounted a challenge against the entire project based on the ground that the PUD had become"inactive" because construction had not yet begun, even though six years had passed since it was initially approved. The Planning Commission rejected the challenge, finding that the project was still "active" and, therefore, that the PUD did not have to go through the process of approval for a second time. The neighbors then filed a second petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court consolidated the two petitions and heard arguments that the procedures the Planning Commission followed in reaching its decisions violated the petitioners' constitutional rights. The court dismissed both petitions, ruling that the Planning Commission had not acted illegally, arbitrarily or fraudulently, and that the petitioners' constitutional rights were not violated. We affirm.

The petitioner, Joseph C. Caldwell, Jr., pled guilty to robbery and aggravated burglary, both Class C felonies, and received a negotiated sentence of six years for each charge, to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The post-conviction court denied the petitioner's post-conviction petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that he entered his guilty pleas involuntarily and unknowingly. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This appeal involves an inmate's efforts to obtain judicial review of a prison disciplinary board decision. After the trial court determined that the inmate's petition for writ of certiorari was time barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 27-9-102 (2000), the inmate filed both a notice of appeal and a letter requesting "another chance." Because the trial court ordered the letter sent to the appellee for a response but has not yet ruled on the relief sought in the letter, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.