APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008)
for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves the efforts of a retired employee of an automobile manufacturer to obtain workers’ compensation benefits for an injury to his right shoulder that was diagnosed after his retirement and also to obtain reconsideration of an earlier award of workers’ compensation benefits for a work-related injury to his left shoulder. Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court for Williamson County concluded that the retired employee had sustained a compensable injury to his right shoulder and awarded him benefits based on a thirty-two percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The trial court also determined that the employee was ineligible for reconsideration of the award for the injury to his left shoulder. On this appeal, the employer takes issue with the award for the injury to the employee’s right shoulder, and the employee takes issue with the trial court’s refusal to reconsider the award of benefits for the injury to his left shoulder. We have determined that the trial court properly declined to reconsider the award for the injury to the employee’s left shoulder. We have also determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s conclusion that the injury to the employee’s right shoulder was work-related. However, we have determined that the trial court erred by failing to limit the award of benefits for the injury to the right shoulder to the cap in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008).

On August 13, 2008, James A. Dellinger, the petitioner, filed a Motion for Disclosure of Evidence Favorable to the Appellant Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and the Federal and State Constitutions Regarding State Witness Charles Harlan. The State filed a response to the motion on August 22, 2008. This Court denied Dellinger’s motion in an order dated August 26, 2008.

The defendant, Salvador Velazquez Alvarez, pled guilty to possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, Class B felonies, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the two possession of cocaine convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of ten years, six months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or other alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a divorce action in which both Husband and Wife challenge various findings and rulings of the trial court. Husband appeals claiming the trial court erred in not finding Wife a non-credible witness, finding Wife is unable to work due to a lengthy illness, awarding Wife alimony in futuro, and requiring him to pay Wife’s COBRA insurance. Wife appeals claiming that the trial court erred in its division of marital property and the amount of alimony awarded. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.

The defendants, Brenda Faye Brewington and Brian Dewayne Brewington, were convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies, and two counts of child neglect, Class E felonies. For their convictions, the defendants each received an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment to be served at 100 percent. On appeal, the defendants raise the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victims, and photographs and a videotape of their home; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain their convictions for aggravated child neglect; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence.

This is an appeal from an order terminating a father’s parental rights and granting a stepfather’s petition for adoption. Because the final order does not contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law justifying the trial court’s decision, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear a suit filed by the City of Chattanooga (“the City”) to enforce a real property tax lien on property acquired by Custom Baking Company through a sale conducted by a bankruptcy court trustee. The previous owner of the real property, which was alleged to have been delinquent in payment of its city property taxes, filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware prior to this action. The City was listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy action and was notified of the proposed sale of the debtor’s assets by the bankruptcy trustee and filed no objection. After the sale of the property, the Bankruptcy Court approved the sale free and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances, and retained jurisdiction “to determine any claims, disputes or causes of action arising out of or relating to the proposed sale.” The City brought this action in state Chancery Court several months after the entry of the Bankruptcy Court’s order. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that it lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide this case and that the City is barred by the collateral attack doctrine from bringing this action to circumvent the Bankruptcy Court’s prior valid final order.

This case involves the construction of a holographic will. Decedent died in 2006, and was survived by her four children. Her will states that one of her sons is to “have” the “home place.” Two of the other siblings, the Appellees, contest the trial court’s determination that the Decedent’s will transfers fee simple title in the Decedent’s real property owned at the time of her death to her son. Finding no error, we affirm.

The real parties at interest in this action are Carol Silvey, plaintiff and Jeanette East, defendant. They are represented by their respective conservators. Investments were made in the parties’ joint names and when the investments matured, the conservator for Jeanette East made investments in a sole account of Jeanette East. The conservator for Carol Silvey brought this action for a declaration that the investments should remain in the joint estates. The Trial Judge approved the actions of the conservator for Jeanette East but on appeal, we order that the accounts be returned to the joint ownership status.

This appeal involves an arbitration agreement executed when the decedent was admitted to a nursing home. The trial court denied the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

After a bench trial, the Lauderdale County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Brittany Ann Kiestler, of two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and ordered her to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that  the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Patrick Smallwood, was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits and medical expenses for a shoulder injury he
allegedly suffered while working for Employer. The trial court bifurcated the trial with regard to (1)
whether the injury was compensable, and (2) if so, the extent of compensation benefits to which
Employee is entitled. At the close of Employee’s proof as to compensability, the trial court
dismissed Employee’s claim, finding that the issue of causation was not established. Employee has appealed this judgment. Employee contends that the evidence does not support the trial court’s ruling that he had failed to sustain his burden of proof as to compensability. We reverse the judgment dismissing the claim and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.1

Maker and guarantors of promissory note brought action against various parties including the maker’s former loan officer, the former holder of the note, and the current holder of the note, alleging that defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the maker, tortiously interfered with the maker’s negotiations to pay off the note at a discount and violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Chancery Court for Davidson County granted defendants’ summary judgment. Maker and guarantors appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a jury trial involving the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. A railroad employee was struck by a passing train belonging to another railroad. The employee sued both railroads, bringing a FELA claim against the employer railroad, and a negligence claim against the other railroad. The jury returned a verdict in the employee’s favor against the employer railroad, finding that the employer railroad was 100 percent at fault. The employee was awarded damages in the amount of $4 million. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Appellant, Ben Blevins, pled guilty to eight counts of passing worthless checks, four counts of forgery, and five counts of attempted money laundering. According to the plea agreement, Appellant’s effective sentence was three years, the manner of service to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied alternative sentencing based on Appellant’s prior criminal history, inability to pay existing restitution, failure to abide by terms of prior probation, behavior of continually reoffending and in order to deter similar behavior. The trial court ordered the sentence served in incarceration. Appellant appeals, pro se, arguing that he should have been granted some form of alternative sentencing. We determine that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This case involves allegations of intentional misrepresentation and associated causes of action all related to the sale of a spring for commercial development. Appellant contends that the output of the spring was misrepresented. The trial court granted summary judgment as to a number of causes of action, and the appellant then non-suited his remaining claims and appealed. For the reasons stated herein we affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Keith Collins, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s holding that lifelong community supervision is not a direct punitive consequence of the petitioner’s pleading guilty to aggravated sexual battery. Tennessee expressly makes life supervision a part of the sentence. See T.C.A. § 39- 13-524 (providing for “a sentence of community supervision for life”). Thus, I agree with the conclusions reached in New Jersey and Nevada. See State v. Jangochian, 832 A.2d 360, 362 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2003); Palmer v. State, 59 P.3d 1192, 1196-97 (Nev. 2002). The post-conviction court’s factual findings, though, fail to reflect whether the court accredited the petitioner’s testimony that he was unaware of this consequence at the time he signed the documents and that he would not have pled guilty had he been told about such a consequence. Thus, I

The Petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Plaintiff, a nurse practitioner formerly employed by a staffing service and supplied to hospital emergency department, sued the service and the hospital for retaliatory discharge, gender discrimination, breach of contract and violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act. Trial court granted summary judgment to staffing company. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

In 2005, the petitioner, Marcus Ward, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated assault and one count each of especially aggravated kidnapping, intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and aggravated sexual battery and received an effective sentence of thirteen and one-half years. No direct appeal was taken. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. This appeal is only as to his conviction for aggravated sexual battery, with the petitioner asserting that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not informing him that registration as a sexual offender was a consequence of his guilty pleas, the trial court  plain error by not informing him of this registration requirement, and the post-conviction court erred in finding that the registration requirement was a “collateral,” rather than direct, consequence of his pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Petitioner, Christopher Lance Shockley, on four counts of rape of a child and nine counts of aggravated sexual battery. The Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixteen years. This Court affirmed the sentence on appeal. The Petitioner then filed a post-conviction petition claiming that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In November 2005 the petitioner, Ronnell Leberry, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In November 2007, following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se petitioner, Michael J. Floyd, appeals as of right the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Wayne County Circuit Court. The petitioner alleges that his conviction and resulting sentence for aggravated robbery is illegal and void due to an involuntary guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.